concurring in the result.
I am in complete accord with the majority’s conclusion that “[t]here is no right to *887be let alone while assembling bombs in safe houses.” It is hard to imagine facts stronger than those before us to justify means of surveillance necessary to protect the public. No society may be lightly presumed to have denied itself the means necessary to defend itself against this kind of assault.
If there were no Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub.L. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197, 212, codified primarily as chapter 119 of 18 U.S.C., and no Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (“FISA”), Pub.L. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783, codified primarily as chapter 36 of 50 U.S.C., I would have no great difficulty in this case in following the majority down the path of inherent powers (fortified by Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure). That route has considerable appeal where, as here, we are apparently responding to the threat of a war to be waged randomly against the populace. But given the existing statutory scheme, that route is, I think, neither necessary nor justifiable.
I believe that, if Title III and FISA are construed together, it is possible and desirable to find in them not only the authority to conduct video surveillance in appropriate circumstances but a procedure which brings authorization of, and responsibility for, such surveillance under centralized and high-level control. Considering the potential of video surveillance to lend dreadful substance to the Orwellian concerns noted by the majority, we should be extremely reluctant to permit this sort of activity free of the statutory safeguards provided by Congress for less intrusive police activities. And it is not as difficult, apparently, for me to find a basis for application of the safeguards of Title III and FISA as it is for the majority. In that connection, it is worth repeating that while
[i]t is not the judge’s job to keep a statute up to date in the sense of making it reflect contemporary values[,] it is his job to imagine as best he can how the legislators who enacted the statute would have wanted it applied to situations they did not foresee.
Posner, Statutory Interpretation — in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U.Chi.L.Rev. 800, 818 (1983). This court itself has recently recognized that
[t]he judicial duty of statutory interpretation is not a duty merely to read; it is a duty to help the legislature achieve the aims that can reasonably be inferred from the statutory design, and it requires us to pay attention to the spirit as well as the letter of the statute.
United States v. Markgraf, 736 F.2d 1179, 1188 (7th Cir.1984) (Posner, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). If these injunctions require one to be — in the words of the majority — “aggressive” and “imaginative,” then so be it.
In my view, a careful evaluation of Title III and FISA, and of the interplay between those two statutes, shows that the video surveillance in this case should be subject to the requirements of Title III. Neither party now advocates this position, but it appears to have been the government’s position when it sought the court orders here and it was Judge McGarr’s approach when he issued the orders.1
The foundation of my position is that Title III must be construed together with FISA, and that it is clear that Congress intended the statutes to be read together, providing a comprehensive and exclusive system of control. See S.Rep. No. 604, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, 6, 15, reprinted in 1978 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 3904, 3907, 3916-17 (Judiciary Comm.); see also S.Rep. No. 701, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 71, reprinted in 1978 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 3973, 4040 (Intelligence Comm.). The two statutes are written to impose a comprehensive regulatory scheme on the use of electronic surveillance in the United States whenever there is a reasonable expectation of privacy. Title III was enacted to govern domes*888tic surveillance activity, and as enacted in 1968 it expressly exempted from its provisions electronic surveillance for national security purposes. Section 802, Pub.L. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197, 213, codified as 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3), repealed by § 201(c) of FISA. In 1978, Congress responded to concerns about the abuse of that national security exemption by enacting FISA. S.Rep. No. 604, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 7, reprinted in 1978 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 3904, 3908. FISA repealed the exemption and declared that the executive branch does not have inherent authority to undertake electronic surveillance even in national security and counterintelligence cases. S.Rep. No. 604, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 6, 64, reprinted in 1978 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 3904, 3907, 3965; S.Rep. No. 701, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 71, reprinted in 1978 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 3973, 4040. Instead, FISA created a new set of procedures and substantive requirements which would subject such surveillance to judicial control while still protecting national security. Several provisions of FISA make it unmistakably clear that government (federal, state and local) may not use highly intrusive forms of electronic surveillance unless it does so in accordance with either Title III or FISA. Kg. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)$ (codifying § 201(b) of FISA); 50 U.S.C. § 1809 (codifying § 109 of FISA). Unless those statutes are complied with, law enforcement officers who engage in these forms of surveillance may very well be committing a federal crime. 50 U.S.C. § 1809.
