joins, dissenting in part:
Slightly more than a year ago, I undertook to set forth, both carefully and fully, my views on the exceedingly difficult problem presented in this case.1 Today, even with the benefit of additional argument, my colleagues’ excellent presentations, and intense restudy and reconsideration of my own, those views remain essentially unchanged. This opinion, then, is largely the earlier version, revised modestly in the interest of clarity.
The one major issue presented by this appeal is whether the allegedly defamatory statements of which Oilman complains are representations of fact capable of supporting an action for libel or, instead, assertions of opinion unconditionally protected by the First Amendment. The District Court, ruling that they are no more than opinion, granted summary judgment for the defense,2 and a majority of this court now affirms. I think there may well be material issues of fact affecting the availability of the opinion privilege for several of the statements.
I
The First Amendment embodies a special solicitude for unfettered expression of opinion. A decade ago, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,3 the Supreme Court stated:
Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas.4
This passage was the first clear verbalization by the Court of the degree to which the Constitution preempts local defamation law in the area of opinion.
Previously, however, the Court had hinted at limitations on governmental power to impose civil or criminal liability for statements of belief, judgment or sentiment. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,5 the landmark decision explicating the interplay between the constitutional guaranties of free speech and press and the common law sanctions for defamation, the Court observed:
*1017Since the Fourteenth Amendment requires recognition of the conditional privilege for honest misstatements of fact, it follows that a defense of fair comment must be afforded for honest expression of opinion based upon privileged, as well as true, statements of fact. Both defenses are of course defeasible if the public official proves actual malice____6
In Garrison v. Louisiana,7 a prosecution for criminal libel, the Court again adverted to fair comment, finding it unnecessary to decide in the context of that case “whether appellant’s statement was factual or merely comment, or whether a State may provide any remedy, civil or criminal, if defamatory comment alone, however vituperative, is directed at public officials.”8
The opinion privilege articulated in Gertz thus was foreshadowed, to some extent at least, in earlier pronouncements, although the degree of constitutional protection to be afforded opinion was not fully apparent. But while Gertz confirms the existence of an absolute privilege for expressions of opinion, neither that nor any other Supreme Court decision has provided much guidance for identifying statements that are opinion for First Amendment purposes.
New York Times involved misstatements, obviously factual in nature, concerning the handling of incidents of racial unrest by police,9 and its reference to fair comment appears only in a footnote at the end of the opinion. The allegedly libelous statements in Garrison — comments disparaging the judicial conduct of certain judges — were more problematic, but the
Court disposed of the case on the ground that the criminal statute at issue unconstitutionally penalized both spitefully-motivated, though truthful, criticism of public officials and negligently-made misstatements about them.10 Since the Court invalidated the statutory basis for the prosecution, it did not find it necessary to classify the remarks as fact or opinion.11
Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Association v. Bresler,12 a pre-Gertz decision, has subsequently been treated by the Court as an opinion case,13 though it did not expressly refer to the opinion-fact dichotomy. There the defendant newspaper had published two articles reporting the proceedings of city council meetings at which Bresler’s request for zoning variances for certain land and the city’s effort to acquire other land owned by him were subjects of heated debate, and had quoted several speakers’ characterization of Bresler’s position as “blackmail.”14 The Court found that the jury had been improperly instructed on malice, and went on to hold that the “blackmail” spoken of could not support a libel verdict even with a proper instruction.15 Noting that the reports of the meetings were accurate and full,16 the Court concluded:
It is simply impossible to believe that a reader who reached the word “blackmail” in either article would not have understood exactly what was meant: it was Bresler’s public and wholly legal negotiating proposals that were being *1018criticized. No reader could have thought that either the speakers at the meetings or the newspaper articles reporting their words were charging Bresler with the commission of a criminal offense. On the contrary, even the most careless reader must have perceived that the word was no more than rhetorical hyperbole, a vigorous epithet used by those who considered Bresler’s negotiating position extremely unreasonable. Indeed, the record is completely devoid of evidence that anyone in the city of Greenbelt or anywhere else thought Bresler had been charged with a crime.
To permit the infliction of financial liability upon the [newspaper] for publishing these two news articles would subvert the most fundamental meaning of a free press, protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.17
Old Dominion Branch 496, National Association of Letter Carriers v. Austin,18 a companion case to Gertz, presented a somewhat similar set of facts. The defendant union had listed the plaintiffs as “scabs” in its monthly newsletter, and had quoted a “well-known piece of trade union literature, generally attributed to author Jack London,” 19 defining “scab” as, among other things, “a traitor to his God, his country, his family and his class.”20 Once again the Court found defective the malice instruction given to the jury;21 it then held the critical statements nonlibelous as a matter of federal law.22 Repeating Gertz’ observation that “there is no such thing as a false idea,”23 the Court reasoned that, in the context of the labor dispute which gave rise to the newsletter statements, “use of words like ‘traitor’ cannot be construed as representations of fact____ Such words were obviously used here in a loose, figurative sense to demonstrate the union’s strong disagreement with the views of those workers who oppose unionization.”24 And, recalling Greenbelt, the Court found it “similarly impossible to believe that any reader ... would have understood the newsletter to be charging the appellees with committing the criminal offense of treason____ Jack London’s ‘definition of a scab’ is merely rhetorical hyperbole, a lusty and imaginative expression of the contempt felt by union members toward those who refuse to join.”25
Gertz involved accusations in the defendant’s magazine that the plaintiff had a large police file, had been an official of an organization advocating the violent seizure of government, and was a “Leninist” and a “Communist-frontier.”26 Although the first two observations seem clearly factual, the latter two could be regarded as expressions of the author’s opinion. The Court did not, however, discuss the applicability of the opinion privilege to these statements; 27 rather, it noted that “Leninist” *1019and “Communist-frontier” are “generally considered defamatory.”28 Holding that Gertz, as a private figure, did not have to meet the demanding New York Times standard of proof on the issue of malice,29 the Court remanded the case for a new trial.30 There was no suggestion that any of the accusations were incapable, as a matter of constitutional law, of being deemed libelous.
In a more recent decision on defamation, the Court reversed a defendant’s summary judgment in a case featuring statements arguably classifiable as opinion. In Hutchinson v. Proxmire31 a United States Senator and his legislative assistant publicized a description of the plaintiff’s governmentally-funded animal research as “nonsense” and “transparent worthlessness;”32 branding this use of public monies “outrageous,” they had added that “[i]n fact, the good doctor has made a fortune from his monkeys and in the process made a monkey out of the American taxpayer.”33 The Court ruled that these observations were not immunized by the Speech and Debate Clause,34 determined that the plaintiff was not a public figure,35 and sent the case back with no intimation that any of the allegedly defamatory remarks were within the opinion privilege.
