In October 1981, appellants were subpoenaed to appear before a special federal grand jury investigating possible skimming or diversion of funds from casino properties owned by Trans-Sterling, Inc., where they were supervisors. The scheduled appearances were postponed to permit resolution by the district court of appellants’ motions for disclosure of electronic surveil*702lance pursuant to Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41, 92 S.Ct. 2357, 33 L.Ed.2d 179 (1972). Judge Harry Claiborne denied those motions in April 1982, and subsequently signed immunity and compulsion orders for all three appellants pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 6001.
Shortly before appellants’ first appearances before the grand jury on January 4, 1983, they filed a second set of Gelbard motions which were substantially the same as those denied in April 1982. At the grand jury hearing, appellants refused to answer substantive questions based on claims of illegal electronic surveillance and self-incrimination although they were made aware of the immunity and compulsion orders issued by Judge Claiborne.
In March 1983, Judge Claiborne denied the second Gelbard motions. Appellants then appeared for a second time before the grand jury and again refused to answer substantive questions. On April 21, 1983, Judge Claiborne, on the government’s motion, issued an order to show cause why appellants should not be held in civil contempt.
In response, appellants filed requests for untimely reconsideration of the denial of the Gelbard motions, for voire dire or dismissal of the grand jury based on juror bias, and for prosecutorial misconduct sanctions against the government’s attorney. After a hearing, Judge Claiborne entered an order denying appellants’ motions but recusing the one grand juror who was accused of bias. Judge Claiborne did not rule on the government’s motion to hold appellants in civil contempt, but instead ordered appellants a third time to appear and testify before the grand jury in September 1983.
At that appearance, appellants were read Judge Claiborne’s order directing them to testify. They were also reread their compulsion orders, reminded of the two Gel-bard denials, and warned that a refusal to testify could result in criminal and/or civil contempt sanctions. Appellants again refused to respond. On January 10, 1984, the federal grand jury returned three separate one-count indictments charging each appellant with criminal contempt for willfully refusing to testify before the grand jury in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 401(3) and Fed.R.Crim.P. 42(b). Identical motions to dismiss the indictment were filed on behalf of each appellant due to the government’s failure to consider the feasibility of civil contempt claimed to be required by Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 86 S.Ct. 1531, 16 L.Ed.2d 622 (1966), and on account of prosecutorial vindictiveness.
On June 13, 1984, Judge Roger Foley adopted the magistrate’s recommendations that appellants’ motions to dismiss be denied. Appellants were thereafter tried and found guilty of criminal contempt on August 31, 1984. Each was fined $500. Timely notices of appeal were filed on September 6, 1984.
I.
Appellants first argue that their convictions must be reversed because the trial court failed to consider civil contempt sanctions before the grand jury returned indictments for criminal contempt. Because this issue involves a question of law, our standard of review is de novo. See Matter of McLinn, 739 F.2d 1395, 1397 (9th Cir.1984) (en banc).
Appellants base their claim on language contained in Shillitani, 384 U.S. 364, 86 S.Ct. 1531, where, as here, the petitioners refused to testify before the grand jury under a grant of immunity and were found guilty of contempt pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 42(b). The petitioners argued that reversal of their convictions was warranted because they had been entitled to, and did not receive, indictments and jury trials. 384 U.S. at 365, 86 S.Ct. at 1533. The Court first found that the contempt proceedings had been civil in nature because appellants’ release from custody had been conditioned upon the contemnors’ willingness to testify. Thus, indictments and jury trials had not been constitutionally required. Id. The Court then ruled that contumacious witnesses cannot be confined after the grand jury has been discharged *703when the contempt orders are coercive in nature, since the witnesses would have no opportunity to purge themselves of contempt. It was in the context of explaining that this restriction on confinement is in accordance with the “least possible power doctrine,” that the Shillitani Court enunciated the rule which appellants urge is applicable here.