The basic problem in the case before us stems from the fact that FISA explicitly addresses the problem of video surveillance, while Title III does not. The majority errs in concluding that the government may engage in the video surveillance in this case without regard to any statutory regulation of such surveillance. In doing so, the majority ignores unequivocal provisions of FISA, and of Title III as amended by FISA, and disregards the clear purpose of both statutes to subject intrusive forms of electronic surveillance to strict statutory control.
The key statutory provisions here are 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(f), enacted as section 201(b) of FISA, and 50 U.S.C. § 1809, enacted as section 109 of FISA. Section 2511(2)(f) of title 18, U.S.C., provides in relevant part:
[Procedures in this chapter and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 shall be the exclusive means by which electronic surveillance, as defined in section 101 of such Act, and the interception of domestic wire and oral communications may be conducted, (emphasis supplied)
This provision incorporates the FISA definition of “electronic surveillance” found in 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f). Subparagraph 4 of that subsection defines “electronic surveillance” as
the installation or use of an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device in the United States for monitoring to acquire information, other than from a wire or radio communication, under circumstances in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for law enforcement purposes.
That language is obviously broad, and, read literally, certainly includes video surveillance. There is no doubt that the miniaturized cameras used in this case are “electronic devices” used “to acquire information” under circumstances in which the subjects had a reasonable expectation of privacy. And when we turn to the relevant committee reports on FISA, we learn that Congress did in fact intend the quoted language to cover such video surveillance equipment. S.Rep. No. 604, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 35, reprinted in 1978 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 3904, 3936; S.Rep. No. 701, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. 37, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.News 3973, 4006. The Senate Judiciary Committee Report on FISA explains that that subparagraph “could also include miniaturized television cameras and other sophisticated devices not aimed merely at communications.” S. Rep. No. 604, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 35, reprinted in 1978 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad. News 3904, 3936. The next sentence of the *889report says “[tjhis part of the definition is meant to be broadly inclusive, because the effect of including a particular means of surveillance is not to prohibit it but to subject it to judicial oversight.” Id. The Senate Intelligence Committee Report on the bill includes the same language. See S. Rep. No. 701, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 37, reprinted in 1978 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 3973, 4006.
Thus, it is clear that video surveillance falls within the FISA definition of electronic surveillance. Therefore, 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(f) may be paraphrased to say that the “procedures in this chapter and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 shall be the exclusive means by which electronic surveillance — including video surveillance — may be conducted.” In short, if the video surveillance employed in this case was not expressly authorized by either Title III or FISA, then it would be prohibited by law. Subsection 2511(2)(f) cannot be contorted into meaning that Title III governs one thing, FISA governs another, and anything not governed by one or the other is permitted, as the majority would have it.
In addition, if the video surveillance here was not authorized by statute, then the officers who engaged in it may have committed a federal crime. Section 109(a) of FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1809(a), provides in relevant part: “A person is guilty of an offense if he intentionally — (1) engages in electronic surveillance under color of law except as authorized by statute ____” Again, the FISA definition of “electronic surveillance” applies to this provision, and as shown above, that definition includes video surveillance such as that used in the case before us.2 Section 1809 thus requires the government to show statutory authorization for its use of video surveillance, and the only possible sources of that authority are Title III and FISA.
But my reasons for disagreeing with the majority are not limited to the statutory language. By leaving an extraordinarily intrusive form of domestic electronic surveillance uncontrolled by statute, the majority acts contrary to the purposes of both statutes and produces a highly improbable result.
