dissenting.
The majority opinion is a very fair examination of all the issues. I fully concur in the affirmance of the Privacy Act issues, but I am not quite convinced on the due process issue, and therefore respectfully dissent, but only to that extent.
As the majority opinion itself points out, this case may be distinguished from Larry v. Lawler, 605 F.2d 954 (7th Cir.1976) (Wood, J., dissenting) because there is no broad and absolute ban barring Perry from all federal employment. Nevertheless, the majority considers Larry to be close enough to be controlling. I do not because the majority stressed in Larry, 605 F.2d at 958 that “It must be remembered that Larry has not merely been denied a particular position within the government; he has been totally debarred from all federal employment for up to three years.” After that three years was up, then it would also be necessary for Larry to convince the United States Civil Service Commission of his rehabilitation and fitness for appointment in a new determination. 5 C.F.R. § 731.303 (1984).
Perry faces no absolute federal employment ban although the majority speculates that the FBI information “makes it extremely unlikely” that anyone would hire him for a federal position. Perry, however, did subsequently apply to the Commission to be placed on the list of eligible applicants for employment consideration by the various agencies and departments within the federal government, and was successful. But Perry nevertheless continues to complain about his failure to be hired by four particular federal law enforcement agencies.
Perry sought law enforcement positions with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF), United States Marshals Service (USMS), Department of Agriculture (DOA), and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). All four agencies rejected Perry’s application. The blame for those rejections is placed on the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) which upon request from BATF, but only after Perry had authorized the release of information contained in police and criminal records, sent the requested information to BATF.
The FBI personnel background information was contained in a five-page memorandum which was excised before distribution to BATF. That memorandum clearly states, however, that what it contains constitutes neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. The memorandum advises that Perry was employed for several months as a clerk by the FBI when he was 18 years old. The reason for his brief tenure is not given. The information the memorandum contains undoubtedly could be expected to be of interest to any federal law enforcement agency considering Perry for employment.
For example, the first bit of information comes not from some unnamed informant of questionable reliability, but from Perry’s own father, Reverend Perry, who advised the FBI that his son, Perry, had told him that he had been required to carry a weapon when he was a clerk for the FBI, and that even though he was no longer employed by the FBI there was still the possibility that he would be called upon for a covert assignment. Perry’s quarrel should be with his father. Anyone with any knowledge of the FBI must realize that its 18 year old clerks without agent training are not authorized to carry guns.
An informant whose name was excised advised the FBI that he overheard Perry in a bar claim to be a federal officer and that he had served a subpoena in a federal investigation. As might be expected, the United States Attorney for' the Northern District of Illinois declined prosecution under the impersonation statute, but the United States Attorney did request that Perry be interviewed and admonished. It does not appear in the memorandum that Perry did any more than talk in a bar about being a federal officer. The report does not al*1283lege that Perry served any subpoena as a federal officer. To violate the statute a person must in fact act as a federal officer or obtain something of value. 18 U.S.C. § 912. Perry was admonished and the memorandum states that Perry “vehemently denied ever representing himself as a Federal Officer.”
Another sample item again from an informant indicates that Perry had flashed a United States Marshal’s badge in a bar, and was. armed. The United States Attorney likewise declined prosecution on this charge. It was only talk as no actual use was made of the badge. Being armed would ordinarily be a local matter. Another item reported Perry used a red light and siren in his car to stop other vehicles for some reason and that it cost him his job on the Deerfield Police Department. A local police agency reported that Perry while driving was stopped by one of its officers. A red light and siren were noted. No charges were filed by the officers, but the officers confiscated a blackjack and a tear gas pen with cartridges. Again the report contained Perry’s explanation that the siren was merely a car alarm, and that he was a dispatcher for the Illinois State Police. Apparently he was a dispatcher for a few months, but resigned. It was reported by the Illinois State Police that Perry would not be eligible for rehire because of poor attitude, failure to obey orders, and allegedly receiving personal gasoline discounts for official favors as a dispatcher. It was also reported that Perry had a state trooper-style hat he wore while driving on the toll road. He was investigated by the state for impersonating a state trooper, but no disposition is shown. Perry was also hired as a dispatcher by a local police department, but for some undisclosed reason that lasted only one night.
