concurring:
Notwithstanding the subjective belief of Officer McIntyre, the agents had probable cause to arrest Moses at the time they stopped the automobile in which he was a passenger. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 507, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1329, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983) (“[T]he fact that the officers did not believe there was probable cause ... would not foreclose the State from justifying [defendant’s] custody by proving probable cause.”). Probable cause arose out of Moses’ own actions, not out of his association with others. Reliance on United States v. Hillison, 733 F.2d 692 (9th Cir.1984), is unnecessary. Under the totality of the facts and circumstances known, a prudent person would have been justified in concluding that there was a fair probability that Moses had committed or was about to commit a crime. United States v. Fixen, 780 F.2d 1434, 1436 (9th Cir.1986). See also Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 n. 2, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 2641 n. 2, 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979) (“[A] trained, experienced police officer ... is able to perceive and articulate meaning in given conduct which would be wholly innocent to the untrained observer.”). Accordingly, I agree that the ensuing search of Moses’ person was lawful. See United States v. Smith, 790 F.2d 789, 791 (9th Cir.1986) (“[A] warrantless search is permissible if conducted incident to a lawful arrest.”).
This conclusion standing alone requires reversal of the district court’s suppression of the Ford trunk key found on Moses. As the key was lawfully obtained, we need not decide whether the key inevitably would have been discovered in the absence of police misconduct. Cf. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 442-43, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 2508-09, 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984). I join in Judge Sneed’s holding reversing the order of the district court that the key be suppressed, but write separately as I see no need to ground our finding of probable cause on Moses’ “association with the group.”