dissenting:
The court correctly quotes the Mabrys’ chief contention on this appeal:
The Mabrys contend that “the facts in possession of the police at least five hours before the warrantless entry (of the Mabry residence) would have led any prudent and trained officer to believe that there was a ‘fair probability that contraband or evidence of crime’ would be found in the Mabry residence. Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 104 S.Ct. 2085, 2088 [80 L.Ed.2d 721] (1984); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 [103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527] (1983). Under the totality of the circumstances of this case, the officers involved had probable cause to search the Mabry residence as early as late afternoon on April 4, 1985, and no later than the strategy meeting at 7:00 p.m.”
Maj. op. at 676-77 (quoting Brief for Mabry Appellants at 20-21). The Mabrys argue that exigent circumstances at the time of John Sanders’ arrest cannot excuse failure to se*689cure a search warrant when police officers could have obtained, or at least initiated the process to obtain, a warrant long before the arrest.
The court fails, however, to squarely confront this contention, instead stating, “We believe that this court, in United States v. Cuaron, [700 F.2d 582 (10th Cir.1983),] effectively put this contention to rest.” Maj. op. at 678. Because Cuaron is not dispositive of this case and because the court’s opinion gives carte blanche to law enforcement officers, who quite commonly and routinely engage in operations such as this one to apprehend those involved in drug trafficking, to deliberately frustrate the warrant requirement in all such operations by relying on the exigent circumstances that predictably and inexorably arise at the time of the middleman’s arrest, I must respectfully dissent.
I.
The time pattern of the events of April 4, 1985, is critical to the Mabrys’ argument. On several occasions during the preceding month, undercover police officers purchased various amounts of cocaine from Roger Sanders, who alluded to his source as living in Tijeras Canyon near Albuquerque, New Mexico. Officers wished to identify and arrest this source and to seize Mr. Sanders’ supply. Consequently, undercover officer Gonzales met with Roger Sanders in a restaurant in Albuquerque on the morning of April 4,1985, to arrange for the purchase of one-half pound of cocaine that evening. After Mr. Sanders stated that he needed to speak with his source, officer Gonzales observed him dial a telephone number. By 2:00 p.m. that afternoon, the officers knew that (1) the number was registered to John Mabry, and (2) Mr. Mabry’s post office box listed his residence as located in Tijeras Canyon. The officers made no attempt to secure a search warrant at this time.
During the afternoon of April 4, 1985, two detectives surveilled the Mabry residence and took several photographs, one of which was later attached to the affidavit for the search warrant eventually obtained. These photographs were made available to the officers involved by 6:00 p.m. Still, no attempt was made to procure a search warrant.
At 7:00 p.m., the officers met to plan strategy for the evening’s operations. The Mabrys’ brief recites the facts known to the police at this time:
1) Roger Sanders intended to sell them one half [sic] pound of cocaine that evening;
2) Roger Sanders had called his alleged source from a restaurant in Albuquerque;
3) Roger Sanders had referred to one of his sources as a man who lived in Tijeras Canyon, New Mexico;
4) The phone number Sanders dialed when trying to reach his source was listed under the name of John Mabry;
5) The Mabry residence was located in Tijeras Canyon;
6) The exact location of the Mabry residence;
7) An exact description, through police photographs, of the Mabry residence;
8) Roger Sanders had repeatedly and regularly supplied undercover officers with cocaine;
9) Sanders had previously been followed driving up Tijeras Canyon; and
10) The Mabry residence would be a target of the evening’s operations.
Brief for Mabry Appellants at 8-9. The officers still did not pursue a search warrant for the Mabry residence.
Undercover detectives met with Mr. Sanders at approximately 9:00 p.m., after which time the latter made several trips to his source’s house. “During these trips, Sanders was under surveillance. He was seen driving up to the Mabry house in Tijeras Canyon, entering the home and later departing.” Maj. op. at 674. “[The] detectives had observed Sanders going to and from the Mabry residence that evening on two occasions, first about 9:00 p.m. and later about 10:30 p.m.” Maj. op. at 675. Although these observations confirmed *690that the photographed residence did, indeed, belong to the source, still no attempt was made to even initiate proceedings to obtain a search warrant.
After returning from the 10:30 p.m. trip to the Mabry residence and delivering a quantity of cocaine to undercover officers, Roger Sanders was arrested at approximately 11:07 p.m. Because the Mabrys expected Mr. Sanders’ return, the officers decided the circumstances were sufficiently exigent to justify a foreeable entry of the Mabry residence without a warrant in order to “secure” it prior to the arrival of a search warrant. Two officers were finally dispatched to Albuquerque to begin the process of obtaining a search warrant between 11:15 and 11:30 p.m.
