(dissenting).
The majority has held that a student who gives a paper to a professor in the course of academic study has no expectation of privacy in that paper. Then they go on to rule that an employer may demand production of a personal paper its employee believes to be private if they think the paper contains information that is relevant to her work. The court also holds that an individual who offers a paper to a third party, changes her mind, and obtains the paper back before it has been read has no expectation of privacy because she has “exposed” the paper to public view. I believe that in arriving at its decision the majority has incorrectly analyzed the fourth amendment claim and, as a result, has run roughshod over core fourth amendment protections against unreasonable searches and seizures of private papers and has rendered an opinion that threatens first amendment protections given to academic freedom of inquiry and expression.
To decide whether an individual possesses a legitimate expectation of privacy the court must determine whether the individual has a subjective expectation and then whether the individual's subjective expectation of privacy is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979).
I. PRIVACY INTEREST IN ACADEMIC PAPER1
A. Subjective Interest
The majority has found, contrary to the district court and the record, that Alinovi *788had no subjective interest in the privacy of the contents of her paper after she submitted it to her professor at Worcester State College.2 After securing permission from Chris’ mother to study Chris and after assuring her that confidentiality would be protected, Alinovi wrote her graduate school assignment using only Chris’ first name. In order to preserve the confidentiality of other persons referred to in her paper, including the principal and herself, Alinovi deleted the names of all school personnel and did not identify the name of the school or the town in which the school is located. Although the majority of the court found that, “when Alinovi gave the paper to the professor she expected that the paper would be discussed in class ...,” the record contains no basis for this assertion. Rather, Alinovi testified that she expected that the paper might add to her professor’s knowledge in the field of mental health, and that the professor might take the knowledge of this case, add it to her knowledge of other cases, and use the accumulated knowledge for discussion in future courses. There is also nothing in the record that contradicts Alinovi’s testimony that she submitted the paper to her professor at Worcester State College with the expectation that it would not be given to Midland Street School authorities, the only people who would be able to identify the writer or individuals referred to in the paper. After grading it, her college professor returned the paper to Alinovi.
The majority stresses that Alinovi did not tell her professor that the paper could not be copied or shared with others. In light of the fact that federal law protects the privacy of academic work, this was not necessary. Students’ privacy expectations are protected by the Family Education and Privacy Rights Act (the Buckley Amendment to the General Education Provisions Act) which provides that federal funds shall be withdrawn if a school or university reveals records containing identifying data, including academic work, to persons outside the university without a student’s consent. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (1982); Act of Dec. 31, 1974, Pub.L. No. 93-568, 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.News 6779. Thus, Alinovi’s belief that her professor would keep her paper private was entirely consistent with the normal expectations of students and teachers and in keeping with university policy in clinical educational settings. See, e.g., Harvard Law School Advisor 19-22 (Aug. 30, 1984); Cooperative Legal Education Handbook, Northeastern University School of Law 16-17 (Dec. 1984). I must, therefore, disagree with my colleagues that Alinovi had no subjective privacy interest in her academic paper after she submitted it to her college professor.
B. Societal Recognition of Privacy Interest in Academic Paper
In order for an individual’s subjective expectation of privacy to be protected by the Constitution, the expectation must be one that “is recognized and permitted by society.” Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. at 740, 99 S.Ct. at 2580; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361, 88 S.Ct. 507, 516, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). The majority appears to find that even if Alinovi did have a subjective expectation of privacy in her paper before she brought it to Midland school, society will not recognize her privacy interest because the paper contained information that Midland school authorities believed might be relevant in developing and implementing Chris’ educational program. In finding “relevance to an employer” to be the test for abrogating an individual’s privacy interest, I believe the majority casts far too wide a net: innumerable personal writings might be thought to be relevant, at least in *789part, to an employer’s work. For instance, Alinovi kept a diary spanning the period that Chris was a student in her classroom. Under the majority’s relevance analysis, the principal could have demanded that Alinovi submit her journal for inspection if she had acknowledged that it contained thoughts about her experiences with Chris. Such a ruling is tantamount to telling employees that they privately criticize any aspect of their work life at their peril.
Perhaps the majority intends to restrict their no-privacy rule to material submitted to professors. Diaries and letters may still be safe but today’s decision will undoubtedly have a chilling effect on free expression and critical inquiry in the classroom, especially in clinical programs and education courses that integrate work experience with classroom learning. Under the court’s rule, the Midland school authorities would be free to discipline Alinovi, as they intimated they might do in this case, because her employer deemed “the content of [her academic paper] ... to reflect very poor professional judgement.” If today’s ruling continues unimpaired, teachers and professors would be well-advised to caution students that their work may be subject to scrutiny by persons other than those directly involved in the educational process regardless of whether the work contains highly personal, revelatory, inflammatory, or simply untactful material.
Even apart from the fact that I think the majority holding is inconsistent with federal law and accepted academic practice, I believe the ruling today impermissibly burdens first amendment freedoms. The Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of preserving an atmosphere of free expression and critical inquiry in our country’s schools and universities: “The vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of American schools.” Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487, 81 S.Ct. 247, 251, 5 L.Ed.2d 231 (1960).
