The petitioner, Marie Lancaster Busby, was convicted and sentenced in an Alabama state court to life imprisonment for the murder of her husband. Her conviction was affirmed on appeal by the Alabama Criminal Court of Appeals, 412 So.2d 837 (1982). She filed in federal court a petition for the writ of habeas corpus, claiming that the questioning of a co-indictee Dennis Cross by the prosecutor constituted prosecutorial misconduct in violation of her right to due process and also violated her right, under the Sixth Amendment, to confront and cross-examine the witness against her. The magistrate recommended granting the writ of habeas corpus because the petitioner’s conviction was secured in contravention of her rights under the Sixth Amendment. The district court denied the writ finding that the record failed to support petitioner’s claim of prosecutorial misconduct and that the invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege by the witness neither had a substantial effect nor added critical weight to the state’s case. We have withheld the decision of this case awaiting the en banc opinion of this court in Brooks v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1383 (11th Cir.1985) (en banc), and a ruling on a second petition for rehearing en banc which has been denied.
I. FACTS
The testimony at trial showed that the deceased was a violent man and that several people could have had a motive for killing him.1
Donna and Tonya Busby testified about the occurrences on the day of the murder. Donna Busby, the petitioner’s thirteen-year-old daughter, stated that she was dating Dennis Cross at the time of her father’s death. The Alabama court described her testimony as follows:
On the afternoon of his death Houston Busby and his stepdaughter Tonya had a disagreement during which Houston called Tonya a “whore.” The deceased also cursed his wife, the [petitioner], Donna testified that during the afternoon and evening both Tonya Busby and Terry Lewis were angry at the deceased. After dinner Donna Busby had a conversation with Dennis Cross during which she learned of a plan to kill Houston Busby. Donna Busby then went to bed and did not awake until 6:15 the next morning. She learned from Dennis Cross at that time that Houston Busby had been killed. She said that she hated her father and was glad he was dead because he had abused her mother, brother and sister for so long. She stated that her parents had kept large amounts of cash in a black money pouch for as long as she could remember.
Tonya Busby, the deceased’s fourteen-year-old stepdaughter, testified that she was engaged to Terry Lewis. On the day of Houston Busby’s murder she and her stepfather had an altercation and he called her a “whore” within the hearing of Terry Lewis. Lewis then had a conversation with Dennis Cross after which he told Tonya, “It is going to happen tonight.” Tonya stated that Lewis had threatened to kill Houston Busby on pri- or occasions when he learned that Busby had abused her, and she did not believe *1463he was going to kill her stepfather that night. Miss Busby stated that Houston had beaten her and tried to rape her and she was glad he was dead.
On the night of the murder Tonya went to bed at 10:00 P.M., but woke up around midnight when she heard what sounded like a truck outside the house. She walked out of her bedroom and saw the [petitioner], her mother, and a bloody mess in the master bedroom. She did not see her stepfather. Her mother told her to start cleaning up and she complied. Tonya testified that Ladner, Cross and Lewis left the house and she and her mother then went back to bed.
Busby v. State, 412 So.2d 837, 840 (Ala.Crim.App.1982). The most detailed description of the murder came from the testimony of Kenneth Ladner, the petitioner’s son and the deceased’s stepson.
Kenneth Ladner, appellant’s son and the deceased’s stepson, testified that on several occasions prior to Houston Busby’s death, he had heard his mother discuss paying to have Busby killed. Ladner said that the discussions took place in the presence of Terry Lewis and Dennis Cross and occurred after his mother had been beaten by his stepfather. Ladner stated that on May 13, 1980, Terry Lewis borrowed his rifle____ Ladner testified that when he loaned the gun to Terry Lewis he had an idea that Lewis was going to kill Houston Busby.
When Ladner returned home after midnight on March 14, 1980, he did not see Houston Busby, but he found his mother, Tonya Busby, Terry Lewis and Dennis Cross cleaning up bloody bedding in the master bedroom. [The Petitioner] told Ladner to watch from the window to see if anyone was coming. According to Ladner, the [petitioner] instructed the others to put bricks into garbage bags with the blood-stained bedding. Ladner said that he, Cross and Lewis then drove to a bridge near the Mississippi State line and threw the garbage bags and rifle into the water.