This most improbable result may be described in the following way. Based on the definition of “electronic surveillance” in FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f)(4), any attempt to employ video surveillance in a foreign intelligence case would be subject to FISA’s restrictions. In these highly sensitive cases of perhaps extraordinary importance to the nation, video surveillance may be employed only with the approval of officials at the highest levels of the federal government and of a spécial court established for this purpose in 50 U.S.C. § 1803. To be more precise, the application must be approved by the Attorney General or Deputy Attorney General of the United States, 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a); and the need for using such intrusive surveillance measures must be certified by the President’s national security affairs adviser or a national security official whose appointment is subject to Senate confirmation, 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7). Only then may the government apply to the special court for a warrant. And FISA imposes numerous other requirements designed to ensure that highly intrusive surveillance measures are used only when and to the extent necessary. See the remainder of § 1804(a).
In sharp contrast to these extraordinary statutory requirements for the use of video surveillance in foreign intelligence cases, the majority would leave video surveillance in all domestic law enforcement cases subject only to a few ad hoc constraints. In this respect, the majority seeks to solve the policy problem of its anomalous position by adopting in dicta some of the requirements of Title III as matters of constitutional *890law.3 There is no persuasive authority for this and, as a matter of judicial aggressiveness, it seems to me more egregious than a mere act of statutory interpretation. In any event, the constitutional requirements, which the majority imposes here by way of dicta can be, I suppose, just as easily interpreted away in the next ease. I think it preferable to follow the mandates of 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(f) and 50 U.S.C. § 1809 and leave the matter to Congress.
Although there is no explicit mention of video surveillance techniques anywhere in Title III or in its legislative history, it is virtually inconceivable that the Congress which enacted Title III would have, if it had ever considered the question directly, left video surveillance unregulated by statute. The relevant committee reports and comments of individual members of Congress reflect quite clearly the process of balancing individual privacy concerns and the fight against organized crime. S.Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 67-69 (state of the law), 70-76 (balance between privacy and control of organized crime), reprinted in 1968 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 2112, 2154-56, 2157-63. The Johnson Administration and numerous members of Congress supported a total prohibition on wiretapping and electronic bugging, believing that the techniques would add relatively little in fighting crime and that the threat to privacy, especially if the techniques were abused, was too great to tolerate. S.Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 161-62, 172-73 (Johnson Administration supported ban on wiretaps and bugging), reprinted in 1968 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 2112, 2223-24, 2233-34. The proponents of Title III argued that the statute struck a correct balance between law enforcement and privacy interests. S.Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 186-87 (individual views of Sen. Bayh), 214-18 (individual views of Sen. Scott), 220 (individual views of Senator Eastland), 224-26 (minority statement), reprinted in 1968 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 2112, 2245-46, 2264-68, 2270, 2274-75. The only members of Congress who expressed opposition to Title III on the grounds that its provisions unduly restricted surveillance were several Senators who argued that the statute should not apply to state officials. S.Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 238-39 (individual views of Sens. Dirksen, Hruska and Thurmond), reprinted in 1968 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 2112, 2288-89.
Further, the committee reports reviewed the state of the law at the time and expressed deep dissatisfaction with the contemporary protection of individual privacy interests. S.Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 67-69, 162-64 (individual views of Sens. Long and Hart), 166-70 (additional views of Sen. Hart), reprinted in 1968 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.News 2112, 2154-56, 2224-26, 2227-31. The reports discussed at some length the Supreme Court’s then-recent decisions in Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 87 S.Ct. 1873, 18 L.Ed.2d 1040 (1967), and Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967), and while they argued that Title III was constitutional, the reports also pointed out the inadequacies of then-applicable constitutional law decisions in protecting privacy. S.Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 66-76, reprinted in 1968 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad. News 2112, 2153-63. But see id. at 166-70 (additional views of Sen. Hart), reprinted in 1968 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 2112, 2227-31.