Rounding out the Supreme Court cases having some bearing on the meaning of “opinion” are two decisions involving articles summarizing documents susceptible of differing interpretations.36 In Time, Inc. v. Pape,37 a pre-Gertz case involving a public-figure plaintiff, Time, a weekly magazine, in the course of recapitulating a report of the Civil Rights Commission, quoted from the report’s summary of the allegations of a civil rights complaint without indicating that charges of police brutality against Pape were not independent findings by the Commission.38 The issue before the Court thus was whether Time had “engaged in a ‘falsification’ [of the report] sufficient in itself to sustain a jury finding of ‘actual malice’.”39 Looking at the report as a whole, the Court saw “a document that bristled with ambiguities,”40 and characterized Time’s summary of what the document “said” as a statement of interpretation rather than one of historic fact.41 Deeming Time’s reading of the report a plausible one, the Court held that no libel recovery was possible in such circumstances.42 It is unclear from the Pape opinion, however, whether the Court reasoned that the challenged statement was constitutionally immune to post hoc evaluation of truth or falsity because it was actually an ex*1020pression of opinion,43 or rather that the statement was capable of being adjudged erroneous but incapable of being labeled malicious because of the reasonableness of Time’s interpretation.44
This uncertainty about the rationale of Pape appears to have been resolved by Time, Inc. v. Firestone,45 a post-Gertz case in which a private-figure plaintiff charged Time with erroneously reporting that her husband had been granted a divorce on grounds of “extreme cruelty and adultery.” 46 The divorce decree prompting the news item was hardly a model of clarity,47 and Time, citing Pape, argued that a “rational interpretation of an ambiguous document is constitutionally protected.”48 The Court disagreed, explaining that Pape was an application of the actual-malice standard,49 thus foreclosing the possibility that Pape was really an “opinion” case. The Court made clear that Time’s interpretation of the divorce decree could be found factually incorrect, and liability could be imposed if Time bore the blame.50
II
Gertz’ pronouncement that the First Amendment confers an absolute privilege on expressions of opinion stands as one of the cardinal principles of free speech and press. Yet, as my brief review of pertinent Supreme Court defamation cases illustrates, it is a principle whose implementation depends entirely upon a precedent determination that the allegedly defamatory statement is actually one of opinion rather than fact. Lacking guidance from the Supreme Court in such an endeavor, federal courts of appeals,51 the highest courts of several states,52 the American Law Institute,53 and various commentators54 have *1021attempted to ascertain just what kinds of statements are protected opinion. Cognizant of the difficulty of the undertaking, and resigned to the fact that any effort to superimpose a categorical ordering on this infinitely variable area entails some oversimplification, I nevertheless believe that helpful guidelines can be fashioned to inform the disposition of cases presenting the problem.
I start with candid recognition that the universe of statements cannot be neatly divided, by some logically discernible equator, into hemispheres of fact and opinion. Fact is the germ of opinion, and the transition from assertion of fact to expression of opinion is a progression along a continuum. A reviewing court’s charge is to determine, in light of the considerations inspiring First Amendment jurisprudence and the surviving policies underlying common law protection of reputation, the point at which we should draw the line marking off the portion of speech to be accorded the absolute constitutional protection of opinion55 rather than the conditional privilege afforded representations of fact.56
At one end of the continuum are statements that may appropriately be called “pure” opinion. These are expressions which commonly are regarded as incapable of being adjudged true or false in any objective sense of those terms. Matters of personal taste, aesthetics, literary criticism, religious beliefs, moral convictions, political views and social theories would fall within this category.57 These are statements which by nature “could be corrected by discussion,”58 and accordingly statements whose survival in our society’s discourse should be committed to “the competition of the market” in ideas.59
Also near the pure-opinion end of the continuum, I think, are those “loosely definable, variously interpretable”60 derogatory remarks that frequently are flung about in colloquial argument and debate.61 The hallmark of these statements is not that they are innocuous or impotent, but rather that they are so far in the realm of vernacular epithet as to become expressions of generalized criticism or dislike, without any specific factual moorings. *1022Evaluating such statements as true or false is problematic largely because of the difficulty of arriving at a consensus on precisely what evidence would be relevant and sufficient to justify their use.62
Finally, metaphorical language is also allied to pure opinion. When context makes it apparent that a word is being used figuratively or imaginatively without any intention to rely on its literal meaning,63 the labels “true” and “false” are inapposite.
All of these types of statements seem clearly to fall within the ambit of the constitutional opinion privilege. They would be recognized by most listeners and readers64 simply as expressions of personal taste or conviction, or as rhetorical outlets for venting anger or contempt without imputing any specific wrongdoing, or as colorful and hyperbolic applications of language. This is not to say that publication of such statements will never be damaging to the reputation of their targets. At this end of the continuum, however, our First Amendment commitment to free circulation of ideas and beliefs — no matter how unfair, unreasonable, or unseemly they may appear to be — bars the law of defamation from assessing, according to some standard of orthodoxy, the propriety of or the justification for such statements.
Expressions at or near the pure-opinion end of the continuum probably constitute only a relatively small portion of the statements that become subjects of defamation lawsuits. Perhaps far more common, and certainly more perplexing, are statements that reflect the author’s deductions or evaluations but are “laden with factual content.” 65 The apparent proportions of opinion and fact in these “hybrid” statement varies considerably. For example, a statement that “Jones is incompetent to handle that job” suggests some factual underpinning but, on the whole, imports a fairly high degree of subjective judgment. By contrast, a statement that “Smith is a murderer” appears much closer to an assertion of objective fact. Analytically, however, the accusation of murder could be regarded as an opinion, for it, like the charge of incompetence, reflects a conclusion ultimately reached by the author on the basis of an amalgamation and interpretation of underlying facts.
Hybrid statements differ from pure opinion in that most people would regard them as capable of denomination as true or false, depending upon what the background facts are revealed to be. At the same time, they generally are not propositions that a scientist or logician would regard as provable facts. The hard question is whether these kinds of statements, which both express the author’s judgment and indicate the existence of specific facts warranting that judgment are within the absolute privilege for opinion.
When the proponent of a hybrid statement discloses to the reader the pertinent background facts with reasonable completeness and accuracy, there is a strong argument for including the statement with*1023in the realm of absolute privilege.66 In these circumstances, the reader can easily recognize the statement as the author’s synthesis and, placing it beside the predicate facts, can make up his own mind about how much weight and credence to give to the author’s conclusion. In effect, the underlying facts transform the hybrid statement in the eyes of the reader from a judgment suffused with assumed but unspecified facts into a simple statement of opinion drawn from specific factual premises. Having supplied an accurate account of those facts, the author cannot be said to have misled or deceived the reader about the matter discussed, even if the author’s ultimate conclusion — the hybrid statement — may in some sense be erroneous. And although the author’s derogatory judgment may carry some power to damage reputation simply by virtue of his stature in the reader’s estimation, it seems safe to posit a fairly high correlation between whatever damage is inflicted and the reader’s personal appraisal of how reasonable that judgment is in light of the facts set forth.
In these circumstances, hybrid statements would seem to pose little or no threat to the reputation interest safeguarded by defamation law because they could be subjected to rigorous and fair evaluation by fully-informed readers.67 At the same time, their claim to First Amendment protection would be great because they would share the primary immunizing characteristic of pure opinion, for the presence of the background data would ensure that the only really active element of the statement is its judgmental or interpretive component.
