Defendant Avis Rent A Car System (Avis) appeals from a judgment entered on a jury verdict in the Eastern District of New York (Weinstein, Ch.J.) awarding $304,693 in damages to plaintiff Robert S. Ohanian for lost wages and pension benefits arising from defendant’s breach of a lifetime employment contract made orally to plaintiff. The jury also awarded Ohani-an $23,100 in bonuses and moving expenses that did not depend on the oral contract. Avis argues that the alleged oral contract is barred by the statute of frauds, is inadmissible under the parol evidence rule and, in any event, that the evidence is insufficient to establish a promise of lifetime employment. Plaintiff cross-appeals seeking a new trial solely on the issue of damages claiming that jury confusion in the damage calculation resulted in a miscarriage of justice. Unpersuaded by defendant’s arguments on its appeal and plaintiff’s on his cross-appeal, we affirm.
I BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Ohanian began working for Avis in Boston in 1967. Later he was appointed District Sales Manager in New York, and subsequently moved to San Francisco. By 1980 he had become Vice President of Sales for Avis’s Western Region. Robert Mahmarian, a former Avis general manager, testified that Ohanian’s performance in that region was excellent. During what Mahmarian characterized as “a very bad, depressed economic period,” Ohanian’s Western Region stood out as the one region that was growing and profitable. According to the witness, Ohanian was directly responsible for this success.
In the fall of 1980, Avis’s Northeast Region — the region with the most profit potential — was “dying.” Mahmarian and *104then Avis President Calvano decided that the Northeast Region needed new leadership and Ohanian was the logical candidate. They thought plaintiff should return to New York as Vice President of Sales for the Northeast Region. According to Mah-marian, “nobody anticipated how tough it would be to get the guy.” Ohanian was happy in the Western Region, and for several reasons did not want to move. First, he had developed a good “team” in the Western Region; second, he and his family liked the San Francisco area; and third, he was secure in his position where he was doing well and did not want to get involved in the politics of the Avis “World Headquarters,” which was located in the Northeast Region. Mahmarian and Calvano were determined to bring Ohanian east and so they set out to overcome his reluctance. After several phone calls to him, first from then Vice President of Sales McNamara, then from Calvano, and finally Mahmarian, Ohanian was convinced to accept the job in the Northeast Region. In Mahmarian’s words, he changed Ohanian’s mind
On the basis of promise, that a good man is a good man, and he has proven his ability, and if it didn’t work out and he had to go back out in the field, or back to California, or whatever else, fine. As far as I was concerned, his future was secure in the company, unless — and I always had to qualify — unless he screwed up badly. Then he is on his own, and even then I indicated that at worst he would get his [severance] because there was some degree of responsibility on the part of management, Calvano and myself, in making this man make this change.
Ohanian’s concerns about security were met by Mahmarian’s assurance that “[ujnless [he] screwed up badly, there is no way [he was] going to get fired ... [he would] never get hurt here in this company.” Ohanian accepted the offer and began work in the Northeast Region in early February 1981.
In April 1981 Ohanian told Fred Sharp, Vice President of Personnel, that he needed relocation money that had been promised, but not yet received. Sharp subsequently sent two form letters to Ohanian: one from Sharp to Ohanian and the other, prepared by Avis, from Ohanian to Sharp. The second letter was a form with boxes for Oha-nian to cheek to signify his choice of relocation expense plans. Ohanian checked one of the boxes, signed the form, and returned it to Sharp.
The following language appeared on the form that Ohanian signed and returned:
I also hereby confirm my understanding that nothing contained herein or in connection with the change in my position with Avis shall be deemed to constitute an obligation on the part of Avis to employ me for any period of time, and both the company and I can terminate my employment at will.
There are no other agreements or understandings in respect of my change in position with Avis or the moving of my residence except as is set forth or referred to herein, and in your confirmation letter to me dated April 21, 1981, and the agreements and undertakings set forth therein cannot be modified or altered except by an instrument in writing signed by me and by an executive officer of Avis.
At trial, Ohanian said that he did not believe he read the letter other than to check the relocation plan he desired. He testified that he did not intend this letter to be a contract or to change the terms of his prior agreement with Avis.
