The decision of the Virgin Islands legislature to amend its divorce statute evinces a clear and explicit intention to eliminate marital fault as a factor in the adjudication of divorce cases. See V.I.Code Ann. tit. 16, § 109 (Supp.1985). The majority’s opinion ignores the purpose and entire thrust of the post-1973 statutory scheme and reads fault back into the law. I therefore dissent from the holding of the majority and would hold instead that the amended legislation be given its full, complete, and clear meaning, and that the present case be remanded for a decision not based in any way on an evaluation of marital fault.
Until 1973, § 109 required that, “unless otherwise manifestly improper,” the court give preference to the party not at fault in awarding custody of children and child support, and provided for “the recovery from the party in fault such an amount of money ... as may be just and proper for such party to contribute to the maintenance of the other.”
In 1973, § 109 was amended to delete any mention of fault. The Virgin Islands Assembly added the clause, “without regard to any determination that the breakdown of the marriage was the fault of one party or the other,” to the general empowering clauses at the head of § 109, and provided that child custody should be determined “giving primary consideration to the needs and welfare of the children.” These changes evince a general determination to eliminate any consideration of fault, not only in the granting of the divorce itself, see V.I.Code Ann. tit. 16, § 104 (Supp.1985), but also in the ensuing disposition of property and in the awarding of child custody.
However, the language of V.I.Code Ann. tit. 33, § 2305(d) that referred to disposition of the homestead “in accordance with the equity of the case” was not amended. This section, which is found in the Taxation and Finance section of the Virgin Islands Code and not in the statute addressing domestic relations, does bear tangentially on the issue before us because, among other things, it contains the provision on which the majority has decided this case.
Section 2305 is the Homestead provision of the Virgin Islands Code. Among other things, it defines homestead property, it provides for exemption of homestead property from real estate tax, it provides for continuation of the homestead exemption after an unmarried person dies, it provides criminal penalties for anyone improperly seeking the benefits of the homestead exemption, and it incidentally provides that “in the case of a divorce, the court which grants it shall make disposition of the homestead in accordance with the equity of the case.” § 2305(d).
The majority’s decision of this appeal is based on two conclusions: 1) that the amendment of § 109 to eliminate fault in the granting of a divorce, the awarding of alimony and custody, and the disposition of personal property did not operate to overrule § 2305(d), and 2) that the provision in § 2305(d) for consideration of the “equity of the case” in the disposition of the marital homestead allows for full consideration of marital fault in an appropriate case.
I concede that amended § 109 does not make direct reference to the Homestead provision in the tax code. It would have been better had it done so. However, just because the legislature of the Virgin Islands did not comb through the entire Virgin Islands Code when it attempted to replace “fault” with “no fault” in divorce proceedings, is no reason to hold that a statute outside of the domestic relations context permits consideration of fault when the legislature has unequivocally rejected that factor. The majority admits that no *969decision has been reported in the Virgin Islands in which fault has been a consideration in the awarding of homestead rights upon divorce. Thus, it cannot be said that a prior practice of considering fault in the division of marital real property has been carried forward even after the 1973 amendments to § 109.
My answer to the question of whether the disposition of homestead property permits consideration of fault is that it does not. First, there has been no historic or traditional interpretation allowing for the consideration of fault in dividing homestead property prior to the amendment of the statute. Second, the amendment of § 109 forcefully expresses the legislature’s view that fault has no place in the scheme of property division when a divorce takes place — the primary considerations being the contributions of each party to the homestead and the maintenance or sustenance of spouse and children. Lastly, the very statute itself which speaks in terms of “dispos[ing] of the homestead in accordance with the equity of the case” does not connote that equity includes fault.
Rather, in my view, “equity of the case” should be read to include only the various non-fault factors generally addressed under modern equitable distribution statutes. These factors include the age, background, and earning abilities of the parties, the duration of the marriage, the standard of living of the parties during the marriage, contributions to the marital estate of each of the parties, present income, employment prospects, and mental and physical health of the parties, the source of income and property acquired during the course of the marriage, gifts between the spouses during the marriage, and debts and liabilities of the parties. These and other factors may properly be addressed in order to effect an equitable distribution of the marital homestead without resort to consideration of marital fault. See Painter v. Painter, 65 N.J. 196, 320 A.2d 484 (1974).