The clearest indications of this dissatisfaction are the statutory requirements *891which seem to go far beyond anything the Constitution demands. Those statutory limitations and requirements include the following restrictions:
(1) bugging and wiretapping are permitted only when investigating specified crimes, 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) & (2);
(2) authorization for bugging and wiretapping requests must be centralized in each jurisdiction so as to prevent local abuses and to make an identifiable person answerable for abuses, §§ 2516(1) & (2), 2518(l)(a);
(3) there is a statutory exclusionary rule for information obtained in violation of Title III, and that rule is broader than the constitutional exclusionary rule as it existed in 1968, let alone now, §§ 2515, 2518(10)(a);
(4) bugging and wiretapping must, in many instances, be disclosed to the targets after the investigation is concluded, § 2518(7) & (8)(d);
(5) police officers engaging in warrant-less wiretapping or bugging are subject to criminal penalties, § 2511(1);
(6) targets of unlawful wiretapping and bugging have a private cause of action for damages, § 2520;
(7) the statutory requirements for minimizing obtrusiveness are much more specific than the Constitution requires, § 2518(l)(b) & (5); and
(8) bugging and wiretapping are permitted only when the government can show that conventional, less intrusive investigation techniques have proven or are very likely to prove unsuccessful, § 2518(l)(c) & (3)(e).
In 1968 Congress enacted Title III in part because audio surveillance was so intrusive that its use had to be subjected to stringent statutory limitations. It is self-evident that the continuous video surveillance in the case before us is more intrusive by a wide margin. The combination of video and audio surveillance here let the government detect every sound, every word and every gesture — everything except the targets’ unexpressed thoughts. Difficult as it may be to place ourselves in the position of Congress and accurately divine what it would have done in considering this new situation, we can say with some confidence what Congress would not have done. It would not have left video surveillance unregulated by statute if it had permitted it at all. In light of the political give and take on Title III, the flow of the debate, the way Congress arranged its agenda, the central competing policy concerns of proponents and opponents, we can say with confidence that Congress, if it had explicitly considered the prospect of video surveillance, would not have left it free of the constraints imposed on audio and wire surveillance. Yet the majority here does so, leaving the far more intrusive video techniques essentially subject only to a few ad hoc constitutional requirements which, by comparison, are ropes.of sand.
The provisions and legislative history of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, enacted in 1978, lend additional support to this conclusion. FISA includes within its definition of “electronic surveillance” the use of video devices such as those used in the present case. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f)(4); S. Rep. No. 604, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 35, reprinted in 1978 U.S.Code Cong. & An. News 3904, 3936; S.Rep. No. 701, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 37, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.News 3973, 4006.
FISA applies to investigations of special, and in some cases, extraordinary importance to the nation. See S.Rep. No. 604, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 9, reprinted in 1978 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 3904, 3910. As was the case with Title III, the congressional debate was focused on achieving a correct balance, in this instance between privacy interests and national security. See S.Rep. No. 604, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 7-9, reprinted in 1978 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 3904, 3908-10; S.Rep. No. 701, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 16, reprinted in 1978 U.S.Code Cong. & AdNews 3973, 3985. In 1978 Congress was willing to authorize the use of these extremely intrusive video surveillance devices, but only subject to conditions which are, in some ways, even more strict than those contained in Title III. For *892example, only the Attorney General or Deputy Attorney General may apply for a court order under 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a). The need for the surveillance and its relation to foreign intelligence must be certified by the President’s adviser for national security affairs or by a national security official whose appointment is subject to Senate confirmation. § 1804(a)(7).4 The statute draws on Title III as its model on issues of necessity and minimization, and imposes those more stringent non-constitutional requirements. § 1805(b) & (d). The surveillance must be carried out subject to court order and supervision, S.Rep. No. 604, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 16, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.News 3904, 3917-18, and the court is a special one selected by the Chief Justice of the United States, § 1803(a), to develop expertise in the subject matter and to impose some controls on the executive branch in conducting this type of surveillance. S.Rep. No. 604, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 16, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.News 3904, 3917. The court operates in secret but it is still an Article III court with the authority to deny permission for surveillance.