This balancing of First Amendment and defamation implications of hybrid statements works flawlessly where the critical background facts are accurately set forth. A significant imbalance results, however, when a hybrid statement appears without any recitation of the underlying facts, or when those facts are stated incompletely or erroneously.68 When that is the case, the reader is unable to place the author’s judgment in perspective, because he either is completely unaware of the predicate facts or is in some degree misled as to what they are. False hybrid statements obviously can wreak considerable damage to reputation.69 A reader supplied with no back*1024ground at all may well assume that there are facts which support the derogatory conclusion, particularly if it is announced by the author with apparent assurance.70 A reader given materially incorrect or incomplete facts, mistakenly supposing that the pertinent data are accurately assembled before him, might give even more credence to the author’s conclusion.71 Hybrid statements unaccompanied by any predicate facts, or attended by defective recitals of the underlying facts, thus should occupy a very different position in the concerns of libel law, for their claim to First Amendment protection is far less compelling. If the background data reaching the reader are deficient, the hybrid statement is as much a representation of the facts it implies as it is a judgment or interpretation of the communicated data.72
The Gertz Court immediately after proclaiming immunity for expressions of opinion, warned that
there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact. Neither the intentional lie nor the careless error materially advances society’s interest in “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open” debate on public issues____ They belong to that category of utterances which “are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”73
I would hold that a hybrid statement is absolutely privileged as opinion when it is accompanied by a reasonably full and accurate narration of the facts pertinent to the author’s conclusion. I would further hold that hybrid statements not so accompanied are not entitled to that degree of protection unless those facts are already known to the author’s listeners or readers.74 I do not mean that the author must supply every little detail that conceivably might have some bearing. What I do mean is that the author’s presentation must be reasonable — enough to enable the audience to fairly judge the conclusion stated.
Nor do I suggest that errors or omissions in recitals of the predicate facts automatically disentitle authors from asserting the opinion privilege for hybrid statements, for First Amendment jurisprudence requires the court to take into account the *1025author’s culpability, if any, for deficiencies in the factual presentation.
As the Gertz Court acknowledged, “[although the erroneous statement of fact is not worthy of constitutional protection, it is nevertheless inevitable in free debate,”75 and “punishment of error runs the risk of inducing a cautious and restrictive exercise of the constitutionally guaranteed freedoms of speech and press.”76 On the other hand, as the Court pointed out, “absolute protection for the communications media requires a total sacrifice of the competing value served by the law of defamation.” 77 “The New York Times standard,” 78 the Court said, “defines the level of constitutional protection appropriate to the context of defamation of a public person,” 79 and, “so long as they do not impose liability without fault, the States may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual.”80 “This approach,” the Court added,
provides a more equitable boundary between the competing concerns involved here. It recognizes the strength of the legitimate state interest in compensating private individuals for wrongful injury to reputation, yet shields the press and broadcast media from the rigors of strict liability for defamation. At least this conclusion obtains where, as here, the substance of the defamatory statement “makes substantial danger to reputation apparent.”81
The considerations underlying the standards of care developed in New York Times and its progeny for measuring liability for defamatory falsehood apply equally to situations wherein an author states the background facts incompletely or incorrectly. I would conclude, then, that if critical background data are omitted or are erroneous,82 the absolute opinion privilege is still available when the infirmity is not traceable, in the case of a public official or public figure, to actual malice or reckless disregard of truth or falsity, or, in the case of a private figure, to culpability great enough to incur liability under relevant state defamation law.83
This approach is dictated by the need to account adequately for the factual load carried by the hybrid statement. As the Supreme Court recently recognized,
[some] sort of inaccuracy ... is commonplace in the forum of robust debate____ “Realistically, ... some error is inevitable; and the difficulties of separating fact from fiction convinced the Court in New York Times,84 Butts,85 Gertz86 and *1026similar cases to limit liability to instances where some degree of culpability is present in order to eliminate the risk of undue self-censorship and the suppression of truthful material.” “[E]rroneous statement is inevitable in free debate, and ... must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the ‘breathing space’ that they ‘need ... to survive.’ ”87
By denying the opinion privilege only in those instances in which authors of hybrid statements are guilty of culpable error or omission, those who satisfy the applicable standard of care — the same standard which they inevitably must meet to keep their defamatory factual assertions from ripening into monetary judgments — would be free of potential liability in expressing their conclusions and interpretations, no matter how unreasonable or intemperate they may be. No author need fear that an insignificant or inadvertent error in factual presentation would transform his otherwise absolutely-protected statement into an actionable claim. Under my mode of analysis, only those indulging in culpable behavior could be deterred from expressing their ideas, and I see no constitutional imperative for extending absolute protection to authors who have misled their readers by refusing or culpably failing to provide reasonably full and accurate background data.88 Even in these latter instances, the hybrid statement, though forfeiting all right to absolute privilege, will be afforded that quantum of unqualified protection accorded a purely factual misstatement under the circumstances.89
*1027A requirement of substantial disclosure of material background facts is hardly a novel step. The Restatement (Second) of Torts takes the position that “[a] defamatory communication may consist of a statement in the form of an opinion, but a statement of this nature is actionable only if it implies the allegation of undisclosed defamatory facts as the basis for the opinion.” 90 This formulation envisions a situation where the derogatory opinion se.emingly is based on facts unstated by the author, and known to or assumed by the parties to the communication91 — as for example, an unelucidated statement that a named person is a thief or an alcoholic.92 The rationale is that such a statement gives rise to the inference that there are undisclosed facts justifying the opinion and that these facts are defamatory.93 So, while the opinion component of the communication cannot subject the author to liability, the implied factual component might.94
I subscribe to this position, and I believe the reasoning underlying it extends further. While the Restatement’s rule does not itself address the derogatory hybrid statement accompanied by an incomplete disclosure of background facts, the propensity for implication underlying the rule may similarly affect such a statement. The author’s recountal of some of the background facts normally creates the inference that there are no other facts pertinent to the opinion expressed; absent some contrary indication, recipients of the communication would naturally derive that understanding. If, then, the undisclosed background facts strip away the justification the disclosed facts proffered for the disparaging remark, the communication cannot automatically be deemed a mere expression of absolutely-protected opinion, for it incorporates a falsehood by inference. The communication is really a false and defamatory representation that, squarely on the basis of such facts as were disclosed, the subject of the comment is guilty of the defamatory behavior charged.95
To recapitulate, I think the absolute First Amendment opinion privilege proclaimed in Gertz should be held to shield four categories of statements. The first includes expressions of personal taste, sentiment and values that are inherently or essentially subjective in nature. In the second group are those general derogatory epithets and “undefined slogans”96 flung about in the course of political, economic and social debate that express contempt or extreme disagreement without connoting any particular factual basis. Third is language which, from its context, obviously is used in the figurative or hyperbolic sense. These three types are characterized by the absence of any suggestion that they are grounded upon any specific factual predicate, and I would locate them near the pure-opinion end of the continuum. The fourth category embraces statements, which I have termed “hybrids,” that both intimate the existence of specific facts and convey the author’s judgment on or inter*1028pretation of those facts, provided that such statements are accompanied by a reasonably full and accurate account of the material background facts, or that incompleteness or inaccuracy of the predicate data is nonculpable according to the applicable standard of care.97
I do not mean to imply that I perceive my delineation of the scope of the opinion privilege to be clearly mandated by any of the Supreme Court’s defamation decisions. I believe, however, that it is responsive to, and certainly not inconsistent with, what little can be gleaned from them. For example, Greenbelt98 and Letter Carriers99 are, by their own terms, instances of protection accorded language used figuratively or hyperbolically.100 In Hutchinson,101 where the challenged press release called the plaintiff’s research “transparent worthlessness” and remarked that he was personally profiting from a pointless expenditure of tax monies, the plaintiff claimed that the release “contained an inaccurate and incomplete summary of his research,” 102 Hence, if the allegedly libelous comments in that case are viewed as hybrids, issue squarely had been joined on whether a full and fair account of the factual predicate had been provided. The report of the content of the divorce decree in Firestone103 was not the kind of literary criticism that would be absolutely privileged as a subjective expression of pure opinion, and if in the realm of opinion at all the report was at best a hybrid presented with no background data whatever.104 Thus, the dispositions in those cases are perfectly harmonious with my view on the scope of the opinion privilege.
