The Majority inaccurately characterizes this case as an attempt by the Town of *1356Brookfield to deprive the picketers of their right to be heard: “People who care passionately about a political or social issue have a right to be heard.” Majority opinion at 1352. The picketers are not being denied their right to be heard. They may advertise their grievances in any non-residential area. They can communicate their message through other media — direct mail, radio, television, newspapers or telephone. We are called upon to balance the right of the picketers to advertise their grievance against the right of innocent people (Brook-field residents) far removed from the controversy to enjoy the peace and tranquility of their home in an area zoned residential where little toddlers romp and play. Citizens also have a right to the quiet, comfort, and privacy of their own home, free from the cacophony of sounds and other disturbances which all too often penetrate and invade our lives once outside the peaceful sanctity of their domicile. The controversy before us involves the Town of Brookfield, Wisconsin’s attempt to balance the right of privacy against the right of freedom of speech under circumstances that I believe reasonably justify the Town’s decision to strike the balance in favor of privacy while not depriving the picketers of their right to advertise their grievance. Although this court has an obligation to protect the rights of individuals, “we must not [ever] lose sight of the common good of all mankind.” United States v. Madison, 689 F.2d 1300, 1314 (7th Cir.1982). For every right, there is a corresponding obligation. The picketers have a right to express their concerns about abortion, but they also have an obligation to respect and honor the rights of others, especially those foreign to the con-troversey such as Dr. Victoria’s innocent neighbors and their infant children who also have the right to enjoy the privacy, peace and tranquility of their own homes. These corresponding obligations preserve the order and organization that make the exercise of our individual rights a reality instead of an illusory promise as is true in many other countries. Ours is a government of laws, not of men, reflecting the beliefs of the Majority enacted through their legislative bodies (Town Council) and protecting individual rights, but not at the expense of society as a whole. We must not lose sight of the common good of all mankind in our zealousness to protect individual rights. As the Supreme Court explained:
“Civil liberties, as guaranteed by the Constitution, imply the existence of an organized society maintaining public order without which liberty itself would be lost in the excesses of unrestrained abuses.”
Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574, 61 S.Ct. 762, 765, 85 L.Ed. 1049 (1941). Because I cannot agree with the Majority that a person’s right to privacy must give way to unsolicited, and disruptive conduct which not only intimidates but harasses innocent people in the privacy of their own homes, I dissent. Even though ample alternative methods of communication are available to the picketers (direct mail, radio, television, newspaper or telephone), the Majority forces the Town and its residents to tolerate this unjustified assault on the residents’ right of privacy.
The right of free speech guaranteed by the First Amendment to our Constitution has always been considered as essential to our survival as a free nation. “[F]ree speech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government.” Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75, 85 S.Ct. 209, 215-16, 13 L.Ed.2d 125 (1964). Just as the courts have recognized the fundamental importance of free speech to a free society, they have also acknowledged that the right of free speech is not absolute: “[i]t is well understood that the right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances.” Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571, 62 S.Ct. 766, 769, 86 L.Ed. 1031 (1942). Justice Holmes stated: “The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a [crowded] theater and causing a panic.” Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52, 39 S.Ct. 247, 249, 63 L.Ed. 470 (1919). Although freedom of *1357speech is fundamental, it does not mean “that everyone with opinions or beliefs to express may address a group at any public place and at any time.” Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554, 85 S.Ct. 453, 464, 13 L.Ed.2d 471 (1965). The Supreme Court stated in United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177, 103 S.Ct. 1702, 1707, 75 L.Ed.2d 736 (1983), “[w]e have regularly rejected the assertion that people who wish ‘to propagandize protests or views have a constitutional right to do so whenever and however and wherever they please.’ ” (quoting Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47-48, 87 S.Ct. 242, 247-48, 17 L.Ed.2d 149 (1966)). As Justice Black noted in his concurrence to Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 125, 89 S.Ct. 946, 953-54, 22 L.Ed.2d 134 (1969) (emphasis added):
“Were the authority of government so trifling as to permit anyone with a complaint to have vast power to do anything he pleased, wherever he pleased, and whenever he pleased, our customs and our habits of conduct, social, political, economic, ethical, and religious, would all be wiped out, and become no more than relics of a gone but not forgotten past. Churches would be compelled to welcome into their buildings invaders who came but to scoff and jeer; streets and highways and public buildings would cease to be available for the purpose for which they were constructed and dedicated whenever demonstrators and picketers wanted to use them for their own purposes. And perhaps worse than all other changes, homes, the sacred retreat to which families repair for their privacy and daily way of living, would have to have their doors thrown open to all who desire to convert the occupants to new views, new morals, and a new way of life.”
Consequently, protected expression is subject to limitation by the state under certain circumstances. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968). As the Supreme Court noted 46 years ago,
“[i]t is equally clear that a state may by general and non-discriminatory legislation regulate the times, places, and the manner of soliciting upon its streets, and of holding meetings thereon; and in other respects safeguard the peace, good, or comfort of the community, without unconstitutionally invading the liberties protected by the [First Amendment].”
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304, 60 S.Ct. 900, 903, 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940) (emphasis added). The state’s right to limit expression becomes less restricted as the form of expression moves away from pure speech to include an element of conduct (picketing). “It has never been deemed an abridgement of freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either spoken, written, or printed.” Giboney v. Empire Storage and Ice Company, 336 U.S. 490, 502, 69 S.Ct. 684, 691, 93 L.Ed. 834 (1949). As the Supreme Court noted in Cox, “[t]he examples are many of the application by this court of the principle that certain forms of conduct mixed with speech may be regulated or prohibited.” 379 U.S. at 563, 85 S.Ct. at 480.
The conduct of the picketers in this case, picketing in a private residential neighborhood, although intertwined with an element of expression, has long been recognized as subject to state regulation:
“Picketing by an organized group is more than free speech, since it involves patrol of a particular locality and since the very presence of a picket line may induce action of one kind or another, . quite irrespective of the nature of the ideas which are being disseminated. Hence, those aspects of picketing make it the subject of restrictive regulation.”
Bakery Drivers Local v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 776-77, 62 S.Ct. 816, 819-20, 86 L.Ed. 1178 (1942). Thus, although picketing contains an element of speech,1 the *1358Supreme Court has never recognized picketing as the “inevitable legal equivalent” of speech. Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460, 465, 70 S.Ct. 718, 721, 94 L.Ed. 985 (1950). Further, the manner in which the picketing proceeds has never been considered as relevant to the state’s power to regulate or prohibit picketing: “[a] state is not required to tolerate in all places and all circumstances even peaceful picketing by an individual.” Bakery & Pastery Drivers, etc. v. Wohl, 315 U.S. at 775, 62 S.Ct. at 819 (emphasis added).