A university ... is a kind of continuing Socratic conversation on the highest level ... and the thing that you must do to the uttermost possible limits is to guarantee ... [women and] men the freedom to think and to express themselves.
Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 197-98, 73 S.Ct. 215, 221-22, 97 L.Ed. 216 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). See also Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603, 87 S.Ct. 675, 17 L.Ed.2d 629 (1967); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 249-50, 77 S.Ct. 1203, 1211-12, 1 L.Ed.2d 1311 (1957).
This circuit, too, has had a long-standing tradition of being a vigorous proponent of academic freedom. We have held that “[there is] a zone of First Amendment protection for the educational process itself, which ... must include ... students and teachers [and] ... their host institutions.” Cuesnongle v. Ramos, 713 F.2d 881, 884 (1st Cir.1983). See also Winkes v. Brown University, 747 F.2d 792, 797 (1st Cir.1984) (“Academic freedom, although not a specifically enumerated constitutional right, has long been viewed as a special concern of the First Amendment.”); Beitzell v. Jeffrey, 643 F.2d 870, 875 (1st Cir.1981) (vigorous exchange of ideas is basic function of university); Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359, 362 (1st Cir.1969) (warning of dangers of chilling teacher’s speech).
Because of Alinovi’s dual role as student and teacher, the court's ruling has a double impact. By stripping Alinovi of her privacy rights in her paper on its submission to her professor at college, the majority holding will discourage students from engaging in critical inquiry. The implications of the majority decision for teachers’ rights are no less disturbing. Most boards of education require or encourage teachers to take continuing education courses to stay abreast of developments in their field or expand their horizons on the theory that continued study will contribute to a vital and stimulating classroom performance. It is both natural and desirable that teachers focus on their teaching experiences in continuing education courses. I find it regrettable that the court lays down a rule that will stymie teachers’ efforts to understand and improve their work. “Teachers [as *790well as] ... students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die.” Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. at 250, 77 S.Ct. at 1211.
In addition to disagreeing with the majority’s view that Alinovi had no legitimate privacy interest in an academic paper because it might be helpful to her employer, I do not believe that school authorities should be given unbridled discretion to compel production of personal papers without relation to existing need. No one has contended at trial or on appeal that Alinovi’s paper contained any material information on Chris that was not already known to the evaluation team. Nonetheless, under the majority’s test school authorities can compel production of material known to be merely cumulative even if the paper contains other highly personal observations.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly curtailed the power of investigating bodies to determine on their own the reasonableness of searches which encroach upon individuals’ privacy interests. See Marshall v. Barlows, 436 U.S. at 323, 98 S.Ct. at 1825 (prohibiting warrantless regulatory searches which place unbridled discretion in hands of executive and administrative officers as to when to search for OSHA violations and whom to search); United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. at 357-59, 88 S.Ct. at 514-515 (denying right of police to determine reasonableness of search without judicial approval); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 77 S.Ct. 1203, 1 L.Ed.2d 1311 (1963) (restricting scope of investigatory powers of state legislative committee); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 205, 77 S.Ct. 1173, 1188, 1 L.Ed.2d 1273 (1957) (restricting scope of federal legislative investigation). I do not believe that school authorities should be treated differently than other investigatory bodies and given unilateral authority to decide when papers prepared in nonemployment contexts are “relevant” and subject to seizure or examination and whether their need outweighs an individual’s competing privacy interests.
II. PRIVACY INTEREST AFTER REEVALUATION MEETING
A. Alinovi’s Subjective Expectation of Privacy
The majority has followed up their finding that Alinovi had no subjective interest in the privacy of her paper before she brought it to the reevaluation meeting by finding that even if she did, she abandoned that expectation of privacy when she brought the paper to Midland Street School. They reach this determination despite the district court’s determination that Alinovi believed her paper to be private and in spite of the evidence.
The record shows that Alinovi, at a private meeting prior to Chris’ reevaluation, sought advice from Generelli, supervisor of special education teams for the Midland Street School. At this meeting she had confided to Generelli that she felt she had been rebuffed by the principal in her efforts to talk to him about Chris and asked Generelli’s advice. Generelli advised her that if she was concerned about the adequacy of Chris’ educational plan, she could request a reevaluation, which she did. Alinovi testified that when she gave Generelli the paper just prior to the beginning of the reevaluation, she expected that Generelli would treat the information in the paper confidentially, as she believed he had treated the comments she had made at their private meeting.3 The evidence shows that Generelli accepted the paper, immediately *791put it into his briefcase, and did not refer to it or read from it at any time during the evaluation. When Alinovi asked for it back at the end of the meeting, Generelli promptly and without reservation handed it to her. The next day when Principal Bombard requested the paper Alinovi told him that she had fulfilled her duty to inform the evaluation team of all information she had concerning Chris but that her paper, written for other purposes in another context, was private. The district court found that “the plaintiff fe[lt] ... that the report was her private paper____” I would uphold the district court and find that Alinovi had a subjective expectation of privacy in her paper even after she gave the paper to Generelli.