Ill
I now turn my attention to the passages of the syndicated column which are sub*1029jects of complaint in the case at bar. I agree with the District Court that Evans’ and Novak’s characterization of Oilman as an “outspoken proponent of ‘political Marxism’ ” 105 is absolutely privileged. It falls well within the class of “loosely definable, variously interpretable statements of opinion ... made inextricably in the contest of political, social or philosophical debate____” 106 “Political Marxism” is much too ambiguous a slogan to permit a court to determine whether it is really defamatory, much less to ascertain whether the claim that Oilman propounds it is actually false.107
Presenting a different problem, however, is the column’s observation that
[w]hile Oilman is described in news accounts as a “respected Marxist scholar,” he is widely viewed in his profession as a political activist.108
Like “political Marxism,” the term “political activist” would not normally be deemed defamatory.109 As it appears here, however, it reasonably could be read as implying the antithesis of scholarship.110 This interpretation is reinforced by the authors’ later comments:
Such pamphleteering is hooted at by one political scientist in a major eastern university, whose scholarship and reputation as a liberal are well known. “Oilman has no status within the profession, but is a pure and simple activist, ” he said.111
The District Court characterized these statements as the authors’ submission “that [Oilman] lacks a reputation in his field as a scholar.”112 I agree that a jury reasonably could find113 the overall import of the remarks to be that, although Oilman has been described in the press as a respected scholar, his professional colleagues actually do not regard him as such. Without doubt, scholarship is the quintessential attribute of professorial competence. To say that a professor’s academic peers, who presumably are those most capable of evaluating the real merit of his work, do not rate him highly as a scholar is to impugn his professional reputation severely.
A statement that Oilman’s peers do not respect him as a scholar stands, I submit, on quite different footing from a statement that Evans and Novak do not themselves rank him as one. The latter might well fall into the category of pure opinion, as a subjective appraisal of the value of Oilman’s writings.114 The former, however, if *1030not actually a representation of fact, certainly rises no higher than a hybrid statement.115 It may convey the authors’ ultimate assessment of what the political science profession thinks of Oilman, but it also implies the existence of facts inducing that conclusion, such as evaluations of Oilman’s work by a sampling of academicians, critical reviews of his articles, or a poll taken of members of the profession. Our attention is directed to a passage describing how Oilman came in last in two American Political Science Association elections,116 but just what this fact has to do with Oilman’s scholarly reputation in the profession is not immediately apparent; indeed, the article itself professes some uncertainty about “[wjhether or not [the election results] represent ] a professional judgment by his colleagues.” 117 Oilman, on the other hand, points to a 1978 published survey in which, so he claims, “a poll of 317 leading and representative political scientists” ranked him “10th in the entire field of all political scientists in terms of occupational prestige.”118 I thus think that, although the matter is not wholly free from doubt, the paucity of supporting facts in the column, coupled with the survey Oilman proffers, raises a genuine issue as to whether there was a culpable error or omission in the background facts presented to the reader.119
I come finally to a set of statements relating to Oilman’s writings and to what assertedly they reveal about his objectives as an instructor:
His candid writings avow his desire to use the classroom as an instrument for preparing what he calls “the revolution.”
***!}:**
Oilman’s intentions become explicit in “On Teaching Marxism and Building the Movement,” his article in the Winter 1978 issue of New Political Science. Most students, he claims, conclude his course with a “Marxist outlook.” Oilman concedes that will be seen “as an admission that the purpose of my course is to convert students to socialism.”
That bothers him not at all because “a correct understanding of Marxism (as indeed of any body of scientific truths) leads automatically to its acceptance.” Non-Marxist students are defined as those “who do not yet understand Marxism.” The “classroom” is a place where the students’ “bourgeois ideology is being dismantled.” “Our prior task” before the revolution, he writes, “is to make more revolutionaries. The revolu*1031tion will only occur when there are enough of us to make it.” 120
I would note initially that these excerpts do not represent literary, scholarly or ideological criticism. They do not advance the authors’ personal views of such attributes as Oilman’s writing style, the quality of his analysis, or the value or correctness of the ideas he advances. While comments of this type, I assume, would be the kind of pure opinion that lies at the core of the opinion privilege,121 the quoted passages purport to describe the substantive content of Oilman’s article. A jury reasonably could read these passages as saying that Oilman, in his writings, openly admits that he wishes to use the classroom to indoctrinate his students and transform them into Marxists.122 To be sure, whenever an author undertakes to encapsulate and describe the contents of another’s lengthy work, the product is apt to reflect some amount of the author’s own interpretation and judgment. Here, however, a significant component of factual representation also comes through, particularly in such strong and apparently unequivocal phrases as “[h]is candid writings avow,” “Oilman’s intentions become explicit” and “Oilman concedes.” 123 I therefore think these passages should properly be regarded as hybrid statements of what Oilman’s writings say about his intentions in the classroom.124
A fair amount of background material on this point is provided in the column under attack, largely in the form of direct quotations from Oilman’s writings. There is some question, however, as to the completeness and accuracy with which these predicate facts are set out. The District Court, after review of the article, found that “[w]hile [Evans and Novak] refer to [Oilman’s] writings and speeches, Oilman’s statements are selected to reflect [their] opinion. Portions contrary to Evan’s [sic] and Novak’s viewpoint are carefully omitted.” 125 The court also suggested that “this may be thought of as biased journalism,” 126 and an examination of the full text of the sources quoted could lead one to believe that this appellation may not be undeserved.127
*1032I conclude, then, that these passages also present a genuine issue whether the absolute privilege for opinion has been forfeited by culpable omissions or errors in the supporting facts which the article offered its readers.
. Ollman v. Evans, 230 U.S.App.D.C. 44, 45, 713 F.2d 838, 839 (Robinson, C.J., concurring), vacated and reh’g en banc granted, 230 U.S.App.D.C. 44, 713 F.2d 838 (1983).
. Ollman v. Evans, 479 F.Supp. 292 (D.D.C. 1979).
. 418 U.S. 323, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974).
. Id., 418 U.S. at 339-340, 94 S.Ct. at 3007, 41 L.Ed.2d at 805 (footnote omitted).
. 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964).
. Id., 376 U.S. at 292 n. 30, 84 S.Ct. at 732 n. 30, 11 L.Ed.2d at 713 n. 30.
. 379 U.S. 64, 85 S.Ct. 209, 13 L.Ed.2d 125 (1964).
. Id., 379 U.S. at 76 n. 10, 85 S.Ct. at 217 n. 10, 13 L.Ed.2d at 134 n. 10.
. See 376 U.S. at 258-259, 84 S.Ct. at 714-715, 11 L.Ed.2d at 693-694.
. 379 U.S. at 77-79, 85 S.Ct. at 217-218, 13 L.Ed.2d at 134-135.
. Id. at 76 n. 10, 85 S.Ct. at 217 n. 10, 13 L.Ed.2d at 134 n. 10.
. 398 U.S. 6, 90 S.Ct. 1537, 26 L.Ed.2d 6 (1970).