The state’s interest in regulating expressive conduct is even greater where the expressive conduct threatens to (or does) impinge on the exercise of equally important constitutional rights (privacy) of others.
“Although American constitutional jurisprudence, in the light of the First Amendment, has been zealous to preserve access to public places for purposes of freedom of speech, the nature of the forum and the conflicting interest involved have remained important in determining the degree of protection afforded by the Amendment to the speech in question.”
Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 302-03, 94 S.Ct. 2714, 2716-17, 41 L.Ed.2d 770 (1974) (emphasis added). Thus, when evaluating a state’s regulation of protected expression, we must consider:
“The nature of a place, ‘the pattern of its normal activities, dictate the kinds of regulations of time, place, and manner that are reasonable.’ Although a silent vigil may not duly interfere with a public library ... making a speech in the reading room almost certainly would. That same speech would be perfectly appropriate in a park. The crucial question is whether the manner of expression is basically incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place at a particular time.”
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 118, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2304, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972) (citations omitted). In this case, as the Majority acknowledges, the right of the picketers to express their opposition to Dr. Victoria’s medical practices on a public street in a residential area in Brookfield, Wisconsin clashes directly with the right of Dr. Victoria and his innocent neighbors and their infant children to retreat to the privacy of their homes, undisturbed by the “public world” that vies for their undivided attention the moment they leave the sanctity of their own property. The picketing might very well be “perfectly appropriate” at the location of Dr. Victoria’s clinic, but it is clearly inappropriate in front of his private residence. The right of a person to the privacy of his or her own home is undisputed. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 551-52, 81 S.Ct. 1752, 1781-82, 6 L.Ed.2d 989 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Further, when the right of privacy clashes with the right of free expression, the interest in privacy has not always come out second best. Thus, in Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 81, 69 S.Ct. 448, 450, 93 L.Ed. 513 (1949), the Supreme Court upheld an ordinance which prohibited the use of sound trucks on residential streets. The court explained that the interest in preventing interference with the activities of residents “or the quiet they would like to enjoy” was sufficient to justify the ordinance involved. Likewise, in Rowan v. United States Post Office Department, 397 U.S. 728, 736, 90 S.Ct. 1484, 1490, 25 L.Ed.2d 736 (1970), the Court upheld as constitutional a federal statute that empowered the post office, upon request of an individual, to require that a sender of unsolicited mail remove the name and address of the individual from its mail lists. Thus, the individual was able to stop the delivery of unwanted information to his private residence without interfering with the mailer’s general right to disseminate its materials to “willing” recipients. See Kovacs, 336 U.S. at 88, 69 S.Ct. at 454. The court recognized “the very basic right to be free from sights, sounds, and tangible matter” in the *1359privacy of our homes. Clearly, as Justice Black noted in his concurring opinion in Gregory:
“No mandate in our Constitution leaves states and governmental units powerless to pass laws to protect the public from the kind of boisterous, threatening conduct that disturbs the tranquility of spots selected by the people either for homes, wherein they can escape the hurly-burly of the outside business and political world, or for public and other buildings that require peace and quiet to carry out their functions, such as courts, libraries, and hospitals.”
394 U.S. at 118, 89 S.Ct. at 950. As important as free speech is to preserving our freedom, the right of privacy which ensures the opportunity for peace, tranquility, comfort, and personal solace away from the often overwhelming bombardment of unsolicited communications from political, commercial, and religious groups, enterprises, and organizations cannot be any less important in a society whose existence depends on the ability of each individual (as well as the majority) to conscientiously exercise his or her judgment in the conduct of their own affairs and those of their locality and nation. The conscientious exercise of judgment upon which we depend can hardly be exercised in the absence of the privacy necessary for contemplation and reflection. To hold that the right of free speech outweighs all other individual rights, as the Majority does in this case, goes far beyond the boundaries the Supreme Court has established when considering the limitations on the right of free speech. The Majority’s unwarranted expansion of the right to freedom of speech under the First Amendment lays a foundation for transforming the right of free speech from a tool of freedom and democracy into a weapon of injustice. See Cox v. Louisiana.
Although the Majority acknowledges that Dr. Victoria and his neighbors have a right to privacy and recognize a need for balancing that right against the picketers’ right of expression, the balancing test applied by the Majority, reflects its determination unsupported in case law that the right of free expression always supersedes the right to privacy. Is the Majority not making the same error of judgment that the civil libertarians in the 1960s made when attempting to overhaul the very foundation of our criminal law? I question whether the Majority’s holding brings us closer to falling prey to the same type of unrealistic interpretation of an individual’s rights as contrasted with the good of all mankind, which is primarily responsible for our present inability to adequately protect society from criminal activity. The Majority, in requiring the Town of Brookfield to substantiate that its ordinance is the least restrictive means to protect its residents’ right to privacy misconstrues decisions of the United States Supreme Court, and not only imposes a greater burden on all municipalities but effectively precludes a state from protecting the rights of individuals in their homes from shouting, “noisy, marching, tramping, threatening picketers and demonstrators bent on filling the minds of men, women, and children with fears of the unknown.” Gregory, 394 U.S. at 126, 89 S.Ct. at 954 (Black, J., concurring).
“[SJtreets and highways and public buildings would cease to be available for the purposes for which they were contracted and dedicated whenever demonstrators and picketers wanted to use them for their own purposes.”
Gregory, 394 U.S. at 125, 89 S.Ct. at 954 (Black, J., concurring).
In so doing, the Majority makes the unwilling recipient of the message carried by the picketers a captive in his own home. As the Supreme Court stated in Rowan:
“If [a] prohibition operates to impede the flow of even valid ideas, the answer is that no one has a right to press even ‘good’ ideas on an unwilling recipient. That we are often ‘captives’ outside the sanctuary of the home and subject to objectionable speech, and other sound does not mean that we must be captives everywhere.”
397 U.S. at 738, 90 S.Ct. at 1491.
Further, the Majority ignores the authority of a state or municipality to enact laws *1360or ordinances for the protection of the public health and safety under its police powers. As the United States Supreme Court explained, that “state legislatures have constitutional authority to experiment with new techniques; they are entitled to their own standard of the public welfare; ...” Day-Brite Lighting v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423, 72 S.Ct. 405, 407, 96 L.Ed. 469 (1952).
“For the legislature absolutely or conditionally to forbid public speaking in a highway or public park is no more an infringement of the rights of a member of the public than for the owner of a private house to forbid it in his house. When no proprietary right interferes the legislature may end the right of the public to enter upon the public place by putting an end to the dedication to public uses. So it may take the less step of limiting the public use to certain purposes.”
Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43, 47, 17 S.Ct. 731, 733, 42 L.Ed. 71 (1897).