At approximately 11:30 p.m., five officers entered the Mabry home without consent, handcuffed John and Debra Mabry, and proceeded to make a “protective sweep” throughout both the house and a detached, locked garage located approximately thirty yards from the residence.1 Upon entry into the living room, the officers found John Mabry watching television and Debra Mabry asleep. During the course of the “protective sweep,” license plate numbers and vehicle identification numbers (VINs) of four automobiles found in the garage, two of which were partially disassembled, were copied down. This information, as well as other information obtained in the “protective sweep,” was relayed to the officers in Albuquerque and used in the preparation of the affidavit for the search warrant. The officers arrived back at the Mabry residence with the issued search warrant at approximately 2:00 a.m., two and one-half hours after being dispatched.
II.
“It is, of course, an elementary constitutional principle that police officers must go before a neutral government official and obtain a search warrant before intruding into a private dwelling.” United States v. Scheffer, 463 F.2d 567, 574 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 984, 93 S.Ct. 324, 34 L.Ed.2d 248 (1972); see also Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980) (warrantless searches inside a home held presumptively unreasonable). Only in “exceptional circumstances” does an exemption lie, and the burden is on the prosecution to demonstrate that the Government’s warrantless search or seizure comes within an exemption. United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51, 72 S.Ct. 93, 95, 96 L.Ed. 59 (1951). Moreover, in this circuit, the Government’s burden is seen as a heavy one. United States v. Coker, 599 F.2d 950, 950-51 (10th Cir.1979).
The well-recognized exception invoked in this case is that of “exigent circumstances.” The police feared that when Roger Sanders failed to return after his arrest, the Mabrys would become suspicious and proceed to destroy incriminating evidence. “When officers have reason to believe that criminal evidence may be destroyed or removed before a warrant can be obtained, the circumstances are considered sufficiently critical to permit officers to enter a private residence in order to secure the evidence while a warrant is sought.” Cuaron, 700 F.2d at 586 (citations omitted). However, part of the equation in determining whether the exigent circumstances exception will excuse the absence of a warrant is whether there was sufficient opportunity before the exigency arose to obtain a warrant. “Exigent circumstances alone ... are insufficient as the government must also show that a warrant could not have been obtained in time.” United States v. Good, 780 F.2d 773, 775 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 106 S.Ct. 1523, 89 L.Ed.2d 920 (1986). If the officers “passed up a reasonable opportunity to have obtained a warrant ... their failure to seek the approval of a detached judicial officer cannot be excused.” United States v. Robertson, 606 F.2d 853, 859 (9th Cir.1979).
*691In this case, the Government failed to satisfy its heavy burden in this respect. It offered no plausible explanation for the failure to attempt to obtain a warrant earlier in the afternoon or evening, particularly considering that
the possible imminent destruction of the cocaine would have been created by an arrest that [the officers] should have known would be necessary. This scenario would suggest that the government created the exigent circumstances on which it now relies in attempting to justify the search. If the government in fact created the exigent circumstances, then those circumstances cannot justify the entry into [the defendants’] home.
United States v. Thompson, 700 F.2d 944, 951 (5th Cir.1983); see also United States v. Morgan, 743 F.2d 1158, 1163 (6th Cir.) (police not free to create exigent circumstances to justify their warrantless intrusions), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1061, 105 S.Ct. 2126, 85 L.Ed.2d 490 (1984); United States v. Dowell, 724 F.2d 599, 602 (7th Cir.) (“law enforcement officials may not deliberately wait for exigent circumstances to arise and then exploit the exception to justify warrantless entry”), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 906, 104 S.Ct. 1683, 80 L.Ed.2d 157, cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1216, 104 S.Ct. 2661, 81 L.Ed.2d 367 (1984); United States v. Hultgren, 713 F.2d 79, 86 (5th Cir.1983) (“warrantless search may not be justified on the basis of exigent circumstances which are created by the government itself”).
