dissenting.
As the majority recognizes, this controversy entails two statutory provisions in tension; the question is which of the two prescriptions, in light of the general congressional design, is more appropriately subordinated to the other. Upon the petitioner-union’s request, the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA or Authority) issued the Interpretation and Guidance contested in this review proceeding. The challenged Interpretation subordinated a decision of the Federal Service Impasses Panel (Impasses Panel or Panel), which under the statute is “final and binding” on the parties, to the agency head’s statutory authority to approve collective bargaining agreements. See Interpretation and Guidance, 15 F.L.R.A. 564 (1984). I conclude that the purposes and policies underlying the statute are frustrated by allowing the agency a unilateral veto over the final, impasse-resolving decision of an impartial and expert Panel. I therefore dissent from the court’s affirmance of the Authority’s Interpretation.
I.
The Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Act, 5 U.S.C. § 7101 et seq. (1982) (Act), provides a framework for the negotiation of employment contracts and the resolution of bargaining disputes in the public sector. To facilitate the just and efficient termination of negotiation impasses, the Act created the Federal Service Impasses Panel. The Panel operates as a “mechanism of last resort” in cases where the parties cannot reach agreement. See Council of Prison Locals v. Brewer, 735 F.2d 1497, 1501 (D.C.Cir.1984). The members of the Panel are appointed by the President; the statute requires that the appointees be persons “familiar with Government operations and knowledgeable in labor-management relations.” 5 U.S.C. § 7119(c)(2) (1982). The Panel’s first charge is to assist the parties in accommodating their differences; if inter-party accommodation fails, the Panel is empowered to “take whatever action is necessary and not inconsistent with this chapter to resolve the impasse.” Id. at § 7119(c)(5)(B)(iii). Panel impasse-resolving action often takes the form of ordering the parties to adopt particular contract provisions. The FLRA and the courts consider such Panel-imposed terms to be part of the collective bargaining agreement. See International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO, Local 121, 10 F.L.R.A. 198, 199 (1982); American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO v. FLRA, 712 F.2d 640, 646 n. 24 (D.C.Cir.1983). The Act mandates that any final action of the Panel "shall be binding on [the] parties during the term of the agreement, unless the parties agree otherwise.” 5 U.S.C. § 7119(c)(5)(C) (1982).
The Act also provides, however, that “[a]n agreement between any agency and an exclusive representative shall be subject to approval by the head of the agency.” Id. at § 7114(c)(1). The agency head has thirty days in which to decide whether or not to approve the agreement, but he must approve it if it is “in accordance with the provisions of this chapter and any other applicable law, rule, or regulation.” Id. at § 7114(c)(2). The agency head’s rejection of a contract term under this provision thus constitutes a claim by him that the term is nonnegotiable. See Interpretation, 15 F.L.R.A. at 567. The issue of negotiability may be decided only by the FLRA. See Interpretation and Guidance, 11 F.L.R.A. 626 (1983).
*864The language of the statute creates a tension between the final and binding character of the Panel’s decision and the agency head’s authority to reject contract provisions that he judges to be contrary to law. The legislative history confirms rather than resolves this tension. Congress clearly desired the Impasses Panel to be the final arbiter in these contract disputes. Indeed, the strength of this desire led Congress to take the unusual step of precluding direct review of Panel decisions by either the FLRA or the courts. See H.R.Rep. No. 1403, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 54 (1978), reprinted in Legislative History at 700; Council of Prison Locals, 735 F.2d at 1499-1500.1 On the other hand, it is also clear that Congress wished to maintain the boundaries of management rights as delineated in the Act. See maj. op. at 852-853 & n. 3. The agency head’s approval authority is designed to secure these boundaries against incursion occasioned by the inexperience or incompetence of the lower level officers who negotiate the contract. The legislative history provides no instruction to the Authority, or the courts, on the appropriate reconciliation of these competing congressional aims.
II.