Seven months after Ohanian moved to the Northeast Region, he was promoted to National Vice President of Sales and began work at Avis World Headquarters in Garden City, New York. He soon became dissatisfied with this position and in June 1982, pursuant to his request, returned to his former position as Vice President of Sales for the Northeast Region. A month later, on July 27, 1982, at 47 years of age, plaintiff was fired without severance pay. He then instituted this action. Within three months of termination, plaintiff obtained a job as Vice President of Sales for *105American International Rent A Car. His first year’s salary at American International was $50,000 plus a $20,000 bonus. When Ohanian was fired by Avis, his yearly salary was $68,400, and the jury found that he was owed a $17,100 bonus that he had earned before being fired.
At the close of the evidence, the trial judge instructed the jury that to find for plaintiff it had to find that Ohanian’s conversations with Mahmarian amounted to an oral contract that plaintiff would not be fired except for just cause, and that he would be paid severance pay no matter what the reason for termination. The judge also instructed the jury that if it found the letters exchanged between Sharp and Ohanian were a contract, it must find in favor of defendant. The jury was further instructed that if it found a contract not to terminate except for just cause, it had to determine if defendant had proved that the termination had been for just cause. If the termination was not for just cause, then the jury should decide if Ohani-an was entitled to lost wages and benefits and, if so, in what amount. If the jury decided that termination was for just cause or that it was not for just cause but Ohani-an was not entitled to lost wages and benefits, it would have to determine if plaintiff was entitled to severance pay and, if so, in what amount. The jury was given a special verdict sheet so that the court would know its answers to all of the above questions.
If the jury found that plaintiff was entitled to lost wages and benefits, it was instructed to compute them by first multiplying plaintiff’s yearly salary by the number of years he would have remained at Avis had he not been fired. The jury was then directed to add to that amount the amount of pension benefits Ohanian would have received. From that total amount, the amount plaintiff had earned and would earn from other employment and the pension benefits from other employment was to be deducted. The sum reached was then to be reduced to its present value.
The jury returned with a verdict in which it found:
(1) That Ohanian had proven that Avis agreed to employ him until he retired unless he was terminated for just cause;
(2) That Avis had not proven that Ohani-an was terminated for just cause;
(8) That Ohanian had proven that he was entitled to lost wages and pension benefits;
(4) That the present value of Ohanian’s lost wages was $245,409;
(5) That the present value of Ohanian’s lost pension benefits was $59,284;
(7) That Ohanian proved he was entitled to an award representing a $17,100 bonus; and
(8) That Ohanian proved he was entitled to an award representing incidental relocation expenses of $6,000.
Finally, to obviate the need for a new trial in the case of a judgment n.o.v. or a reversal on appeal, the trial court instructed the jury to deliberate on the amount of severance to which plaintiff would have been entitled if the jury had so found. The jury found that Ohanian would have been entitled to a three-month severance package.
Avis does not challenge the jury’s finding that it had not proved that plaintiff was terminated for just cause. Neither has it appealed the awards for the bonus and relocation expenses. Both parties agree that New York law applies.
II DISCUSSION
A. The Statute of Frauds
Defendant’s principal argument is that the oral contract that the jury found existed is barred under the statute of frauds, § 5-701 (subd. a, para. 1) of the General Obligations Law. Section 5-701 provides in relevant part:
Every agreement, promise or undertaking is void, unless it or some note or memorandum thereof be in writing, and subscribed by the party to be charged *106therewith, or by his lawful agent, if such agreement, promise or undertaking ... [b]y its terms is not to be performed within one year from the making thereof or the performance of which is not to be completed before the end of a lifetime.
It has long been held that the purpose of the statute is to raise a barrier to fraud when parties attempt to prove certain legal transactions that are deemed to be particularly susceptible to deception, mistake, and perjury. See D & N Boening, Inc. v. Kirsch Beverages, 63 N.Y.2d 449, 453-54, 483 N.Y.S.2d 164, 472 N.E.2d 992 (1984). The provision making void any oral contract “not to be performed within one year” is to prevent injustice that might result either from a faulty memory or the absence of witnesses that have died or moved. See id.; 2 Corbin on Contracts § 444, at 534 (1950).