I concur in the position taken by the Sixth Circuit:
Where law enforcement officers have squandered an overt opportunity to obtain a warrant antecedent to an otherwise acceptable search (justified by exigent circumstances or incident to a valid arrest), there must be a showing of compelling “countervailing factors” to sustain the constitutionality of the suspect intrusion. Niro v. United States, [388 F.2d 535, 539 (1st Cir.1968)]. We are persuaded that this view is not foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s holding in Cardwell v. Lewis, [417 U.S. 583, 94 S.Ct. 2464, 41 L.Ed.2d 325 (1974)]. We believe that, if a defendant’s allegation of deliberate bypass of a warrant is supported by a finding that a realistic opportunity existed to procure one, as in this case, the Government must come forward with objective evidence tending to justify this deviation from normal police procedure. Subjective good faith on the part of the authorities cannot suffice as a complete defense if we are to honor the principle that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
United States v. Chuke, 554 F.2d 260, 263-64 (6th Cir.1977) (emphasis in original). I do not maintain that a search warrant must always be obtained at “the first practicable moment.” Cardwell, 417 U.S. at 595, 94 S.Ct. at 2471. However, a definite factor to consider when evaluating whether exigent circumstances justify a warrantless search is whether there was a prior “realistic opportunity” to secure a warrant. Absent “compelling countervailing factors” and adequate “objective evidence” to satisfy the Government’s burden of justifying the failure to obtain a warrant when it had a reasonable opportunity, I would not absolve the divergence from the constitutional requirement of procuring a search warrant before entering a private residence.
The only testimony in the record with respect to why the officers made no attempt to obtain a search warrant earlier in the evening was a statement by Officer Gonzales: “I didn’t have any probable cause, I didn’t know who the connection was or where the house was at.” Record, vol. 3, at 72.2 While I take issue with the *692assertion that there was no probable cause before 11:30 p.m. when a warrant was finally pursued, I must first assert that it is not the function of the officer to make the determination of probable cause. “A law enforcement officer is only justified in making his own probable cause determinations when there are exigent circumstances.” United States v. Alberts, 721 F.2d 636, 639 n. 3 (8th Cir.1983); see also Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. at 214 n. 7, 101 S.Ct. at 1648 n. 7, 68 L.Ed.2d 38 (1981) (“absent exigent circumstances the magistrate, rather than the police officer, must make the decision that probable cause exists”). There were no exigent circumstances at 2:00, 6:00, 7:00, 9:00 or 10:30 — all times when probable cause arguably arose.
The integrity of the fourth amendment depends on the independent evaluation of probable cause by a neutral and detached magistrate. Otherwise, the very person whose behavior is meant to be circumscribed by the warrant requirement determines whether a warrant should issue. The Supreme Court discussed this crucial point in Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 68 S.Ct. 367, 92 L.Ed. 436 (1948):
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. Any assumption that evidence sufficient to support a magistrate’s disinterested determination to issue a search warrant will justify the officers in making a search without a warrant would reduce the Amendment to a nullity and leave the people’s homes secure only in the discretion of police officers____ When the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or government enforcement agent.
Id. at 13-14, 68 S.Ct. at 368-69 (footnotes omitted).
Just as the affirmative existence of probable cause is not to be determined by police officers absent exigent circumstances, neither is the lack thereof to be determined by them. This is particularly so when there is a subsequent warrantless entry, and the Government then attempts to justify the absence of a warrant through arguing the prior lack of probable cause — even though it never submitted the matter to a magistrate for such a determination. The rise of the telephonic warrant is due in part in response to just these concerns.3 If at all *693possible, the matter should be submitted to a magistrate, no matter how inconvenient that may be. Convenience, after all, is not the touchstone of fourth amendment analysis. “Convenience and efficiency are not the primary objectives — or the hallmarks— of democratic government____” Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944, 103 S.Ct. 2764, 2780, 77 L.Ed.2d 317 (1983).
In stating that “courts must be careful not to ‘second guess’ the strategy decisions of experienced, skilled and trained law enforcement officers,” maj. op. at 677, the court implies that the decision to refrain from pursuing a warrant earlier in the evening was nothing more than a “strategy decision,” because the timing of the warrant is all that is at issue — not the manner in which the officers executed their plan of action. With all due respect, that implication proves too much. The decision whether to comply with the constitutional mandate of prior recourse to a neutral magistrate before entering a private home is much more than a mere “strategy decision.” It is a decision of constitutional dimensions and must be closely scrutinized by this court. Moreover, the effectiveness and success of the officers’ operations that evening were in no way dependent upon delay in obtaining the search warrant until 11:30 p.m. as opposed to 6:00 or 7:00 or 9:00 or 10:30 p.m. Their operation would not have been affected in any manner. They still may have chosen to wait until Roger Sanders’ arrest at 11:07 p.m. to enter the Mabry home with the search warrant.