On cross-examination, Ladner said that he did not take his mother seriously when she mentioned having her husband killed and he did not think Lewis or Cross believed she was serious either. He admitted that he hated and feared his stepfather, whom he described as six feet, three or four inches tall and weighing 230 pounds, because Busby had beaten him before. Ladner said that his mother had always carried large sums of money and it was not unusual for her to have $14,000 in the black pouch.
Id. at 839.
In addition to the foregoing Ladner testified that about two months before the murder he had a conversation with his mother as follows:
Q. What did she say to you?
A. She asked me, did I know anybody that would kill him for $10,000, after she had been beaten.
Q. And that was between, you say, the four month and two month statement, is that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. On a later occasion, did your mother come back to you and ask you if you had found somebody?
A. Yes.
Q. How much time had passed when she asked you if you knew somebody who would kill Houston Busby, until she asked you, “Have you found somebody?”
A. It was about a month or six weeks, or something like that. I don’t remember exactly.
R. 372. The Court of Appeals of Alabama summarized the testimony of a witness who had previously been married to Houston Busby, Jr., but at that time was divorced, which summary is as follows:
Lynn Busby, appellant’s former daughter-in-law, testified that about six weeks prior to Houston Busby’s death appellant told her that she had talked with a man about having her husband “taken care of.” Later, on the night before the murder, appellant told Ms. Busby that if Houston “laid a hand on her” it would be “the last chance he would have.” Ac*1464cording to the witness, appellant stated that there was a price for having her husband killed and she would be willing to pay it. On cross-examination, Ms. Busby acknowledged that she had seen appellant bruised and swollen on several occasions. She also stated that appellant and Houston Busby were in the habit of carrying large sums of cash and she had previously seen appellant with a black pouch of money.
412 So.2d at 839.
Marie Busby testified in her own behalf that she had lived with Houston Busby for fourteen years and they had one child, Donna. Her husband physically abused her at least three times a week and threatened to kill her if she ever left him. She stated that she had never made an offer of money to anyone to have her husband killed. She admitted that, after a beating, she may have said she wished he were dead, or she would give $10,000 to have him killed, but she did not intend for anyone to take her seriously.
The [petitioner] testified that on the night of her husband’s death she cleaned up in the kitchen and her husband retired for the evening. Then she went to take a shower and while she was in the bathroom she heard what sounded like a gunshot. She put on her robe and started out of the bathroom when Terry Lewis appeared at the door with a gun in his' hand said “You don’t want to come out now.” She was scared and she stayed in the bathroom crying until Lewis returned and told her to come out. Lewis then informed her that Busby was dead.
[The petitioner] stated that she was afraid her daughter Tonya had helped Lewis kill Busby and all of her ... further actions that night and the following day were done in an effort to protect her daughter. [The petitioner] admitted cleaning up the bedroom but denied planning to have her husband killed. She denied telling Lynn Busby about a plan to pay for her husband's murder.
Id. at 840.
Two character witnesses testified as to the petitioner’s good reputation for truthfulness and peacefulness and one recalled that he had seen her come to work with black eyes and bruises at various times. Another witness testified that he had lived with the Busbys for five years during which “he saw the deceased abuse the [petitioner] and her children and he himself had also been beaten by the deceased.” Id. at 840.
A. The Colloquy Between the Court and Counsel
During the trial, the prosecutor insisted that Dennis Cross and Terry Lewis, who were both co-indictees be permitted to take the witness stand. Dennis Cross and Terry Lewis had been charged with first degree murder but neither had been tried. The defense had no advance notice of the prosecutor’s intent to call them to the stand. The state called Cross to the stand but did not call Lewis.
Defense counsel adamantly objected and requested the court to instruct the state not to call the witnesses because: (1) there was a reasonable expectation they would assert the Fifth Amendment as both witnesses were charged with first degree murder; and (2) the exercise of their rights not to testify would be highly prejudicial. In the alternative, defense counsel argued that the court should allow the witnesses to take the stand out of the presence of the jury.2
The prosecutor maintained that the state had an absolute right to call the witnesses in the presence of the jury. First, he argued that the jurors, as lay people, would not understand the “legal ramifications” involved, i.e., that the witnesses were charged with murder and that they could assert their rights under the Fifth Amendment if called to testify. It was urged that the jurors had “a right to know that the *1465State [had] the good sense to at least call them.”3 Second, it was asserted that defense counsel could comment on the failure of the state to call the witnesses during his closing argument if the witnesses were not called before the jury. Last, the state maintained that as eyewitnesses to the crime the testimony of the witnesses could be highly relevant.
