The Memorandum decision filed the 9th day of July, 1984, 740 F.2d 973, is withdrawn. On petition for rehearing, the following opinion is substituted and the petition for rehearing is denied.
Dianne Craig appeals from the magistrate’s judgment exonerating the owners of the motor vessel PEACOCK from liability in the death of her husband, Larry Lewis. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
The M/Y PEACOCK (PEACOCK), a former Navy minesweeper, is owned by appellees, Oscko Edwards and Harry M. Tompkins (Shipowners). During the latter part of 1979, the Peacock was chartered to Fair-field Industries, Inc. (Fairfield), for seismic oil exploration. Larry Lewis (Lewis) was employed as a technician by Fairfield. He had been employed in this capacity aboard the PEACOCK for several months. On December 23, 1979, while assisting a fellow employee in the repair of some of the survey equipment, Lewis fell overboard. After an extensive seven-hour search, begin*955ning immediately after the fall and continuing with the aid of the Coast Guard, Lewis was declared missing and presumed dead.
Dianne Craig (Craig) filed suit in the Southern District of Texas for the wrongful death of Lewis, her husband. Shipowners and Fairfield then filed a limitation proceeding in the Northern District of California. As a result, the Texas proceeding was brought into the California limitation proceeding together with a California salvage action arising out of the same voyage. Fairfield was dismissed from the limitation proceeding. The magistrate held Shipowners exonerated from liability for the death of Lewis and entered judgment. This appeal followed.
II. DISCUSSION
The central issue in this matter is what standard of care the owners of the vessel PEACOCK owed to Lewis, who was lawfully aboard the vessel. The applicable standard depends upon Lewis’s status while aboard ship. If a seaman, Lewis would be entitled to claim the traditional maritime remedies: The benefit of the doctrine of seaworthiness under general maritime law; the benefit of the provisions of the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688; and the benefit of the provisions of the Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. § 761. If Lewis were not a seaman, the only duty owed him by Shipowners was that of exercising due care under the circumstances. Kermarec v. Compagnie Generate Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 632, 79 S.Ct. 406, 410, 3 L.Ed.2d 550 (1959).
Like the PEACOCK, vessels involved in oceanographic research carry both scientifie personnel, engaged in research activities, and a crew which performs those duties usually assigned to seamen. Traditionally, some scientific personnel might have been considered seamen because they “contribute[d] to the function of the vessel or the accomplishment of its mission.” Offshore Co. v. Robison, 266 F.2d 769, 775 (5th Cir.1959). More recently, however, Congress has addressed the special concerns of scientific personnel aboard these vessels in the Oceanographic Research Vessels Act (ORVA), 46 U.S.C. § 441, et seq.
At trial, the parties assumed applicability of ORVA.1 It provides in relevant part, that scientific personnel on an oceanographic research vessel shall not be considered seamen under the provisions of Title 53 of the revised statutes and act amendatory thereof or supplemental thereto. 46 U.S.C. § 444. By virtue of ORVA’s exclusionary language, it has been held that the Act prevented scientific personnel from being classified as “seamen” for the purposes of the Jones Act and also the Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C.A. § 761, et. seq. Sennett v. Shell Oil Co., 325 F.Supp. 1, 6-7 (E.D.La.1971).
Sennett implies that Lewis might have been entitled to the doctrine of seaworthiness and, at the very least, guaranteed a safe place to work. A recent Fifth Circuit opinion, Presley v. Vessel Carribean Seal, 709 F.2d 406 (1983), cert. denied, approves the Sennett analysis. In Presley, the Fifth Circuit agreed that the Jones Act was amendatory or supplementary to Title III of the revised statutes; accordingly, although scientific personnel on oceano*956graphic vessels may not bring suit under the Jones Act, they are not excluded from remedies available under the general maritime law. Id. at 408-409 (citing Sennett, 325 F.Supp. at 6).
We are persuaded by Judge Rubin’s analysis in Sennett. Additionally, we find no reference in ORVA to general maritime law remedies which are independent of statutory remedies afforded seamen. There is no suggestion that Congress intended ORVA to deprive scientific personnel of the protection of the general maritime law. Thus, if Mr. Lewis is a seaman, his status as one of the scientific personnel aboard an ORV would not deprive him of a warranty of seaworthiness from the shipowners.
