In this case we must balance the rights of one individual against another, and individual rights against the workings of our system of criminal justice. The complex question presented does not avail itself of an easy answer; I cannot say that the majority’s approach in resolving the conflict between these competing interests is manifestly wrong. Nevertheless, I believe the majority does not confront the key question on this appeal: did the government’s refusal to grant DePalm use immunity while using his out-of-court statements as the cornerstone of its case violate Paris’ right to a fair trial? Because I conclude that it did, I must respectfully dissent.
I concede at the outset that the district court could not have forced the government to grant DePalm use immunity. Use immunity is a creature of statute and “Congress has delegated the authority to grant use immunity solely to the executive branch of government.” United States v. Taylor, 728 F.2d 930, 934 (7th Cir.1984). The statute grants the prosecutor a great deal of discretion: It provides that a “United States Attorney may ” request use immunity where “in his judgment” the testimony may be vital to the public interest. 18 U.S.C. § 6003 (1982) (emphasis added). No statute authorizes the court to grant a witness use immunity sua sponte or at the behest of a defendant.
Even so, the court does have the authority, indeed the responsibility, to ensure that the accused is given a fair trial. Where the prosecutor’s refusal to grant immunity results in such unfairness to the accused that it amounts to a denial of due process, the court must exercise the considerable powers it does have to even the balance. In this case, the district court could have, and in my view should have, excluded DePalm’s out-of-court statements unless the government granted DePalm use immunity so that Paris could cross-examine him.
This is not a novel proposition. We have long held that the “key question” in this situation is “whether appellant was denied a fair trial because of the government’s refusal to seek immunity for defense witnesses.” United States v. Alessio, 528 F.2d 1079, 1082 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 948, 96 S.Ct. 3167, 49 L.Ed.2d 1184 (1976); see also Taylor, 728 F.2d at 935 (“[pjrosecutors must exercise [immunity] authority within the bounds of the due process clause of the fifth amendment”). Where the prosecutor’s decision not to grant a witness use immunity has “distorted] the judicial fact-finding process,” id., the court must step in. The circumstances here indicate that the denial of use immunity, coupled with the introduction of DePalm’s out-of-court statements, created just such an impermissible distortion.
First, once the prosecutor decided to rely on DePalm’s out-of-court statements as reported by Officer Hafley, cross-examination of DePalm became crucial to Paris’ defense. DePalm’s statements constituted, in the majority’s terms, the “chief evidence of Paris’s guilt.” at 474. More than that, however, the statements were indispensable to the government’s case for conspiracy. See United States v. Lewis, 759 F.2d 1316, 1352 (8th Cir.) (delivery of cocaine does not prove knowledge of conspiracy), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 106 S.Ct. 406, 88 L.Ed.2d 357 (1985); United States v. Hyson, 721 F.2d 856, 862 (1st Cir.1983) (possession of controlled substance does not establish participation in conspiracy to distribute). Thus, Paris’ best chance of gaining acquittal lay in impeaching Hailey’s testimony. And the best way to do this would have been to have DePalm contradict Hafley in open court. Moreover, Paris maintained that he was set up by DePalm and a man named Michael, who allegedly planted the briefcase full of cocaine in the back seat of Paris’ car. While the story seems somewhat implausible, it is not, in my view, patently absurd.1 Because *480Michael never turned up, the only person who could possibly lend credibility to this story was DePalm.
There is a substantial possibility that DePalm’s testimony would have materially affected the outcome of the case. One of the government’s most telling pieces of evidence, for example, was DePalm’s reported statement that his source was- going back east on a certain date to attend his parents’ fiftieth wedding anniversary. The government argued, with devastating effect I would imagine, that Paris must have been the source, because he had in fact traveled to Ohio on that date for his parents’ fiftieth anniversary. However, in his presentence report, DePalm flatly denied having made that statement. A similar denial on the witness stand would have cast serious doubt on this key piece of evidence and, quite possibility, on Hafley’s entire testimony.2
There were other weaknesses and contradictions in the DePalm evidence that could have been exploited through cross-examination. For example, DePalm reportedly said that the source would arrive in a red Subaru or a white Toyota; Paris asserts he does not own a red Subaru. Because DePalm did not-take the stand, Paris was unable to explore whether DePalm actually made that statement and, if so, why. In addition, the court admitted DePalm’s out-of-court statement that he had 25 years’ experience in the drug business. Again, the presentence report indicates that DePalm denied saying this. In light of these discrepancies, I cannot find, as the majority does, that there was “no evidence” DePalm would have retracted his statements nor that the DePalm evidence had all the indicia of reliability.