The “least possible power doctrine” requires that courts exercise the “least possible power adequate to the end proposed,” Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 231, 5 L.Ed. 242 (1821). The Court in Shil-litani relied upon this doctrine to create a procedural rule restricting the exercise of judicial contempt power. That rule appears in footnote nine of the opinion, and states:
[The “least possible power doctrine”] ... requires that the trial judge first consider the feasibility of coercing testimony through the imposition of civil contempt. The judge should resort to criminal sanctions only after he determines, for good reason, that the civil remedy would be inappropriate.
384 U.S. at 371 n. 9, 86 S.Ct. at 1536.
Appellants claim that this dictum in Shil-litani was intended to serve as a rule to be followed in every case in which criminal contempt sanctions are imposed. Thus, they urge that when a witness refuses to testify before a grand jury under a grant of immunity and pursuant to a lawful court order, the court must first consider holding the witness in civil contempt before a grand jury may return an indictment for criminal contempt. We disagree. Appellants’ interpretation fails to consider significant factual differences between the situation in Shillitani and the one before us. In Shillitani, the court, rather than the grand jury, initiated the contempt charges. Moreover, the charges were brought for the purpose of coercing compliance with the court’s order to testify, and not to punish the witnesses for their contumacious conduct.
Appellants’ argument also ignores the fact that the same conduct may result in both civil and criminal contempt. United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258, 303, 67 S.Ct. 677, 701, 91 L.Ed. 884 (1947); United States v. Powers, 629 F.2d 619, 627 (9th Cir.1980). The distinction between the two forms of contempt lies in the intended effect of the punishment imposed. United States v. Asay, 614 F.2d 655, 659 (9th Cir.1980). The purpose of civil contempt is coercive or compensatory, whereas the purpose of criminal contempt is punitive. United States v. Rylander, 714 F.2d 996, 1001 (9th Cir.1983), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 2398, 81 L.Ed.2d 355 (1984); Powers, 629 F.2d at 624. Criminal contempt is intended to vindicate the court’s authority in the face of contumacious and disrespectful acts. See Asay, 614 F.2d at 659. When a grand jury witness refuses to testify, civil contempt sanctions can be imposed to coerce compliance with the court’s order, and penalties for criminal contempt can be assessed to punish the witness’ disobedient conduct.
Additionally, appellants’ interpretation of Shillitani fails to recognize the historical relationship between the grand jury and the courts, and the contempt powers of each. The power of a court to punish a defendant for refusing to comply with its direct order cannot be disputed. See Rylander, 714 F.2d at 1001; Powers, 629 F.2d at 624. This authority has been codified in 18 U.S.C. § 401(3), under which appellants were convicted. The statute provides that
A court of the United States shall have power to punish by fine or imprisonment, at its discretion, such contempt of its authority, and none other, as—
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(3) Disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command.
Rule 42 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure sets forth the procedural requirements for prosecuting criminal *704contempt.1 Part (b) that rule provides for disposition of criminal contempt upon notice and hearing when, as here, the contempt was not committed in the actual presence of the court. Rule 42 is merely procedural, however, and does not purport to vest exclusive authority to initiate contempt charges in the court. Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41, 51, 79 S.Ct. 539, 547, 3 L.Ed.2d 609 (1959), overruled on other grounds, Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. 162, 86 S.Ct. 352, 15 L.Ed.2d 240 (1965); United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 838 (5th Cir.1980) (per curiam), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127, 101 S.Ct. 946, 67 L.Ed.2d 114 (1981); United States v. Leyva, 513 F.2d 774, 778 (5th Cir.1975). The power of the grand jury to initiate contempt charges without any prior action by the court has long been recognized. See Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 187, 78 S.Ct. 632, 644-45, 2 L.Ed.2d 672 (1958); Steinert v. United States District Court for the District of Nevada, 543 F.2d 69, 70-71 (9th Cir.1976); United States v. Snyder, 428 F.2d 520, 522 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 903, 91 S.Ct. 139, 27 L.Ed.2d 139 (1970); Williams, 622 F.2d at 838; United States v. Morales, 566 F.2d 402, 404 (2d Cir.1977); Leyva, 513 F.2d at 778; United States v. Mensik, 440 F.2d 1232, 1234 (4th Cir.1971) (per curiam). Although an indictment is not necessary for a criminal contempt prosecution, it is permissible if the notice requirements of Rule 42(b) are satisfied. Mensik, 440 F.2d at 1234.
