concurring:
I concur in the result reached by the majority. However, I must register my strong disagreement with its decision first to reach out for and then to resolve in a most perfunctory manner an important issue of first impression with significant constitutional implications and equally significant implications regarding the proper balance to be struck between state and federal law. The majority concludes that where a joint investigation occurs federal law governs the validity of a state search warrant issued to a state law enforcement officer by a state court. It does so by adopting without analysis or discussion a rule previously applied only in an entirely different factual and legal context. There is no rea*1514son whatsoever for us to decide the question the majority resolves. There are at least two other ways to uphold the validity of the warrant at issue here. Both allow us to avoid resolving the sensitive issue of whether state or federal law is applicable.
Whether state or federal law should be used to test the validity of a state warrant obtained by a state officer involved in a joint investigation with federal officers has not previously been decided by this court. The issue is a difficult one involving important interests both from the state and federal standpoint. It should be resolved only after careful inquiry, an inquiry the majority fails entirely to undertake. Moreover, as I have already stated, there is absolutely no reason to decide the question here— first, because the warrant clearly is valid under both federal and Oregon state law and, second, because the officers relied on the warrant in good faith. The majority offers no excuse for its disregard of the principle that “constitutional issues should be addressed only when strictly necessary.” Hospital & Service Employees Union v. N.L.R.B., 743 F.2d 1417, 1427 (9th Cir.1984) (emphasis added); see also, e.g., Minnick v. California Department of Corrections, 452 U.S. 105, 122-23, 101 S.Ct. 2211, 2220-21, 68 L.Ed.2d 706 (1981); Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 568, 67 S.Ct. 1409, 1419, 91 L.Ed. 1666 (1947) (“policy of strict necessity in disposing of constitutional issues”). Even if the issue in the case before us does not fall directly within that rule, the principle is equally applicable in view of both the constitutional implications and the sensitivity of the issue.
The majority quotes United States v. Henderson, 721 F.2d 662 (9th Cir.1983), to support its pronouncement that the suggestion that state law might apply in the present case is “meritless.” In Henderson the search warrant was obtained by an FBI agent, relying in part on information from a county sheriff, and was presumably a federal warrant. It is correct that in dictum we said that evidence obtained by federal officials in violation of state law is not inadmissible even where the federal officials are acting in concert with state officers. however, nothing in that dictum or elsewhere in Henderson provides any support for a holding that federal law applies when determining the validity of a state search warrant obtained from a state court by a state officer. Moreover, we held the search warrant valid in Henderson not because federal law applied, but because the affidavit supporting the warrant established probable cause even without the disputed material. The other two cases cited by the majority, United States v. Adams, 694 F.2d 200 (9th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1118, 103 S.Ct. 3085, 77 L.Ed.2d 1347 (1983), and United States v. Daniel, 667 F.2d 783 (9th Cir.1982) (per curiam), are no more supportive of the majority’s conclusion. Both involved wiretaps conducted jointly by federal and state officers ■in conformity with federal wiretap law; neither involved a state search warrant issued by a state court.
In short, none of the cases relied upon by the majority deals remotely with the issue presented by the instant case — the validity of a state warrant procured by a state officer from a state court. Both the state and the federal interests are substantially different in a case where a search is conducted pursuant to a warrant issued under state law than in a case where a search is conducted under federal law and there is no involvement of a state court at all. The state has a strong interest in preserving the integrity of its own judicial process, an interest that we should at least consider before we decide that the state’s law is irrelevant.
It may be that federal law should apply in the present case. However, this important issue should be resolved only after a proper analysis, including an express weighing of the state’s interest in the integrity of its warrants. We should not so cavalierly adopt, without discussion, a rule developed in cases not involving state warrants — and certainly, if we do so, we should not dismiss a party’s objections as “merit-less” while erroneously claiming that we are merely applying existing law.
*1515As I stated earlier, the warrant may be held valid on either of two alternative grounds, neither of which depends upon our answering the question whether federal or state law applies. First, the challenged affidavit is sufficient to support a finding of probable cause under both Oregon and federal law. Oregon requires that an affidavit supporting a search warrant satisfy the “two-prong” test of Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964), and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969), that formerly was employed in federal courts. See Or.Rev.Stat. 133.545; State v. Horwedel, 66 Or.App. 400, 674 P.2d 623, 624-25 (1984). Under this test, an affidavit containing hearsay information must set forth both the informant’s “basis of knowledge” and facts showing the informant’s “veracity” by indicating either that the informant is credible or that his information is reliable. See, e.g., State v. Carlile, 290 Or. 161, 619 P.2d 1280, 1281 (1980). Under current federal law, on the other hand, an affidavit supporting a search warrant is to be tested under the more relaxed “totality of the circumstances” test. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). Consequently, an affidavit that is sufficient under the more restrictive Oregon standard also satisfies the federal standard. Horwedel, 674 P.2d at 625.
As the majority points out, Kovac has made no showing that the word “conversation” was inaccurate. See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2332, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983) (affidavits must be read in common sense manner); State v. Villagran, 294 Or. 404, 657 P.2d 1223, 1226 (1983) (in banc) (same). In addition, inaccuracies in an affidavit do not invalidate a warrant if the rest of the affidavit supports a finding of probable cause. E.g., State v. Freehely, 27 Or.App. 343, 556 P.2d 142,145 (1976). As the majority indicates, the unchallenged information in the affidavit was sufficient to establish the basis of knowledge of the witness on whose statement the state officer relied and the witness’s interest in providing accurate information, and to support a finding that probable cause existed that contraband would be found at Kovac’s house. See State v. An-spach, 298 Or. 375, 692 P.2d 602, 605 (1984) (in banc) (probable cause standard met if facts would “lead a reasonable person to believe that seizable things will probably be found in the location to be searched”). If the majority believes the affidavit is defective under Oregon law, it should explain why it reaches that conclusion. If it does not, there is clearly no reason for us to address the issue of whether to apply federal or state law.
The second alternative ground that would avoid the necessity of deciding the unresolved choice of law issue is that, even if the warrant is invalid under the applicable law, evidence obtained pursuant to it may nevertheless be admitted because the officers acted in good faith reliance on the warrant. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984). Although the district court did not address the issue whether the officers acted in good faith, “if the record is adequate we can reach that question for the first time on appeal since the district court’s determination of good faith would be subject to de novo review.” United States v. Hendricks, 743 F.2d 653, 656 (9th Cir.1984), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 105 S.Ct. 1362, 84 L.Ed.2d 382 (1985). Here, the record is adequate. Reliance on a warrant normally establishes the officer’s good faith, Leon, 468 U.S. at 922, 104 S.Ct. at 3421; Kovac has made no showing that would suggest a contrary conclusion in the present case.
The majority’s failure to analyze the important question it resolves is unfortunate; the state’s legitimate and significant interest in the integrity of its judicial process should not be so lightly subordinated. The majority’s decision to resolve the previously unanswered question is in any event unjustified; there are two independent grounds upon which our decision could be based, neither of which requires the making of new law. Accordingly, I do not join in that portion of the court’s opinion that unnecessarily (and possibly incorrectly) *1516holds that federal law applies in determining the validity of the state search warrant.