dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc, joined by ROSS, JOHN R. GIBSON, and BOWMAN, Circuit Judges.
The panel opinion addresses an issue of significant constitutional dimension and of paramount concern to lawyers representing criminal defendants:
Was Emmanuel Charles Whiteside denied effective assistance of counsel because his lawyer insisted that he testify truthfully in his own behalf?
I find it difficult to believe that a panel of this court would hold that a lawyer who makes use of a private dialogue with his client to dissuade the client from testifying falsely is burdened by a conflict of interest, is disloyal, is less than zealous, and is guilty of compromising the client’s right to testify in his own defense. In arriving at this result, the panel has lost sight of the fact that “the ultimate focus of inquiry must be on the fundamental fairness of the proceeding whose result is being challenged.” Strickland v. Washington, - U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2069, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Contrary to the panel’s view, I have no difficulty in taking the position that a lawyer who insists upon truthful testimony is beyond reproach and his conduct is professionally reasonable. To hold otherwise is to foster “a breakdown in the adversarial process that our system counts on to produce just results.” Id.
Whiteside has one fundamental complaint about his lawyer’s performance: the lawyer insisted that Whiteside testify truthfully (that Whiteside thought his victim had a gun) while Whiteside wished to *718testify falsely (that he saw a gun in the victim’s hand). Indeed, the panel acknowledges that Whiteside “would have testified falsely,” and that the lawyer’s actions “prevented [Whiteside] from testifying falsely.” Whiteside v. Scurr, 744 F.2d 1323, 1328 (8th Cir.1984). Nevertheless, the panel concludes “that counsel’s actions deprived [Whiteside] of due process and effective assistance of counsel.” Id.
To prevent his client from committing penury, Whiteside’s lawyer told him “that if he insisted [on committing perjury], then he (counsel) would move to withdraw, advise the state trial judge that the testimony was perjurious and testify against him.” Id. at 1326. Although this strongly worded admonition may have resulted in some degree of antagonism between Whiteside and his lawyer, I simply do not believe that a lawyer who, in the privacy of the lawyer-client relationship, admonishes his client to testify truthfully creates an actual conflict of interest. This conclusion is particularly compelling since a client has no constitutionally protected interest in testifying falsely. Furthermore, even if the actions of Whiteside’s attorney created a conflict, the panel points to no evidence which suggests that the lawyer’s dialogue adversely affected either his performance or the underlying lawyer-client relationship. Strickland, 104 S.Ct. at 2067.
In fact, it appears that Whiteside received the zealous, faithful representation of a lawyer who did his best to prepare and present his client’s defense. Further, the lawyer did nothing to prevent Whiteside from testifying, but rather allowed White-side to testify fully and only insisted that his testimony be truthful. Since White-side’s testimony was truthful and uninhibited, it is difficult to understand how the panel concludes that the lawyer’s actions “compromised Whiteside’s right to testify in his own defense,” Whiteside, 744 F.2d at 1329, particularly in light of the panel’s recognition that “criminal defendants’ privilege to testify in their own defense does not include the right to commit perjury,” id. at 1328 (citing Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225, 91 S.Ct. 643, 645, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971)). In my view, the panel’s holding is at odds with the principle espoused in Harris.
The lawyer’s reaction to Whiteside’s announced intention to give false testimony was undeniably strident. In my opinion, however, the panel analyzed the lawyer’s strongly worded admonition from a theoretical viewpoint without taking into account what actually happened after the lawyer told Whiteside that he would not tolerate perjurious testimony. Further, the panel overlooked the practicalities of effective communication between the lawyer and his client. The lawyer’s choice of words should not disturb us. Rather, what is important is that the lawyer effectively communicate with his client on a level the client can understand. In this case he did. As far as I can tell from reading the panel opinion and the trial transcript, the lawyer’s threats had a singular impact on the trial — Whiteside did not tell a deliberate lie when he appeared on the witness stand.
I cannot accept the panel’s conclusion that a lawyer, otherwise diligent and zealous in his representation, commits an “unprofessional error” solely because he insists that his client refrain from doing something the client has no constitutional right to do — commit perjury. In Strickland, the Supreme Court observed that “[t]he benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.” 104 S.Ct. at 2064. The panel opinion disregards the Strickland benchmark and totally ignores the lawyer’s duty as an officer of the court to protect the integrity of our Nation’s courts. False testimony on a crucial factual issue is not “evidence subject to adversarial testing” within the framework of a fair trial. Id. at 2063.
*719In affirming Whiteside’s state court conviction, the Iowa Supreme Court stated:
A defendant is entitled to present his defense and to an opportunity to testify fully and freely concerning any defensive matter. However, he has no right to commit perjury nor is an attorney permitted — much less required — to aid in such a purpose. Counsel owes a client charged with a crime honest, loyal, and faithful representation. However, this duty extends only to the use of fair and honorable means. A lawyer may never assist in the perpetration of a crime or countenance any other dishonest act.
State v. Whiteside, 272 N.W.2d 468, 470 (Iowa 1978). This pronouncement has a virtue. Criminal defense lawyers are told where they stand and assured that they can proceed with confidence to purge the deliberate lie from the trial record. This court should not shirk its obligation to provide the same affirmative guidance.
I find it hard to believe that a lawyer who nips perjury in the bud is “ineffective” within the context of the constitutional fabric. Rather, I believe the proper view is the one taken by the Seventh Circuit in the case of United States v. Curtis, 742 F.2d 1070 (7th Cir.1984), in which that court concluded that a lawyer’s refusal to allow his client to take the witness stand and commit perjury did not constitute ineffective assistance. Id. at 1076.
Hence, I note with dismay that the court has denied the petition for rehearing en banc.