Appellants do not challenge the grand jury’s power to return an indictment and thereby to initiate a prosecution. Indeed, they could not, because under 18 U.S.C. § 401, contempt is a criminal offense. Appellants only argue that before the grand jury may perform its historically independent role of bringing an indictment, the court must first consider civil sanctions.
We have stated that, although the functions of the grand jury are intimately related to the functions of the court, the grand jury is not and should not be captive to the judiciary. See Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 218, 80 S.Ct. 270, 273-74, 4 L.Ed.2d 252 (1960); United States v. Chanen, 549 F.2d 1306, 1312 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 825, 98 S.Ct. 72, 54 L.Ed.2d 83 (1977). A court’s supervisory control of the grand jury is narrowly construed, and should be exercised only when there is a clear basis in fact and law for doing so. In re Grand Jury Investigation of Hugle, 754 F.2d 863, 864 (9th Cir.1985); United States v. Wilson, 614 F.2d 1224, 1227 (9th Cir.1980); Chanen, 549 F.2d at 1313. Frequent or unnecessary court intervention in grand jury proceedings would impede the grand jury’s ability to perform its constitutional mission, which is to clear the innocent and bring to trial those who may be guilty. See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 17, 93 S.Ct. 764, 773, 35 L.Ed.2d 67 (1973); In re Grand Jury Investigation of Hugle, 754 F.2d at 864.
When the assertion of judicial power is not needed to preserve the integri*705ty of the judicial process and to avoid fundamental unfairness, the legal basis for the exercise of judicial control is absent. Wilson, 614 F.2d at 1227. The adoption of a rule that would preclude a grand jury from returning an indictment for criminal contempt until after the court has considered civil contempt sanctions would ignore the rule of judicial noninterference with grand jury proceedings by requiring judicial control of the grand jury when no control is needed. This is not a case in which judicial intervention is permissible because of a clear potential for violation of the rights of the witnesses. Cf. In re Grand Jury Investigation of Hugle, 754 F.2d at 865 (case remanded to district court to consider applicability of marital communications privilege to anticipated grand jury testimony). Appellants have no right to refuse to testify. A witness who has been granted immunity and ordered to testify before a grand jury must do so, or risk punishment for criminal contempt. See generally Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. 162, 86 S.Ct. 352, 15 L.Ed.2d 240 (1965); United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 67 S.Ct. 677.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. 162, 86 S.Ct. 352, 15 L.Ed.2d 240 (1965), further supports our conclusion that the dictum in Shillitani was not intended to serve as a rule to be followed in every case in which criminal contempt sanctions are imposed. See also U.S. v. Wilson, 421 U.S. 309, 321 n. 2 95 S.Ct. 1802, 1809 n. 2, 44 L.Ed.2d 186 (Blackmun, J., concurring). In Harris, a witness who had been granted immunity under 18 U.S.C. § 6002 similarly refused to answer certain questions before the grand jury. The witness was then brought before a district judge and asked the same questions. When the witness still refused to answer, the court summarily held him in criminal contempt under Fed.R.Crim.P. 42(a).
The Supreme Court ruled that when the contempt is criminal, consisting of a refusal to testify before a grand jury, the court must proceed under Rule 42(b) with notice and hearing to the defendant rather than summarily under Rule 42(a) because disobedience of the order to testify occurred not in the court’s presence, but before the grand jury. Like the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Di Mauro, 441 F.2d 428 (8th Cir.1971),2 we consider significant the fact that Harris was decided during the same term as Shillitani and did not suggest that the trial court must first resort to civil sanctions before proceeding under Rule 42(b). Id. at 434. In fact, Harris appears to suggest just the opposite.
