Antonio Pino Palafox appeals from his conviction on one count of possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance and one count of distribution of a eon-trolled substance under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The charges stem from a meeting in a parking lot where Palafox intended to sell a package of heroin to an undercover agent. The agent asked Pala-fox for a sample of the heroin, took a small quantity from the package and returned the package to Palafox. Almost immediately thereafter agents arrested Palafox. He was charged with distribution of the .12 gram sample and with possession of the remaining 124.58 grams with intent to distribute. Upon conviction, he was sentenced to concurrent terms of five years on each count.
Palafox argues in this appeal that because only one sale was contemplated and both the possession and the distribution were part of the same unconsummated transaction, he should not have been tried on both counts. He asks that we reverse his convictions and order the government to retry him on only one of the charges.
Palafox relies on certain language in decisions of this and other circuits involving convictions for possession with intent to distribute and actual distribution of the same drugs in one transaction. See, e.g., United States v. Oropeza, 564 F.2d 316 (9th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1080, 98 S.Ct. 1276, 55 L.Ed.2d 788 (1978); United States v. Olivas, 558 F.2d 1366 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 866, 98 S.Ct. 203, 54 L.Ed.2d 142 (1977). He recognizes, however, that none of these decisions compel adoption of his position. Rather, the cases upon which he relies approve of the prosecution for both possession with intent and distribution but hold that in the sentencing phase, the defendant should receive only one punishment. In the alternative, therefore, he argues that he should not have been sentenced on both counts.
The government relies upon our decision in United States v. Mehrmanesh, 682 F.2d 1303 (9th Cir.1982). It argues that since the defendant completed the distribution of the sample and retained possession of the remainder with the intent to make a subsequent distribution, he committed two separately punishable offenses.
Mehrmanesh, however, involved two distributions. The first was the giving of a sample and the second was the delivery, several hours later, of the remainder to a different person at a different place. Mehrmanesh lived in Phoenix and arranged for the sale of a quantity of drugs in Tucson. One of Mehrmanesh’s men and an undercover agent left Phoenix with the drugs to make the delivery to another undercover agent in Tucson. On the way, and unbeknownst to Mehrmanesh, the undercover agent asked Mehrmanesh’s courier for a sample, and he complied with the request. That day they delivered the remainder in Tucson. Mehrmanesh was charged and convicted with aiding and abetting both the delivery in Tucson, which he helped plan, and the giving of the sample, about which he knew nothing.
On appeal, the panel majority rejected his argument that the only punishable offense was the aiding and abetting of the sale in Tucson. The majority held that the statute covers distributions and is not limited to sales. Id. at 1305-07. The majority also rejected the contention that, because *560Mehrmanesh was not even aware of the sample distribution, there was insufficient evidence to convict him of aiding and abetting it. It went on to hold, in effect, that one who arranges a sale can be punished separately for the distribution of a sample which occurs after the sale is arranged and before it is consummated. Id. at 1307-09.
Because the government recognizes that Mehrmanesh is at the very least factually distinguishable, it takes an alternative position similar to that taken by the appellant. The government therefore argues that if there are not two separately punishable offenses, we should remand for resentenc-ing.
The district court apparently wanted to impose only one punishment but felt bound by Mehrmanesh to impose punishments on each count. We granted en banc review in order to resolve the confusion. We hold, in line with the alternative arguments of both sides, that where the defendant distributes a sample and retains the remainder for the purpose of making an immediate distribution to the same recipients at the same place and at the same time, verdicts of guilty may be returned on both counts but the defendant may be punished on only one.1
This conclusion flows from three sources of legal authority. The first is the statute under which the appellant was convicted, the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 (“Drug Act”), and its legislative history. The second is the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of an analogous statute, the Federal Bank Robbery Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2113. The third is the line of Federal Court of Appeals decisions under the Drug Act in factual situations most analogous to this one.
Our examination of the statute and its history underscores the strong congressional intent to criminalize all aspects of drug trafficking, and it compels us to reject an approach which focuses on sales or commercial transactions. See Mehrmanesh, 682 F.2d at 1306-07; United States v. Pruitt, 487 F.2d 1241, 1245 (8th Cir.1973). Palafox is charged with violating section 841(a)(1) of the Drug Act. The section provides:
(a) Except as authorized by this subchap-ter, it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally—
(1) to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance;
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Congress fixed the maximum punishment for conviction of possession with intent to distribute at fifteen years, with a possible fine of $25,000, 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A).2 It fixed the same maximum punishment for distribution. Id. Congress indicated thereby that the offenses were equally serious and should be treated with equal severity. The Drug Act attacks illegal drug traffic by making the price for drug participation in any aspect prohibitive. H.R.Rep. No. 91-1444, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., in [1970] U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 4566 passim; cf. Pruitt, 487 F.2d at 1245 (“Congress undoubtedly intended by this new Act to make an all-out attempt to combat illicit drugs by subjecting any individual who knowingly participates in the distribution to substantial, and in some cases severe, penalties----”).
