specially concurring.
I concur with the result reached by the opinion written by Judge Williams. I do so because I agree that the law in this Circuit is well established that in granting statutorily authorized attorney’s fees the district court must follow the twelve factor standard set out in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974) and must indicate how each of the twelve factors affected the award.
However, I write specially to say that in light of Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983), and Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984), it is time for this Circuit to determine whether the continued rigid application of Johnson, su*138pra, to require a specific indication as to how each of the twelve factors was considered is still necessary. In a system burdened with increased caseloads, it is inappropriate and unnecessary to make a request for attorney’s fees an unduly complex matter. The attorney’s fees issue should not become a second complicated lawsuit. To determine the amount of an attorney’s fee award, district courts should be given standards which are fair, simple and easily reviewable on appeal for abuse of discretion.
District Judge of the Southern District of Texas, sitting by designation.