When the language and legislative history of a statute are ambiguous, the court generally must defer to the interpretation of the agency entrusted with superintendence of the statutory scheme. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2782-83, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). But judicial deference cannot be blind or absolute; the courts “must not ‘rubber-stamp ... administrative decisions that they deem inconsistent with a statutory mandate or that frustrate the congressional policy underlying a statute.’ ” Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms v. FLRA, 464 U.S. 89, 97, 104 S.Ct. 439, 444, 78 L.Ed.2d 195 (1983) (quoting NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 291-92, 85 S.Ct. 980, 988, 13 L.Ed.2d 839 (1965)); see American Federation of Government Employees v. FLRA, 750 F.2d 143, 146 (D.C.Cir.1984). The purpose of the Labor-Management Act was to strike a sensitive balance between the rights of federal employees and the need for effective and efficient operation of the government. See 5 U.S.C. § 7101(b) (1982); 123 Cong.Rec. E5566 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1977) (remarks of Hon. William Clay), reprinted in Legislative History at 834. The Authority’s holding in this case disrupts that balance and frustrates the policy underlying the statute. It is, therefore, beyond the range of “reasonably defensible” interpretation. See Department of Defense v. FLRA, 691 F.2d 553, 558-59 (D.C.Cir.1982).
The Authority’s interpretation significantly erodes the right Congress accorded federal employees to bargain collectively. The Act prohibits recourse by federal employees to the ultimate device in labor’s cabinet to impel management to reach an acceptable agreement — the strike. See 5 U.S.C. § 7116(b)(7) (1982). Having denied federal employees this arm, Congress provided a different mechanism through which a union could force a recalcitrant agency to accept a termination of the dispute. This mechanism is the Federal Service Impasses Panel.2 The employees’ right to bargain *865would be debilitated if they were denied the secure ability to force negotiations to a conclusion binding on management and simultaneously foreclosed from refusing to work without a contract. Thus, their bargaining capacity depends, to an important extent, on the fairness and efficacy of the impasse resolution procedure.
The Interpretation upheld by the majority opens the way for agency abuse of that impasse resolution process. As counsel for the union pointed out at oral argument, the Panel often functions as a kind of “final offer” arbitrator. Accord Department of Defense, Army-Air Force Exchange Service v. FLRA, 659 F.2d 1140, 1146 n. 32 (D.C.Cir.1981). The parties present their proposed contracts and the Panel, rather than designing new terms itself, picks and chooses from among the provisions suggested by the parties to design a contract that is fair as a package. Allowing the agency to withhold an objection to the negotiability of a term until after the Panel issues its decision undermines the fairness of this procedure. The agreement that the Panel constructs is intended to be balanced; if the agency can wait and reject a term after the Panel has included it, that balance will be upset.3
For example, in the dispute that led to the Interpretation in this case, the provision that the agency head rejected was one that the agency itself suggested to the Panel. See Department of Justice, Bureau of Prisons, Washington, D.C., No. 79 F.S.I.P. 120 (Oct. 29, 1980) (Factfinder’s Report), reprinted in Brief for Petitioner, Addendum B at B-51. The Panel might have seen the term as a generous concession — it provided that “[personnel actions made the subject of formal grievances will be stayed, if the grievant so requests, unless the employer has a good faith reason to go ahead with the actions.” See Letter from Kenneth T. Blaylock, President of AFGE, to Barbara Mahone, Chairperson of the FLRA, at 2 (May 25, 1983) (requesting an Interpretation and Guidance), reprinted in Joint Appendix at 4. In exchange for this term, the Panel might have given the agency a more favorable provision elsewhere in the contract. Allowing the agency head to veto the provision after the Panel has ordered its inclusion permits the agency to misemploy the system by suggesting generous terms and then repudiating them.4
A further, intensely practical concern, adds weight to my misgivings about the majority’s denigration of the Panel’s position in the statutory scheme, and the extra card the majority deals to the agency. The FLRA’s disposition, which the court so strenuously labors to affirm,5 undermines *866the employees’ rights in this additional and conspicuous way: it delays the decision on the validity of the Panel-imposed term for so long that the term may not be worth anything to the union when it is finally upheld. I agree with the majority that the second issue in this case hinges on the first: if the agency head has the authority to reject a Panel-imposed provision then the union may challenge that action only through an “expedited” negotiability appeal or an unfair labor practice charge. See maj. op. at 857, 861-62. Both of these paths lead to the Authority, and the road, as experience reveals, is a long one.