Congressional intent to penalize all aspects of the unauthorized use of controlled substances was emphasized by the Eighth Circuit in Pruitt, when it stated that the Drug Act is “no longer restricted to the *561narrower concepts of buy and sell, but all inclusive in covering the entire field of narcotics and dangerous drugs in all phases of their manufacturing, processing, distribution and use.” 487 F.2d at 1245; see also United States v. Gomez, 593 F.2d 210, 213 (3d Cir.) (en banc) (Congress intended to proscribe all drug activity in enacting the Drug Act), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 948, 99 S.Ct. 2172, 60 L.Ed.2d 1052 (1979).
Appellant’s position that he could be prosecuted for only one offense and that the government must elect to prosecute either the distribution or the possession with intent to distribute, is contrary to this congressional intent. Id. For this reason, the circuits that have considered this contention have rejected it. United States v. Gonzalez, 715 F.2d 1411, 1412 (9th Cir. 1983) (the companion case to this one); United States v. Cortes, 606 F.2d 511, 512 (5th Cir.1979); see also United States v. Woods, 568 F.2d 509, 511-12 (6th Cir.) (election not required), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 972, 98 S.Ct. 1614, 56 L.Ed.2d 64 (1978). This appellant was therefore properly prosecuted for two component offenses of one intended sale.
The next issue is whether the appellant may be punished for two crimes after he has been found guilty of two such component offenses. We are guided here by the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation in Prince v. United States, 352 U.S. 322, 77 S.Ct. 403, 1 L.Ed.2d 370 (1957), of the Federal Bank Robbery Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2113.3 In the Federal Bank Robbery Act, as in the Drug Act, Congress created separate offenses, i.e., entry with intent to rob, and robbery, out of what could have been described as one criminal undertaking. See Prince, 352 U.S. at 323, 77 S.Ct. at 404, 1 L.Ed.2d 370. The Supreme Court in Prince upheld prosecution and findings of guilt on multiple counts but permitted punishment for only one. Id. at 329, 77 S.Ct. at 407, 1 L.Ed.2d 370.
Prince came to the Supreme Court because of a conflict among the circuits. The Fifth Circuit in Prince itself had held two sentences were appropriate, Prince v. United States, 230 F.2d 568 (5th Cir.1956), rev’d, 352 U.S. 322, 77 S.Ct. 403, 1 L.Ed.2d 370 (1957); other circuits had held only one was appropriate. Compare Simunov v. United States, 162 F.2d 314 (6th Cir.1947) (statute permits only one sentence) with Rawls v. United States, 162 F.2d 798 (10th Cir.1947) (multiple sentences allowed) and Durrett v. United States, 107 F.2d 438 (5th Cir.1939) (same). See generally Prince, 352 U.S. at 324 n. 3, 77 S.Ct. at 405 n. 3, 1 L.Ed.2d 370. No circuit had adopted the theory appellant urges in this case that the defendant could be prosecuted for only one offense. In Prince, the Supreme Court held that Congress created multiple offenses in connection with the same robbery, but that it did not intend to impose multiple punishments.
The Supreme Court reviewed the legislative history regarding the establishment of separate offenses — robbery and acts which fall short of a completed robbery — with the same maximum punishment for each offense. It held that in creating the offenses “there was no indication that Congress intended also to pyramid the penalties.” 352 U.S. at 327, 77 S.Ct. at 406, 1 L.Ed.2d 370. Hence, it reasoned that Congress did not intend, by making entry of the bank a separate offense, to multiply the maximum twenty-year sentence for robbery of the bank by another twenty years for the ini*562tial entry. The Court stressed in Prince that Congress’s intent in criminalizing each step leading to a robbery was to punish, and punish severely, the person who embarks upon a robbery but is frustrated before completion. Congress did not intend to make “drastic changes in authorized punishments.” Id. at 328, 77 S.Ct. at 407, 1 L.Ed.2d 370. The Court went on to state:
We hold, therefore, that when Congress made either robbery or an entry for that purpose a crime it intended that the maximum punishment for robbery should remain at 20 years, but that, even if the culprit should fall short of accomplishing his purpose, he could be imprisoned for 20 years for entering with the felonious intent.
Id. at 329, 77 S.Ct. at 407, 1 L.Ed.2d 370 (footnote omitted). The Court remanded for resentencing.