“The power and duty of the State to take adequate steps to preserve the peace and protect the privacy, the lives, and the property of its residents cannot be doubted.”
Carlson v. California, 310 U.S. 106, 113, 60 S.Ct. 746, 749, 84 L.Ed. 1104 (1940). Thus, I am convinced that the Framers of the Constitution would have held that the Town of Brookfield acted within its constitutional authority in enacting an appropriate content-neutral time, manner, place regulation of speech.
The analysis applied to determine the constitutionality of a challenged regulation of free expression depends on (1) the nature of the forum involved, and (2) whether the regulation is content-based. Where the forum involved falls within the class the Supreme Court has labeled “quintessential public forums,”2 the state may enforce a content-based regulation only by showing that “its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.” Perry Educ. Assn. v. Perry Local Educator’s Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 46, 103 S.Ct. 948, 955, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983). However, the states may also enforce time, place, and manner regulations of expression that are content-neutral upon a lesser showing that the regulation is “narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest” and that it “leave[s] open ample alternative channels of communication.” Id. The first step in analyzing a statute or ordinance that regulates expression is to determine whether the regulation involved is a content-based or content-neutral time, manner, and place restriction.
The Brookfield ordinance challenged in this case provides:
Section 9.17 Residential Picketing.
"... (2) PICKETING RESIDENCE OR DWELLING UNLAWFUL. It is unlawful for any person to engage in picketing before or about the residence or dwelling of any individual in the Town of Brook-field.”
The ordinance is not selectively drafted and prohibits all picketing “before or about the residence or dwelling of any individual,” regardless of the purpose of the picketing. The ordinance does not prescribe expression on the basis of the message contained in the expression, but rather proscribes a specific mode of expression (picketing), in a particular locality — a residential area. Therefore, the Brookfield ordinance is a content-neutral time, manner, and place regulation, and meets the test of constitutional validity if it serves a significant state interest, is narrowly tailored to meet that interest, and leaves open ample alternative channels of communication.
The Town of Brookfield set out in the declaration of purpose two interests among others that the picketing ordinance was intended to serve: (1) protecting the privacy interests of its residents, and (2) the town’s interest in protecting the safely of *1361those using its streets and sidewalks by regulating vehicular and pedestrian traffic. The Supreme Court has long recognized the legitimacy of the state’s interest in regulating expressive conduct that interferes with the orderly use of public streets:
“Civil liberties, as guaranteed by the Constitution, imply the existence of an organized society maintaining public order without which liberty itself would be lost in the excesses of unrestrained abuses. The authority of a municipality to impose regulations in order to assure the safety and convenience of the people in the use of public highways has never been regarded as inconsistent with civil liberties but rather as one of the means of safeguarding the good order upon which they ultimately de-pend____ Where a restriction of the use of highways in that relation is designed to promote the public convenience in the interest of all, it cannot be disregarded by the attempted exercise of some civil right which in other circumstances would be entitled to protection. One would not be justified in ignoring the familiar red traffic light because he thought it his religious duty to disobey the municipal command or sought by that means to direct public attention to an announcement of his opinions.”
Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. at 574, 61 S.Ct. at 765 (emphasis added). See also Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 293-94, 71 S.Ct. 312, 314-15, 95 L.Ed. 280 (1951).
“The control of travel on the streets is a clear example of governmental responsibility to insure this necessary order. A restriction [e.g., a ban on picketing in residential areas] in that relation, designed to promote the public convenience in the interest of all, and not susceptible to abuses of discriminatory application, cannot be disregarded by the attempted exercise of some civil right which, in other circumstances, would be entitled to protection.
Nor could one, contrary to traffic regulations, insist upon a street meeting in the middle of Times Square at the rush hour as a form of freedom of speech or assembly. Governmental authorities have the duty and responsibility to keep their streets open and available for movement. A group of demonstrators could not insist upon the right to cordon off a street, or entrance to a public or private building, and allow no one to pass who did not agree to listen to their exhortations.”
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. at 554, 85 S.Ct. at 464 (emphasis added). See also United States Labor Party v. Oremus, 619 F.2d 683, 688 (7th Cir.1980) (Illinois statute which prohibited persons from standing on a “highway for purposes of soliciting employment, business or contributions from the occupant of any vehicle” is a “permissible regulation”); ACORN v. City of Phoenix, 603 F.Supp. 869, 871 (D.C.Ariz.1985) (holding unconstitutional an ordinance that prohibited “tagging” of cars on roadways because highway or roadway intersections “are not designated forums for public communication while in use by vehicular traffic”) (emphasis added). The street in front of Dr. Victoria’s home was intended for vehicular traffic and not as a forum for public communication. Although “highway” has a broad meaning (basically including any street, city or rural), the purposes of a highway, as used in the statutory definition, are limited. In defining highway, the statute refers to “every way open to the use of the public as a matter of right for the purposes of vehicular travel. It includes those roads ... opened to the use of the public for the purpose of vehicular travel.” Wis.Stat. § 340.01(22) (emphasis added). Thus it is clear that the purpose envisioned by the Wisconsin legislature — vehicular travel — would be inherently incompatible with pedestrians’ picketing, and the use of the street for picketing as a matter of right is lost. The record here reveals that there were no sidewalks along the streets affronting Dr. Victoria’s residence and that the streets were but a mere thirty feet wide. Obviously any picketing conducted in front of private residences in Brookfield would be confined to *1362those narrow streets where it obviously will disrupt and impede the purpose for which the land was dedicated — the free flow and movement of vehicular traffic. More importantly, the traffic on these roads poses a threat to the safety of pedestrians, including the picketers, especially young children, senior citizens and others who might be forced to walk further out onto the road in order that they might get around the picketers congregated, shouting and chanting in front of Dr. Victoria’s residence. The danger to pedestrians on these narrow roads in front of and about Dr. Victoria’s home becomes even greater when cars are parked on the streets, as they were during the picketing involved here, leaving less space for the movement of traffic.3 The distraction of the driver’s attention caused by the marching and chanting of the picketers and the narrowness of the streets certainly presents a safety hazard the Town of Brookfield is obligated to prevent. As we noted in Ore-mus where “the concern of the State is the evident dangers of physical injury and traffic disruption that are present when individuals stand in the center of busy streets trying to engage drivers and solicit contri-butions____ [tjhis legislatively expressed concern outweighs” the solicitors’ First Amendment interests. 619 F.2d at 688. The danger to picketers congregated in the street in front of Dr. Victoria’s home was no less than the danger to the solicitors in Oremus. This danger increases where, as in this case, the picketers do not limit their picketing to daytime, since at sunset visibility is reduced and thus driving is more difficult.4 The State of Wisconsin has recognized the danger to pedestrians using the streets and has imposed a duty on such persons: “No person shall stand or loiter on any roadway other than in a safety zone if such act interferes with the lawful movement of traffic.” Wis.Stat. § 346.29(2) (Standing or loitering in highway prohibited). The Wisconsin Supreme court has stated:
“This court has, in a number of eases, held that a pedestrian, crossing a highway at other than a crosswalk, is, as a matter of law, at least 50 percent negligent in the event he is struck by a motor vehicle during the crossing. However, these cases cite and rely upon the right-of-way statute, imposing on a non-crosswalk pedestrian on a highway an absolute duty to yield the right-of-way____ [Persons voluntarily on a street] are required to maintain a lookout and are negligent for placing themselves in such position of danger to their own safe-ty____ [Playing on the street] adds an additional element [to the duty of care imposed on person walking across street]: using a highway for a purpose for which it was not intended, and placing oneself in a position of danger while so doing.”