The crucial distinction between Shillita-ni and Harris seems to be the purpose of the contempt charge. In Shillitani, the court’s purpose was coercive, rather than punitive, as the court found to be indicated by the sentence imposed. On the other hand, in Harris, the court’s purpose was punitive. Thus, because the purpose of a grand jury indictment is not to coerce testimony, that role being exclusively reserved to the courts, see Brown, 359 U.S. at 49, 79 S.Ct. at 546, we find Harris more analogous to the situation before us.
We conclude from a consideration of the above authorities that the Supreme Court’s admonition in Shillitani was in*706tended to apply only when a judge initiates criminal contempt proceedings for the purpose of coercing future compliance with a court order, and not when an independent federal grand jury returns a criminal contempt indictment to punish past violations. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. N.Y. Broadway International Corp., 705 F.2d 94, 96 n. 1 (2d Cir.1983); Di Mauro, 441 F.2d at 433-436. Accordingly, we reject appellants’ claim that their convictions must be reversed on the basis of Shillita-ni.
II.
Appellants next claim that their convictions must be reversed because they did not act willfully in disobeying the court’s order to testify. We have held that the crime of contempt is established when a defendant willfully disobeys a clear and definite court order of which the defendant is aware. United States v. Thoreen, 653 F.2d 1332, 1339 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 938, 102 S.Ct. 1428, 71 L.Ed.2d 648 (1982); United States v. Baker, 641 F.2d 1311, 1317 (9th Cir.1981); Powers, 629 F.2d at 627; Chapman v. Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Co., 613 F.2d 193, 195 (9th Cir.1979). Thus, willfullness is an essential element of criminal contempt.
"Willfulness" is defined as "a you-tional act done by one who knows or should reasonably be aware that his conduct is wrongful.” Baker, 641 F.2d at 1317; United States v. Greyhound Corporation, 508 F.2d 529, 531-32 (7th Cir.1974). It implies a “deliberate or intended violation, as distinguished from an accidental, inadvertent, or negligent violation of an order.” Falstaff Brewing Corp. v. Miller Brewing Co., 702 F.2d 770, 782 (9th Cir.1983).
Appellants claim that their conduct was not willful because of their good faith reliance upon the advice of counsel not to testify. Because the issue whether good faith reliance on the advice of counsel is a defense to a charge of criminal contempt involves a question of law, our standard of review is de novo. See Matter of McLinn, 739 F.2d at 1397. The district court rejected appellants’ argument and so do we.
Appellants misinterpret the nature of the “good faith” defense to a charge of criminal contempt. Although a defendant’s good faith belief that he is complying with the order of the court may prevent a finding of willfulness, good faith reliance on the advice of counsel to disobey a court order will not.3 See United States v. Snyder, 428 F.2d 520, 522-23 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 903, 91 S.Ct. 139, 27 L.Ed.2d 139 (1970); see also United States v. Di Mauro, 441 F.2d at 437.
In Steinert v. United States, 571 F.2d 1105 (9th Cir.1978), we considered the good faith defense in a similar context and found that the defendant’s disobedience of a court order to answer questions was willful even though he acted in good faith reliance on the advice of a tax accountant. Id. at 1108. In doing so, we reasoned that
[t]o hold otherwise would make stultification of a court order impermissibly easy. In litigation frequently the client must assume the risks of his advisor’s errors. Appellant’s long sustained recalcitrance in this and earlier litigation provides no *707basis for relieving him of these ordinary risks.
Id. Here, appellants admitted that they were aware of the district court’s compulsion orders and the orders denying their Gelbard claims. There is no evidence that appellants believed that their refusal to testify complied with the court’s orders. They knew that they could be punished for refusing to obey those orders.4 Government counsel advised each appellant before the grand jury that his conduct was contumacious and he therefore was subject to possible civil and criminal contempt. Nonetheless, appellants claim that they did not understand that their conduct amounted to criminal contempt. Even if this were true, it is no defense. The critical inquiry is whether the appellants were aware that they were disobeying a lawful court order, not whether they realized the nature of the punishment they could receive for disobeying that order. See Snyder, 428 F.2d at 522-23.
