dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. I believe the State of Colorado satisfies the requirements of Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977), and like decisions, in providing the contract attorney firm to counsel mental patients under commitment after being found not guilty of a criminal offense by reason of insanity. This service, in my view, provides meaningful access to the courts in respect to the inmates’ 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims.
It is a matter of common knowledge that all of the district courts in our circuit supply inmates who desire to file either 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims or habeas corpus claims with forms easily understood and which, with simple guidance, may be completed for filing. In this case, the record shows that the law firm does procure the forms, reviews them and advises the inmates concerning their proper completion for filing. Nothing more is constitutionally required.
The majority opinion would seem to require some expertise on the part of the law firm for counseling in the area of civil rights. A private person with a justifiable cause would not be entitled, ipso facto, to ■an expert. If financially able, he or she could obtain the services of such an expert upon payment of a fee. If entitled to legal aid such as that provided to indigents by Legal Services, such aid does not include an “expert” counselor. In most cases the private litigant contacts his general practitioner and seeks his advice and counsel.
It is unreasonable to expect the State of Colorado or any other state to provide “adequate” law libraries not only at its penal facilities, but, in addition, at its hospitals treating inmates for mental disorders following their commitments after having been found not guilty of a criminal offense by reason of insanity. There is no magic in producing the money to fulfill such a requirement. Quite obviously, the funds are hard to come by when one considers the heavy demands on government services overall. The requirements which have been imposed by the federal courts upon state authorities to build, maintain and provide physical facilities and support personnel at state penal institutions are staggering in terms of available state resources for all governmental needs.
There is no right under Bounds to legal representation in civil litigation. The advisement and counseling provided in this case does not deny the appellant access to the courts. Ward’s complaint is vague, uncertain and posed in a shotgun manner. An “expert” in the area of § 1983 would, I *862believe, have difficulty positing his claims under the federal constitution and/or laws of the United States.
For some time, the federal courts have reviewed state prison facilities and conditions, generally under Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment claims. The Supreme Court of the United States admonished us to move with caution in this area in Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981). That case involved a constitutional challenge to Ohio’s double-celling requirement at a state penal facility. Under the cruel and unusual punishment provisions of the Eighth Amendment, the Supreme Court rejected the challenge and held that the record did not evidence conditions proving that unnecessary or wanton pain was being inflicted on the Ohio inmates or that the punishment was disproportionate to the crimes committed. Significantly, Justice Powell, writing for the majority, stated that “[T]o the extent that such conditions [of confinement] are restrictive and even harsh, they are part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.” Id. at 347, 101 S.Ct. at 2399. And, significantly, the majority pointedly observed that state legislatures and state prison officials can properly weigh considerations affecting the adequacy of prisons because they are sensitive to the dictates of the Constitution.
I would uphold the district court’s affirmance and adoption of the recommendations of the magistrate.