Wicker v. Hadler, 58 Wis.2d 173, 179, 205 N.W.2d 770 (1973). Wisconsin Statute § 941.03 makes it a felony to interfere with the orderly flow of traffic on a street:
“941.03 HIGHWAY OBSTRUCTION
(1) Whoever creates an unreasonable risk and high probability of causing death or great bodily harm to another by intentionally placing an obstacle in or upon a highway, damaging a highway, removing or tampering with a sign or signal used for the guidance of vehicles, giving a false traffic signal, or otherwise interfering with the orderly flow of traffic and realizes that he or she thereby created such risk and probability is guilty of a Class A felony.”
(emphasis added). Highway is defined for purposes of the criminal code as:
*1363“any public way or thoroughfare, including bridges thereon, any roadways commonly used for vehicular traffic, whether public or private, ...”
The statute clearly covers all streets including streets in residential neighborhoods, e.g., the street in front of Dr. Victoria’s home. Thus, unless this court is prepared to hold § 941.08 of the Wisconsin Statutes unenforceable for being unconstitutional, I fail to understand how the Majority can hold the Brookfield picketing ordinance unconstitutional.
A number of picketers on a street pose a much greater danger than a person merely crossing the street. The continued presence of a picketer on a street designed and maintained exclusively for vehicular travel makes him a stationary target for any driver distracted by the picketing activity. If we allow picketing on streets and highways, the danger to the picketers and pedestrians would be even greater during the winter months, when snowbanks along the streets protrude onto the streets making them even more narrow and thus providing even less space for the free movement of vehicular traffic, pedestrians. Picketing on streets would cause the Town a myriad of problems. The Town would be subject to liability if it failed to adequately protect those using the streets from the increased hazards posed by the picketing activities. In order to adequately protect the pedestrians and the picketers, the Town at the expense of its taxpayers would in all probability be required to provide police protection to supervise and direct traffic and pedestrian flow around the area whenever any group decided to picket in a residential area. Since the picketers are not required to give notice of their plans to picket, the Town would have no way to plan efficiently for the staffing of officers needed to supervise the demonstration, and thus a demonstration could leave the town underprotect-ed by tying up the on-duty police force. Furthermore, this would, in effect, place the Town of Brookfield and its residents in the position of subsidizing the protest activities of any group that selected a private residence as the target for a demonstration. Further, it is inconceivable that the First Amendment requires taxpayers to bear the extra costs associated with unlawful picketing5 in private residential neighborhoods where they have ample and more appropriate alternative forums for advertising their grievances such as direct mail, radio, television, newspapers or telephoning as is common practice in political campaigns. As I discuss infra, there are reasonable and more appropriate places for the picketers here to conduct their protests — any area other than private residential neighborhoods or at the place where Dr. Victoria performs the surgical procedures.
Although protecting the privacy interests of its residents was one motivation for the Town’s ordinance, the Majority disregards the other interest the Town set out in the declaration of policy, that of regulating traffic, simply because the town did not introduce evidence in this case that the abortion-picketing had disrupted traffic. Picketing in the street obviously would disrupt the flow of traffic. The fact that there was no evidence of traffic disruption presented in this case does not negate the legitimacy or significance of the justification proffered for the ordinance. The ordinance bans all picketing “before or about the residence or dwelling of any individual,” not just the picketing that the appel-lees seek to conduct. And thus the Majority unjustifiably assumes that because some picketing might not have implicated the Town’s interest in protecting the safety of those using the streets, no picketing ever will. As this court noted in Oremus:
“Plaintiffs also argue that the [State] could serve [its] interest through a less restrictive means by punishing only those who actually disrupt traffic or engage in unsafe behavior. The state need not wait for personal injuries.”
619 F.2d at 688 n. 4 (emphasis added). We do not require municipalities to wait until a building is engulfed in flames be*1364fore allowing the city to enact and enforce fire codes. We do not require the deaths of thousands in air traffic accidents before we regulate air travel. I fail to understand why the Town of Brookfield must wait until someone is injured, and seeks to recover damages from the Town or hold the Town liable, before it acts to protect those using its streets in an unlawful manner. See Wis.Stat. § 340.01(22).
Thus, I see no logical or legal basis to accept the Majority’s assertion that the town’s interest in regulating traffic in residential areas adds no weight to the town’s justification for the ordinance. Picketing in a street interferes with the free movement of vehicular traffic and endangers citizens using the streets for lawful purposes (crossing the street at a crosswalk). Clearly, protecting the safety of its residents and others using its streets is a legitimate exercise of the Town’s police power reserved to it by the Constitution.
“A restriction [e.g., a ban on picketing in residential areas] in that relation, designed to promote the public convenience in the interest of all, and not susceptible to abuses of discriminatory application, cannot be disregarded by the attempted exercise of some civil right which, in other circumstances, would be entitled to protection. Governmental authorities have the duty and responsibility to keep their streets open and available for movement.”
Cox, 379 U.S. at 554, 85 S.Ct. at 464. Furthermore, it is a basic principle of tort law that a town that neglects to prevent foreseeable injuries in public areas can be held liable for its negligence. The examples of this are too obvious to recount. The danger to people using the streets lawfully while the picketers are demonstrating is so obvious that I do not comprehend how the Majority can cavalierly brush it aside stating that the Town’s interest in regulating traffic “constituted only a minor part of the Town’s interest in the ordinance.” Majority op. at 1350. When the interest in traffic regulation is combined with the Town’s interest in protecting the privacy of its residents as set forth in the declaration of policy, the Town’s justification for the ordinance is more than “significant,” it is substantial and compelling.