Furthermore, that there existed prior to 11:30 p.m. a “fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime,” Gates, 462 U.S. at 238, 103 S.Ct. at 2332, could be found in the Mabry residence cannot seriously be challenged. If not sooner, the police clearly had probable cause at 9:00 p.m. when they first observed Roger Sanders enter and leave, in the middle of the drug sale, the very residence that they expected housed the source. The court states that “the police did not know that the Mabry residence was the place where the contraband was kept or delivered by the source, i.e., the Mabrys to the seller, Sanders.” Maj. op. at 677. First, the police need not “know”; they need only have probable cause. Surely the court is not suggesting that it is proper to quash a search warrant issued prior to definitively “knowing” that contraband can be found. The conscious choice to wait for certainty cannot excuse a later warrantless entry which ensues because of that choice, particularly when the arrest of the middleman and the concomitant rise of exigent circumstances is foreseeable. Second, and more important, all such uncertainty was dispelled when they observed Mr. Sanders enter and leave the residence during the drug purchase transaction. Even if the officers had waited until this point to dispatch the officer for a traditional warrant, the officers would have likely had the warrant in hand when they entered the Mabry residence at 11:30 p.m., for the record shows that it took approximately two and one-half *694hours to obtain the warrant once the process was finally initiated.
The police investigation and staged narcotic sale involved in this case are everyday occurrences in police precincts across the nation. In an effort to protect Government funds earmarked for these operations, the middleman is usually arrested, as in this case, prior to entrusting him with the total amount of “buy money” — and prior to his expected return to his source. The middleman’s arrest in these schemes is, therefore, a foreseeable event which will likely raise exigent circumstances at the situs of the source in light of the middleman’s expected return. In some operations, the location of the source may be unknown until shortly before the arrest and the accompanying rise of exigent circumstances. Such is not the case here. When sufficient probable cause that the contraband can be found in a known location exists hours before the inevitable arrest, officers have no excuse for not having a warrant in hand when the arrest transpires and prompt entry becomes imperative to preserve the evidence. In short, the Government fails in this case to satisfy its heavy burden of showing, as a legitimate and necessary part of the exigent circumstances inquiry, any compelling “countervailing factors” to excuse its “unexplained neglect to obtain a warrant” before Roger Sanders’ arrest. Niro, 388 F.2d at 538.
The majority relies heavily on this court’s opinion in United States v. Cuaron in dismissing the Mabrys’ contention that a warrant should have been pursued prior to Roger Sanders’ arrest. Its reliance is misplaced.
In that case, in a drug operation similar to the case at bar, the officers first observed the middleman drive up to the source’s residence at 12:30 p.m. The middleman was arrested shortly before 2:00 p.m. and efforts were then initiated to obtain a search warrant. Approximately forty minutes later, because the source expected the middleman’s return, the officers decided to secure his residence without waiting for a search warrant. The search warrant arrived approximately four hours later. Cuaron, 700 F.2d at 585.
The chief contention there on appeal was that the situation at the time of the arrest did not amount to exigent circumstances. The source contended that the police had no objective basis to believe that destruction of criminal evidence was imminent. Alternatively, he argued that in any event the police had sufficient time after the middleman’s arrest to obtain a telephonic warrant pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 41(c)(2).
In finding exigent circumstances and upholding the validity of the warrantless entry, the court focused entirely on the span of time between the arrest and the warrantless entry. The court found that “[a]t the time of [the middleman’s] arrest, the officers could not count on even thirty minutes to obtain a telephone warrant because it had taken [the middleman] less time than that to return to [the source’s] house after completing the first transaction.” Cuaron, 700 F.2d at 590. No argument was either made by the parties or addressed by the court that there was sufficient probable cause far enough in advance of the arrest that a warrant should have been pursued prior to that time. Indeed, the time sequence in that case would have made such an argument tenuous at best. The source’s house was first identified a little more than one hour before, the middleman’s arrest. This is in marked contrast to this case in which there was a nine-hour time span between first knowing John Mabry’s address and Roger Sanders' arrest. Notwithstanding the majority’s characterization, the issue in this case is one of first impression. In failing to recognize that, the court unjustifiably extends Cuaron beyond its intended boundaries by infusing it with an interpretation not contemplated by the Cuaron court.
The majority opinion in this case, as well as the district court’s opinion quoted at length therein, focuses only on the exigency which arose “after Roger Sanders was arrested,” maj. op. at 678, thus, ignoring the prior ample opportunity to attempt to obtain a warrant. Such a narrow focus *695was justifiable, even necessary, in Cuaron where the facts simply did not present the issue raised in this case. To rely on Cuaron here, however, in disposing of the Mabrys’ argument is to summarily dismiss without adequate reasoning a constitutional contention not addressed in Cuaron.