The union estimates that a decision by the Authority may be delayed some three years by the backlog from which that agency suffers. See Brief for Petitioner at 15. By contrast, the grievance/arbitration procedure established by every contract, see 5 U.S.C. § 7121(a) (1982), may be accomplished in a matter of months. See F. Elkouri & E.A. Elkouri, How Arbitration Works 9 n. 36, 277 & n. 235 (4th ed. 1985).
This difference may mean a great deal to the union. The term of a public sector labor contract is typically only two or three years, see Brief for Petitioner at 16 n. 9; by the time the Authority addresses the issue it might lose its immediate, practical vitality even if the union’s appeal could survive a mootness challenge. See, e.g., FLRA v. Office of Personnel Management, 778 F.2d 844 (D.C.Cir.1985) (union filed expedited negotiability appeal in February 1980, collective bargaining agreement relevant to union’s proposals expired June 1983, FLRA announced its decision February 1984; agency unsuccessfully contended that union’s negotiability appeal became moot upon expiration of the particular agreement’s term). Moreover, the time lapse itself generates losses that cannot always be compensated by retroactive relief: for example, the loss of procedural protections or beneficial working conditions during the years when the contract should have been in force.6
The majority argues that this factual— and therefore changeable — difference in the time required for the various resolution procedures cannot be the basis for an interpretation of congressional intent. See maj. op. at 860 n. 17. It is true, of course, that our interpretation of the statutory procedure cannot vary depending on the size of the backlog from which the FLRA suffers; but the slowness of the FLRA’s nonnegotiability procedure is nonetheless relevant because it is, in part, symptomatic of the lack of fit between that procedure and the union’s concerns.
*867The negotiability appeal minimizes the time span between the Panel order imposing agreement terms and the request for review, but places no limit on the amount of time the Authority may take in rendering a final decision. See 5 U.S.C. § 7117(c)(6) (1982). From the union’s point of view, however, the relevant time period is not the one between the Panel’s decision and the request for Authority review; that time may be so brief that scant, if any, loss is sustained. Instead, the lapse critical to the employees’ interests is the time between the agency’s violation of the agreement and the resolution of the dispute. This latter time, it should be apparent, represents the measure of lost benefits — benefits due under the contract. And it is this crucial period that the availability of arbitration shortens. Thus, the negotiability appeal route requires the union to expend its resources before the issue becomes vital, i.e., when the agency asserts nonnegotiability but is not yet chargeable with breach of contract. Furthermore, no clock limits the time that the union must suffer the adverse consequences of the agency’s refusal to follow the Panel-imposed term. Arbitration, on the other hand, is triggered only when the union is positioned to charge the agency with violation of its contractual responsibility. Moreover, the parties have substantial assurances concerning — and sometimes even control over — the time within which a decision will be issued.7
Thus, the Interpretation at issue in this case may lead to a substantial delay and severe erosion of the employees’ rights. Nor is this erosion of employee bargaining rights counterbalanced by any overriding consideration relating to efficiency or effectiveness in government. Indeed, the Interpretation adopted by the Authority and affirmed by the majority hinders rather than furthers the statutory policy in favor of the smooth operation of government.