Second, the government’s use of DePalm’s out-of-court statements implicated Paris’ Sixth Amendment right to confront a key witness against him. While neither the rules of evidence nor the Constitution bars the introduction of all out-of-court statements, it is well recognized that such statements have serious potential for denying the accused a full and fair opportunity to present a defense. We have previously noted that “the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation ... is effectively denied to a criminal defendant when out of court statements, made outside a defendant’s presence, are introduced at trial and the maker of the statement is not present, does not take the stand, or invokes a privilege so as to deprive the defendant an opportunity to cross-examine.” United States v. Brady, 579 F.2d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir.1978) (citing Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 124-26, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 1621-22, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968)), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1074, 99 S.Ct. 849, 59 L.Ed.2d 41 (1979). As in Bruton, Paris’ constitutional right to confrontation was impaired by the admission of evidence which “added substantial, perhaps even critical, weight to the Government’s case in a form not subject to cross-examination.” Bruton, 391 U.S. at 128, 88 S.Ct. at 1623.3
Of course, where circumstances make it impossible to present the hearsay declarant for cross-examination, the balance may well tip in favor of letting the government present its case. But here there was no such necessity.4. DePalm was available to *481testify but refused to do so merely because he feared self-incrimination, a fear that immunity could have removed.5
Finally, the government has advanced no legitimate reason for refusing to grant DePalm use immunity as to any testimony he would give in Paris’ case.6 The government’s brief on appeal completely ignores the issue, asserting only that “there is no right to defense witness immunity.” Gov’t Brief at 17. Questioned at oral argument, government counsel argued that DePalm was not given immunity because the prosecution doubted DePalm would tell the truth. This is patent nonsense. In essence, the prosecutor made a unilateral decision that Hafley’s second-hand report of what DePalm allegedly said to him months ago was more reliable than what DePalm would say in court under oath. This seriously misconceives the proper role of the prosecution in a criminal case. The trial is a search for the truth; it is up to the jury, not the government, to decide the facts, weighing the credibility of witnesses. By allowing only one side of the story to be presented, the government unfairly tipped the scales in its favor. The proper approach would have been to allow DePalm to testify; if the government believed he was lying, it could have cross-examined him or prosecuted him for perjury.
A criminal trial, like life itself, can make no claim to perfection. All too frequently we must compromise ideal to necessity. But compromise suggests weighing and weighing requires a consideration of competing interests. The evil I see here is that there were no competing interests. Paris’ right to confront the key witness against him, to cross-examine him in open court, to attempt to impeach his story was sacrificed, as best the record discloses, at the whim of the prosecutor.
It is the district court’s responsibility to guard against such overreaching. Here the district court had a simple method of avoiding unfairness to the accused: It could have excluded Hafley’s account of what DePalm allegedly told him unless the prosecution was willing to produce DePalm *482and grant him use immunity. Federal Rule of Evidence 403 or the court’s inherent powers to control the admission of evidence were ample authority for imposing this condition. Due regard for the rights of the accused, in my view, required the district court to do so. Its failure to so condition introduction of the DePalm evidence unnecessarily and improperly prejudiced Paris’ right to a fair trial, denying him due process and the right to confrontation. I would reverse.
. It is worth noting that none of the prints found on the briefcase or the bag of cocaine inside belonged to Paris.
. This information was not known at the time of trial. It therefore could not have been used to impeach Hafley’s statements. It does show, however, that DePalm's testimony might well have contradicted Hafley’s.