Next, the court heard arguments from Dennis Cross’s counsel. He advised the court that Cross’s case had arisen from the same transaction and that his trial was pending. He also stated that Cross would assert the Fifth Amendment if called to testify.4
Thereafter, another discussion occurred between the court and counsel in which defense counsel repeated his objections. During this discussion, the prosecutor addressed the subject of prosecutorial misconduct and conceded that this case presented “a close question.”5
In ruling on the objections, the court stated:
The question that bothers the Court is the right of the State Government ... in [sic] the duty of the District Attorney’s office to present all of the evidence that is available, or anyone who might testify who would lead ... give probative testimony, who would be someone who might present evidence that would be enlightening to the jury.
Record Volume III at 507. The court ruled that the prosecutor had the right to interrogate the witnesses in the presence of the jury but granted defense counsel a standing objection.6
B. The Interrogation of Dennis Cross
Dennis Cross was called to the stand in the presence of the jury. Prior to being interrogated by the prosecutor, Cross was examined by the trial judge and counseled by him with respect to his Fifth Amendment right not to answer questions which would tend to incriminate him. Cross was examined as follows by the prosecutor:
Q. Did you say, sir, that your name is Dennis Brinson Cross, Jr.?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How old are you, sir?
A. I just turned 19 in December.
Q. Mr. Cross, are you presently under indictment in this Court for the offense of Murder?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Does that charge of murder stem from the homicide of Houston E. Busby?
A. I refuse to answer.
Q. Do you know a woman by the name of Marie Busby?
A. I refuse to answer.
Q. Did you live in the home of Houston E. Busby during the period ... approximate period of January 1, 1980 to May 1, 1980?
A. I refuse to answer.
Q. On May the 14th of 1980, were you employed at the Busby sand and gravel pit in the Theodore area?
A. I refuse ...
Q. Have you ever been offered money to either murder Houston Busby *1466yourself, or help someone else murder Houston Busby?
A. I refuse to answer.
Q. Do you know a man by the name of Terry Lewis?
A. I refuse to answer.
Q. Have you ever seen this weapon? A. I refuse to answer.
Q. Where were you at approximately five o’clock on the afternoon of May 13, 1980?
A. I refuse to answer.
Q. Where were you at approximately 10 or 10:30 p.m. on the night of May 13, 1980?
A. I refuse to answer.
Q. During the early morning hours of May 14, 1980, did you have occasion to ride in a pickup truck to an area west of the Mobile Airport?
A. I refuse to answer.
Q. Mr. Cross, are you going to refuse to answer any additional question that I might ask you?
A. Yes, sir.
Id. at 513-15.
After the prosecutor had asked these questions, the interrogation was interrupted by defense counsel’s objection. Defense counsel moved for a mistrial but the motion was denied. No further questions were asked of Dennis Cross. The subject of Cross being interrogated was not again addressed or mentioned during the trial.
C. Information Before the Jury
While the jury panel was being assembled, the indictment was read. The indictment provided that the petitioner Marie Busby had:
[Cjaused Houston Busby to be killed with a rifle pursuant to an agreement or contract for hire, to wit, an agreement or promise to pay Terry Lewis and Dennis Cross the approximate sum of $10,000 to kill the said Houston Busby. The said Terry Lewis and Dennis Cross, pursuant to said contract or agreement ... did ... kill Houston Busby by shooting him with a rifle in violation of ... the Code of Alabama.