Congress was so concerned about potential abuses of these investigative techniques in foreign intelligence cases that it imposed these numerous requirements— checks and balances affecting officials at the highest levels of government. It imposed those requirements in cases of utmost importance and sensitivity to national security. I am unpersuaded by the suggestion that Congress could have subjected these techniques to such tight controls in those cases and still left open the use of the same techniques for every local police department in every minor investigation. The majority’s interpretation would presumably give the power to engage in this intrusive video surveillance to virtually any officer with a badge and to any official with a robe and gavel. In fact, the majority runs the risk of leaving open the use of video surveillance with such relatively loose controls in every ease except those of greatest importance. According to the majority, Congress entrusted powers to a deputy sheriff and half-time magistrate on a local gambling investigation that it expressly denied the director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and a special expert court in foreign intelligence cases of the utmost sensitivity and importance. This result is irrational and contrary to Congressional intent. If statutory language must be bent, as the majority must bend the language of 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(f) and 50 U.S.C. § 1809, we should at least bend it in the general direction of Congressional purpose and method.
The defendants make a plausible argument, based on the statutory language, for a third interpretation of FISA and Title III, under which video surveillance is prohibited except in foreign intelligence cases.5 I cannot dismiss defendants’ argument out of hand; indeed I have argued consistently with it that FISA and Title III are constructed to provide a comprehensive framework for the use of electronic surveillance in the United States in situations where the targets have a reasonable expectation of privacy. Under that scheme the government’s use of video surveillance in this case was illegal if it was not authorized either by FISA or by Title III.
It is obvious that the government’s video surveillance here was not authorized under FISA. The FALN is not a “foreign” target within the meaning of FISA and the government made no attempt to employ *893FISA procedures. Therefore, either Title III must apply or the video surveillance was unlawful.
But the defendants argue that Title III cannot authorize video surveillance because that statute is limited to audio and wire surveillance, as appears in the language of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510 and 2511.6 This language, in particular the definition of “intercept” contained in 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4), does indeed pose the principal obstacle to reaching my conclusion. That definition states: “ ‘intercept’ means the aural acquisition of the contents of any wire or oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device.” On its face, this definition appears to restrict Title III to audio surveillance techniques, and courts have construed the definition as limited to devices which acquire information through the sense of hearing. E.g., United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 165-68, 98 S.Ct. 364, 368-70, 54 L.Ed.2d 376 (1977) (pen registers); United States v. Cassity, 546 F.Supp. 611, 621 (E.D.Mich.1981) (beepers), rev’d in part, on other grounds, 720 F.2d 451 (6th Cir.1983), vacated — U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 3581, 82 L.Ed.2d 879 (1984) (mem.). Three courts have specifically held Title III not applicable to video surveillance. In re Application for Order Authorizing Interception of Oral Communications and Videotape Surveillance, 513 F.Supp. 421 (D.Mass.1980); People v. Teicher, 52 N.Y.2d 638, 439 N.Y.S.2d 846, 422 N.E.2d 506 (1981); Sponick v. City of Detroit Police Dept., 49 Mich.App. 162, 211 N.W.2d 674 (1973).
There are, however, several reasons why we should not adhere blindly to those prior constructions. First, the prior court constructions have, with certain exceptions, involved efforts by defendants to extend Title III to relatively less intrusive surveillance devices such as pen registers, which record telephone numbers dialed by a monitored telephone. See New York Telephone, supra, and cases cited therein 434 U.S. at 166 n. 9, 98 S.Ct. at 369 n. 9; Cassity, supra. Courts have with good reason relied on both the language of the statute and the legislative history to resist extensions of Title III to these less intrusive surveillance methods. The definition of “intercept” in Title III is carefully worded, but its sharp focus on the “aural” acquisition of information was designed to avoid including less intrusive surveillance devices. S.Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 90, reprinted in 1968 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 2112, 2178. The use of the word “aural” had the effect of limiting Title III to those highly intrusive electronic surveillance measures, such as wiretapping and bugging, which could disclose the contents of communications. Id.
The question we face here, by contrast, is one which the definition of “intercept” was not framed to address. We are dealing with a far more intrusive surveillance technique, and one that surely has the effect of revealing the contents of communications together with a vast amount of other information about targets. Careful wording does not require us to reach irrational results when facing a question not contemplated by the drafters of the definition merely because other courts have reached those results in a different context.