. Even assuming the statements were not hearsay under Rule 801(d)(2)(E), our court still requires the district judge to consider whether admission of the statements would violate the confrontation clause. United States v. Eaglin, 571 F.2d 1069, 1083-84 & n. 18 (9th Cir.1977), cert. denied 435 U.S. 906, 98 S.Ct. 1453, 55 L.Ed.2d 497 (1978). The rule in other circuits is different. See Ottomano v. United States, 468 F.2d 269, 273 (1st Cir.1972) (no such responsibility), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1128, 93 S.Ct. 948, 35 L.Ed.2d 260 (1973); United States v. McManus, 560 F.2d 747 (6th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1047, 98 S.Ct. 894, 54 L.Ed.2d 798 (1978); United States v. Burroughs, 650 F.2d 595, 597 n. 3 (5th Cir.1981) (confrontation clause never bars statements admissible under rule 801(d)(2)(E)); United States v. Chiavola, 744 F.2d 1271, 1275-76 (7th Cir.1984) (same).
. In Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 2538, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980), the court noted that "the Sixth Amendment establishes a rule of necessity. In the usual case ... the prosecution must either produce, or demonstrate the unavailability of, the declarant whose *481statement it wishes to use against the defendant.” Recently, however, the Court limited this rule to hearsay consisting of prior testimony. United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. —, 106 S.Ct. 1121, 89 L.Ed.2d 390 (1986). The Inadi Court specifically rejected a requirement that the government prove the unavailability of the declarant before co-conspirator statements are admitted. Id. at —, 106 S.Ct. at 1129. Nevertheless, I do not read Inadi as holding that co-conspirator’s statements are automatically admissible. Inadi simply does not deal with what additional requirements for admissibility may be imposed when the reliability of the evidence has been called into question. See id. at — n. 3, 106 S.Ct. at 1124 n. 3. And many circuits, even before Inadi, did impose additional safeguards to ensure reliability. See, e.g., United States v. Perez, 658 F.2d 654, 660-62 (9th Cir.1981) (additional indicia of reliability required to satisfy confrontation clause); United States v. Wright, 588 F.2d 31, 38 (2d Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 917, 99 S.Ct. 1236, 59 L.Ed.2d 467 (1979); United States v. Ammar, 714 F.2d 238, 254-57 (3d Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 936, 104 S.Ct. 344, 78 L.Ed.2d 311 (1983); United States v. DeLuna, 763 F.2d 897, 909-11 (8th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 106 S.Ct. 382, 88 L.Ed.2d 336 (1985).
Moreover, Inadi certainly did not eliminate a court’s responsibility under the Fifth Amendment to evaluate the overall fairness of a criminal proceeding. In this case, I cannot conclude that “the trier of fact could satisfactorily evaluate the truth of the hearsay statement” without DePalm’s in-court testimony. Eaglin, 571 F.2d at 1084. The Sixth Amendment must inform our application of the Fifth.
. Indeed, it appears that DePalm had little to fear from testifying. He based his Fifth Amendment claim on the possibility he could be implicated in a drug conspiracy. In the process of pleading guilty, however, DePalm had already admitted he conspired with others to purchase and sell cocaine. It is difficult to imagine, therefore, how DePalm could have been subjected to greater criminal liability by testifying. See United States v. Pardo, 636 F.2d 535, 542-44 (D.C.Cir.1980). The state was precluded from prosecuting him on similar charges under Cal. Penal Code § 656 (1970). See People v. Belcher, 11 Cal.3d 91, 113 Cal.Rptr. 1, 520 P.2d 385 (1974).
. For his part, Paris did everything he could to obtain DePalm's testimony. He subpeonaed him, but after DePalm invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege the district court quashed the subpeona. Paris then requested that the government grant DePalm use immunity and made an offer of proof suggesting that DePalm's testimony would be material, possibly favorable to the defense and not cumulative. See generally United States v. Carman, 577 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir.1978). This request was refused.