Furthermore, we are not persuaded that Steinert is factually distinguishable from this case. Although in Steinert the defendant relied on a tax accountant’s advice while here the erroneous advice was rendered by an attorney, such a distinction was not made by the court in Steinert. In fact, the court cited to the Snyder decision to support its conclusion that appellant’s disobedience was willful. Steinert, 571 F.2d at 1108. In Snyder, reliance was based on an attorney’s advice to disobey the court’s compulsion order. 428 F.2d at 522.
Appellants voluntarily chose to follow the erroneous advice of their counsel rather than to testify. To permit them to disobey the compulsion orders in reliance on the advice of their counsel “would in effect do away with the judicial grant of immunity because a witness given immunity could still avoid testifying if his attorney advised him to remain silent.” Id.
Appellants also claim that they lacked willfulness because they expressed a willingness to testify if their Gelbard claims were denied on appeal. We agree with the First Circuit Court of Appeals that this argument is untenable.5 United States v. Nightingale, 703 F.2d 17, 19 (1st Cir.1983). Appellants’ intent to disobey the orders of the district court was clearly established. They were not relieved of their duty to testify simply because they wished to appeal the denial of their Gelbard motions. Nor could they refuse to obey because they intended later to challenge the command. As the Supreme Court has directed, the proper course of action, unless and until the court’s order is invalidated by an appellate court, was for appellants to comply and cite the order as reversible error should an adverse judgment result. See Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 458, 95 S.Ct. 584, 591, 42 L.Ed.2d 574 (1975); United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. at 294, 67 S.Ct. at 696; Chapman, 613 F.2d at 197.
*708III.
Finally, appellants assert that their indictments for criminal contempt indicate vindictive motives on the part of the prosecution and the grand jury since civil contempt sanctions were not first pursued. The district court found no vindictive prosecution. We review this finding for an abuse of discretion, United States v. Gallegos-Curiel, 681 F.2d 1164, 1171 n. 6 (9th Cir.1982), and find none.
Appellants were initially called before the grand jury in October 1981. Their first Gelbard motions were denied in April 1982 and in December of that year, immunity and compulsion orders were issued. In January 1983, appellants filed a second set of Gelbard motions and appeared before the grand jury for the first time, but refused to testify. In March 1983, the second Gelbard motions were denied and the appellants appeared before the grand jury for a second time. Again, they refused to testify. In April, the government moved for the imposition of civil contempt sanctions and an order to show cause was issued. That motion was never ruled upon by the district court.
In August 1983, appellants were again ordered to testify before the grand jury. On September 20, they made their third appearance and, as twice before, refused to answer. Appellants subsequently were indicted for criminal contempt in January 1984. Under such circumstances, we find that the appropriateness of criminal contempt sanctions can hardly be questioned.
In Gallegos-Curiel, 681 F.2d at 1169, we stated that “the appearance of vindictiveness results only where, as a practical matter, there is a realistic or reasonable likelihood of prosecutorial conduct that would not have occurred but for hostility or a punitive animus towards the defendant because he has exercised his specific legal rights.” This is not such a case. The prosecutor was amply justified in seeking criminal contempt sanctions in light of appellants’ persistently contumacious conduct.
CONCLUSION
The district court was not required under Shillitani to consider the appropriateness of civil contempt sanctions before the grand jury returned indictments for criminal contempt. Because appellants were aware of the court’s compulsion orders, they cannot claim that their good faith reliance on the advice of counsel negates the element of willfulness required for their convictions. Nor was the willfulness element negated by appellants’ willingness to testify should their Gelbard claims be denied on appeal. Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in failing to find prosecutorial vindictiveness.
The convictions are AFFIRMED.
. Rule 42 provides:
(a) Summary Disposition. A criminal contempt may be punished summarily if the judge certifies that he saw or heard the conduct constituting the contempt and that it was committed in the actual presence of the court. The order of contempt shall recite the facts and shall be signed by the judge and entered of record.