The serious bargaining imbalance created by this extension of the agency head’s authority undermines both the reality and the appearance of fairness on which the amicable and expeditious resolution of labor disputes depends. By creating an opening for abuse on management’s side and an impression of unfairness to the union, the Interpretation invites suspicion and distrust on the part of the union and intransigence, even guile, on the part of the agency. The stable labor relations that the Act was intended to promote will therefore be disserved rather than advanced by this Interpretation.8
No discernible government interest supports the bargaining power imbalance that the court affirms today. The purpose served by the agency head’s approval authority does not warrant extension of that authority to cover Panel-imposed agreements. That purpose, as the majority points out, was to insure high level review of federal labor agreements. See maj. op. at 858. The approval power is designed to prevent the intrusion on management rights that sometimes results from the inexperience or incompetence of the lower level officials who negotiate the contracts. This functional interpretation is confirmed by the explicit statutory exception for contracts negotiated at a higher level, as part *868of a national agreement. See 5 U.S.C. § 7114(c)(4) (1982). Congress evidently assumed that national officials are experienced and knowledgeable, and therefore found no need for the agency head to review and approve a contract negotiated by such officials.
No doubt Congress also anticipated that the Impasses Panel would be far more experienced and knowledgeable than the agency head when it comes to the consistency of contract terms with the applicable laws. Congress instructed the President to choose Panel members “solely on the basis of fitness to perform the duties and functions involved, from among individuals who are familiar with Government operations and knowledgeable in labor-management relations.” 5 U.S.C. § 7119(e)(2) (1982).9 Panel members obviously are more analogous to the national officers in the statutory exception than to the subordinate negotiators whose deficiencies the agency head’s approval power was designed to check.
The- majority suggests that the Panel’s knowledge may nonetheless be inadequate because the Panel is not aware of all the rules and regulations concerning each agency — rules and regulations with which the agreement must also be consistent. See id. at § 7114(c)(2) (head of agency shall approve if agreement is consistent with applicable laws, rules, and regulations). The approval power is functional with respect to Panel-imposed terms, the argument goes, because it allows the agency head to insure that the agreement is compatible with all applicable agency regulations. See maj. op. at 859. However, this argument proves too much. The national officers who are exempted from agency head review, as well as the FLRA and the courts, are surely less familiar with such regulations than the agency head or, indeed, the agency’s representatives in negotiations. Rulings by such superior authorities, prescribing or upholding contract terms, are, nonetheless, not subject to subsequent oversight by the agency head. Clearly then, closeness to local regulations is neither sufficient nor necessary for exemption from review by the agency head.
There is a very good reason why this should be so. The Panel, like the Authority and the courts, has the agency as a party before it and, therefore, has easy access to any information it might need regarding potential conflicts between the agreement and agency regulations.10 The Panel also has the expertise in government operations and labor-management relations that equips it to make the appropriate inquiries before imposing terms. See supra. If there is a question of conflict, which raises an attendant issue of negotiability, the Panel’s own procedures call for it to decline jurisdiction and allow resolution of the question by the Authority. See International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 10 F.L.R.A. 198, 198 n. 1 (1982). Thus, the Panel’s composition, its procedures, and the administrative process provide ample protection from overreaching Panel decisions without undermining the other purposes of the statute.
The Authority’s Interpretation, in sum, is inconsistent with the policies underlying the statutory scheme. It disrupts the delicate balance between labor and management, weakens employees’ rights, erodes stable negotiation practices, and serves no significant government interest. It is therefore an unacceptable interpretation.
*869III.
As the majority recognizes, once the question whether the agency head may disapprove a Panel-imposed term is resolved, the issue of where the union may go to challenge the disapproval is essentially answered. See maj. op. at 861. If, as I conclude, the agency head had no authority to disapprove the term in the first place, then his rejection of it becomes a simple contract violation. A dispute over the meaning or application of the collective bargaining agreement is properly challenged through the grievance procedure and arbitration. See Louis A. Johnson Veterans Administration Medical Center, Clarksburg, West Virginia, 15 F.L.R.A. 347 (1984). In the course of resolving such a dispute, the arbitrator must consider whether the provision at issue violates the applicable laws, rules or regulations. See id. at 350-51.11 Either party may request FLRA review of the arbitrator’s decision. See 5 U.S.C. § 7122 (1982); see also supra note 6.