In addition, whatever the scope of Title III before 1978, the enactment of FISA in 1978 provides a sound basis for extending Title III to encompass video surveillance.7 *894Because FISA was intended to mesh with Title III in a comprehensive statutory system for regulating highly intrusive forms of electronic surveillance, it included a number of “conforming amendments” to prevent various statutory anomalies or conflicts which might otherwise have arisen.8 Some of those conforming amendments expressly introduced the FISA definition of “electronic surveillance” (including its video dimension) into some sections of Title III. E.g., FISA § 201(a), amending 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(ii) (authorizing a common carrier to assist an agent with a court order authorizing the interception of wire or oral communications or electronic surveillance as defined in FISA).
The inclusion of video surveillance in FISA’s definition of electronic surveillance is relatively obscure and becomes explicit only in a few sentences buried in the committee reports. Congress’ attention was clearly elsewhere with regard to FISA. And it seems evident to me that the potential problems of either the majority position or the defendants’ position were simply not recognized in the development of one complicated statute and its integration with another complicated statute. Either result — the exemption of video surveillance from any statutory regulation or the prohibition of video surveillance — is extreme enough to persuade me that Congress, if it had noticed the possibility, would at least have commented on it somewhere. Instead, there is silence.
In view of the language of both Title III and FISA, the purposes of both statutes, the practical connections between audio and video surveillance methods and the silence in the legislative history on the subject, it is most sensible to view the statutory dilemma as the result of inadvertence rather than design. FISA’s “conforming amendments” simply did not mesh the gears of the statutes quite as smoothly as Congress had intended.
There is a further difficulty with the defendants’ argument. If Congress chose to prohibit video surveillance, it chose a remarkably roundabout and subtle way to do it, and it never indicated clearly any intention to do so. In fact, neither Title III nor FISA prohibits any specific surveillance method. Instead, both statutes are designed to control intrusive methods of electronic surveillance by regulating their use. There is no indication in the language or legislative history of either statute that Congress meant to outlaw any form of surveillance, and I think it quite implausible that Congress — faced with a situation such as confronts us — would have prohibited surveillance in almost any form.
Although the defendants’ argument is certainly not frivolous, and, indeed, tracks the statutory language more closely than the interpretations offered in this and the majority opinions, we should, in order to avoid absurd results, construe Title III to apply to video surveillance for domestic law enforcement investigations where the targets of the surveillance have a reasonable expectation of privacy, as in this case.
As a practical matter, the procedural and substantive requirements of Title III are compatible with video' surveillance in every respect, and video surveillance is likely to be used only in tandem with audio surveillance techniques already subject to Title III. The same application, the same authorization, the same showing of probable cause, the same showing of need for such intrusive measures would all apply equally to both video and audio surveillance methods. And, of course, that is essentially the *895course the government pursued here in its applications, including a request for video surveillance as part — albeit as only one sentence — of routine Title III applications.9 Thus, the details of the Title III regulatory scheme appear to be compatible in every respect with video surveillance as a supplement to audio surveillance.
Further, the application of Title III to video surveillance seems to me to be most closely in accord with Congress’ intent in Title III and FISA. Congress was troubled by the potential for abuses of electronic surveillance, and was dissatisfied with the adequacy of the contemporary constitutional doctrine for the protection of privacy interests. The purpose of these two statutes was not to outlaw electronic surveillance but to subject it to rigorous controls. A key element of both Title III and FISA is that each centralizes authority and responsibility for the use of intrusive means of electronic surveillance. Congress was quite concerned in Title III to prevent the possibility of local or relatively low-level officials using or abusing their power by employing electronic surveillance for their own purposes, or where it was otherwise unwarranted. There is of course no guarantee that high level officials will not also abuse their power, but Title III was designed to make it easy to assign responsibility for abuses and to provide for rational and consistent policies in the use of these highly intrusive measures. All of these concerns apply with at least as much force to video as to audio surveillance and it makes the utmost sense to apply those constraints to video surveillance as well.