The Supreme Court has previously acknowledged that in the privacy of the home, “the individual’s right to be left alone plainly outweighs the First Amendment rights of an intruder.” F.C.C. v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 748, 98 S.Ct. 3026, 3040, 57 L.Ed.2d 1073 (1978). Indeed, almost 40 years ago, in 1949, the Supreme Court recognized the legitimate interest of the state in regulating expression so as to protect the privacy interest of its citizens in their homes. Kovacs v. Cooper (prohibition of sound trucks in residential neighborhoods). And in the years since the Kovacs decision, the Supreme Court has consistently held that where the privacy interest is substantial, the right to free expression may have to give way. As the Supreme Court pointed out in Grayned, when evaluating a time, manner, and place regulation “the crucial question is whether the manner of expression is basically incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place at a particular time.” 408 U.S. at 118, 92 S.Ct. at 2304. Accordingly,
“consideration of a forum’s special attributes is relevant to the constitutionality of a regulation since the significance of the governmental interest must be assessed in light of the characteristic nature and function of the particular forum involved.”
Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 651-52, 101 S.Ct. 2559, 2565-66, 69 L.Ed.2d 298 (1981). See also Bering v. Share, 106 Wash.2d 212, 721 P.2d 918 (1986). Indeed, the Town of Brookfield determined — and I agree with its well-reasoned conclusion— that picketing was incompatible with the normal activity of a private residential neighborhood.
“The crucial question is whether the manner of expression is basically incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place at a particular time.”
Grayned, 408 U.S. at 118, 92 S.Ct. at 2304. Unless this court can hold as a matter of law that picketing is compatible with the *1365normal activity usually carried on in a residential neighborhood, it is not the function of this court or any other court to substitute its judgment for the careful and considered judgment of the Brookfield Town Council. Clark v. CCNV, 468 U.S. 288, 104 S.Ct. 3065, 3072, 82 L.Ed.2d 221 (1984).
“We do not believe, however, that either United States v. O’Brien, or the time, place, and manner decisions assign to the judiciary the authority to replace the Park Service as the manager of the nation’s parks____”
(emphasis added). To do so is to ignore the municipality’s own right of governance. In order to fit its analysis into the Perry test for time, manner, and place regulations the Majority is forced to assert both that picketing is compatible with the normal activities of a residential neighborhood and that ample alternative channels are not available to the picketers because “the disturbance occasioned by the residential picketing in this case is actually one measure of its unique value____” Majority op. at 1348. The Majority ignores the incompatibility of picketing with a residential area and ingeniously states:
“The fact that the message may reach and disturb families and children is clearly part of the point of the picketing, for, to a certain extent, the picketers seek to communicate their concerns about a perceived assault on the family and on childhood itself. There can be no better place to convey those concerns than in a residential area.”
Majority op. at 1348. The Majority incorrectly assumes that prohibiting the picketers from demonstrating in front of Dr. Victoria’s home denies the picketers access to his neighbors. But this is totally unfounded because nothing in the ordinance precludes the picketers from reaching Dr. Victoria’s neighbors through use of advertising through the media of direct mail, radio, television, newspaper or telephone. Each of these alternative methods allows Dr. Victoria’s neighbors to “turn off” the message and protect their privacy should they choose to do so, and thus is in accord with the safeguards of privacy enumerated in the decisions of the United States Supreme Court. See Pacifica; Rowan; Ko-vacs. See also, 39 U.S.C. § 4009 (Prohibition of pandering advertisements in the mails).
Furthermore, contrary to the Majority’s assertion, I fail to see any connection between the picketer’s message that abortion is wrong that would make anti-abortion picketing compatible with the neighborhood wherein a doctor who performs abortions happens to reside. There is no evidence in the record that Dr. Victoria performed abortions at his home or provided any abortion-related service in his home, much less ever received phone calls concerning his abortion practice since his home phone is unlisted. Whom did the picketers intend the message to reach? If they intended to dissuade others from obtaining abortions by advertising the same through picketing, they were in the wrong place for their activity would have more impact at one of the clinics in the immediate area where those intending to receive an abortion would visit to have the vacuum or surgical procedure performed and where the pedestrian and vehicular traffic is much greater. If it was their intention to persuade Dr. Victoria’s neighbors that abortion was wrong, as the Majority suggests, the ordinance does not prevent their access to his neighbors since direct mail, radio, television, newspapers, and telephones all provide the picketers with the same access to Dr. Victoria’s neighbors that any political campaign has. If they intended to embarrass, harass and intimidate the doctor and embarrass him by annoying his neighbors, then certainly the right of free expression in this case does not counterbalance the well-recognized right of an individual to the privacy of his own home, “sometimes the last citadel of the tired, the weary, and the sick.” Gregory, 394 U.S. at 125, 89 S.Ct. at 954. (Black, J., concurring). I do not agree with the Majority’s holding that in effect interprets the First Amendment to include the right to harass or intimidate others.
*1366Another major flaw in the Majority’s analysis of the compatibility issue is that the Majority conveniently avoids addressing the central question. The central question is not, as the Majority seems to believe, whether the message the picketers seek to convey is compatible with the residential area the ordinance covers, but rather, as the Supreme Court enunciated, whether “the manner of expression” is basically incompatible with “the normal activity of a particular place at a particular time.” Grayned, 408 U.S. at 118, 92 S.Ct. at 2304 (emphasis added). The Majority admits that the conduct of the picketers in front of private residences disrupts the neighborhood wherein it occurs. As the United States Supreme Court decisions make clear, an individual’s residence, and the neighborhood surrounding that residence, is a place for quiet repose; family tranquility; an “island of solace” away from the “hustle and bustle” of public activity. See Pacifica, Kovacs, Rowan. Cf. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21, 91 5. Ct. 1780, 1786, 29 L.Ed.2d 284 (1971) (“... this Court has recognized that government may properly act in many situations to prohibit intrusion into the privacy of the home of unwelcome views and ideas which can never be considered as being totally banned from the public dialog ... ”). In Kovacs, the Court stated:
“The right of free speech is guaranteed every citizen that he may reach the minds of willing listeners and to do so there must be opportunity to win their attention. This is the phase of freedom of speech that is involved here. We do not think the Trenton ordinance abridges that freedom. It is an extravagant extension of due process to say that because of it a city cannot forbid talking on the streets through a loud speaker in a loud and raucous tone. Surely such an ordinance does not violate our people’s ‘concept of ordered liberty’ so as to require federal intervention to protect a citizen from the actions of his own local government. Opportunity to gain the public’s ears by objectionably amplified sound on the streets is no more assured by the right of free speech than is the unlimited opportunity to address gatherings on the streets. The preferred position of freedom of speech in a society that cherishes liberty for all does not require legislators to be insensible to claims by citizens to comfort and convenience. To enforce freedom of speech in disregard of the rights of others would be harsh and arbitrary in itself. That more people may be more easily and cheaply reached by sound trucks, perhaps borrowed without cost from some zealous supporter, is not enough to call forth constitutional protection for what those charged with public welfare reasonably think is a nuisance when easy means of publicity are open. Section 4 of the ordinance bars sound trucks from broadcasting in a loud and raucous manner on the streets. There is no restriction upon the communication of ideas or discussion of issues by the human voice, by newspapers, by pamphlets, by dodgers. ”
336 U.S. at 88-89, 69 S.Ct. at 454-55 (emphasis added). The presence of picketers lurking outside one’s home, threatening the very peace and tranquility and security that constitutes a most significant part of the right to privacy, can never be considered as being compatible with the normal activities of a private residential neighborhood. See Pacifica; Rowan. The frightening of small children, as occurred during the prior demonstrations in front of Dr. Victoria’s home by these picketers, can never be accepted much less tolerated as part of the normal activity that occurs in a residential neighborhood.6 Despite the ob*1367vious incompatibility of the picketing with the residential areas of the Town of Brook-field, the Majority cavalierly concludes that the Town’s interest in protecting its residents from the “noisy, marching, tramping, threatening picketers and demonstrators bent on filling the minds of men, women, and children with fears of the unknown,” Gregory, 394 U.S. at 126, 89 S.Ct. at (Black, J., concurring), can never be sufficient to justify the limited restraint on free expression imposed by the Brookfield ordinance.
