concurring.
In my view, this case should not be decided by inventing novel approaches to the confrontation clause which will provide dangerous precedent in future cases. Nor should it be decided by invoking the harmless error rule. Such a course would undoubtedly send the wrong signal with respect to this court’s tolerance of serious error to the trial courts and to those officials of the federal and state government charged with the prosecution of criminal offenses. Rather, this case should be decided by the forthright adherence to the basic principles governing the role of the federal courts in habeas corpus actions.
In Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 545-46, 101 S.Ct. 764, 768, 66 L.Ed.2d 722 (1981) (Sumner I), the Supreme Court held that the presumption of correctness accorded the findings of fact of state courts under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1966) extends to findings of fact of the appellate courts of the state when those findings of fact are contained in the court’s .written opinion. See also Love v. Young, 781 F.2d 1307, 1310 (7th Cir.1986) (per curiam). This holding was reaffirmed by the Court in Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591, 592-93, 102 S.Ct. 1303, 1304-05, 71 L.Ed.2d 480 (1982) (per curiam ) (Sumner II). This presumption does not apply to conclusions of law. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 341, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 1714, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980). Nor does it apply to “mixed” questions of fact and law. Sumner II, 455 U.S. at 597, 102 S.Ct. at 1306. On the other hand, it does apply not only to the facts explicitly found by the state courts but also to the inferences fairly deducible from those facts. Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 435, 103 S.Ct. 843, 851, 74 L.Ed.2d 646 (1983). In this case, the conclusion of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin that the prosecutrix was “unavailable” is probably a mixed question of law and fact and not entitled to the deference mandated by section 2254(d). See Miller v. Fenton, — U.S. —, 106 S.Ct. 445, 88 L.Ed.2d 405 (1985); but see Maggio v. Fulford, 462 U.S. 111, 103 S.Ct. 2261, 76 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983). However, in any event, this conclusion is based on the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s finding that “the victim is presently diagnosed as being severely mentally ill” and that “the act of testifying again has a significant probability of worsening the condition.” State v. Burns, 332 N.W.2d 757, 764 (Wis.1983). This finding is in turn based on more detailed findings:
Dr. Busby testified that L.L. presently suffered from schizophrenia, a severe mental illness, and would continue to suffer from the illness for two years or more. He also testified that requiring *948L.L. to testify at trial had a moderate to high probability of causing her to suffer a relapse. The symptoms L.L. originally suffered included being in a “catatonic stupor with hallucinations and delusions.” He further testified that schizophrenia was known for the difficulty which patients experienced in recovering from it.
The victim in this case became a catatonic schizophrenic, after her preliminary examination testimony, as a result of the vicious assault upon her. We are not capable of understanding all the mechanisms the mind uses to cope with the seemingly unbearable. Calling on Jesus Christ to save her during her struggle, she continued to call on him during her hospitalization as she apparently relived the horror of her brush with death. Following slight improvement in her situation, she now seeks refuge in her religion from the haunting shadows of her experience. She is trying to “convert” her attacker, hence her pitiable letter and visit to him in the jail and also her feeling she shouldn’t testify, treating this heinous crime as something between her and the defendant and outside the concern of the court____ One cannot forget that her forgiveness here is the product of a mind rendered seriously ill due to the defendant’s assault upon her.
Id. at 762, 765.
Based on this evidence, the Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded that the victim was suffering1 from a long term mental illness. Id. at 761 n. 6. The Supreme Court’s holdings in Sumner I, Sumner II and Wainwright v. Goode, 464 U.S. 78, 83, 104 S.Ct. 378, 382, 78 L.Ed.2d 187 (1983), require us to apply the section 2254(d) presumption to this finding.
It is clear that these findings of fact were not unanimously accepted by the justices of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin. Two distinguished members of that court believed that the record revealed that the condition of the prosecutrix may have been significantly improved by the time of trial and that, consequently, she was not “unavailable.” The fact that these distinguished jurists disagreed on the appropriate findings does not alter the role of this court. We do not sit as a court of appeal and error over every determination of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin. That tribunal did resolve the matter and, as long as that determination is fairly supported by the record, it is not our place to second-guess that tribunal. Here, my own examination of the record convinces me that there is indeed an adequate basis for the finding of the majority. As in the case of most psychiatric testimony, absolute clarity is not apparent and it was necessary for the state court to evaluate the testimonial submission in its totality.1 However, the state court undertook that task and we must accept its conclusion. Goode, 104 S.Ct. at 382-83.2 The record fairly sup*949ports the conclusion that the prosecutrix was suffering from a long-term mental illness with little or no chance of significant improvement in the short or intermediate term.
The finding that the prosecutrix was suffering from a long-term mental illness is fairly supported by the record. Therefore, we cannot substitute our findings or the findings of the minority of the Wisconsin Supreme Court. Goode, 104 S.Ct. at 383. Bound by the findings that the witness suffered a mental illness which would likely continue for two years and that requiring her to testify could cause a relapse, I would find no violation of the confrontation clause and would affirm the judgment of the district court.
. For instance, the Wisconsin court carefully evaluated apparent discrepancies in medical terminology:
In the record, Dr. Busby initially testified that L.L. suffered from schizophrenia. He later identified the disorder as an acute schizophreniform disorder. > However, the record clearly shows that he expected the recovery period to last a minimum of two years and such a recovery period is consistent with a diagnosis of schizophrenia but not acute schizophreniform disorder. See Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3rd Ed. 1980).
State v. Burns, 332 N.W.2d 757, 761 n. 6 (Wis. 1983).
. In Wainwright v. Goode, 464 U.S. 78, 83, 104 S.Ct. 378, 382, 78 L.Ed.2d 187 (1983), the Court reversed an Eleventh Circuit decision to grant a petition for habeas corpus. Mr. Goode had filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Florida Supreme Court. He claimed that he had been denied effective assistance of counsel because his attorney on appeal had failed to challenge the trial judge’s reliance on a nonstatutory aggravating factor when the judge sentenced him to death. The Florida Supreme Court reviewed the record and determined that the trial judge had not relied on an improper factor. Id. 104 S.Ct. at 381. The Eleventh Circuit evaluated the record and decided that the trial judge had considered a nonstatutory aggravating factor. The Supreme Court concluded that the record in the trial court was at best ambiguous. However, because both possible characterizations of the trial court's action "find *949fair support in the record, ... [the Supreme Court believed that] the Court of Appeals erred in substituting its view of the facts for that of the Florida Supreme Court.” Id. at 383.