. See Old Dominion Branch 496, Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 283-286, 94 S.Ct. 2770, 2781-2782, 41 L.Ed.2d 745, 761-763 (1974).
. 398 U.S. at 7, 12-13, 90 S.Ct. at 1538, 1541, 26 L.Ed.2d at 11, 14.
. Id. at 10-15, 90 S.Ct. at 1540-1542, 26 L.Ed.2d at 12-15.
. Id. at 13, 90 S.Ct. at 1541, 26 L.Ed.2d at 15.
. Id. at 14, 90 S.Ct. at 1542, 26 L.Ed.2d at 15 (footnote omitted).
. Supra note 13.
. 418 U.S. at 268, 94 S.Ct. at 2773, 41 L.Ed.2d at 752.
. Id.
. Id. at 280-282, 94 S.Ct. at 2779-2780, 41 L.Ed.2d at 759-760.
. This holding rested on the protection that federal labor laws extend to communications made in the course of a labor dispute. But while the Court did not reach the First Amendment question, see id. at 283 n. 15, 94 S.Ct. at 2781 n. 15, 41 L.Ed.2d at 761 n. 15, its interpretation of the labor laws rested heavily on First Amendment defamation cases, including Gertz. See id. at 282-286, 94 S.Ct. at 2780-2782, 41 L.Ed.2d at 760-763. It therefore seems safe to regard Letter Carriers as a further explication of those cases.
. Id. at 284, 94 S.Ct. at 2781, 41 L.Ed.2d at 761- 762.
. Id.
. Id. at 285-286, 94 S.Ct. at 2782, 41 L.Ed.2d at 762- 763.
. 418 U.S. at 326, 94 S.Ct. at 3000, 41 L.Ed.2d at 797-798.
. The Court, having announced that opinions command absolute constitutional protection did not thereafter allude to the privilege.
. 418 U.S. at 331 n. 4, 94 S.Ct. at 3003 n. 4, 41 L.Ed.2d at 800 n. 4.
. Id. at 339-348, 94 S.Ct. at 3007-3011, 41 L.Ed.2d at 805-810. See text infra at notes 78-83.
. Id. at 352, 94 S.Ct. at 3013, 41 L.Ed. at 813.
. 443 U.S. 111, 99 S.Ct. 2675, 61 L.Ed.2d 411 (1979).
. Id., 443 U.S. at 116, 99 S.Ct. at 2678-2679, 61 L.Ed.2d at 419.
. Id.
. Id. at 123-133, 99 S.Ct. at 2682-2687, 61 L.Ed.2d at 423-430.
. Id. at 133-136, 99 S.Ct. at 2687-2688, 61 L.Ed.2d at 430-432.
. Perhaps also deserving of mention is the preGertz decision in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 91 S.Ct. 1811, 29 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971), where the plurality appeared willing to assume that Metromedia’s characterizations of Rosenbloom’s business as "the smut literature racket" and "girlie book peddlers” were capable of being deemed defamatory. See id., 403 U.S. at 56-57, 91 S.Ct. at 1826, 29 L.Ed.2d at 319.
. 401 U.S. 279, 91 S.Ct. 633, 28 L.Ed.2d 45 (1971).
. Id., 401 U.S. at 284-285, 91 S.Ct. at 637, 28 L.Ed.2d at 50.
. Id. at 289, 91 S.Ct. at 639, 28 L.Ed.2d at 53.
. Id. at 290, 91 S.Ct. at 639, 28 L.Ed.2d at 53.
. Id. at 290-291, 91 S.Ct. at 639-640, 28 L.Ed.2d at 53.
. Id. at 290-292, 91 S.Ct. at 639-640, 28 L.Ed.2d at 53-54.
. See, e.g., id. at 291, 91 S.Ct. at 640, 28 L.Ed.2d at 54 (“[w]here the document reported on is so ambiguous as this one was, it is hard to imagine a test of ‘truth’ that would not put the publisher virtually at the mercy of the unguided discretion of a jury").
. See, e.g., id. at 290, 91 S.Ct. at 639, 28 L.Ed.2d at 53 (“[t]he deliberate choice of such an interpretation, though arguably reflecting a misconception, was not enough to create a jury issue of ‘malice’ under New York Times ”).
. 424 U.S. 448, 96 S.Ct. 958, 47 L.Ed.2d 154 (1976).
. Id., 424 U.S. at 452, 96 S.Ct. at 964, 47 L.Ed.2d at 161.
. See id. at 467-469, 96 S.Ct. at 971-972, 47 L.Ed.2d at 170-172 (concurring opinion).
. Id. at 459 n. 4, 96 S.Ct. at 967 n. 4, 47 L.Ed.2d at 166 n. 4.
. Id.
. See id. at 458-459, 96 S.Ct. at 967, 47 L.Ed.2d at 165-166.
. See, e.g., Ciànci v. New Times Publishing Co., 639 F.2d 54, 61-67 (2d Cir.1980); Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, 551 F.2d 910, 913-914 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 834, 98 S.Ct. 120, 54 L.Ed.2d 95 (1977); Buckley v. Littell, 539 F.2d 882, 893-895 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062, 97 S.Ct. 785, 50 L.Ed.2d 777 (1977); Avins v. White, 627 F.2d 637, 642-644 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 982, 101 S.Ct. 398, 66 L.Ed.2d 244 (1980); Church of Scientology v. Cazares, 638 F.2d 1272, 1286-1289 (5th Cir.1981); Street v. NBC, 645 F.2d 1227, 1232-1233 (6th Cir.1981); Orr v. Argus-Press Co., 586 F.2d 1108, 1114-1115 (6th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 960, 99 S.Ct. 1502, 59 L.Ed.2d 773 (1979); Lauderback v. American Broadcasting Co., 741 F.2d 193 (8th Cir.1984); Information Control Corp. v. Genesis One Computer Corp., 611 F.2d 781, 783-784 (9th Cir.1980); Dixson v. Newsweek, Inc., 562 F.2d 626, 631 (10th Cir.1977). These cases differ markedly in the comprehensiveness with which they treat the opinion issue.
. See, e.g., Gregory v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 17 Cal.3d 596, 552 P.2d 425, 131 Cal.Rptr. 641 (1976); National Ass’n of Gov’t Employees, Inc. v. Central Broadcasting Corp., 379 Mass. 220, 396 N.E.2d 996 (1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 935, 100 S.Ct. 2152, 64 L.Ed.2d 788 (1980); Kutz v. Independent Publishing Co., 97 N.M. 243, 638 P.2d 1088 (N.M.Ct.App.1981); Rinaldi v. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 42 N.Y.2d 369, 397 N.Y.S.2d 943, 366 N.E.2d 1299, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 969, 98 S.Ct. 514, 54 L.Ed.2d 456 (1977).
. See Restatement (Second) Torts § 566 (1977) and accompanying comments, discussed in text infra at notes 90-94.
. See, e.g., Christie, Defamatory Opinions and the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 75 Mich.L.Rev. 1621 (1977); Keeton, Defamation and Freedom of the Press, 54 Tex L.Rev. 1221 (1976); Wade, The Communicative Torts and the First Amendment, 48 Miss.L.J. 671 (1977); Note, Fact *1021and Opinion After Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.: The Evolution of a Privilege, 34 Rutgers L.Rev. 81 (1981).