III.
I also question the constitutionality of the putative “protective sweep” ostensibly undertaken for the officers’ safety. First, no court has held that a protective sweep can be routinely undertaken in all justifiable warrantless entries. The officers must “reasonably believe that there might be other persons on the premises who could pose some danger to them.” United States v. Riccio, 726 F.2d 638, 641 (10th Cir.1984) (officers heard several shots fired from different places in the residence). “[Protective sweeps are appropriate only where officers reasonably perceive an immediate danger to their safety.” United States v. Owens, 782 F.2d 146, 151 (10th Cir.1986). Moreover, vague claims of fear for safety are not sufficient to justify departure from the usual requirement of a warrant. The officers “must be able to ‘point to specific and articulable facts’ supporting their belief that other dangerous persons may be in the building or elsewhere on the premises.” United States v. Whitten, 706 F.2d 1000, 1014 (9th Cir.1983) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1100, 104 S.Ct. 1593, 80 L.Ed.2d 125 (1984). This court has said that “the suspicion of danger must be clear and reasonable in light of all surrounding circumstances.” United States v. Tabor, 722 F.2d 596, 598 (10th Cir.1983) (emphasis added); see also Morgan, 743 F.2d at 1163 (Government must show “serious and demonstrable potentiality for danger”). Second, even if that burden is satisfied, “[a] protective sweep is not a thorough search. It is merely a quick and cursory viewing to check for other persons who might present a security risk.” Owens, 782 F.2d at 151.
Both of these limitations to a constitutional protective sweep were transgressed in this case. The police had no reason to believe that there were other persons in the Mabry residence who could pose some danger to them. Unlike in Cuaron, none of the officers testified that anyone was observed other than Roger Sanders entering or leaving the Mabry residence while it was under surveillance or that anyone other than the Mabrys was believed to be in the house.4 The record in this case is completely void of any objective facts or articulable expression by the police officers that the sweep was undertaken because they feared for their safety. Even the exigent circumstance prompting the initial entry was fear of the destruction of incriminating evidence rather than fear for anyone’s safety. “[T]he situation confronting the officers when they entered the Mabry residence was completely innocuous and did not pose any threat to the officers’ safety; John Mabry was sitting in a chair watching TV and his pregnant wife Debra was lying on the floor sleeping.” Brief for Mabry Appellants at 26-27.
Even more egregious was the so-called protective sweep of the detached garage. The building was a full thirty yards away from the house. The officers did not observe anyone entering or leaving the garage during the entire evening of surveillance. The fact that the police had to obtain an electric garage door opener from John Mabry to enter it illuminates the absurdity of claiming that the garage was searched because the officers possessed articulable facts leading them to reasonably fear that someone dangerous to their safety was secreted there.
*696-698The court’s approval of this “protective sweep” without requiring any objective showing of both suspicion of the presence of others and fear for safety abolishes, in effect, such prerequisites and legitimates so-called “protective sweeps” anytime a residence is lawfully entered, even if only to prevent the destruction of evidence while awaiting a warrant. No court, including this one, has blanketly condoned such warrantless sweeps without the requisite showing of objective facts reasonably supporting an inference that there is a threat to the officers’ safety. The burden is not a heavy one, but it must be met.
Furthermore, the officers clearly exceeded the scope of a lawful protective sweep when they went so far as to copy down license plate numbers and VINs of four vehicles found in the garage. A protective sweep is a limited search for persons, not things. Even if the officers could have conducted a protective sweep, their activity went beyond legitimately securing the area. Many of us judges would have to don our eyeglasses to be able to even read VINs. The so-called “protective sweep” was, in fact, nothing more than a smokescreen for an unconstitutional warrantless search. Attaching an attractive, but self-serving, label to police activity does not cure the defect. Moreover, in the long run, it undermines and discredits this important exception whose purpose is to protect the safety of the officers. I would not jeopardize that vital purpose by approving the prostitution of the rule.
IV.
With respect to Roger Sanders’ requested entrapment instruction, the court affirmed the district court’s ruling that, to be entitled to such an instruction, the defendant, or the defendant’s attorney in the opening statement or the closing argument, must admit “all of the elements of the crime with which he was charged.” Maj. op. at 688. I continue to adhere to my view expressed in my dissenting opinion in United States v. Badger, Nos. 78-1935 & 78-1936, slip op. (10th Cir. March 4, 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 889,101 S.Ct. 247, 66 L.Ed.2d 115 (1980). Specifically, since the defense of entrapment is essentially a claim that the Government supplied the criminal intent, I would not require an admission of that element of the crime.
