dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
The majority today agrees with Judge Eisele’s ruling that the Government’s conduct violated Mark Lewis Singer’s sixth amendment right to be represented by counsel of his choice and upholds Judge Eisele’s remedy for that violation. The majority concludes that by permitting Singer to move for a continuance or a change of venue, Judge Eisele fashioned a remedy which enabled Ronald Meshbesher to remain as Singer’s trial counsel, thereby removing the prejudice to Singer and effectively curing the sixth amendment violation. I disagree. Against the background of the Government’s highly improper conduct, Meshbesher had no choice except to withdraw. In my opinion Judge Eisele’s order did not serve as a curative for the Government’s conduct. Under the circumstances of this case, I believe that the proper remedy is dismissal of Singer’s indictment.1
I.
The sixth amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right * * * to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” This right is “indispensable to the fair administration of our adversarial system of justice” and “safeguards the other rights deemed essential for the fair prosecution of a criminal proceeding.” Maine v. Moulton, -U.S.-, 106 S.Ct. 477, 483-84, 88 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985) (footnote omitted).2 It has long been recognized that the sixth amendment’s broad guarantee of counsel includes the right to be represented by counsel of one’s choice. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 70, 62 S.Ct. 457, 464-65, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942); United States v. Agosto, 675 F.2d 965, 969 (8th Cir.1982).3
The Supreme Court has indicated that to establish a sixth amendment violation a criminal defendant must show that the government knowingly intruded into the attorney-client relationship, and that the intrusion created a “realistic possibility” of prejudice to the defendant or “benefit” to the prosecution. United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 365, 101 S.Ct. 665, 668, 66 L.Ed.2d 564 (1981); Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 558, 97 S.Ct. 837, 845, 51 L.Ed.2d 30 (1977). See also United States v. Mastroianni, 749 F.2d 900, 907 (1st Cir.1984); United States v. Davis, 646 F.2d 1298, 1303 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 868, 102 S.Ct. 333, 70 L.Ed.2d 170 (1981). As the majority notes, the establishment of a sixth amendment violation alone, however, does not require dismissal of a criminal defendant’s indictment. See Majority Opinion at 234-35.
In United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 365, 101 S.Ct. 665, 668, 66 L.Ed.2d 564 (1981), the Supreme Court held that “absent demonstrable prejudice, or substantial threat thereof, dismissal of the indictment” is not a proper remedy for the violation of a criminal defendant’s sixth amendment *245-247rights.4 The Court stated that cases involving sixth amendment deprivations are subject to the rule that remedies should be tailored to the injuries suffered from the constitutional violation. Id. at 364, 101 S.Ct. at 667. See also United States v. Solomon, 679 F.2d 1246, 1250-51 (8th Cir.1982).
II.
In the present case Judge Eisele found that law enforcement officials charged with prosecuting Singer made improper, unproven allegations that Meshbesher had suborned perjury. He concluded that these statements interfered with the attorney-client relationship between Meshbesher and Singer and threatened to prejudice Singer, thereby resulting in a sixth amendment violation. The question then becomes what is the appropriate remedy for this violation.
Judge Eisele found, in the majority’s words, “that either the passage of time or the shifting of the trial to a different locale would serve to dissipate any derogation to Meshbesher’s integrity resulting from governmental impropriety.” Therefore, relying on Morrison, Judge Eisele permitted Singer to move for a continuance or a change of venue. The majority approves of Judge Eisele’s findings and upholds his remedy, concluding that it allows Meshbesher to remain as Singer’s trial counsel and therefore removes the taint of the sixth amendment violation. I disagree.
The “governmental impropriety” did more than simply disparage “Meshbesher’s integrity.” I believe that the allegations made by Government officers that Meshbesher suborned perjury, and the prosecutors’ veiled threats of prosecution, disrupted Meshbesher’s ability to zealously represent Singer,- and created a situation in which the taint placed on Meshbesher by the Government’s conduct might wash off on Singer in a trial in which Meshbesher was trial counsel. Meshbesher, therefore, was forced to withdraw and Singer was injured by losing the services of his counsel of choice. Under Morrison, I believe that this is “demonstrable prejudice” which justifies dismissal of Singer’s indictment. I would therefore reverse.
. Because I believe that under the circumstances of this case the Government’s violation of Singer's sixth amendment right to counsel requires dismissal of his indictment, I do not reach the other issues raised on appeal.
. In Maine v. Moulton, — U.S.-, 106 S.Ct. 477, 485, 88 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985), the Supreme Court said that "at the very least, the prosecutor and police have an affirmative obligation not to act in a manner that circumvents and thereby dilutes the protection afforded by the right to counsel." This is exactly what occurred in the present case.
. It is of course true that the sixth amendment right to be represented by counsel of one’s choice is not absolute. United States v. Agosto, 675 F.2d 965, 970 n. 4 (8th Cir.1982). See also United States v. Rankin, 779 F.2d 956, 958 (3d Cir.1986). This is not the type of case, however, in which the extent of that right should be circumscribed.
. It is important to note that in Morrison the Supreme Court did not create a per se rule against the dismissal of a defendant’s indictment for a violation of his sixth amendment rights. The Court merely stated that there had to be an appropriate showing of prejudice to warrant dismissal of a defendant’s indictment.
In Morrison the Court stated that no prejudice had been demonstrated and noted the record did "not reveal a pattern of recurring violations by investigative officers that might warrant the imposition of a more extreme remedy in order to deter further lawlessness.” 449 U.S. at 365-66 n. 2, 101 S.Ct. at 668 n. 2. I believe that the present case contains precisely the kind of actual prejudice and recurring violations that require dismissal of Singer’s indictment.