B. Exposure to Public View
The majority found that Alinovi had no legitimate privacy interest once she brought the paper to Midland Street School because in giving it to the chairman of the special education evaluation team she exposed her paper to public view. In so ruling, I believe that the majority has misapplied Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 103 S.Ct. 3319, 77 L.Ed.2d 1003 (1983), the case on which it relies. In Andreas, a customs officer at an airport opened a container holding marijuana. He notified Drug Enforcement Agents who saw the marijuana inside the container and then resealed the container and delivered it to the addressee’s residence where Andreas took possession of it. When Andreas was arrested, he tried to assert a privacy interest in the marijuana. The Supreme Court ruled that no protected privacy interest remains in contraband inside a container once government officers have lawfully opened the container and examined its contents. Andreas, 463 U.S. at 771, 103 S.Ct. at 3323.
Alinovi was obviously not asserting a privacy interest in the physical sheets of paper that were viewed, but in the thoughts expressed thereon, thoughts which clearly were not “exposed” in any meaningful way.4 Therefore, I cannot agree that when Alinovi brought the paper to the reevaluation meeting and gave it to Generelli, who immediately placed it inside his briefcase and returned it to her unread, that she had “exposed the paper to view” and thereby lost her expectation of privacy.
C. Private Paper v. Work Product
Because the majority grounds its decision that Alinovi’s privacy claim fails on the reasons that I have previously discussed, they did not address what I believe to be the real issue in this case: Whether Alinovi submitted her private academic paper into the educational evaluation process when she gave it to Generelli at the meeting and thereby transformed it into a professional work product.
Clearly the school has a substantial interest in gathering the full panoply of information available on a student in order to implement the child’s Individualized Educational Plan (IEP) pursuant to its responsibilities under Chapter 766, Mass.Gen.Laws Ann. ch. 71B (West 1982). The regulations for the implementation of Chapter 766 require that the “Administrator” of an evaluation team direct that “assessments” be prepared by a “TEAM” of specialists. The TEAM specialists typically include the child’s teacher, adjustment counselor, physician, psychologist, etc. Each person preparing an assessment must summarize in writing the procedures employed in conducting their assessment, results, and their diagnostic impression as well as define in detail their view of the child’s needs. Mass.Admin.Code tit. 603 §§ 319.0-319.4. Section 310.3 of the regulations requires that current records be kept of all information relating to evaluations. Records must be available for inspection by the child’s *792parents and can be useful in review of the child’s progress after an IEP is adopted.
Given the clear import of the regulations, I have no doubt that once a paper is submitted by a TEAM participant and accepted into the evaluation process to help in the child’s evaluation, whether read or not, it becomes part of the child’s educational record. I would find this to be so regardless of whether the paper was previously a research paper, a journal entry or, as is normally the case, was prepared specifically for the evaluation.
If, under the facts of the case, Alinovi’s giving of her paper to Generelli transformed it from a private paper into a professional work product, then the administrators of the special needs program would be deemed to be on notice of its contents whether or not they read it, and Alinovi would have lost her right of privacy in it. If the paper was not accepted into the evaluation process and was not, under Chapter 766, a submission that became part of the student’s record, then I believe we should follow the well-established law that when a search is based upon consent and consent is withdrawn or revoked the searchers must abide by the limitations placed upon them by the consenting individual. See, e.g., Linn v. Civatero, 714 F.2d 1278, 1288 (5th Cir.1983); United States v. Ward, 776 F.2d 143 (9th Cir.1978); Mason v. Pulliam, 557 F.2d 426 (5th Cir.1977). See also LaFave, Search and Seizure § 8.1(c) (1978); Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure §§ SS 240.3 (Official Draft 1975).
Since the district court did not address what I conceive of as is the central issue, I would remand for factual findings on it.
. I consider the private nature of the paper to include the particular embodiment of the Alinovi’s thoughts as well as her interest in not revealing her personal feelings about her principal and her teaching philosophy. See Harper and Row v. Nation Enterprises, — U.S. —, *788—, 105 S.Ct. 2218, 2228, 85 L.Ed.2d 588 (1985) (distinguishing first amendment right of privacy in choice of words from suppression of facts).
. Although the district court did not make a finding of fact on this precise question, it implicitly found that Alinovi did have a subjective interest in privacy prior to bringing her paper to Midland Street School since it found that she believed her paper to be private after she presented it to Mr. Generelli, chairman of the evaluation meeting at Midland school.
. Although Alinovi testified at trial that in giving the paper to Generelli she knew she was running the risk that he would divulge its contents to third parties, anyone who participates in a private conversation or writes a private letter runs the risk that the recipient may reveal the contents or thoughts to third persons. See also P. Goldberger, Consent, Expectations of Privacy, and the Meaning of "Searches” in the Fourth Amendment, 75 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 319, 332 (1984) (concept of “assumption of risk” limited to cases of third-party consent).
. The majority also cites Katz for the proposition that "what a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection." The Supreme Court, however, did not stop there, but went on to state, “But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.” Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52, 88 S.Ct. 507, 511-12, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967).