IV.
The FLRA’s interpretations merit substantial deference when they present reasonable and defensible constructions of the Act. The Interpretation at issue here involves scant reasoning on the FLRA’s part, see supra note 5, and is incompatible with the policies underlying the statutory scheme. The Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Act, 5 U.S.C. § 7101 et seq. (1982), does not authorize an agency head to undermine the crucial role of the Federal Service Impasses Panel by unilaterally rejecting a term that Panel imposed. The agency’s refusal to comply with such a provision is, as I comprehend the legislators’ dominant intent, a simple contract violation, subject to the usual grievance and arbitration procedures. I therefore dissent from the majority opinion.
. The FLRA and, eventually, the courts may indirectly review the Panel's decision through an unfair labor practice charge brought against the party refusing to adhere to the Panel-imposed term. If the term is contrary to law then it will not be enforced against the violator. See National Federation of Federal Employees, Local 1332, 5 F.L.R.A. 599, 601 (1981). This collateral review provides a safety valve for those few cases in which the Panel imposes an illegal term; it remains clear, however, that Congress permitted no one — not even a court — to nullify a Panel decision by direct action or review.
. The majority opinion appears to acknowledge the importance of the Impasses Panel as a replacement for the use of economic force. See maj. op. at 852 ("[Although strikes continue to be forbidden, Congress established an Impasses Panel, whose job it is to suggest, and if necessary, order, terms of settlement between agencies and unions when they cannot agree.”) (citations omitted).
The controlling office of the Panel motivates and provides the entire foundation for the union’s challenge to the Authority’s Interpretation. The union does not contest the agency head’s *865approval authority as applied to negotiated agreements; rather, the union targets solely and squarely a veto for the agency head over Panel-imposed agreements. The unfairness and the conflict with statutory policy both arise because of the singular and critical role of the Panel’s impasse resolution process.
. The majority attempts to escape this charge of unfairness by expanding the agency head’s approval power in a way that presents even greater potential for unfairness. The majority opinion maintains that the agency head’s veto has the effect of invalidating not only the allegedly illegal provision, but the entire agreement which contains it. See maj. op. at 860 n. 16. In other words, according to the majority, Congress — having set out to create a system which protected federal employees' right to "participate ... in decisions which affect them,” 5 U.S.C. § 7101(a)(1) (1982) — gave the agency head the unilateral power to require employees to work under an outdated contract or without any contract at all. As the majority must- realize, extending an outdated contract that the employees wish to change may intrude on their self-determination — the self-determination that collective bargaining is designed to implement — well-nigh as much as commanding them to work without any agreement. Thus, under either one of these options, the employees lose the very power that the statute was designed to advance and protect.
. As the majority points out, the Interpretation was not issued to resolve this particular dispute but to address a broader problem. See maj. op. at 854-55 & n. 9. Nonetheless, the facts of this case afford a telling illustration of the kind of abuse the Interpretation countenances.
. The court’s long analysis is scarcely aided by the agency’s decision, which answered the union’s question, “Is an agency [head] barred from disapproving ... provisions of an agreement ... when such provisions are imposed by decision of the Federal Service Impasses Panel,” in a *866half-page paragraph noting "the absence of relevant legislative history" and relying simply on "the plain words of the Statute." See Interpretation and Guidance, 15 F.L.R.A. at 567. To the extent that there is a reasoned explanation for the Authority's decision, that explanation surely does not come from the mouth of the agency.