Supplemental Transcript at 4. The prosecutor also read the indictment to the jury during his opening statement. In addition, he discussed the theory of the case, i.e. that Mrs. Busby induced the murder by offering money.7 He pointed out that he expected the evidence to show that: (1) on more than one occasion, Marie Busby offered Lewis and Cross money to kill Houston Busby; (2) on May 13, Lewis and Cross went to a dirt pit owned by Houston Busby and acquired a rifle from Mrs. Busby's son by a previous marriage; (3) Lewis and Cross proceeded to the Busby home with the rifle and stayed there until Houston Busby went to bed; (4) while Houston Busby was asleep, Lewis and Cross went to his bedroom and shot him; (5) after the murder was committed, Lewis and Cross transported Houston Busby’s body to another area; and (6) Cross and Lewis returned to the Busby home and with the assistance of Mrs. Busby cleaned up and disposed of the evidence of the crime.8
Defense counsel also discussed the state’s theory in his opening statement and explained that Cross was a boyfriend of Mrs. Busby’s daughter and that he had moved out shortly before the shooting. Defense counsel stated he expected the evidence to show that Cross was at the house the day Houston Busby was killed.9
As mentioned previously, the jury heard testimony on approximately three or four occasions that Cross had dated Mrs. Busby’s daughter, lived in the house, worked at the gravel pit owned by Houston Busby, and had a murder charge that stemmed *1467from the homicide of Houston Busby. There was also testimony that he had seen the murder weapon and was at the Busby house the night of the murder.
Kenneth Ladner, Mrs. Busby’s son, affirmatively testified that he had heard his mother tell Cross and Lewis that she would give $10,000 to have Houston Busby killed. He stated that on each of these occasions Busby had just previously beaten his mother, which was evidenced by facial bruises, a black eye, and one time by her dental plate being bent so that it did not “fit her right after then.” He said the last of these conversations was six weeks to two months before Busby was killed.10 He stated that he did not take his mother seriously when she mentioned having her husband killed and “he did not think Lewis or Cross believed she was serious either.”11 Lynn Busby, who had previously been married to Houston Busby’s son, also testified that the petitioner had discussed having her husband killed.12 Neither Donna nor Tonya Busby affirmatively testified that they had heard their mother discuss paying money to anyone to have Houston Busby killed.13 The defendant, Marie Busby, testified that she never intended her statements to be taken as an offer to have her husband killed.14
Neither the prosecutor nor defense counsel referred to Cross’s answers to the prosecutor’s questions in their closing argument. In addition, defense counsel did not request (and the court did not give) a curative instruction concerning the inferences to be drawn from Dennis Cross’s invocation of the privilege.
II. THE INQUIRY
Our task is to determine if petitioner’s constitutional rights were abridged as a result of the prosecutor’s actions in interrogating Dennis Cross as just described.
Two constitutional rights are implicated: (1) Petitioner’s right to a fundamentally fair trial under the due process clause; and (2) Petitioner’s right under the Sixth Amendment to confront witnesses called by the state and cross examine them.
Petitioner contends that the state attorney was guilty of prosecutorial misconduct when he intentionally put Dennis Cross on the stand knowing that he would not answer the questions asked of him, and that such misconduct deprived her of a fundamentally fair trial. She further contends that she was deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine Dennis Cross and dispel the adverse inferences created against her by the questions propounded.
Turning first to the prosecutorial misconduct claim, we call attention to our recent opinion in Brooks v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1383 (11th Cir.1985) (en bane), petition for rehearing en banc denied. In Brooks, we acknowledged that while fundamental fairness is the relevant standard in a prosecutorial misconduct case, further tests are necessary to guide us in resolving particular cases. Id. at 1400. In Brooks, we adopted the prejudice requirement which was set out in Strickland v. Washington, — U.S. ---, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), an ineffective assistance of counsel case. We quoted the prejudice standard from Strickland v. Washington as follows:
The defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.
Brooks, supra at 1401 (quoting from Strickland). Further on that same page of our opinion we stated that the inquiry is “whether the absence of improper argu*1468ment would have, in reasonable probability, changed the result____” Id.
We have the problem of determining whether Brooks controls our opinion in this case. Brooks involved an alleged prosecutorial argument based upon an improper or impermissible argument to the jury in the sentencing phase of a death case. In Brooks, we stated that “a permissible argument no matter how ‘prejudicial’ or ‘persuasive’ can never be unconstitutional.” Id. at 1403. The opinion then went on to state that we had to undertake an examination of the argument to determine whether all or parts of it constituted an impermissible or egregious argument which created a reasonable probability that the outcome was changed because of them. Id. at 1403. In the present case the claimed prosecutorial misconduct is not related to the prosecutorial argument to the jury but to the intentional calling of Dennis Cross for the purpose of prejudicing the petitioner. We conclude that we are bound by Brooks even though, here, there is a different type of prosecutorial misconduct. We turn to the fundamental fairness test to determine whether the absence of the examination of Dennis Cross by the prosecutor would have, in reasonable probability, changed the outcome of the case.