The Supreme Court followed Prince in United States v. Gaddis, 424 U.S. 544, 96 S.Ct. 1023, 47 L.Ed.2d 222 (1976). There the Court, citing Prince, left standing only one of multiple sentences imposed in a prosecution for component offenses of bank robbery. Gaddis, 424 U.S. at 549 n. 12, 96 S.Ct. 1023 n. 12, 47 L.Ed.2d 222.
In this case, as in Prince, the defendant committed and was charged and convicted of two criminalized steps of one transaction. We conclude that the Supreme Court's reasoning in Prince should apply, and the district court should have imposed only one punishment.
Our conclusion that Prince should apply . and that the defendant may be subjected to only one punishment is supported by the Drug Act decisions in analogous situations. All six of the circuits that have considered multiple sentences for a distribution of a controlled substance and the possession of that substance with intent to distribute have viewed the Prince rationale as the controlling authority. All, including our own, have held that where a single act of distribution forms the basis for both the charge of distribution and the charge of possession with intent to distribute, the government may prosecute and the defendant may be found guilty of both charges, but the court may impose only one sentence. United States v. Oropeza, 564 F.2d 316 (9th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1080, 98 S.Ct. 1276, 55 L.Ed.2d 788 (1978); United States v. Gomez, 593 F.2d 210 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 948, 99 S.Ct. 2172, 60 L.Ed.2d 1052 (1979); United States v. Hernandez, 591 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir.1979) (en banc); United States v. Olivas, 558 F.2d 1366 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 866, 98 S.Ct. 203, 54 L.Ed.2d 142 (1977); United States v. Stevens, 521 F.2d 334 (6th Cir.1975); United States v. Curry, 512 F.2d 1299 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 832, 96 S.Ct. 55, 46 L.Ed.2d 50 (1975); United States v. Atkinson, 512 F.2d 1235 (4th Cir.1975).
Following the Supreme Court’s interpretation in Prince of the Federal Bank Robbery Act, the dominant theme in all of these federal Courts of Appeals’ decisions under the Drug Act is a simple one: when more than one offense arises under § 841(a)(1) from a single criminal undertaking involving drugs, and each offense is committed at virtually the same time, in the same place, and with the same participants, the punishments should not be compounded. Thus, in Gomez, the Third Circuit declared that “sentences cannot be imposed for both the offense of distribution and the offense of possession with intent to distribute when both are charged and proved to have taken place at the same time.” 593 F.2d at 217. The Sixth Circuit, in Stevens, emphasized that it was the single act of distribution that gave rise to prosecution for both the distribution and the possession with intent to distribute. 521 F.2d at 337. The Tenth Circuit in Olivas is in accord, 558 F.2d at 1368, and our own opinion in Oropeza stressed that “[t]he circumstantial evidence on which their possession convictions rest was identical to the evidence supporting their distribution convictions.” 564 F.2d at 324. The same theme sounds with equal clarity in this case.
*563This case, however, factually differs in one respect from the other cases of multiple prosecution for distribution and possession with intent. Here, the charge of distribution is based on the distribution of the sample, and the charge of possession is based on the possession of the remainder with intent to make the immediate sale. However, the meeting with the agent, the giving of the sample and the possession of the remainder were all directed toward consummation of one criminal undertaking. Since the possession and the distribution occurred at the same time, in the same place, and with the involvement of the same participants, there should, as in the other cases, be only one punishment.
We stress that the delivery of a sample may well be a separately punishable offense in different circumstances. For example, an individual on the street corner who hands a sample to a passerby and who possesses the remainder with the intent to distribute it to others should receive multiple punishments, just as an individual should be punished if he makes distributions, sample or otherwise, to two different individuals as part of two separate transactions. Insofar as Mehrmanesh held that one involved in an ultimate distribution is always separately punishable for a preceding sample distribution, however, it is overruled. The general rule under § 841(a)(1) is, consistent with Prince, that where the defendant is convicted of multiple criminal steps leading to the same criminal undertaking, only one punishment should be imposed.
Permitting separate punishments in the present ease could lead to potentially ludicrous results. Government agents, for example, could ask for repeated samples, and turn one intended delivery into a theoretically infinite number of crimes, each punishable with a maximum of fifteen years. Such results were not intended under a statute criminalizing the various steps involved in one criminal undertaking. See Prince, 352 U.S. at 328, 77 S.Ct. at 406-07, 1 L.Ed.2d 370. The defendant in this ease, therefore, should not receive multiple punishments for steps in what in fact amounted to one frustrated delivery of drugs.
Manner of Sentencing
Since we hold that the district court should impose only one sentence based upon two offenses, we should give some guidance on the sentencing process in cases involving component offenses under the Drug Act. A problem could arise, for example, if the district court imposed a sentence on one count and dismissed the other at the time of sentencing or even earlier. The defendant then would escape punishment altogether if the sentenced count were subsequently reversed on appeal or collateral attack.