Of course, this is open to criticism as an aggressive exercise in statutory construction, and if either of the alternatives were more consistent with both statutes and their purposes and legislative histories, I would perhaps retreat from my interpretation. However, each alternative has technical and policy problems which are, in my view, considerably more severe than my bending of the Title III language. If my construction were to be chastised as “result oriented,” I would assert that it seeks a result which is both sensible and consistent with both the statutes and the legislative histories read carefully and as a whole. Applying Title III to video surveillance avoids the majority’s anomaly of subjecting the most dangerously intrusive form of electronic surveillance to much less control 10 than other forms. In addition, the majority’s interpretation subjects video surveillance to much less control in the investigation of a local gambling parlor than in foreign intelligence investigations. My construction also avoids the improbable result of reading Title III and FISA as prohibiting one particular form of electronic surveillance when there are no indications anywhere that Congress meant to prohibit any surveillance technique in all situations. Instead, my approach subjects this highly intrusive form of surveillance to at least as much constraint as less intrusive forms are subject to, and it accords with the general congressional design of closely regulating — not prohibiting — these somewhat awesome forms of surveillance.
. See Initial Buena Application at 6, Gov’t App. at 101; Initial Lunt Application at 5, Gov't App. at 232; Transcript of Initial Buena Application-Order Proceedings before Judge McGarr, January 18, 1983, at 2-3, Gov’t App. at 223-24.
. Of course, subsection (b) of the section (50 U.S.C. § 1809(b)) provides a defense for officers with a search warrant or court order, so the officers in the matter before us presumably would not be in jeopardy. By finding that courts have the power to issue warrants for video surveillance, even though not authorized by statute, the majority effectively eviscerates this criminalizing provision.
. There are special limited provisions for war-rantless surveillance under very narrow circumstances on orders of the President and certification by the Attorney General. 50 U.S.C. § 1802(a).
. A similar argument, that the absence of provisions in Title III for video surveillance implies that such surveillance is forbidden, has been rejected as giving too little weight to Congressional concerns. In re Application for Order Authorizing Interceptions of Oral Communications and Videotape Surveillance, 513 F.Supp. 421, 422 (D.Mass.1980) (allowing video surveillance where substantive safeguards at least as rigorous as those required by Title III, if not more so, had been observed). The effect of FISA on Title III was not considered.
. Both the majority and the government agree, though they draw a different conclusion than do the defendants.
. None of the courts which have said Title III is limited to information acquired through the sense of hearing has considered the complicated effects of the 1978 FISA statute, which quite clearly does cover video surveillance. E.g. United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 165-68, 98 S.Ct. 364, 368-70, 54 L.Ed.2d 376 (1977) (pen registers); United States v. Cassity, 546 F.Supp. 611, 621 (E.D.Mich.1981) (beepers), rev'd in part, on other grounds, 720 F.2d 451 (6th Cir.1983), vacated — U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 3581, 82 L.Ed.2d 879 (1984) (mem.). Nor have the effects of FISA on Title III been considered by the three courts which have held Title III inapplicable to video surveillance. In re Application for Order Authorizing Interception of Oral Communications and Videotape Surveillance, 513 F.Supp. 421 (D.Mass.1980); People v. Teicher, 52 N.Y.2d 638, 439 N.Y.S.2d 846, 422 N.E.2d *894506 (1981); Sponick v. City of Detroit Police Dept., 49 Mich.App. 162, 211 N.W.2d 674 (1973). Several of the cases relied on by the majority, including New York Telephone and Sponick, were decided prior to the enactment of FISA. And in In re Application, Judge Keeton allowed video surveillance only after forcing the government to go through Title III application procedures and subjecting the surveillance to substantive safeguards at least as rigorous as those required by Title III. In re Application, 513 F.Supp. at 423.
. These undesirable effects included such possible results as holding federal agents criminally liable under 18 U.S.C. § 2511 for acting in accordance with a court order under FISA. See FISA § 201(b).
. This course was also taken by the government, though after some prodding by Judge Keeton, in In re Application, supra.
. See n. 3 supra.