Clearly the Framers of the Constitution never intended the right of free speech as a weapon of harassment or intimidation of individuals in the very privacy of their own dwellings. Thus, the Town of Brookfield’s picketing ordinance was justified by compelling state interests: protecting the right of privacy of residents in their own homes and regulating vehicular and pedestrian traffic on narrow streets without sidewalks.
Having enacted the ordinance to serve substantial and compelling interests, the Town of Brookfield is entitled to enforce the ordinance as long as it is “narrowly tailored” to serve those interests and as long as “ample alternative channels of communication” are made available to picketers. Since the ordinance is narrowly tailored and circumscribed and ample alternatives remain for the picketers to convey their message, I would hold the ordinance constitutional under the Perry criteria.
Contrary to the assertion of the Majority that in order for the town to establish that its ordinance is “narrowly tailored,” it must “demonstrate that its objectives will not be served by means less restrictive of First Amendment Freedoms,” Majority opinion at 1349-50, the town need only establish that its content-neutral regulation of expression “responds precisely to the substantive problems which legitimately concern the [town].” City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 104 S.Ct. 2118, 2132, 80 L.Ed.2d 772 (1984). The Majority derives its “less restrictive” alternative requirement from this court’s ingenious interpretation of the Perry time, manner, and place test in City of Watseka v. Illinois Public Action Council, 796 F.2d 1547 (7th Cir.1986). In Watseka, the Majority incorrectly read into the “narrowly tailored” prong of the Perry test a requirement that the government, when arguing the constitutional validity of a statute or ordinance that impinges on free expression, must establish that “less restrictive alternatives are inadequate to protect the governmental interest.” 796 F.2d at 1554. The Majority somehow condescendingly cast aside my argument that cases decided after Perry made clear that the “less restrictive” alternative requirement was not part of the test for content-neutral time, manner, and place regulations. See Watse-ka, 796 F.2d at 1561-67 (Coffey, J., dissenting). In Clark v. CCNV, the Supreme Court emphatically rejected the “less restrictive” alternative that the District of Columbia Circuit had read into the content-neutral time, manner, and place test:
“We are unmoved by the Court of Appeals’ view that the challenged regulation is unnecessary, and hence invalid, as there are less speech-restrictive alternatives that could have satisfied the government’s interest in preserving park lands. There is no gainsaying that preventing overnight sleeping will avoid a measure of actual or threatened damage to Lafayette Park Mall. The Court of Appeals’ suggestions that the Park Service minimize the possible injury by reducing the size, duration, or frequency of demonstrations would still curtail the total allowable expression in which demonstrators could engage, whether by sleeping or otherwise, and these suggestions represent no more than a disagreement with the Park Service over how much protection the core *1368parks require or how an acceptable level of preservation is to be attained. We do not believe, however, that either United States v. O’Brien, or the time, place, and manner decisions assign to the judiciary the authority to replace the Park Service as the manager of the nation’s parks or endow the judiciary with the competence to judge how much protection of park lands is wise and how that level of conservation is to be attained. ”
104 S.Ct. at 3072 (emphasis added).
Despite this unequivocal rejection of the “less restrictive alternative” requirement, the Majority in Watseka insisted on reading the requirement into the Perry test explaining:
“We do not believe that Justice White’s opinion in Clark rejected the less restrictive means analysis. See 468 U.S. at 298, 104 S.Ct. 3071. Although the opinion rejects the lower court’s less-restrictive means holding, we read Justice White to say that the alternatives were not adequate. Although Justice White has elsewhere expressed his disapproval of the less-restrictive-means standard, see Re-gan v. Time, 468 U.S. [641] at 655-57, 104 S.Ct. [3262] at 3271 [82 L.Ed.2d 487 (1984) ], that view has never attracted a majority of the Court. See also Ke-nosha, 767 F.2d at 1255 n. 4”
796 F.2d at 1554 n. 13. The Supreme Court cases decided after Clark make it even more clear, definite and certain that the “less restrictive” alternative requirement is not part of the time, manner, and place test. In United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 105 S.Ct. 2897, 2907, 86 L.Ed.2d 536 (1985) (emphasis added), the Court stated:
“[T]he First Amendment does not bar application of a neutral regulation that incidentally burdens speech merely because a party contends that allowing an exception in the particular case will not threaten important government interests. See Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 295-96, 104 S.Ct. 3065, 3070, 82 L.Ed.2d 221 (1984) (“the validity of this regulation need not be judged solely by reference to the demonstration at hand”). Regulations that burden speech incidentally or control the time, place, and manner of expression, see id., at 297-98, and n. 8, 104 S.Ct., at 3071, and n. 8, must be evaluated in terms of their general effect. Nor are such regulations invalid simply because there is some imaginable alternative that might be less burdensome on speech. Id. at 299-300, 104 S.Ct., at 3072. Instead, an incidental burden on speech is no greater than is essential, and therefore is permissible under O’Brien, so long as the neutral regulation promotes a substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation. Cf. id., at 297-98, 104 S.Ct., at 3071 (“if the parks would be more exposed to harm without the sleeping prohibition than with it, the ban is safe from invalidation under the First Amendment.”) The validity of such regulations does not turn on a judge’s agreement with the responsible decisionmaker concerning the most appropriate method for promoting significant government interests. Id., at 299-300, 104 S.Ct., at 3072.”