This reading of “equity of the case” is consistent with the treatment given to similar language in other states. For example, the New Jersey Supreme Court concluded, in interpreting a statute providing for an “equitable distribution of the property,” that “fault of a marital nature is not an appropriate criterion for consideration in effecting an equitable distribution of marital assets.” Painter v. Painter, 65 N.J. 196, 212, 320 A.2d 484, 492 (1974). In a companion case, Chalmers v. Chalmers, 65 N.J. 186, 320 A.2d 478 (1974), the New Jersey Supreme Court explained that “fault may be merely the manifestation of a sick marriage,” and that “[t]he concept of fault is not relevant to [equitable] distribution since all that is being effected is the allocation to each party of what really belongs to him or her.” Id. at 193, 320 A.2d at 482-83. The court concluded that “we are satisfied that the concept of equitable distribution requires that fault be excluded as a consideration.” Id. at 193, 320 A.2d at 482.
The New Jersey Supreme Court reached this conclusion regarding the consideration of marital fault even though the New Jersey statute provided that fault could be taken into account in awarding alimony. See Painter, 65 N.J. at 205, 320 A.2d at 488. Indeed, if fault is to be considered only with regard to some aspects of the divorce proceeding and not others, it seems more reasonable to examine marital fault in connection with the awarding of alimony rather than in the division of property, where the respective contributions of the parties should perhaps be a central concern. That is New Jersey’s approach. See also Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 23, §§ 401(d), 501(b)(14) (Purdon Supp.1985) (marital misconduct considered for alimony, but excluded for property distribution).
It is true, as the majority notes, that several states do permit consideration of fault in the division of marital property. However, the majority cites to no Virgin Islands authority supporting its position that “equity of the case” includes fault; it cites only to authority of other jurisdictions in different contexts. Indeed, most states permitting consideration of fault have statutes containing so-called “catch-all” provi*970sions permitting a court to consider any other factor deemed “just and proper.” See Hinton v. Hinton, 70 N.C.App. 665, 321 S.E.2d 161, 162 (1984). Even among these “catch-all” states, there is a split of opinion on whether fault is a proper consideration in the distribution of marital property, and several such states have excluded it. See, e.g., Blickstein v. Blickstein, 99 A.D.2d 287, 472 N.Y.S.2d 110 (2d Dept. 1984); Hinton, 321 S.E.2d at 163. In the absence of specific statutory authorization for the consideration of marital fault in these other jurisdictions, and even where fault may be considered in the granting of the divorce and the awarding of alimony, I think the better rule is to exclude consideration of fault in the equitable distribution of marital real property.
In the Virgin Islands, however, we are faced with a much simpler situation. We are remitted to what the Virgin Islands legislature has effected by repealing the old § 109 and adopting the new § 109 with but one significant addition: the inclusion in the preamble of the statement that divorce decrees are to be rendered “without regard to any determination that the breakdown of the marriage was the fault of one party or the other.” (emphasis added). The Territorial legislature thus has made crystal clear, through its 1973 amendment of § 109, that it desires to join the modern trend in barring any consideration of marital fault from divorce decisions. In this context, I can see no justification for reading the out-of-context clause of § 2305(d) — contained not in the Virgin Islands divorce statute but in the Homestead subsection of the tax law — to permit such an inquiry.
I would therefore hold that the district court erred as a matter of law in affirming the judgment of the Territorial Court, and would remand the present case to the district court with instructions to vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings.1
. The Territorial Court stated in its November 17, 1983 order that even if it had erred “by considering the equities,” which I assume to mean by taking marital fault into account, ,it would still have awarded the homestead to the wife on the basis of need. Nevertheless, since it is unclear whether fault was improperly considered in the overall property distribution, and since the territorial court may have exceeded its powers in ordering the wife to quitclaim to the husband her interest in the Estate Mandahl property, see Dyndul v. Dyndul, 541 F.2d 132, 134 (3d Cir.1976), I would still vacate the judgment of the district court and remand with instructions.