The fact that inconsistent theories have been advanced to explain the statute’s enactment perhaps sheds light on modern courts’ strict construction of it. Parliament enacted An Act for Prevention of Frauds and Perjuries in 1677 that required certain contracts to be evidenced by a signed writing. One theory for its enactment was that evidence of oral contracts tended to be susceptible to perjury and inherently unreliable. See, e.g., Burns v. McCormick, 233 N.Y. 230, 234, 135 N.E. 273 (1922) (Cardozo, J.) (passage of the statute of frauds was necessary because of the “peril of perjury ... latent in the spoken promise”). This view is premised on the theory that an interested plaintiff will testify untruthfully about the existence of an oral contract. Another view derives from the fact that in a seventeenth century jury trial the parties and all others interested in the outcome were incompetent to testify as witnesses. T. Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law, 55-56 (2d ed. 1936). To overcome that hurdle, so this theory goes, parties desiring legal protection for their transactions had to embody them in documents whose contents and authenticity were easily ascertainable. Id. at 56.
Whatever may be the fact with regard to the history of the statute, and whatever may have been the difficulties arising from proof that all sides agree brought about the enactment of the statute of frauds over 300 years ago, it is an anachronism today. The reasons that prompted its passage no longer exist. And, far from serving as a barrier to fraud — in the case of a genuinely aggrieved plaintiff barred from enforcing an oral contract — the statute may actually shield fraud. Note, The Statute of Frauds as a Bar to an Action in Tort for Fraud, 53 Fordham L.Rev. 1231, 1232-33 (1985).
In fact, New York courts perhaps also believing that strict application of the statute causes more fraud than it prevents, have tended to construe it warily. The one-year provision has been held not to preclude an oral contract unless there is “not ... the slightest possibility that it can be fully performed within one year.” 2 Corbin on Contracts § 444 at 535; Warner v. Texas and Pacific Railway, 164 U.S. 418, 434, 17 S.Ct. 147, 153, 41 L.Ed. 495 (1896) (“The question is not what the probable, or expected, or actual performance of the contract was; but whether the contract, according to the reasonable interpretation of its terms, required that it should not be performed within the year.”); Boening, 63 N.Y.2d at 455, 483 N.Y.S.2d 164, 472 N.E.2d 992. (“this court has continued to analyze oral agreements to determine if, according to the parties’ terms, there might be any possible means of performance within one year”).
It was long ago established that
[i]t is not the meaning of the statute that the contract must be performed within a year_ [I]f the obligation of the contract is not, by its very terms, or necessary construction, to endure for a longer period than one year, it is a valid agreement, although it may be capable of an indefinite continuance.
Trustees of First Baptist Church v. Brooklyn Fire Ins. Co., 19 N.Y. 305, 307 (1859). Therefore, a contract to continue for longer than a year, that is terminable at the will of the party against whom it is *107being enforced, is not. barred by the statute of frauds because it is capable of being performed within one year. See North Shore Bottling Co. v. C. Schmidt & Sons, Inc., 22 N.Y.2d 171, 176-77, 292 N.Y.S.2d 86, 239 N.E.2d 189 (1968). Similarly, it has been held that a contract which provides that either party may rightfully terminate within the year falls outside the statute. Blake v. Voigt, 134 N.Y. 69, 72-73, 31 N.E. 256 (1892); see 2 Corbin on Contracts § 449 at 564.
When does an oral contract not to be performed within a year fall within the strictures of the statute? A contract is not “to be performed within a year” if it is terminable within that time only upon the breach of one of the parties. Boening, 63 N.Y.2d at 456, 483 N.Y.S.2d 164, 472 N.E.2d 992. That rule derives from logic because “[performance, if it means anything at all, is ‘carrying out the contract by doing what it requires or permits’ ... and a breach is the unexcused failure to do so.” Id. (citing Blake v. Voigt, 134 N.Y. at 72, 31 N.E. 256). The distinction is between an oral contract that provides for its own termination at any time on the one hand, and an oral contract that is terminable within a year only upon its breach on the other. The former may be proved by a plaintiff and the latter is barred by the statute.