The State of California has given great attention to this and related problems which may arise in connection with the imposition of single punishments when a defendant has been found guilty of multiple offenses. California has enacted a statute which requires that a single punishment be imposed in every situation in which “[a]n act or omission ... is made punishable in different ways by different provisions of [the criminal] code____” Cal. Penal Code § 654 (West 1970 & Supp.1984). Because of the vast array of situations to which this statute might apply, see generally 2 B. Witkin, California Crimes §§ 948-964 (1963 & Supp.1983), California has adopted a rule to ensure that the defendant receives an appropriate sentence. Rule 449 of California Rules of Court provides that the execution of sentence on all but one count be stayed pending appeal, with the stay becoming permanent when the sentence not stayed is completed. The rule is derived from the decision of the California Court of Appeal in People v. Niles, 227 Cal.App.2d 749, 39 Cal.Rptr. 11 (1964), where the reasons for it are fully explained.
The California experience is instructive where, as here, implementation of congressional intent calls for imposition of one punishment in the context of two offenses. Staying execution of sentence on one count *564goes far toward ensuring that the defendant is punished, but punished only once, and for no more than the maximum set for that offense of which he is found guilty which carries the greatest maximum penalty.
If, however, as apparently contemplated under the California rule, judgment of conviction is entered on both offenses at the time of original sentencing, the defendant could at least arguably be subject to additional, collateral punitive effects of the second conviction. This problem can be avoided by staying both the sentence and entry of judgment of conviction on all but one count in prosecutions for component offenses under the Drug Act. Such a procedure follows the directive of Prince to avoid multiple punishments. It avoids both the punitive collateral effects of multiple convictions as well as the direct effects of multiple sentences. See Ball v. United States, — U.S.-, 105 S.Ct. 1668, 1673-74, 84 L.Ed.2d 740 (1985). Our conclusion is consistent with the Fifth Circuit’s in United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 1039 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1136, 102 S.Ct. 2965, 73 L.Ed.2d 1354 (1982), that component drug offenses constituted one, not two, predicate acts under the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968. In prosecutions for component drug offenses, sentence and entry of judgment of conviction therefore should be stayed on all but one count.
Palafox’s Other Contentions
Palafox contends that the use of the word conspiracy in the jury instructions, when no conspiracy was charged, was confusing. This claim is identical to that of appellant’s co-defendant in United States v. Gonzalez, 715 F.2d 1411, 1412 (9th Cir. 1983). Our holding that, in the absence of any showing of prejudice, there was no reversible error is controlling. There was no showing of prejudice here or in Gonzalez.
Palafox also argues as a matter of law that he was entitled to an acquittal because he was entrapped. Palafox was required to present “ ‘undisputed testimony making it patently clear’ that he was an ‘otherwise innocent’ person in whom the government implanted the criminal design.” United States v. Abushi, 682 F.2d 1289, 1297 (9th Cir.1982) (quoting United States v. Rangel, 534 F.2d 147, 149 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 854, 97 S.Ct. 147, 50 L.Ed.2d 129 (1976)). Appellant did not come close to meeting this standard.
We therefore remand with instructions to the district court to vacate and stay the entry of judgment and the imposition of sentence on one count. The stays are to become permanent upon service of the sentence on the remaining count. The judgment is otherwise affirmed:
. As explained more fully in our discussion of sentencing, we affirm the judgment of conviction on one count and direct the district court to vacate and stay both the imposition of sentence and entry of judgment of conviction on the other count. This is to ensure that appellant receives a single punishment without the direct or collateral consequences of conviction on a second count. Although Judge Poole's dissenting opinion characterizes our holding as permitting “two convictions," the appellant’s record will reflect only one.
. The penalty provisions applicable to this case are those which were in effect before the Controlled Substances Penalties Amendments Act of 1984, 98 Stat. 2068 (codified at 21 U.S.C. 841(b)), increased the penalties.
. 18 U.S.C. § 2113 provides in relevant part: (a) Whoever, by force and violence, or by intimidation, takes, or attempts to take, from the person or presence of another any property or money or any other thing of value belonging to, or in the care, custody, control, management, or possession of, any bank, credit union, or any savings and loan association; or
Whoever enters or attempts to enter any bank, credit union, or any savings and loan association, or any building used in whole or in part as a bank, credit union, or as a savings and loan association, with intent to commit in such bank, credit union, or in such savings and loan association, or building, or part thereof, so used, any felony affecting such bank, credit union, or such savings and loan association and in violation of any statute of the United States, or any larceny—
Shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.