(b) Disposition Upon Notice and Hearing. A criminal contempt except as provided in subdivision (a) of this rule shall be prosecuted on notice. The notice shall state the time and place of hearing, allowing a reasonable time for the preparation of the defense, and shall state the essential facts constituting the criminal contempt charged and describe it as such. The notice shall be given orally by the judge in open court in the presence of the defendant or, on application of the United States attorney or of an attorney appointed by the court for that purpose, by an order to show cause or an order of arrest. The defendant is entitled to a trial by jury in any case in which an act of Congress so provides. He is entitled to admission to bail as provided in these rules. If the contempt charged involves disrespect to or criticism of a judge, that judge is disqualified from presiding at the trial or hearing except with the defendant’s consent. Upon á verdict or finding of guilt the court shall enter an order fixing the punishment.
. In Di Mauro, the government requested that the trial court find the defendants in civil contempt, or alternatively, cite them for criminal contempt after defendants refused to testify before the grand jury. The court specifically rejected the civil contempt alternative because of the severity of the defendants’ conduct. Consequently, the court directed the government to file an information against the defendants.
Defendants were subsequently convicted of criminal contempt by a jury. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit considered their Shillitani argument, and concluded that Shillitani “merely requires that the trial court expressly consider the imposition of civil contempt before resorting to criminal contempt and that the record reveal that the civil alternative was considered and rejected. 441 F.2d at 435. In DiMauro, contrary to the case before us, the trial court, and not the grand jury, initiated the criminal contempt charges. Thus, Shillitani required consideration of civil contempt although the court concluded that criminal sanctions could first be imposed so long as “those sanctions are surrounded by the safeguards of an ordinary criminal proceeding.” Id. at 433.
. The dissent cites Williamson v. United States, 207 U.S. 425, 28 S.Ct. 163, 52 L.Ed. 278 (1908), as authority that advice of counsel constitutes a defense in this situation. However, the language quoted from that case was a jury instruction given by the trial judge. The Supreme Court never held that this instruction was in fact correct as it was the defendant, in a trial for falsely subscribing an oath to a document, who was challenging the instruction. In addressing the issue, what the Court said was that
[wjithout attempting to review in detail the requested charges concerning motive and intent and the effect of advice of counsel, we think the trial judge went as far in favor of the accused as it was possible for him to go consistently with right, and therefore there is no ground for complaint * * * *
Id. at 453, 28 S.Ct. at 173 (emphasis added). Furthermore, the Court's holding in the case was based on the entirely different ground that federal law did not require that the defendant swear to the document, and hence no false swearing charge was authorized by law. Id. at 462, 28 S.Ct. at 177. Thus, the principle upon which the dissent relies was never adopted by the Supreme Court.
. Thus, we disagree with the dissent that appellants believed that their refusal to testify in the face of court orders requiring such testimony was lawful. The dissent concedes that appellants were aware that their refusal constituted disobedience of the court's orders. In refusing to testify when commanded to do so by unambiguous orders, appellants had to know that their conduct was in clear violation of the orders and thus contrary to law. Their position was that the federal court would not punish them for their recalcitrance, and not that a federal court would find that they were not recalcitrant. As one appellant testified, “I just believed * * * that the only way we can have this resolved * * * [is] to get charged with contempt ****’’ Contempt is a knowing and willing violation of a valid court order. This testimony certainly suggests that appellants were aware that their conduct was not lawful, since they anticipated, at the minimum, a contempt citation by the district court. If everyone was free to disobey lawful court orders until the orders were ratified by some other tribunal, the result would be anarchy and disorder. As previously stated, the purpose of criminal contempt is to vindicate the court’s authority in the face of such contumacious acts. See Asay, 614 F.2d at 659.
. The First Circuit observed that no court has ruled that criminal contempt may not be found until "an appellate court passes on the merits of the reason for a defendant’s refusal to obey a Court’s order to testify before a grand jury.” 703 F.2d at 19.