dissenting.
I would dismiss this appeal because petitioner, Carl Rose, has failed to exhaust administrative remedies by not pursuing a hearing before an administrative law judge.
Both the statutory and regulatory schemes involved in this case require a complainant to request an administrative hearing before the complainant may seek judicial review. Although 42 U.S.C. § 5851(c)(1)1 gives this Court jurisdiction to review “an order issued under [42 U.S.C. § 5851(b) ],” 42 U.S.C. § 5851(b)(2)(A) provides in pertinent part that: “An order of the Secretary shall be made on the record after notice and opportunity for public hearing.” Under 29 C.F.R. § 24.7(a) (1985),2 this Court can review “a final order under § 24.6.” The Secretary of Labor, however, can issue “a final order under § 24.6”3 only after receiving a recom*567mended decision from an administrative law judge. Since petitioner never requested a hearing before an administrative law judge, we do not have “an order issued under [42 U.S.C. § 5851(b)]” or “a final order under § 24.6.”
In this case, William M. Otter, Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division (“the Administrator”), issued a decision that the facts did not justify tolling the thirty-day limitations period in 42 U.S.C. § 5851(b)(1). Although 29 C.F.R. § 24.4(d)(2)(i) (1985)4 states that the Administrator’s “notice of determination shall become the final order of the Secretary” if the complainant does not request an administrative hearing, a “notice of determination” does not become judicially reviewable when it becomes final in effect. Title 29 C.F.R. § 24.7(a) provides for judicial review of “a final order under § 24.6,” not “a final order under § 24.6 or § 24.4(d)(2)(i). ” In this case, we have a “notice of determination” which has become a final, non-reviewable order because petitioner did not seek an administrative hearing.
This case is distinguishable from this Court’s recent decision in Midland Insurance Company v. Adam, 781 F.2d 526 (6th Cir.1985). In that case, Midland Insurance Company (“Midland”) sought review of a December 31, 1981 order of the Benefits Review Board (“the Board”) determining that Midland, rather than Continental Insurance Company (“Continental”), was the responsible insurance carrier for the claimant’s permanent partial disability under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, as amended, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950.® This Court held that since Midland failed to file a petition for review of the subsequent October 27, 1983 decision of an administrative law judge (“ALJ”), the administrative proceedings had not produced a “final order of the Board.5 6 Accordingly, this Court granted the motion to dismiss *568the appeal. The Court acknowledged that the administrative proceedings ended when the parties did not file an appeal with the Board following the AU’s decision on remand, but specifically rejected an argument that since no party appealed the AU’s October 27, 1983 decision, the Board’s December 31,1981 decision became a final, reviewable order.
In refusing to dismiss this case on jurisdictional grounds, the majority creates extremely dangerous precedent. In every case of lower-level administrative action or inaction, when the losing party does not proceed to the next administrative level, the agency’s decision becomes final. This does not mean that the losing party is entitled to judicial review wherever or however the matter becomes final. In a social security case, for example, the initial determination of the Secretary of Health and Human Services becomes final if the claimant does not seek reconsideration, and after reconsideration, a hearing before an administrative law judge. Certainly, this Court would not allow claimants who have received an adverse initial determination to appeal directly to the district court or the court of appeals. Yet that is what the majority allows in this case. Although the Administrator’s decision in this case became final, in effect, because petitioner did not pursue further administrative remedies, the Administrator’s decision is not judicially reviewable without an administrative hearing and a complete administrative record.
Since petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies by not requesting a hearing before an administrative law judge, I would dismiss this appeal on jurisdictional grounds.7 Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
. Title 42 U.S.C. § 5851(c)(1) provides in pertinent part:
Any person adversely affected or aggrieved by an order issued under subsection (b) of this section may obtain review of the order in the United States court of appeals for the circuit in which the violation, with respect to which the order was issued, allegedly oc-curred____
. Title 29 C.F.R. § 24.7(a) (1985) provides in pertinent part:
Within 60 days after the issuance of a final order under § 24.6, above, any person adversely affected or aggrieved by such order may file a petition for review of the order in the United States court of appeals for the circuit in which the violation with respect to which the order was issued allegedly occurred ____
. Title 29 C.F.R. § 24.6 (1985) provides in pertinent part:
(a) Recommended decision. The administrative law judge shall issue a recommended decision within 20 days after the termination of a proceeding at which evidence was submitted. The recommended decision shall contain appropriate findings, conclusions and a recommended order and be forwarded, together with the record, to the Secretary of Labor for a final order. The recommended *567decision shall be served upon all parties to the proceeding.
(b) Final order. (1) Within 90 days after receipt of a complaint, the Secretary of Labor shall issue a final order, based on the record and the recommended decision of the administrative law judge, which shall be served upon all of the parties____
. Title 29 C.F.R. § 24.4(d)(2)(i) (1985) provides:
If on the basis of the investigation the Administrator determines that the complaint is without merit, the notice of determination shall include, or be accompanied by notice to the complainant that the notice of determination shall become the final order of the Secretary denying the complaint unless within five calendar days of its receipt the complainant files with the Chief Administrative Law Judge a request by telegram for a hearing on the complaint. The notice shall give the address of the Chief Administrative Law Judge.
. An administrative law judge (“AU”) found Continental liable for the claimant’s permanent partial disability from October 12, 1977 until February 20, 1978, and Midland liable beginning June 13, 1978. Midland and the claimant appealed the AU’s decision to the Board, the claimant contending that he was totally disabled. On December 31, 1981, the Board upheld the AU’s determination that the claimant was partially disabled and that Midland was responsible for compensating claimant for his permanent partial disability beginning June 13, 1978. The Board, however, vacated the portion of the AU’s decision concerning the extent of the claimant’s permanent partial disability and remanded that issue to the AU for further proceedings. The Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, United States Department of Labor ("the Director”) filed a petition to review the Board’s order in this Court. A panel of this Court dismissed the Director's petition to review the Board’s order in this Court. A panel of this Court dismissed the Director’s petition finding that that Board’s December 31, 1981 decision was not a final and reviewable order because the Board had vacated a portion of the AU’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. On remand, the AU entered another decision on October 27, 1983. No party appealed that order to the Board within the thirty-day period allowed in 33 U.S.C. § 921. Midland, however, filed a petition to review the Board’s December 31, 1981 order in this Court, within sixty days after the AU’s October 27, 1983 decision.
. Title 33 U.S.C. § 921(c) provides in pertineni part:
Any person adversely affected or aggrieved by a final order of the [Benefits Review] Board may obtain a review of that order in the United States court of appeals for the circuit in which the injury occurred, by filing in such court within sixty days following the issuance of such Board order a written petition praying that the order be modified or set aside____
. While I express no opinion as to whether petitioner can now request a hearing before an administrative law judge, I note that the Secretary did not comply with 29 C.F.R. § 24.-4(d)(2)(i) because the Administrator did not include notice with the "notice of determination” denying petitioner’s complaint that the "notice of determination” would become the final order of the Secretary unless, within five calendar days of the receipt of the "notice of determination,” the petitioner filed, by telegram, a request for a hearing on the complaint with the Chief Administrative Law Judge.