In the Estate of Wenzel v. Seaward, Marine Services, Inc., 709 F.2d 1326, 1327 (9th Cir.1983), this court set out the test for determining seaman status as follows:
1. The vessel on which the claimant was employed must be in navigation.
2. The claimant must have a more or less permanent connection with the vessel, and
3. The claimant must be aboard primarily to aid in navigation.
Although this test is “simply stated, the result ‘depends largely upon the facts of the particular case and the activity in which [the claimant] was engaged at the time of the injury.’ ” Id. (citing Bullis v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 474 F.2d 392, 393 (9th Cir.1973)). Terms such as “seaman” and “vessel” have a wide range of meaning; as such, “only a jury or trier of facts can determine their application in a particular case.” Wenzel, id. (citing Offshore Co. v. Robison, 266 F.2d 769 at 779 (5th Cir.1959)).
The magistrate determined that Lewis was not a seaman, but was instead a member of the scientific personnel aboard the PEACOCK in Fairfield’s employ. 46 U.S.C. § 444. In light of our rule in Wenzel which makes the determination of seaman status a factual inquiry, we do not find this conclusion clearly erroneous.
The magistrate found that Lewis was exclusively an employee of Fairfield and “at no time had he or was he performing any duties in aid of the PEACOCK’S navigation, but was performing only scientific duties on behalf of his employer, Fair-field.” ER page 93. Implicit in this finding is a conclusion that the function or mission of the vessel PEACOCK was the transportation of the Fairfield seismic team. The PEACOCK’S owners did not employ Lewis; Fairfield was his employer, and Fairfield controlled the scientific survey operations on the rear deck of the vessel. Accordingly, like passengers on a cruise ship, these scientific personnel would not be considered seamen nor would they be entitled to benefit from the doctrine of seaworthiness.
Even assuming that Lewis was a seaman and entitled to the warranty of seaworthiness, the trial court determined that the PEACOCK was reasonably fit for the service for which she was intended. See Smith v. American Mail Line, Ltd., 525 F.2d 1148, 1150 (9th Cir.1975). This finding equates that of seaworthiness set forth in Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 550, 80 S.Ct. 926, 933, 4 L.Ed.2d 941 (1960), and Kermarec, supra, 358 U.S., at 631, 79 S.Ct. at 410. Thus, even if the trial court erred in its assessment of Lewis’s status, the decision could be affirmed on the basis of seaworthiness.
Appellant’s challenge to the seaworthiness finding asserts error in the magistrate’s finding of compliance with Coast Guard regulations on the basis of a distinction between ORVA vessels and non-ORVA vessels. The issues raised by this contention are relevant to the Rule 60(b) motion; consequently, arguments in support thereof are not properly before the court for decision at this time although they may still be raised in the district court.
The magistrate determined the PEACOCK to be particularly suited to her function as an oceanographic research vessel. ER page 95. Although guard rails were in place when Shipowners turned the PEACOCK over to Fairfield for its seismic *957equipment operation, these rails were removed by Fairfield in order to deploy its seismic equipment. Id. Although Lewis fell overboard at a place where the rails had been removed, the evidence was uncertain and speculative as to whether he might not have fallen into the sea even if the rails had been in place. Id. at 95. Holding that the alterations to the guard rails were conducted entirely under the direction of Fairfield, the magistrate refused to extend Shipowners’ responsibility to this action. See West v. United States, 361 U.S. 118, 80 S.Ct. 189, 4 L.Ed.2d 161 (1959) (no special duty to provide a safe place to work where another party conducts and controls its own operation). Finally, the magistrate found that there was no inadequacy in the rescue operation or equipment and that there was no evidence to suggest that additional crew or equipment would have enhanced the success of the search. We conclude, therefore, that the magistrate’s finding of seaworthiness is supported by the evidence and is not clearly erroneous.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the decision exonerating Shipowners from liability in the death of Larry Lewis is
AFFIRMED.
. After this appeal was filed, Craig requested the magistrate to certify to this court that he would entertain a motion under Rule 60(b) Fed.R.Civ. Proc. challenging an implied finding of the PEACOCK’S status to be that of an "oceanographic research vessel” subject to the provisions of the Oceanographic Research Vessels Act, 46 U.S.C. § 441, et seq. The magistrate refused to entertain the motion for certification.
Generally, pending appeal, the trial court lacks jurisdiction to enter an order under Rule 60(b). The proper procedure is for the trial court, at movant’s request, to indicate whether it would entertain or grant such a motion. Crateo, Inc. v. Intermark, Inc., 536 F.2d 862, 869 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 896, 97 S.Ct. 259, 50 L.Ed.2d 180 (1976). Where, as here, the trial court determined that it would not entertain the Rule 60(b) motion "at that time,” the order is generally considered interlocutory in nature and therefore not final and appealable. 536 F.2d at 869. See Canadian Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Peterson Products, 350 F.2d 18, 27 (9th Cir. 1965). We find, therefore, that Craig’s 60(b) motion and arguments in support thereof are not properly before this court.