. The record shows that the officers had to obtain an automatic garage door opener from Mr. Mabry in order to open the garage. Record, vol. 7, at 921.
. The majority mischaracterizes this testimony as a response to a question concerning why no warrant was pursued after officers observed Mr. Sanders’ telephone call to his source. Maj. op. at 677. In actuality, this statement was in response to the following question: "Now, why didn’t you get a search warrant before you purchased this two ounces of cocaine from Mr. Sanders on the night of April 4th?” Record, vol. 3, at 72. This distinction is significant for, while there may not have been probable cause at 2:00 p.m. when the phone number was traced *692to John Mabry, there certainly was when Roger Sanders was observed entering and leaving the Mabry residence at 9:00 p.m. — if not much earlier at 6:00 p.m. when photographs of the Mabry residence were made available to the officers.
This mischaracterization by the court is consistent with its misconceived statement that "[t]he Mabrys contend that the police were armed with probable cause and could have and should have proceeded to obtain a search warrant after Officer Gonzales observed Roger Sanders dialing the telephone [sic] of John Mabry prior to noon on April 4, 1985.” Maj. op. at 677. As the quotation from their brief at the beginning of this dissent indicates, the Mabrys argue only that probable cause was clear “at least five hours before the warrantless entry” at 11:30 p.m. Their brief concentrates in large part on the activities of the early evening of April 4, 1985.
. Because only "a federal law enforcement officer or an attorney for the government” can request a warrant under Fed.R.Crim.P. 41, a telephonic warrant pursuant to Rule 41(c)(2) was unfortunately unavailable in this case. Operation Panama was conducted exclusively by the Albuquerque Police Department.
The chief purpose behind the rule providing for telephonic warrants is "to encourage police to procure telephone warrants” when they might otherwise conduct a warrantless search. Cuaron, 700 F.2d at 588. Consistent with this purpose, five circuits have imposed a burden on the Government in the federal context when attempting to justify a warrantless search to demonstrate that a telephonic warrant could not have been obtained. See Good, 780 F.2d at 775; United States v. Manfredi, 722 F.2d 519, 522 (9th Cir.1983); United States v. Berick, 710 F.2d 1035, 1038-39 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 899, 104 S.Ct. 255, 78 L.Ed.2d 241, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 918, 104 S.Ct. 286, 78 L.Ed.2d 263 (1983); Cuaron, 700 F.2d at 589; United States v. Jones, 696 F.2d 479, 487-88 (7th Cir.1982), *693cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1106, 103 S.Ct. 2453, 77 L.Ed.2d 1333 (1983); United States v. McEachin, 670 F.2d 1139, 1147 (D.C.Cir.1981); cf. Steagald, 451 U.S. at 222, 101 S.Ct. at 1652 ("if a magistrate is not nearby, a telephonic search warrant can usually be obtained”). Furthermore, they have not tolerated evasion of the requirement by simply accepting the Government’s pleas of “a general policy to avoid using telephonic search warrants.” Jones, 696 F.2d at 487; see also Cuaron, 700 F.2d at 590 (failure to obtain telephonic warrant merely because not looked upon favorably will not be excused).
Until individual states take the progressive step exemplified by the federal rule providing for telephonic warrants, state law enforcement officers have the option of contacting a federal law enforcement officer or government attorney who, in turn, can request a telephonic warrant from a federal magistrate. See United States v. Johnson, 641 F.2d 652 (9th Cir.1980) (telephonic warrant upheld where San Diego police officer contacted Assistant United States Attorney who then contacted United States Magistrate to request telephonic search warrant). The present case would have lent itself well to such a procedure, because DEA authorities, while not actively participating in the operation until after the arrests, were notified of it beforehand. Record, vol. 5, at 587. They could easily have been consulted as the federal intermediary in requesting a telephonic search warrant from a federal magistrate.
. Testimony quoted in the Cuaron opinion affirmed that "people were starting to leave the house, leave the residence, there were some comings and goings there.” Cuaron, 700 F.2d at 587 (emphasis in original). Moreover, the opinion quotes the testimony of one officer which verifies that he knew of at least one person other than the source in the residence: "Yes, sir, we knew that, at least one subject was in the residence. Mr. Van Omen had entered and not exited that residence." Id.