Avis contends that its oral agreement with Ohanian is barred by the statute of frauds because it was not performable within a year. Avis claims that it could only fire plaintiff if he breached the contract, and breach of a contract is not performance. Defendant further states that an option in plaintiff alone to terminate the contract at will, if there was in fact such an option, also would not remove this agreement from the statute’s coverage. See North Shore Bottling, 22 N.Y.2d at 177 n. 3, 292 N.Y.S.2d 86, 239 N.E.2d 189; Belfert v. Peoples Planning Corp., 22 Misc.2d 753, 755-56, 199 N.Y.S.2d 839 (1959), aff'd mem., 11 A.D.2d 760, 202 N.Y.S.2d 101 (1st Dep’t 1960), aff'd mem., 11 N.Y.2d 755, 226 N.Y.S.2d 693, 181 N.E.2d 630 (1962).
What defendant fails to recognize is that under New York law “just cause” for termination may exist for reasons other than an employee’s breach. Thus, for example, in Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 458, 460, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193, 443 N.E.2d 441 (1982), the plaintiff was induced to leave his former position to take up employment with defendant McGraw-Hill, in part by an assurance from defendant’s representative that “since his company’s firm policy was not to terminate employees without ‘just cause’, employment by it would, among other things, bring him the advantage of job security.” The company handbook describing its dismissal policies stated, “ ‘[t]he company will resort to dismissal for just and sufficient cause only_ However, if the welfare of the company indicates that dismissal is necessary, then that decision is arrived at and carried out forthrightly.’” Id. at 460-61, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193, 443 N.E.2d 441. The New York Court of Appeals held that the arguably oral contract in question “whether terminable at will or only for just cause, [was] not one which, ‘by its terms’, could not be performed within one year and, therefore, [was] not one which [was] barred.” Id. at 463, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193, 443 N.E.2d 441.
Later, in Boening, 63 N.Y.2d at 456 n. *, 483 N.Y.S.2d 164, 472 N.E.2d 992, the court noted that “the reference in [Weiner ] ... to an agreement terminable ‘only for just cause’ falling outside the Statute of Frauds is not to be construed as including an agreement where ‘just cause’ can only be the other party’s breach.” (emphasis added). The Boening court recognized therefore that some contracts terminable for “just cause” do not require a breach in order to terminate. In Boening, the court determined that the supply contract in question required plaintiff to “conduct its subdistributorship satisfactorily, exerting its best efforts and acting in good faith.” Id. at 458, 483 N.Y.S.2d 164, 472 N.E.2d 992. Defendant was only allowed to terminate the contract for failure to satisfy those requirements. Since the only possible cause for termination was plaintiff’s *108breach, the contract was barred by the statute of frauds.
In the instant case, just cause for dismissing Ohanian would plainly include any breach of the contract, such as drinking on the job or refusing to work, since the agreement contemplates plaintiff giving his best efforts. But, as noted, just cause can be broader than breach and here there may be just cause to dismiss without a breach. To illustrate, under the terms of the contract it would be possible that despite plaintiff’s best efforts the results achieved might prove poor because of adverse market conditions. From defendant’s standpoint that too would force Avis to make a change in its business strategy, perhaps reducing or closing an operation. That is, there would be just cause for plaintiff’s dismissal. But if this is what occurred, it would not constitute a breach of the agreement. Best efforts were contemplated by the parties, results were not. Defendant was anxious to have plaintiff relocate because of his past success, but plaintiff made no guarantee to produce certain results. Thus, this oral contract could have been terminated for just cause within one year, without any breach by plaintiff, and is therefore not barred by the statute of frauds.
Defendant’s further claim that a contract does not escape the statute if it is terminable at will only by plaintiff is negated by the fact that the contract provided that plaintiff could be terminated for reasons other than the plaintiff’s breach. As just stated, defendant could fire the plaintiff on account of conduct that would not constitute breach of contract. Where either party under the contract may rightfully terminate within a year, the contract is outside the statute. See North Shore Bottling, 22 N.Y.2d at 176, 292 N.Y.S.2d 86, 239 N.E.2d 189 (quoting with approval Blake v. Voigt, 134 N.Y. 69, 31 N.E. 256) and 177 n. 3; Nat Nal Services Stations, Inc. v. Wolf, 304 N.Y. 332, 336-37, 107 N.E.2d 473 (1952).
