dissenting:
As the majority opinion notes, it is the general rule in this circuit that “[w]hen a party has given clear answers to unambiguous questions which negate the existence of any genuine issue of material fact, that party cannot thereafter create such an issue with an affidavit that merely contradicts, without explanation, previously given clear testimony.” Van T. Junkins & Associates v. U.S. Industries, 736 F.2d 656 (11th Cir.1984). The majority suggests (without holding) that perhaps the Ring affidavit ought not be tested by this standard, which has previously only been applied by this court to inconsistent sworn statements by parties to the litigation.
I would apply this rule with as much force in this particular context, however, as in the context in which it was developed. I am not as confident as the majority seems to be in Ring’s neutrality in this litigation; I certainly would not consider him “disinterested” in a practical rather than purely legalistic sense. Lane and Ring have, through the same counsel, filed lawsuits alleging asbestos-related injuries against many of the same manufacturers of asbestos-containing products. Evidence of exposure to the defendants’ products is obviously essential to the success of such claims. There may not exist, as Keene suggests, a “cooperative arrangement” whereby workers “exchange” testimony of product exposure in each other’s cases; the threat of such a situation developing, however, is clear. Without passing upon the applicability of the Van T. Junkins rule to witnesses who are without question certain to be entirely disinterested in the outcome of the case, I would find it applicable here.
Applying the Van T. Junkins rule, the court in the majority opinion finds that “Ring’s affidavit is not necessarily inconsistent with his earlier deposition testimony.” In my view, the Ring affidavit does indeed clearly contradict his earlier deposi*1534tion testimony, insofar as that testimony is relevant to this case, without explaining the conflict. The deposition testimony given by Ring in his own asbestos case consisted of a detailed, systematic inquiry into Ring’s use of and exposure to asbestos-containing products over the course of his career. His recollection was prompted with the aid of social security records indicating which employers had made social security payments on his behalf and when. Although it was naturally difficult in 1981, when the deposition was taken, for Ring to recall with precision and clarity the details of employment which had occurred ten or fifteen years previously, his testimony is unambiguous concerning his use of Monoblock, the only asbestos-containing product manufactured by Keene that is at issue here. In the deposition testimony set forth in footnote 13 to the majority opinion, Ring stated clearly that the only time he used Monoblock was at a pulp mill in Brunswick, Georgia. In the affidavit he completed in 1983, however, which is set forth in full in footnote 3, Ring “recalls the use of and exposure to ... Monobloek ... while working with and in close proximity to W.C. Lane” in Jesup, Georgia in approximately 1969. This latter recollection, which is the only statement made by anyone indicating that Lane was ever exposed to Keene manufactured asbestos-containing products, is in utter and complete conflict with Ring’s earlier deposition testimony. Further, nowhere in his brief affidavit does Ring offer any explanation for his earlier failure to testify consistently with the statements made in the affidavit. Applying the rule set forth in Van T. Junkins, the district court was therefore eminently correct in refusing to credit the Ring affidavit in its determination of whether there existed a genuine issue of material fact concerning Lane’s exposure to asbestos-containing products manufactured by Keene.
I would also add a further comment. These asbestos cases have imposed a heavy burden on the district courts. The district court whose decision we reverse in this case has prescribed precise, orderly and efficient procedures for the processing of such claims. These procedures, the integrity of which is essential to the success of the tasks the court must perform, included the requirement that Lane provide the defendants with a list of the witnesses he intended to produce at trial by November 30, 1983. Lane provided Keene with a list of nineteen witnesses that Lane indicated he might call to testify at trial. That list did not include Ring. Each of the witnesses on Lane’s “may call” list was deposed; because no witness indicated any knowledge that Lane had been exposed to any Keene asbestos-containing products, Keene filed its motion for summary judgment. The Ring affidavit was only produced by Lane in response to the motion for summary judgment. Ring’s name was never added to Lane’s witness list. Keene filed with the district court a motion to strike the Ring affidavit on the grounds that it should not be considered on summary judgment in a case in which the affiant will not be permitted to testify at trial. As this court’s opinion notes, the district court did not rule on the motion to strike the Ring affidavit, and it is therefore not before us now. I simply add to what the majority has already said the observation that, on remand, the propriety of considering the Ring affidavit on summary judgment in light of Lane’s failure to include Ring on his witness list will apparently still be before the district court.