. Cf. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., supra note 3, 418 U.S. 339-348, 94 S.Ct. at 3007-3011, 41 L.Ed.2d at 805-810 (balancing the needs of the First Amendment with society’s concern for protection of reputation, to arrive at a standard of culpability in private-figure libel actions); Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publications, 201 U.S.App.D.C. 301, 305-312, 627 F.2d 1287, 1291-1298, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 898, 101 S.Ct. 266, 66 L.Ed.2d 128 (1980) (similar balancing, to arrive at a standard for identifying public figures).
. The privilege varies, of course, with the status of the plaintiff. Public officials and public figures can recover for defamatory factual misstatements only on clear and convincing proof that the misstatement was published either with knowledge that it was false or in reckless disregard of its truth or falsity. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., supra note 3, 418 U.S. at 336 & n. 7, 342, 94 S.Ct. at 3005 & n. 7, 3008, 41 L.Ed.2d at 803 & n. 7, 806-807; New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra note 5, 376 U.S. at 279-280, 84 S.Ct. at 726, 11 L.Ed.2d at 706; Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 162-165, 87 S.Ct. 1975, 1995-1996, 18 L.Ed.2d 1094, 1115-1117 (1967). Private-figure plaintiffs must show at least negligence and, unless they can go further and prove actual malice, may recover only compensatory damages. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., supra note 3, 418 U.S. at 347-350, 94 S.Ct. at 3010-3012, 41 L.Ed.2d at 809-811.
. E.g., Avins v. White, supra note 51, 627 F.2d at 640 (inter alia, "there is an academic ennui that pervades the institution. The intellectual spark is missing in the faculty and students”); Loeb v. Globe Newspaper Co., 489 F.Supp. 481, 486 & n. 6 (D.Mass.1980) (inter alia, “probably the worst newspaper in America”).
. Cianci v. New Times Publishing Co., supra note 51, 639 F.2d at 62 n. 10.
. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630, 40 S.Ct. 17, 22, 63 L.Ed. 1173, 1180 (1919) (dissenting opinion).
. Buckley v. Littell, supra note 51, 539 F.2d at 895.
. E.g., Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, supra note 51, 551 F.2d at 912 (inter alia, "toady,” "hypocrite,” "never open and above board”); Loeb v. Globe Newspaper Co., supra note 57, 489 F.Supp. at 486 & n. 6, 488 (cartoon of plaintiff showing cuckoo emerging from his forehead).
. See, e.g., Buckley v. Littell, supra note 51, 539 F.2d at 893 (regarding "fascist," "fellow traveler,” and “radical right,” in their context, as statements of opinion because of the “tremendous imprecision of the meaning and usage of these terms in the realm of political debate”).
. E.g., text supra at notes 12-25; Loeb v. Globe Newspaper Co., supra note 57, 489 F.Supp. at 486 (plaintiff "runs a paper by paranoids for paranoids”). For a discussion of the significance of a statement’s context, see note 88 infra.
. In deciding, as a threshold matter, whether a statement is susceptible of a defamatory meaning, the court assumes the viewpoint of the audience to which the publication was directed. Afro-American Publishing Co. v. Jaffe, 125 U.S.App.D.C. 70, 76, 366 F.2d 649, 655 (en banc 1966); De Savitsch v. Patterson, 81 U.S.App.D.C. 358, 360, 159 F.2d 15, 17 (1946); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 563 (1977) and accompanying comments. This same viewpoint is the appropriate perspective for determining whether a statement is a representation of fact or an expression of opinion. See Buckley v. Littell, supra note 51, 539 F.2d at 894; Information Control Corp. v. Genesis One Computer Corp., supra note 51, 611 F.2d at 784.
. Cianci v. New Times Publishing Co., supra note 51, 639 F.2d at 63.
. The argument would apply equally to the case where the reader already knows, from personal observations or other source, the same degree of knowledge of the pertinent background facts.
. This point can be neatly illustrated hypothetically. The author is a person who takes the extreme view that the killing of one human by another is murder irrespective of the circumstances. The author makes the following communication:
One evening, Smith went to White’s house. She had with her a small gun which she customarily carried in her purse for protection. She and White began a discussion which escalated into a heated argument. White became enraged, grabbed a butcher knife and lunged across the room toward Smith with the weapon raised. Smith drew out her gun, aimed it at White’s heart, and pulled the trigger. White died from the wound. Smith is a murderer.
Most readers would likely consider the hybrid "Smith is a murderer” to be an irrational and thus a false conclusion. Presumably their view of Smith would not be adversely affected by what commonly would be regarded as an unwarranted application of the charge by the author. Because the readers possess the relevant background data, they would not be misled by the innuendo of the word "murderer.”
. See Adler v. American Standard Corp., 538 F.Supp. 572, 576 (D.Md.1982) ("there is a distinction between simple opinions and expressions of opinion which indicate that they are based on undisclosed facts”). See also note 66 supra.
. This has long been recognized:
“To state accurately what a man has done, and then to say that in your opinion such conduct is disgraceful or dishonorable, is comment which may do no harm, as every one can judge for himself whether the opinion expressed is well founded or not. Misdescription of conduct, on the other hand, only leads to the one conclusion detrimental to the person whose conduct is misdescribed, and leaves the reader no opportunity for judging himself for [szc ] the character of the conduct condemned, nothing but a false picture being presented for judgment.”
De Savitsch v. Patterson, supra note 64, 81 U.S.App.D.C. at 360, 159 F.2d at 17, quoting Christie v. Robertson, 10 New S. Wales L.Rep. 157.
. Consider, for example, a variation on the illustration given in note 67 supra. This time the author states, without elaboration, that "Smith is a murderer” to persons with no knowledge of the circumstances. The average reader is unlikely to even consider the possibility that the author entertains a bizarre conception of murder which fails to distinguish between unjustified intentional killing and self-defense. Readers are thus apt to assume the existence of some factual predicate which, by common understanding, would warrant use of the charge "murderer" — particularly if the author were someone who appeared to be in a position to know about the incident to which the statement ostensibly refers.
. In one more variation on the illustration, note 67 supra, consider the case where the author recites the story of Smith’s encounter with White except that he omits the sentence describing how White came at Smith with a knife. In this event, the statement “Smith is a murderer” is probably both the most damaging to Smith's reputation, and the most deceptive of all the hypothetical hybrids, because it is seemingly accompanied by a complete set of facts which, on their face, justify its use. Neither the damage nor the deception would likely be significantly lessened if the author had said instead "I think Smith is a murderer." The problem is not with the reader’s ability to recognize that this is the author’s conclusion, but rather the reader’s inability to separate out, and dismiss as erroneously suggested, the factual component of the charge "murderer” in these circumstances.
. See text infra at notes 90-95.
. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., supra note 3, 418 U.S. at 340, 94 S.Ct. at 3007, 41 L.Ed.2d at 805, quoting in turn New York Times v. Sullivan, supra note 5, 376 U.S. at 270, 84 S.Ct. at 721, 11 L.Ed.2d at 701, and Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 508, 572, 62 S.Ct. 766, 769, 86 L.Ed. 1031, 1035 (1942).
. Hybrid statements are, of course, always entitled to at least the leeway that the First Amendment accords factual misstatements. See note 56 supra and note 83 infra and accompanying text. The task in the case at bar is to determine when a hybrid statement will receive the quantum of additional protection afforded by the opinion privilege.
. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., supra note 3, 418 U.S. at 340, 94 S.Ct. at 3007, 41 L.Ed.2d at 805.
. Id.
. Id. at 341, 94 S.Ct. at 3008, 41 L.Ed.2d at 806.
. See note 56 supra.
. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., supra note 3, 418 U.S. at 342, 94 S.Ct. at 3008, 41 L.Ed.2d at 806-807.
. Id. at 347, 94 S.Ct. at 3010, 41 L.Ed.2d at 809 (footnote omitted).
. Id. at 347-348, 94 S.Ct. at 3010-3011, 41 L.Ed.2d at 809-810, quoting Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, supra note 56, 388 U.S. at 155, 87 S.Ct. at 1991, 18 L.Ed.2d at 1111.
. The author’s recitation of background may, of course, be defective for any of a variety of reasons. They run the gamut from a completely innocent and excusable ignorance of relevant facts to a deliberate and malicious withholding of vital facts. In between are errors and omissions of varying magnitude attributable to varying degrees of fault.
. Thus, when the plaintiff claiming defamation is a public figure or public official, the pertinent inquiry should be whether the author’s failure to provide reasonably full and correct background data is traceable to actual malice or recklessness. When the plaintiff is a private figure, the critical question should be whether the author was negligent, or violated a higher local-law standard of conduct applicable, in setting out the factual basis for the hybrid statement. If the error or omission in the recital of predicate data is found nonculpable under the relevant standard, the hybrid statement, though false, should nonetheless be absolutely privileged as opinion even though it may mislead the reader and damage the victim’s reputation.
. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra note 5.
. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, supra note 56.
. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., supra note 3.
. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, - U.S.-, -, 104 S.Ct. 1949, 1966, 80 L.Ed.2d 502, 525 (1984) (citation omitted), quoting in turn Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 171-172, 99 S.Ct. 1635, 1646, 60 L.Ed.2d 115, 130-131 (1979) and New York Times v. Sullivan, supra note 5, 376 U.S. at 271-272, 84 S.Ct. at 721, 11 L.Ed.2d at 701, in turn quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433, 83 S.Ct. 328, 338, 9 L.Ed.2d 405, 418 (1963).
. I readily agree that context may play a vital role in determining whether a hybrid statement is one of fact or opinion. Indeed, context may be as important in this connection as it is in determining whether a statement is capable of conveying a defamatory meaning. Since words ' and phrases can seldom if ever be accorded an immutable meaning obtaining at all times and in all circumstances, the "publication must be taken as a whole, and in the sense in which it would be understood by the reader to whom it was addressed." Afro-American Publishing Co. v. Jaffe, supra note 64, 125 U.S.App.D.C. at 76, 366 F.2d at 655 (footnote omitted).
A hybrid statement’s broad social context may be particularly relevant in determining whether it falls within one of the categories of pure opinion. See text supra at notes 57-63. For example, "fascist” flung at a police officer by an angry demonstrator presents a very different case from use of that term in an article accusing a person of having been one of Mussolini’s henchmen. In the first situation, "fascist" likely would be classed as protected opinion; in. the second, it normally would be actionable, if culpably false, as an assertion of fact.
The location of a hybrid statement — for example, its appearance in the editorial section of a newspaper — is relevant in determining, from the perspective of readers, whether it is fact or opinion, and as well in assessing the reasonableness of an error or omission in ascertaining whether the author satisfied the requisite standard of care. I do not believe, however, that a hybrid statement earns the absolute privilege simply because it is part of an editorial. As the majority recognizes, clearly factual statements should not receive absolute protection merely because they appear on the editorial page. Majority Opinion (Maj.Op.) at 987 n. 33. A hybrid statement unaccompanied by critical background facts has an equally devastating capacity to mislead. While a reader’s understanding of particular ambiguous statements as opinion may result from the fact that they appear in an editorial, I cannot agree that the average reader will necessarily view the factual components of a hybrid statement as the author’s subjective impressions just because they are part of that editorial. Quite the contrary may be true, since authors of editorials frequently do not document the sources of their factual information in a manner enabling readers to evaluate it. Those readers may make the mistake of assuming that the factual underpinnings of a hybrid statement are commonly-accepted beliefs, and therefore true, precisely because they are assumed, unsupported or undocumented.
. Evans and Novak argue that all that is necessary to trigger the opinion privilege is disclosure of some of the factual basis for the hybrid statement. Were that the rule, in our note 67 example the author could (a) truthfully set forth the facts that Smith went to White’s house, quarreled, took a gun and intentionally shot White; *1027(b) deliberately and maliciously omit the fact that White attacked first with a knife; (c) announce the conclusion that "Smith is a murderer"; and (d) claim that the communication is absolutely privileged because the hybrid statement was accompanied by some of its factual basis and the facts that were reported were accurate. As this court has said in a slightly different context, “[pjartial truths are not necessarily even mitigating in this branch of the law, for the defamer may be the more successful when he baits the hook with truth.” Afro-American Publishing Co. v. Jaffe, supra note 64, 125 U.S.App.D.C. at 76, 366 F.2d at 655. See note 69 supra.
. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 566 (1977).
. Id. comment b.
. Id. See also illustration 3.
. Id. comments b, c.
. Id. comment c.
. Cf. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 529 comment a (“[a] statement containing a half truth may be as misleading as a statement wholly false. Thus, a statement that contains only favorable matters and omits all reference to unfavorable matters is as much a false representation as if all the facts stated were untrue"); Afro-American Publishing Co. v. Jaffe, supra note 64, 125 U.S.App.D.C. at 76, 366 F.2d at 655, quoted in part supra note 89.
. Cafeteria Employees Union v. Angelos, 320 U.S. 293, 295, 64 S.Ct. 126, 127, 88 L.Ed. 58, 60 (1943).
. While I agree that the question whether a statement is one of fact or of opinion is to be decided by the court as a matter of law, see Maj. Op. at 978, it is up to the jury, if it is the trier of fact, to settle any evidentiary disputes over the facts upon which the legal conclusion is to be based. See Manbeck v. Ostrowski, 128 U.S.App.D.C. 1, 5, & n. 20, 384 F.2d 970, 974 & n. 20 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 966, 88 S.Ct. 1077, 19 L.Ed.2d 1170 (1968) (whether communication is privileged a question of law for court "where the facts surrounding its publication are undisputed”); Morgan v. Dun & Bradstreet, 421 F.2d 1241, 1242 (5th Cir.1970) (“[wjhen the evidence material to the privilege is in dispute, the trial judge is quite correct in submitting it to the jury”); Prosser & Keeton on Torts § 115 (5th ed. 1984) ("[wjhether the occasion was a privileged one is a question to be determined by the court as an issue of law, unless of course the facts are in dispute, in which case the jury will be instructed as to the proper rule to apply”). Two possible questions in this connection for the trier of facts are whether a hybrid statement predicated upon unreasonably inaccurate or incomplete background data actually conveyed a defamatory message to its audience, and, if so whether the author was culpable in making the error or omission creating the deficiency. Cf. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, supra note 87, - U.S. at -, 104 S.Ct. at 1958-1959, 80 L.Ed.2d at 515 (issue of malice is a question of fact); Porson v. Pojidaeff, 141 U.S.App.D.C. 139, 140-141, 436 F.2d 293, 294-295 (1970) (truth of statement is jury question); Olinger v. American Savs. & Loan Ass'n, 133 U.S.App.D.C. 107, 109, 409 F.2d 142, 144 (1969) (same); Dickins v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 84 U.S.App.D.C. 51, 54 n. 2, 171 F.2d 21, 24 n. 2 (1948) (malice is fact question); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 617 (stating general rule). Of course, if the material facts are not in dispute, or if reasonable minds would not differ, the court may proceed to rule on the legal question. See Gospel Spreading Church v. Johnson Publishing Co., 147 U.S.App.D.C. 207, 208, 454 F.2d 1050, 1051 (1971) (summary judgment justified if no evidence of actual malice); Thompson v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 129 U.S.App.D.C. 299, 302, 394 F.2d 774, 777, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 884, 89 S.Ct. 194, 21 L.Ed.2d 160 (1968) (same); McCarney v. Des Moines Register & Tribune Co., 239 N.W.2d 152, 157 (Iowa 1976) (summary judgment appropriate if no facts on malice issue controverted).
. Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Ass’n v. Bressler, supra note 12.
. Old Dominion Branch 49, Nat’l Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, supra note 13.
. See text supra at notes 12-25.
. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, supra note 31.
. 443 U.S. at 116, 99 S.Ct. at 2678, 61 L.Ed.2d at 419.
. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, supra note 45.
. See 424 U.S. at 452, 96 S.Ct. at 964, 47 L.Ed.2d at 161-162 (reprint of the entire paragraph complained of).
. See Maj. Op. app. f 5.
. Buckley v. Littell, supra note 51, 539 F.2d at 895.
. This is not a case wherein the author has defined the critical terminology in the statement so as to impart a precise meaning in the particular context.
. See Maj. Op. app. j[ 5.
. Nor, for that matter, is it very precise.
. A term not defamatory when standing alone may be defamatory in a context in which it has a damaging connotation. See, e.g., Da Savitsch v. Patterson, supra note 64, 81 U.S.App.D.C. at 359, 159 F.2d at 16.
. See Maj. Op. app. jf 11 (emphasis added). Authors are not, of course, insulated from liability by virtue of the fact that they merely repeat what another purportedly said. "The law affords no protection to those who couch their libel in the form of reports or repetition.” Olinger v. American Savs. & Loan Ass’n, supra note 97, 133 U.S.App.D.C. at 109, 409 F.2d at 144. Accord, Pittsburgh Courier Publishing Co. v. Lubore, 91 U.S.App.D.C. 311, 312, 200 F.2d 355, 356 (1952); Cianci v. New Times Publishing Co., supra note 51, 639 F.2d at 60-61; Dixson v. Newsweek, Inc., supra note 51, 562 F.2d at 630-631.
. Ollman v. Evans, supra note 2, 479 F.Supp. at 294.
. The threshold determination on whether a statement is capable of bearing a defamatory meaning is for the court; the ultimate conclusion on whether such a meaning was indeed conveyed is for the jury. Olinger v. American Savs. & Loan Ass’n, supra note 97, 133 U.S.App.D.C. at 109, 409 F.2d at 144. Accord, Cianci v. New Times Publishing Co., supra note 51, 639 F.2d at 60; Avins v. White, supra note 51, 627 F.2d at 644; Church of Scientology v. Cazares, supra note 51, 638 F.2d at 1286.
. In similar vein, I consider Evans’ and Novak’s characterization of Ollman’s book, Aliena*1030tion: Marx’s Conception of Man in Capitalist Society, as a "ponderous tome” and "pamphleteering," see Maj. Op. app. jff 10 & 11, to be an obviously subjective judgment within the realm of pure opinion.
. There is some reason for treating the statement as a factual representation. It purports uncategorically to announce what a finite set of people — political scientists — think about a given subject — Oilman’s scholarship. In theory at least, the truth or falsity of this representation could be established empirically by polling each member of the group and tabulating the results. That each of the answers is in itself the respondent’s opinion does not make the summary of how many people gave which answer any less a statement of fact. I recognize, however, that the opinion of a large group on a given subject often cannot, for logistical reasons, be obtained through a universal poll and that, in such cases, the would-be reported of opinion must extrapolate from a sample survey or from other data. For this reason, I take it that the statements at issue reflect in some degree elements of judgment and interpretation. By no means, however, could I accept the suggestion that they represent pure opinion.
. See Maj. Op. app. ([ 6.
. See id. Evans and Novak here argue that "[rjunning for office is an act of political activism____’’ Brief for Appellees at 23. That, of course, misses the point. The issue is not whether Oilman is indeed an activist of any sort, but whether his professional colleagues regard him as a "political activist" as opposed— according to the antithesis set up in the column — to a "respected Marxist scholar.”
. Letter from Isidore Silver, counsel for Oilman, to Evans and Novak demanding retraction, appended to Complaint, Oilman v. Evans, 479 F.Supp. 292 (D.D.C.), as Exhibit B, Joint Appendix 12.
. In view of its disposition of the entire case on the ground of the opinion privilege, the District Court did not reach the question whether Oilman is a public figure. See generally Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publications, supra note 55.
. See Maj. Op. app. 3, 7, 8.
. See text supra at notes 57-63.
. I accept Oilman's view that a suggestion that a teacher uses his classroom, not for the impartial educational goal of advancing his students’ intellectual progress, but for the partisan purpose of recruiting them to his personal political creed, is damaging, for it implies a perversion of the academic mission. To say falsely that a professor admits to such a purpose could well be found defamatory.
. See Maj. Op. app. fjf 3, 7.
. Indeed, the opening paragraph of Evans’ and Novak’s column identifies this as its principal theme:
What is in danger of becoming a frivolous public debate over the appointment of a Marxist to head the University of Maryland’s department of politics and government has so far ignored this unspoken concern within the academic community: the avowed desire of many political activists to use higher education for indoctrination.
Maj. Op. app. j[ 1 (emphasis supplied). As noted earlier, see text supra at note 108, Oilman is subsequently identified in the column as someone whom his colleagues regard as a "political activist."
. Oilman v. Evans, supra note 2, 479 F.Supp. at 294.
. Id.
. For example, the opening paragraphs of Oilman’s article, from which several quotations were taken, read in full:
What are the practical results of my course on Marxism? How can one judge them? Most students who answer the question, "Why are you or aren’t you a Marxist?”, indicate at the end of the course that they now accept Marx’s analysis (although the majority are still wary of the label "Marxist"). Where this happens, these students know better than most comrades with whom I have talked when and how they adopted a Marxist outlook. For most, the break with bourgeois ideology seems to have taken place behind their backs, so that at one moment they considered themselves liberals (or worse), and then a little later — without quite noticing the transition — they considered themselves socialists.
If non-Marxists see my concern with such questions as an admission that the purpose of my course is to convert students to socialism, I can only answer that in my view — a view which denies the fact/value distinction — a correct understanding of Marxism (as indeed *1032of any body of scientific truths) leads automatically to its acceptance. I hasten to add that this is not reflected in my grading practices; non-Marxist students (i.e., students who do not yet understand Marxism) do at least as well as the rest of the class given by bourgeois professors, [sic ] Furthermore, I do not consider that I introduce more ''politics" into my course than do other social science professors, or that I am any more interested than they are in convincing students of the correctness of my interpretations.
Ollman, On Teaching Marxism and Building the Movement, New Political Science (Winter 1978), Supplemental Appendix at 5.