Before examining the questioning of Dennis Cross and its probable impact on the outcome of this case, we turn to the second constitutional principle involved, and that is petitioner’s right under the Sixth Amendment to have cross-examined Dennis Cross. Two Supreme Court eases assist us in this analysis. While not discussing constitutional issues, the Supreme Court first addressed the facts similar to those presented here in Namet v. United States, 373 U.S. 179, 83 S.Ct. 1151, 10 L.Ed.2d 278 (1963). In Namet, the appellant claimed that reversible error was committed when the government was permitted to question witnesses when it was known that they would assert their privilege not to answer. Warning that reversible error is not invariably committed whenever a witness claims his privilege not to answer, the Supreme Court pointed out that there are two principles that suggest that a witness’ invocation of the privilege constituted error. First, error “may be based upon a concept of prosecutorial misconduct, when the Government makes a conscious and flagrant attempt to build its case out of inferences arising from the use of the testimonial privilege.” Id., 83 S.Ct. at 1154-55. Second, error may occur where “inferences from a witness’ refusal to answer added critical weight to the prosecution’s case in a form not subject to cross-examination, and thus unfairly prejudiced the defendant.” Id. at 1155. Namet, also pointed out that reversible error does not occur where the event in question was no more than a minor lapse through a long trial or where the claims of privilege were at most cumulative support for an inference well established by nonprivileged testimony. Namet v. United States, 373 U.S. at 187, 189, 83 S.Ct. at 1154-55.15 These principles have constitutional significance and are applicable to the states. Rado v. Connecticut, 607 F.2d 572, 581 (2d Cir.1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 920, 100 S.Ct. 3009, 65 L.Ed.2d 1112 (1980).
Courts have considered several factors in applying the Namet test. Some of these are: (1) the prosecutor’s intent in calling the witness; (2) the number of questions asked that elicit an assertion of the privilege; (3) whether the adverse inferences drawn from the assertion of the privilege relate to central issues or collateral matters; (4) whether the inference is the only evidence or is merely cumulative of other evidence; (5) whether the witness is closely associated with the accused; (6) whether defense counsel objects; (7) whether the prosecutor attempts to draw adverse inferences from the witness’ refusal to testify in his closing argument; (8) whether defense counsel has relied on the assertion of the privilege; and (9) whether the trial judge *1469gives a curative instruction. See Zeigler v. Callahan, 659 F.2d 254, 272 (1st Cir.1981); Rado v. Connecticut, 607 F,2d at 581; United States v. Ritz, 548 F.2d 510, 518-20 (5th Cir.1977).
The Supreme Court in Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 85 S.Ct. 1074, 13 L.Ed.2d 934 (1965) reversed the affirmance of a conviction by the Supreme Court of Alabama where the prosecutor had placed a co-defendant on the stand and interrogated him about a confession he had made which implicated defendant Douglas. Because the co-defendant exercised his Fifth Amendment right not to testify, Douglas was thus denied the right to cross-examine.
There is no doubt that a defendant in a criminal trial has a fundamental constitutional right to cross-examine witnesses called by the state, and this constitutional right has been equated to the right to notice and an opportunity to be heard and the right to counsel. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404-05, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 1068, 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965); Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 3, 86 S.Ct. 1245, 1246, 16 L.Ed.2d 314 (1966); Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129, 131, 88 S.Ct. 748, 749, 19 L.Ed.2d 956 (1968); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294-95, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 1045, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973). In speaking to the extent of this right, the Supreme Court in Smith v. Illinois, supra, said:
Even more recently we have repeated that “[a] denial of cross examination without waiver ... would be constitutional error of the first magnitude no amount or showing of want of prejudice would cure it.” Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 3, 86 S.Ct. 1245-46, 16 L.Ed.2d 314 (1966).
Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. at 131, 88 S.Ct. at 750.
The test was lessened slightly in Chambers v. Mississippi, supra, where the Supreme Court said:
Of course, the right to confront and to cross-examine is not absolute and may, in appropriate cases, bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process. Eg., Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 92 S.Ct. 2308, 33 L.Ed.2d 293 (1972). But its denial or significant diminution calls into question the ultimate “integrity of the fact finding process” and requires that the competing interest be closely examined. Burger v. California, 393 U.S. 314, 315, 89 S.Ct. 540, 541, 21 L.Ed.2d 508 (1969).