BATF, like the other federal agencies, is a sophisticated federal law enforcement agency. BATF did not rely on the FBI information, but conducted its own independent background investigation of Perry and then declined to hire him. Most of what was contained in the FBI memorandum, even without the names of the informants except for Perry’s father, was easily subject to verification since most of it directly involved other police agencies. Perry knew where he had worked, why employment was terminated, and when and for what he had been stopped, questioned, and admonished. The information was clearly designated not to be construed as a recommendation nor a conclusion of the FBI. The information was presented in a straightforward manner without editorial comment, and even contained several direct denials by Perry. Had the memorandum gone to some private source not capable of evaluating that type of raw information nor having the capability of checking it out, we would have a different case. Nor does the report directly accuse Perry of an act of dishonesty that might be criminal. Perry’s own barroom talk is not sufficient. He was not, for instance, labeled as an embezzler or a thief. Nor is there anything in the report to suggest any immorality whatsoever. Those accusations are examples cited in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2707, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972) as implicating a liberty interest. The memorandum information about Perry approaches nothing involving moral turpitude.
There is a pattern of conduct, however, which emerges in the reported items which fully justified dissemination by the FBI to serve as leads but obviously requiring further verification by any interested law enforcement agency. But putting all that impersonation conduct aside, the Illinois State Police evaluation of Perry after termination of his employment with that agency stating that Perry would not be rehired because of poor attitude, failure to obey orders, and misuse of his job for personal gain is classic employment information not within any police or criminal record category. That information alone, also easily verifiable, would justify employment rejection by a federal law enforcement agency making all the other items in the FBI memo surplusage. It is difficult to imagine that a federal law enforcement agency would hire an employee who would not be rehired for *1284good reason by a state law enforcement agency. Perry does not deny he was hired by the Illinois State Police and should have expected that his former employer would give an evaluation of him separate from any FBI report.
For the FBI not to have passed on the pertinent information concerning closed investigations and investigative leads to another federal law enforcement agency contemplating hiring Perry as an agent would have been, as I see it, a dereliction. Therefore, I do not see it as a due process violation when the FBI did what was sensible and practical. There was no federal employment ban imposed on Perry by regulation. The agencies were free to make their independent choices and exercise their individual discretions. Perry was given the opportunity to dispute the information directly by letter, by phone, and in person and did so. Any additional due process requirements would constitute an unnecessary burden on federal law enforcement hiring practices. It is better for a federal law enforcement agency not to hire than to be later unpleasantly surprised by a new employee’s unstable conduct which could have serious public safety consequences.
But, even if it is to be considered a possible due process violation, Perry’s interviews, denials, and his use of the FBI procedures for labeling the information in the FBI file as disputed together with his pursuit of a U.S. Civil Service Commission remedy provided all the due process he deserved. Federal law enforcement positions are too critical and sensitive to make it unnecessarily difficult for one federal law enforcement agency to pass pertinent investigative leads to another federal law enforcement agency. On balance, the risk to public safety far outweighs the possibility that some potential employer might rely on the mere bits of information in the FBI file without more in rejecting an otherwise qualified applicant. The information in the file did not constitute allegations, only unverified information easily recognized by a federal law enforcement agency for no more than it was. Even a possible chilling of Perry’s federal employment by an adverse reflection on his reputation is not an employment ban and does not amount to a deprivation of liberty. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 47 L.Ed.2d 405 (1976). A mere failure to hire, considering all the circumstances of this case, does not meet the “stigma plus” standard as characterized in Colaizzi v. Walker, 542 F.2d 969 (7th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 960, 97 S.Ct. 1610, 51 L.Ed.2d 811 (1977).
Therefore, in part, I respectfully dissent.