concurring:
I agree that the ordinance here is unconstitutional on its face but only to the extent that it fails to provide for prompt judicial review of the denial of a permit, an issue left unaddressed by the majority opinion. Strict procedural safeguards are required for prior restraints on speech. See National Socialist Party of America v. Village of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43, 44, 97 S.Ct. 2205, 2206, 53 L.Ed.2d 96, 98 (1977) (per curiam). A licensing regulation which grants city officials the discretion to deny permits must provide for speedy review to ensure constitutional protection. See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 85 S.Ct. 734, 13 L.Ed.2d 649 (1965); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. City of Hallandale, 734 F.2d 666, 675-76 (11th Cir.1984), modified 742 F.2d 590 (1984).
*1527The Orlando ordinance directs the chief of police to determine the amount of police protection “reasonably” required for traffic and crowd control, Orlando City Ordinance § 18A.12, and to deny applications for permits if the policing expenses are not prepaid. Id. § 18A.13(8). This authority is precisely the sort of discretion to restrain free expression which triggers the requirement of prompt judicial review. In Miami Herald, for example, this court invalidated a city ordinance which conditioned the issuance of licenses to operate newsracks on compliance with “all applicable provisions of the city Code,” Miami Herald, 734 F.2d at 669. Because it vested in city officials discretion to determine which ordinances and regulations were “applicable” to newspaper vending machines without also providing for ready judicial review, it failed to supply an adequate constitutional guarantee against an abuse of that discretion. Id. at 673-76. The authority to deny parade licenses on the basis of the failure to prepay “reasonably” required expenses confers at least as much discretion as an ordinance permitting the denial of a permit because of noncompliance with “applicable” regulations.
Although the Orlando ordinance states that “[a]ny applicant aggrieved shall have the right to appeal the denial of a permit to the city council of the city,” Orlando City Ordinance § 18A.15, it lacks the adversarial feature of judicial review. “[Ojnly a judicial determination in an adversary proceeding ensures the necessary sensitivity to freedom of expression____” Freedman, 380 U.S. at 58, 85 S.Ct. at 739, 13 L.Ed.2d at 654.
In light of this conclusion, I would not reach the remaining issues. However, because the majority did not feel so constrained, I write separately to express my disagreement with its views on several other important constitutional questions.
The majority misreads Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 61 S.Ct. 762, 85 L.Ed. 1049 (1941), as permitting only nominal charges for policing a demonstration in a public area. The fee approved in Cox was not nominal, but instead ranged “from $300 to a nominal amount.” Id., 312 U.S. at 576, 61 S.Ct. at 766, 85 L.Ed. at 1054. The Court found “nothing contrary to the Constitution in the charge of a fee limited to the purpose” of meeting the “expensefs] incident to the administration of the [licensing statute] and to the maintenance of public order....” Id., 312 U.S. at 577, 61 S.Ct. at 766, 85 L.Ed. at 1054.
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 63 S.Ct. 870, 87 L.Ed. 1292 (1943), did not overrule Cox’s endorsement of charges greater than a token amount. Murdock invalidated a flat license fee levied on distributors of religious literature. Distinguishing Cox, the Court stated that it was not confronted with
state regulation of the streets to protect and insure the safety, comfort, or convenience of the public. Furthermore, the present ordinance is not narrowly drawn to safeguard the people of the community in their homes against the evils of solicitation. As we have said, it is not merely a registration ordinance calling for an identification of the solicitors so as to give the authorities some basis for investigating strangers coming into the community. And the fee is not a nominal one, imposed as a regulatory measure and calculated to defray the expense of protecting those on the streets and at home against the abuses of solicitors.
Murdock, 319 U.S. at 116, 63 S.Ct. at 876, 87 L.Ed. at 1300 (citations omitted). The majority’s reliance on the Murdock Court’s use of the word “nominal” misapprehends the basis of the decision—that the flat license tax was not justified by any legitimate state interest. If anything, Murdock reaffirms the principle that concerns for public safety support restrictions on speech.