Chambers v. Mississippi, Id., 410 U.S. at 295, 93 S.Ct. at 1046.
There is no question but that petitioner Busby was denied the right of confrontation and effective cross-examination of Dennis Cross by his invocation of his privilege not to testify. A witness is not available for full and effective cross-examination when he or she refuses to testify. Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 85 S.Ct. 1074, 13 L.Ed.2d 934 (1965); Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968); Nelson v. O’Neil, 402 U.S. 622, 91 S.Ct. 1723, 29 L.Ed.2d 222 (1971). Since it appears that the petitioner was denied her Sixth Amendment right of confrontation, the question is what test should be applied in determining the effect of the constitutional deprivation upon the petitioner. The Supreme Court has not specifically applied Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967) to a denial of a defendant's right of confrontation.
We have faithfully attempted above to set forth the clearest statements of the Supreme Court concerning its opinion of the importance of this constitutional right. Our review indicates that the Sixth Circuit in Mayes v. Sowders, 621 F.2d 850, 856 (6th Cir.1980) did apply Chapman v. California, supra. The court said:
Having found constitutional error, we must next assess “whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction” or whether the error can be declared to be “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”
621 F.2d at 856 (citing Chapman v. California, supra). Since the Chapman v. California test is the one most frequently *1470used in assessing the weight of constitutional error, we adopt that standard.
We normally would be troubled by considering a case where different tests were required in the assessment of two constitutional errors. The interrogation of Dennis Cross by the prosecutor in the presence of the jury presents to us the two constitutional issues previously described, alleged prosecutorial misconduct and deprivation of a defendant’s right of confrontation. However, since the Chapman v. California test invokes a higher standard than does the Brooks v. Kemp test, and since we find that the action of the prosecutor here in denying the petitioner the right of confrontation is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we conclude that there is no reasonable possibility that the interrogation of Dennis Cross might have contributed to the conviction of the defendant. Thus, finding that the district court should be affirmed in light of the severer of the two tests, we hold that even if the prosecutor had been guilty of prosecutorial misconduct, there would be no basis for reversal under the lesser Brooks v. Kemp standard.
Our reasons for concluding that the interrogation of Dennis Cross could not have contributed to the conviction of petitioner are the same as those reached by the district court. The only question in the interrogation that could have prejudiced the defendant at trial was: “Have you ever been offered money to either murder Houston Busby yourself, or help someone else murder Houston Busby?” Any implication that the defendant might have offered to pay Cross for killing her husband would have been cumulative to evidence already admitted.
Additionally, although Marie Busby was charged with the capital offense of murder for hire, the jury returned a verdict for the lesser offense of murder. Consequently, any inference from the question implicating Marie Busby for offering to pay Dennis Cross money to kill Houston Busby was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the district court.
AFFIRMED.
. For a detailed factual account of the trial, see Busby v. State, 412 So.2d 837 (Ala.Crim.App.1982).
. Record Volume III at 482-83.
. Id. at 486.
. Id. at 486, 506.
. The prosecutor stated:
The law on the question is concededly very close.
The bottom line, Judge, is that it is a close question____ The law, as I read it says, that we are allowed to put Dennis Cross and Terry Lewis on the stand, even if we know that they will take the Fifth. Because, A., no prosecutorial misconduct, and B., no inferences would be drawn from a witness’ refusal to answer which would add critical weight. By inference there, we are talking about a prosecutor in a closing argument getting up and ranting and raving about, he took the stand, he took the Fifth.
Id. at 503-05.
. Id. at 511.
. The prosecutor stated: "The theory of the prosecution is that an offer was made to Cross, to Lewis, pursuant to that offer, that these two kids ... then went and killed Houston Busby.” Supplemental Transcript at 69-70.
. Id. at 70-71.
. Id. at 75-78.
. Record Volume II-III at 371, 412, 415.
. Busby v. State, 412 So.2d at 839.
. Record Volume III at 491-93. She also acknowledged that she had seen the petitioner bruised and swollen on several occasions.
. Id. at 595.
. Record Volume IV at 643-44.
. In Namet defense counsel failed to object. Additionally, the witnesses were co-defendants who had pled guilty and claimed their fifth amendment rights only to a portion of their testimony.