The government appeals from a final order entered in the District Court1 for the Eastern District of Arkansas awarding Bill R. Herring the amount of $4,686.10 for attorney’s fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA). 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (as amended and extended by Act of Aug. 5, 1985, Pub.L. No. 99-80, 99 Stat. 183 (1985)). Herring v. United States, No. LR-C-80-362 (E.D.Ark. Nov. 9, 1984) (Herring II) (order). The award was made by the district court before the case was reversed and remanded on appeal. United States v. Herring, 750 F.2d 669, 674 (8th Cir.1984) (Herring I).
For reversal the government argues that Herring cannot now be considered the prevailing party nor can it be held that the government’s position was not substantially justified. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the order of the district court.
The underlying facts are set forth in detail in Herring I, id. at 670. In 1960 the government condemned large numbers of tracts of land for the Greers Ferry Dam and Reservoir flood control project in Arkansas. Herring was later found to be the owner of three acres of the land condemned. Notice was given by publication in the local newspaper, but Herring was living in Arizona at the time, was not personally served, and claims that he was unaware the condemnation proceedings included his land. He had planned to build his retirement home on the three acres.2 The government made a declaration of taking on the land in May 1960, obtained a court order of possession in May 1960, and in August 1960 obtained a judgment on stipulation which, by the district court’s *121decree, confirmed the vesting of title to the property in the United States.
In 1980 Herring filed suit under the Quiet Title Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2409a, challenging the government’s title because he had not received notice of the 1960 condemnation proceeding. He asked the district court to declare that he owned the title to the three acres and that the government had no claim of right, title or interest in the land. Herring argued that if he prevailed, the government could elect to retain possession and pay him the value of the land at current prices or it could give up possession. The government defended the suit, asserting, among other things, that (1) notice was properly given and even if notice was inadequate, inadequate notice would not void the government’s title, (2) Herring should have brought suit for just compensation under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1491, instead of suing under the Quiet Title Act, and (3) the government had adverse possession. In the alternative the government argued that if Herring had any claim on the land, he had only an equitable lien for just compensation for the value of the land as of 1960, plus interest.
The district court held that Herring could sue under the Quiet Title Act, inadequate notice voided the government’s declaration of taking and Herring continued to own fee title to the three acres.
On appeal a panel of this court held that the Quiet Title Act can be invoked to collaterally attack the government’s title acquired through condemnation under the Declaration of Taking Act, but that inadequate notice does not void the government’s title. Herring I, 750 F.2d at 671. The court held that Herring had an equitable lien in the property that entitled him to just compensation, calculated as the fair market value of the land as of the date of taking, and remanded the case to the district court for determination and award of the amount of just compensation, plus interest. Id. at 674.
While the appeal was pending, Herring filed a motion for attorney’s fees and costs under the EAJA. The district court referred the motion to a magistrate for an evidentiary hearing and recommended disposition. The district court held that Herring was a prevailing party, the position of the government was not substantially justified and no special circumstances existed which would make the award of attorney’s fees unjust and awarded attorney’s fees and costs in the amount of $4,686.10. Herring II, slip op. at 1-2. This appeal followed.
We hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Herring attorney’s fees and costs under the EAJA. The government argues that Herring cannot be a prevailing party because he sued for title, not compensation. However, Herring successfully brought the underlying action under the Quiet Title Act, Herring I, 750 F.2d at 671, and, although he did not obtain title, he was successful in the sense that he obtained recognition of his right to just compensation. Id. at 674 (landowner has equitable lien dischargeable by the government by payment of just compensation). The case was remanded for determination and award of the amount of just compensation. Compare Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754, 100 S.Ct. 1987, 64 L.Ed.2d 670 (1980) (per curiam) (procedural remand only). Herring was thus successful on two issues, use of the Quiet Title Act to collaterally attack the government’s title and the right to just compensation.
The government next argues that Herring cannot be awarded attorney’s fees under the EAJA because the government’s position was substantially justified. “[W]e must consider the totality of the circumstances-prelitigation and during litigation-in determining whether the position of the government was substantially justified.” United States v. 341.45 Acres of Land (St. Louis County, Minn.), 751 F.2d 924, 940 (8th Cir.1984). The government’s litigation position, before the district court and on appeal, cannot in and of itself be considered unreasonable. At the time of litigation, whether the Quiet Title Act could be used to collaterally attack title in condemnation cases on the basis of inadequate *122notice to the landowner was an issue of first impression in this circuit and had been decided by only one circuit court of appeals. See Fulcher v. United States, 632 F.2d 278 (4th Cir.1980) (banc); accord United States v. 125.2 Acres of Land (Nantucket, Mass.), 732 F.2d 239 (1st Cir.1984). However, the magistrate concluded that the government’s pre litigation position was unreasonable because the government failed to make an offer to settle Herring’s claim. Herring II, tr. at 7 (Sept. 6, 1984) (magistrate’s oral recommendation). We cannot conclude that the district court abused its discretion in finding that, under the totality of the circumstances, the government’s position was not substantially justified.
Accordingly, we affirm the order of the district court.
. The Honorable G. Thomas Eisele, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas.
. Herring’s three acres were part of tract #2118, which contained 27.5 acres. A.L. Clark owned the rest of tract #2118, as well as tracts #2118E-1, which contained four acres, and #2118E-2, which contained one acre. Just compensation for all three tracts was determined to be $750. Clark received $575 in November 1960; the remaining funds were held in the registry of the court subject to other possible outstanding interests. In August 1962, the remaining funds were apparently paid to Clark. Herring did not receive any of the funds.