concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the majority opinion on the issue of Lambert’s failure to recall Davis. However, I believe that the district court erred in dismissing Davis’ retaliation claim. On the record, it is undisputed that (1) Davis filed an EEOC charge against Lambert; (2) thereafter, Lambert failed to rehire Davis when she reapplied for employment; and (3) at that time, Lambert’s vice president Kroul told Davis he could not consider her application in view of her pending EEOC suit against Lambert. By showing that this adverse employment consequence flowed from her participation in a protected activity, Davis met her burden of establishing a prima facie case of retaliation. Robinson v. Monsanto Co., 758 F.2d 331, 335 (8th Cir.1985); Womack v. Munson, 619 F.2d 1292, 1296 (8th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 979, 101 S.Ct. 1513, 67 L.Ed.2d 814 (1981). The burden then shifted to Lambert to articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for not rehiring Davis. Womack, 619 F.2d at 1296. *662However, Lambert offered no reason other than the pendency of the EEOC suit for not considering Davis’ application in May of 1984. Davis’ pursuit of the EEOC claim was a protected activity and, without more, will not suffice as a reason for not reinstating Davis.
Because Lambert failed to rebut Davis’ prima facie showing of retaliation, the trial court erred in its consideration of the retaliation claim, and in determining that Lambert possessed no subjective motive to retaliate. The determination of whether a defendant was motivated by a desire to retaliate arises only after the defendant has offered a legitiiiiate nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment decision. This Lambert failed tó do. Therefore, because Lambert failed to rebut Davis’ prima facie showing of retaliation, I would hold that the district court erred in not finding Lambert liable for retaliation.