B. The Parol Evidence Rule
Defendant next urges that any claims based on the oral agreement between Ohanian and Avis are barred by the parol evidence rule. Avis says that the clear and unambiguous letter of April 21, 1981 was signed by plaintiff, and it contradicts plaintiff’s assertion that he was promised lifetime employment and severance on termination. It is, of course, a fundamental principle of contract law “that, where parties have reduced their bargain, or any element of it, to writing, the parol evidence rule applies to prevent its variance by parol evidence.” Laskey v. Rubel Corp., 303 N.Y. 69, 71, 100 N.E.2d 140 (1951).
Avis’s argument fails for a very basic reason: the jury found that the April 21st letter did not constitute a contract between it and Ohanian. The trial judge had correctly instructed the jury that if it found the letter to be a contract it could not find for plaintiff, and the jury found for plaintiff. Parol evidence is excluded only when used as an attempt to vary or modify the terms of an existing written contract. See Kirtley v. Abrams, 299 F.2d 341, 345 (2d Cir.1962) (the rule does not preclude a party “from attempting to show that there never was any agreement such as the writing purported to be”); Whipple v. Brown Brothers Co., 225 N.Y. 237, 244, 121 N.E. 748 (1919) (“One cannot be made to stand on a contract he never intended to make.”); 3 Corbin on Contracts § 577 at 385 (1960).
This case is quite unlike Franzek v. Calspan Corp., 78 A.D.2d 134, 434 N.Y.S.2d 288 (Fourth Dep’t. 1980), upon which defendant relies. In Franzek the plaintiff, about to embark on a hazardous “white water” raft ride in the Niagara River, was handed and signed a release form. He later claimed he had not read it. Such failure on his part was held not to raise an issue of fact to relieve plaintiff of its effect when the release was asserted against his claim of injury. Id. at 138, 434 N.Y.S.2d 288. But the contrary appears in the present case where there is strong evidence in the record to support the jury’s finding *109that the writing was not intended to be a contract: the letter was on a form; it was sent to Ohanian in response to his request for relocation expenses; and he testified that he did not believe he read the letter other than to check a box indicating the type of relocation reimbursement he wanted. Most significantly, no evidence was presented that suggests that either Ohani-an or Sharp, the Avis Vice President who sent the form to plaintiff, intended it to define the terms of Ohanian’s employment with Avis.
C. The Sufficiency of Evidence Regarding Avis’s Promise of Lifetime Employment
Avis says that inasmuch as the evidence of an oral promise of lifetime employment was insufficient as a matter of law, that issue should not have gone to the jury. It relies on Brown v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 190 F.Supp. 295 (E.D.N.Y.1960), as support for this argument. Defendant can draw little solace from Brown. In that case the claimed assurances were made in several ways including meetings of a group of employees — the purpose of which was not to discuss length of employment — or during casual conversation. Id. at 299-300. The conversations were not conducted in an atmosphere, as here, of critical one-on-one negotiation regarding the terms of future employment. Further, in Brown the district court found as a matter of fact that the alleged promise of lifetime employment was never made. In contrast, in the instant case the evidence was ample to permit the jury to decide whether statements made to Ohanian by defendant were more than casual comments or mere pep talks delivered by management to a group of employees. All of the surrounding circumstances — fully related earlier — were sufficient for the jury in fact to find that there was a promise of lifetime employment to a “star” employee who, it was hoped, would revive a “dying” division of defendant corporation.
Avis argues further that even if a promise of lifetime employment terminable only for just cause is found, evidence of that promise is not sufficiently definite and for that reason cannot be enforced. It is true “that, before the power of law can be invoked to enforce a promise, it must be sufficiently certain and specific so that what was promised can be ascertained.... Thus, definiteness as to material matters is of the very essence in contract law.” Joseph Martin, Jr., Delicatessen v. Schumacher, 52 N.Y.2d 105, 109, 436 N.Y.S.2d 247, 417 N.E.2d 541 (1981) (citations omitted); see also Brookhaven Housing Coalition v. Solomon, 583 F.2d 584, 593 (2d Cir.1978) (“[t]o consummate an enforceable agreement, the parties must not only believe that they have made a contract, they must also have expressed their intent in a manner susceptible of judicial interpretation”). Yet, promises of lifetime employment have long been enforced if found to be supported by sufficient consideration. See 9 Williston on Contracts § 1017 at 132-35 & nn. 17-19 (3d ed. 1967); 3A Corbin on Contracts § 684 at 229 (1960). Defendant does not contend that Ohanian’s consideration for the promise of lifetime employment—his relocation from San Francisco to New York—was inadequate.