It is true that the ordinance here permits the assessment of unreasonable .fees, an issue not addressed by the Cox Court. The charges there were subject to a limitation. However, the reasoning in Cox establishes that fees are constitutionally permissible as long as they are attributable to the cost of ensuring public safety. A different view *1528would be unprecedented, and contrary to the interpretation of Cox by at least three other circuits. See Eastern Connecticut Citizens Action Group v. Powers, 723 F.2d 1050, 1056 (2d Cir.1983) (license fee invalidated because the plaintiffs failed to show that the charge was equal to the administrative costs incurred); Fernandes v. Limmer, 663 F.2d 619, 633 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981) (“A licensing fee to be used in defraying administrative costs is permissible, Cox v. New Hampshire, supra, but only to the extent that the fees are necessary----”); Baldwin v. Redwood City, 540 F.2d 1360, 1372 (9th Cir.1976) (“In some circumstances a city may both require a permit for activity involving free expression without violating the First Amendment and also collect fees that fairly reflect costs incurred by the city in connection with such activity.”), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 913, 97 S.Ct. 2173, 53 L.Ed.2d 223 (1977).
The majority also faults the ordinance as being content-based. Restrictions founded on the content of speech are disfavored because of the danger that free expression may be discouraged or prohibited “ ‘merely because public officials disapprove the speaker’s view.’ ” Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 530, 536, 100 S.Ct. 2326, 2332, 65 L.Ed.2d 319, 327 (1980) (quoting Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 282, 71 S.Ct. 325, 333, 95 L.Ed. 267, 276 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)); see also Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, — U.S. —, —, 104 S.Ct. 3065, 3070, 82 L.Ed.2d 221, 228 (1984). That risk is not present here. Consideration of the nature of the demonstration is strictly limited to evaluating its threat to public safety. The police costs depend not on whether state officials disapprove of the applicant’s message but whether the public reacts disfavorably to the speaker’s view. The ordinance does not discriminate on the basis of the group’s viewpoint or the subject matter of the demonstration. Speech sufficiently controversial to endanger public safety when presented to one audience at a certain time and place may be completely uncontroversial to another audience at a different time and place. I fail to see how a restriction can be content-based when it treats identical speech differently in varying situations.1
Even if the ordinance is content-based it is not, as the majority indicates, automatically unconstitutional. The Supreme Court has repeatedly made clear that restrictions predicated on the content of the speech are simply analyzed under a stricter standard. “For the State to enforce a content-based exclusion it must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.” Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators’ Association, 460 U.S. 37, 45, 103 S.Ct. 948, 955, 74 L.Ed.2d 794, 804 (1984); see also United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177, 103 S.Ct. 1702, 1707, 75 L.Ed.2d 736, 744 (1983); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269-70, 102 S.Ct. 269, 274, 70 L.Ed.2d 440, 448-49 (1981). In my opinion the ordinance here, by virtue of its concern for public safety, meets this standard.
Because the ordinance is unconstitutional on its face, I see no need to inquire further into the constitutional validity of its application in this instance. However, the majority assumes this additional burden by holding that less restrictive means were available to achieve the governmental purpose of protecting public safety. Deputy chief of police Frederick Walsh testified in his deposition that regular police officers must be paid for overtime under the union contract. See Record, vol. 1 at 169. He also stated that reserve officers are paid the same as regular officers for such duty in many cases since diverting them to police demonstrations often requires assigning regular officers at overtime pay to replace them. Id. at 182-83. From my review of the record the plaintiffs in this case were not charged different rates than other organizations which use public places for demonstrations or parades.
*1529By holding that local governments must pay virtually all the expense of police protection for a demonstration in a public area, the majority would place the burden of reasonable costs for police services in such a situation on the city alone, a result not mandated by Cox. It is not difficult to foresee the dangerous consequences of inadequate police supervision resulting from a municipality’s inability or reluctance to allocate sufficient funds during, for example, a politically or racially charged parade. Although it would be a laudable gesture for local governments to subsidize the free expression of speech, it is not required by the Constitution. The “First Amendment does not guarantee the right to communicate one’s views at all times and places or in any manner that may be desired.” Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 647, 101 S.Ct. 2559, 2563, 69 L.Ed.2d 298, 306 (1981).
. Interestingly, one commentor points to the precise problem here as support for abandoning the distinction between content-based and content-neutral restrictions on speech. Redish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34 Stan.L.Rev. 113, 133 (1981).