. The majority suggests that arbitration is no shorter than a nonnegotiability appeal in the long run because, although the arbitrator’s award may be issued sooner, the parties may always appeal that award to the FLRA and thereby cause the final decision to be delayed indefinitely. See maj.op. at 860 n. 17. The possibility of appeal fails to vitiate the advantages of arbitration for two reasons. First, only a relatively small percentage of arbitral awards are appealed at all. See F. Elkouri & E.A. Elkouri, supra at 68 n. 144 (stating that only 17% of arbitral awards were appealed in 1980-1982). Thus, in most cases, the arbitrator’s judgment is the final decision. Second, even when the arbitrator’s award is appealed, existing FLRA regulations require the agency to comply with the award pending the Authority’s decision on appeal unless the agency has made a special request for, and been granted, a stay. See AFGE v. FLRA, 777 F.2d 751 (D.C.Cir.1985). The FLRA permits stays only under conditions essentially as stringent as those required for the stay of a federal district court order pending appeal. See id., at 758. And in nearly 90% of the cases in which arbitral awards were appealed, the FLRA has ultimately upheld the awards. See id. at 758. In other words, if the union is allowed to challenge the agency head’s veto through the arbitration procedure, then in most cases it can expect to enjoy the benefits of the arbitrator's award continuously from the date the award issues even if, thereafter, the award is appealed. In contrast, if the union is channeled into the nonnegotiability appeal process, it can expect to wait long years before it sees any benefits even if it is ultimately successful.
. For example, the American Arbitration Association instructs arbitrators to issue their judgments within 30 days of the close of the hearing and the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service suggests 60 days after the close of the hearing. See F. Elkouri & E.A. Elkouri, supra at 111. Moreover, the parties may themselves prescribe time limits on arbitration in their collective bargaining agreements. See id.
. The majority appears to acknowledge "the disruption that disapproval might create," maj.op. at 860 n. 16, and argues only that such disruption is also caused by agency head disapproval of a negotiated agreement. See id. But the balance struck by the statute plainly justifies one kind of disruption while, sensibly comprehended, it rules out the other. The disruption caused by agency head disapproval of a negotiated contract is the price that must be paid in order to protect agency rights from the danger inherent in negotiation by subordinate officials. When an agency head rejects a Panel-imposed contract, however, the disruption is much greater — because of the special role and competence of the impartial, expert Panel as a mechanism of last resort — and there is no countervailing consideration to justify that disruption. See infra at 868.
. These statutorily required qualifications distinguish the Panel members from the members of the Authority, who are required to meet only political criteria. See 5 U.S.C. § 7104(a) (1982). The Authority, nonetheless, enjoys an undisputed right to impose terms on an agency free from the threat of agency head disapproval.
. Contrary to the majority’s suggestion, constant vigilance by the agency head is not the only alternative to an extension of his revocation authority to Panel-imposed terms. See maj.op. at 858. The agency head’s review need be conducted only once, but that review should occur immediately before the Panel makes its decision rather than after. Given the Panel’s usual practice of adopting some collection of the parties' terms, such an eve of final submission review ordinarily should be sufficient to protect the agency from the imposition of a term it considers nonnegotiable.
. As counsel for the FLRA acknowledged at oral argument, the issues of illegality and non-negotiability are substantively identical. The question then arises, if only the FLRA may decide the negotiability issue, why may an arbitrator decide the issue of illegality? The Louis A. Johnson case suggests that the answer lies not in the substance of the issues but in their context. A negotiability dispute arises when “an agency involved in collective bargaining ... alleges that the duty to bargain in good faith does not extend to any matter.” Louis A. Johnson, 15 F.L.R.A. at 349 n. 2; see id. at 349-50. But disputes relating to the meaning and application of provisions of an existing contract — including disputes over the legality of the provisions— should be decided through arbitration. See id. at 350-51. In other words, the Authority has very sensibly suggested that disputes of this nature which arise in the context of negotiation concern negotiability, and disputes of this nature which arise in the context of enforcing an existing contract concern illegality. Cf. National Federation of Federal Employees, Local 1332, 5 F.L.R.A. 599, 601 (1981) (holding that agency head nonnegotiability objections made after 30 days were properly raised in grievance arbitration rather than in a negotiability appeal because the contract had gone into effect). Obviously, if the agency head has no authority to revoke it, then a Panel-imposed agreement is a completed contract when it is issued; any challenge to its terms made in an enforcement proceeding therefore raises an arbitrable issue of illegality.