D. Defendant’s Damage Arguments
Defendant finally urges that Ohanian’s complaint alleges that any oral agreement between Avis and Ohanian contained a liquidated damage clause, and that therefore the damages awarded were excessive. Defendant refers to a portion of plaintiff’s complaint which states:
in any event, if plaintiff’s employment with Avis should be terminated for any reason, he would be entitled to the normal Avis Vice President’s severance compensation on the basis of one month of benefits for each year of employment at the time of termination.
We agree that if the severance package was intended to be liquidated damages, it would set a maximum on the recovery. Nonetheless, as plaintiff correctly points out, a liquidated damage clause must be the result of an express agreement *110between the parties; courts will not read such a clause into a contract by implication. See, e.g., Winkelman v. Winkelman, 208 App.Div. 68, 70, 203 N.Y.S. 63 (1st Dep’t 1924). It is anything but clear from the record that plaintiff intended the severance package to constitute his damages regardless of the reason he was terminated. Quite the contrary, the evidence suggests that the severance package was to be given plaintiff only if he “screwed up” in some manner that would constitute a breach of the contract and defeat his contract of lifetime employment.
Defendant finally contends that the trial court’s instructions to the jury on how to compute damages were unreasonable. Allowing the jury to compute the amount plaintiff would have received until the natural end of his contract, according to Avis, gives the plaintiff a windfall. But the court also instructed the jury to subtract from this amount anything Ohanian had received and would receive from other employment and to reduce the amount arrived at to its present value. Contrary to defendant’s view, this is a reasonable and correct method of determining future damages from lost wages. See Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Kelly, 241 U.S. 485, 488, 36 S.Ct. 630, 631, 60 L.Ed. 1117 (1916); Doca v. Marina Mercante Nicaraguense, S.A., 634 F.2d 30, 37 (2d Cir.1980), cert. denied sub nom. Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Doca, 451 U.S. 971, 101 S.Ct. 2049, 68 L.Ed.2d 351 (1981).
E. Plaintiff’s Cross-Appeal
Plaintiff cross-appeals claiming that the jury was hopelessly confused in its computation of damages, and the result was a damage award so low as to constitute a miscarriage of justice. Ohanian bases the claim of confusion on his analysis of the notes that the jury made while determining damages. It is well-established that evidence from a jury or juror may not be used to impeach the jury’s verdict. McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267-69, 35 S.Ct. 783, 784-85, 59 L.Ed. 1300 (1915); see United States v. Dioguardi, 492 F.2d 70, 79 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873, 95 S.Ct. 134, 42 L.Ed.2d 112 (1974). Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) provides:
[A] juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury’s deliberations ... or concerning his mental processes in connection therewith_ Nor may his affidavit or evidence of any statement by him concerning a matter about which he would be precluded from testifying be received for these purposes.
The subject jury notes fall within this rule and thus may not be used to attack the verdict. To use jurors’ notes to impeach a verdict would, as the Supreme Court in McDonald v. Pless feared, “make what was intended to be a private deliberation, the constant subject of public investigation — to the destruction of all frankness and freedom of discussion and conference.” 238 U.S. at 267-68, 35 S.Ct. at 784. See also Domeracki v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 443 F.2d 1245, 1247 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 883, 92 S.Ct. 212, 30 L.Ed.2d 165 (1971); Carson v. Polley, 689 F.2d 562, 581 (5th Cir.1982).
Other than the juror notes there is no basis for ordering a new trial on damages. Before ordering such a trial on account of inadequate damages an appeals court must find that the amount awarded is so low “ ‘that it would be a denial of justice to permit it to stand,’ and hence, ‘an abuse of discretion,’ giving the ‘benefit of every doubt to the judgment of the trial judge.’” Yodice v. Koninklijke Nederlandsche Stoomboot Maatschappij, 471 F.2d 705, 706-07 (2d Cir.1972) (per curiam), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 933, 93 S.Ct. 1902, 36 L.Ed.2d 393 (1973) (quoting Dagnello v. Long Island Rail Road Company, 289 F.2d 797, 806 (2d Cir.1961)). The award here does not meet the criteria needed to obtain a new trial because of inadequacy.
Ill CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.