In City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., — U.S.-, 106 S.Ct. 925, 928, 89 L.Ed.2d 29 (1986) (emphasis added), the Court explained:
“On the other hand, so-called ‘content-neutral’ time, place, and manner regulations are acceptable so long as they are designed to serve a substantial governmental interest and do not unreasonably limit alternative avenues of communication. See Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293-94, 104 S.Ct. 3065, 3069, 82 L.Ed.2d 221 (1984); City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 807, 104 S.Ct. 2118, 2130, 80 L.Ed.2d 772 (1984); Heffron v. International Society for Kirshna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 647, 648, 101 S.Ct. 2559, 2563, 2564, 69 L.Ed.2d 298 (1981).”
*1369This measure of constitutional validity is not an inflexible standard. In Clark v. CCNV, 468 U.S. 288, 104 S.Ct. 3065, 3071, 82 L.Ed.2d 221 (1984), the Supreme Court held that the fact that a more carefully drafted regulation banning sleeping in parks in the District of Columbia could have accomplished the purposes of the Park’s Services “more effectively or less clumsily” than the regulation enacted, did not make the regulation constitutionally infirm. Thus, even though the protection of the government’s interest involved in Clark was “imperfect,” the absence of perfection did not negate the value of the regulation in achieving the government’s purpose.
These eases make it clear that the “less restrictive” alternative requirement is not part of the time, manner, and place test where the regulation involved is content-neutral. I fail to understand how the Majority can defiantly persist in reading that gratuitous requirement into the test in view of the clearly expressed directives from the Supreme Court of the Land that the government need not establish that a content-neutral regulation of expression is the least restrictive means to accomplish a legitimate government objective.
Thus, if the interest of the particular governing body, state or municipality in enacting laws or ordinances which limits expression is significant, the regulation is constitutionally valid if it effectuates that interest even imperfectly, and our courts should not second guess the legislatures as to the efficiency or adequacy of the means ultimately chosen by the state:
“‘content-neutral’ time, place, and manner regulations are acceptable so long as they are designed to serve a substantial governmental interest and do not unreasonably limit alternative avenues of communication.”
Renton, 106 S.Ct. at 928.
The Majority, in striking down the Brook-field ordinance because, in its view, there are less restrictive alternatives “available to the town to address its legitimate concerns” not only imposes and mandates a burden on the town greater than that required by the Supreme Court, but substitutes its own judgment as to how best to protect the privacy interests of Dr. Victoria and his innocent neighbors and citizens for that of the Brookfield Town Council. “The validity of such regulations does not touch on a judge’s agreement with the responsible decision-maker concerning the most appropriate method for promoting significant government interests.” Albertini, 105 S.Ct. 2907. It is not the function of this court to second-guess the legislative bodies of states in enacting statutes and ordinances, since they are more attuned to the problems of their locale and thus are in a far better position to make this determination than is this court.
Finally, the Majority incorrectly concludes that a ban on picketing in residential areas is unconstitutional because it does not provide ample alternative channels of communication. The Majority claims that forcing these picketers “to picket in nonresidential areas would be, in effect, to force them to engage in an entirely different form of expressive activity.” Majority opinion at 1348. This overly-narrow reading of the ample alternative prong of the time, manner, and place test contravenes the very concept of time, manner, and place restrictions on free expression. The concept of time, manner and place regulations of free speech recognizes that not every form of speech is compatible with the location where the speaker may want to convey his message. The issue in analyzing the constitutionality of a content-neutral time, manner and place regulation is whether the regulation denies the speaker access to listeners that but for the. ordinance could be reached by the speaker. But there is
“no restriction upon the communication of ideas or discussion of issues by the human voice, by newspapers, by pamphlets, by dodgers.”
Kovacs, 336 U.S. at 89, 69 S.Ct. at 454. The Brookfield ordinance does not deny the picketers access to Dr. Victoria’s neighbors through alternative means of communication (direct mail, radio, television, newspa*1370pers and telephones); rather it merely provides his neighbors the opportunity to turn off the picketer’s message and enjoy the privacy of their own homes. The Majority has taken it upon itself to rewrite the decisions of the United States Supreme Court on time, manner and place exception to the First Amendment to include a right to make unwilling listeners captives in their own homes. This is contrary to case law and logic and effectively undermines any attempt by the state or municipality to regulate any form of expressive conduct.7
The Majority does not stop at rewriting the exception for time, manner, and place restrictions. It goes on to speculate that the “quality of the means of expression” used by the pieketers would be adversely affected by the ordinance because “consigned to the 'safe’ and busy area around Bluemound Rd., they may be conveniently ignored by passersby. They may be written off as excentric and irrelevant nuisances.” I am at a loss to understand how anyone can “conveniently ignore” 30-40 people parading up and down a sidewalk chanting and carrying placards. Even so, the Majority concludes that because residential picketing does not permit “the citizens to ignore or trivialize the message pieketers wish to communicate,” the town cannot prohibit picketing on residential streets. In other words, the Majority has determined that the residents of Brook-field, Wisconsin, and every other suburban or residential area must listen to the message of pieketers and each and every other group that decides to communicate its message by lurking about the private homes of those residents infringing upon the use and enjoyment of their homes. Brookfield’s residents, contrary to the Supreme Court’s statement that “no one has a right to press even good ideas on an unwilling recipient,” are made captives in their own homes. Rowan, 397 U.S. at 738, 90 S.Ct. at 1491. Any group or organization can now make people captive in their own homes in any residential neighborhood. In so doing, the Majority has demonstrated a complete disregard for the absence of any alternatives to Dr. Victoria and his neighbors to protect their right of privacy. It is Dr. Victoria, his neighbors and their infant children who do not have an adequate (equivalent quality) alternative for the exercise of their constitutional right to privacy in their own home; the pieketers have several alternative methods that would effectively allow them to communicate their message without infringing on the constitutional rights of others. The ordinance does not preclude the pieketers from conveying their message. The pieketers should limit their picketing activity to the clinics where Dr. Victoria performs abortions or any areas other than those zoned residential.8 The Majority concludes, however, that because people are free to ignore the pieketers in the alternative forums available, such forums do not provide an adequate alternative to the residential streets covered by the Brook-field ordinance. “Forcing [the pieketers] to picket in non-residential areas would be, in effect, to force them to engage in an entirely different form of expressive activity.” Majority opinion at 1348. There is no support in the Constitution for the Majority’s position which forces unwilling listeners to give up their right of privacy in their dwellings and become the captive audience of any group or organization with a message to communicate.
I fail to understand how the Majority can speculate simply on the basis of the fact that people may be able to ignore the piek-eters in non-residential areas that the
*1371Brookfield ordinance failed to provide ample alternative channels of communication through which the picketers can convey their message. If we stretch the limits of the First Amendment, as the Majority has, to provide the picketers with the right to picket Dr. Victoria’s house, do they also have the right to follow Dr. Victoria around, posting picketers outside of every place he enters to embarrass Dr. Victoria, his family, his friends: Outside his church or synagogue so as to interfere with other worshipers? Outside his relatives’ homes? Outside the homes of his friends? Outside his children’s school? The Majority’s holding expands the rights of the picketers at the expense of the rights of the majority of Brookfield’s residents that are reflected in its passage of this ordinance. The Majority assumes, contrary to the explicit mandate of the United States Supreme Court, that the right to free speech includes the right to force unwilling people to listen. See Cox v. Louisiana; Rowan v. United States Post Office Dept. The Majority’s contention undermines the required balancing of conflicting constitutional rights that the Supreme Court has required in cases such as this where the exercise of free speech interferes with the exercise of another constitutional right by others. See Cantwell. The disregarding of countervailing constitutional rights is especially intolerable where the right of privacy is involved. For the first time in almost 200 years since the drafting of our Constitution, the Majority has decided that the right of free speech is always more important than any other individual right guaranteed by the Constitution in direct contradiction to what the Supreme Court stated in Paci-fica: in the privacy of the home, “the individual’s right to be left alone plainly outweighs the First Amendment rights of an intruder.” 438 U.S. at 748, 98 S.Ct. at 3040. Thus, the Majority erroneously, as pointed out earlier, concludes that no ample alternative to residential picketing exists through which the picketers in this case can communicate their message since in no other available forum could the picketers force their message on an unwilling captive audience. I cannot agree with the Majority’s unwarranted expansion of the First Amendment right of free speech to include the privilege of forcing others to receive any message that a group, organization, or individual desires to communicate.
Furthermore, the Majority fails to recognize that ample alternative methods of communicating the picketers’ message in residential areas of Brookfield exist. The picketers could direct mail literature to each of Dr. Victoria’s neighbors stating their views on abortion and informing Victoria’s neighbors of the doctor’s activities. The picketers could advertise on the radio or on television, in newspapers or by using the telephone and communicate their views through those media. If the picketers need to demonstrate in Brookfield, let it be in the commercial areas of the Town, where their message could reach more people with less infringement on the rights of others. Each of these alternatives allows as the Supreme Court requires, the listener the freedom to turn off the message at any time; each allows the listener to protect his own privacy and does not allow protesters to make captives of unwilling listeners. Thus, contrary to the assertion of the Majority, ample alternatives exist through which the picketers can communicate their message of dissent as effectively as they can by picketing Dr. Victoria’s private home and which do not infringe upon the rights of privacy of others in their homes and completely foreign to the controversy. The Majority ignores the rights of others to disregard messages they choose not to hear. See Rowan.
Therefore, because the Majority has unreasonably expanded the right of free expression beyond the limits established by the Supreme Court, and has done so at the expense of an equally valuable and important right, the right of privacy in one’s own home, I dissent. The residents of the Town of Brookfield through their Town Council *1372have a right to decide what they will or will not hear. The Supreme Court explained:
“Where a restriction of the use of highways in that relation is designed to promote the public convenience in the interest of all, it cannot be disregarded by the attempted exercise of some civil right which in other circumstances would be entitled to protection. One would not be justified in ignoring the familiar red traffic light because he thought it his religious duty to disobey the municipal command or sought by that means to direct public attention to an announcement of his opinions.”
Cox, 312 U.S. at 574, 61 S.Ct. at 765 (emphasis added). The Town of Brookfield was entitled to exercise its police power to protect the comfort and convenience of its residents:
“The police power of a state extends beyond health, morals and safety, and comprehends the duty, within constitutional limitations, to protect the well-being and tranquility of a community.”
Kovacs, 336 U.S. at 83, 69 S.Ct. at 451.
The Majority in its opinion has underwritten the right of any group or organization to disrupt tranquillity and privacy that we have come to associate with our homes.
“To enforce freedom of speech in disregard of the rights of others would be harsh and arbitrary in itself.”
Kovacs, 336 U.S. at 88, 69 S.Ct. at 454. As the Supreme Court of Wisconsin noted over 15 years ago:
“To those inside ... the house becomes something less than a home when and while the picketing ... continue[s] with..... [T]he tensions and pressures may be psychological, not physical, but they are not for that reason less inimical to family privacy and truly domestic tranquillity.”
Wauwatosa v. King, 49 Wis.2d 398, 411-12, 182 N.W.2d 530, 537 (1971) (quoted by Rehnquist, J., dissenting in Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. at 478, 100 S.Ct. at 2299).
. "[t]hat is arguments, usually on a plaque card, made to persuade other people to take the picketers side of a controversy.” NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen, Loc. 760, *1358377 U.S. 58, 77, 84 S.Ct. 1063, 1073, 12 L.Ed.2d 129 (1964) (Black, J., concurring).
. "Places which by long tradition or by government fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate.” Perry, 460 U.S. at 45, 103 S.Ct. at 955.
. The record reveals that the picketers sometimes came to Dr. Victoria's home on buses which were parked on the street. Assuming the width of a bus is approximately seven feet, buses parked on both sides of the street would not only greatly effect the visibility of drivers and pedestrians, but would leave less than sixteen feet for traffic movement (and even less in the winter).
. The record establishes that on several occasions, the picketing lasted until 8:30 p.m. In April the picketing was conducted after darkness had descended on the area.
. See Wis.Stat. § 340.01(22), supra at 44.
. During the April 20, 1985 picketing of Dr. Victoria's home, one of the picketers told a five-year old neighbor boy that "there is a man up the road who kills babies.” The child became upset and would not leave the house the rest of the day. For over one week, the child would not even visit his little friend's house because his friend lived two houses away from the “man who kills babies.” Another neighbor of Dr. Victoria related that while walking in the area where the picketing occurred with his six-year old daughter, picketers approached and *1367made comments, in the presence of the child, to the effect that Dr. Victoria was killing their children. I am at a loss to understand how the Majority can condone such conduct — as it clearly does by stating that “the disturbance [of families and children] occasioned by the residential picketing in this case is actually one measure of its unique value____” Majority op. at 1348.
. See Taxpayers for Vincent. Indeed, none of the regulations upheld by the Supreme Court would be constitutionally valid under this approach.
. The fact that picketing the abortion clinics might interfere with other activities of the antiabortion group responsible for the picketing (e.g., disrupt sidewalk counseling) does not entitle the pieketers to violate the privacy rights of Dr. Victoria and his neighbors. It is the antiabortion group itself that has foreclosed this alternative means of communicating its message, not the Town of Brookfield. The Majority forces the residents of Brookfield to endure invasions of the residents’ privacy merely because the anti-abortion group has chosen conflicting methods to communicate its message.