dissenting [from prior panel opinion, now withdrawn, dated November 14, 1986].
Notwithstanding this court’s repeated warnings that the striking of black jurors solely on account of their race is impermissible, the Government prosecutor in the trial of George Wilson, a black male, used fifty percent of the prosecution’s peremptory challenges to strike three of the four remaining black prospective jurors from the jury without any apparent cause other than race. The special efforts we have taken to curb and condemn this prosecutorial practice requires us to apply Batson v. Kentucky, — U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986) retroactively to this direct appeal from George Wilson’s conviction.
I.
In case after case, this court has decried the frequency with which we have been called upon to examine prosecutors’ use of peremptory challenges to strike black jurors from the trials of black defendants. See United States v. Andrade, 788 F.2d 521 (8th Cir.1986); United States v. Norton, 780 F.2d 21 (8th Cir.1985); United States v. Childress, 715 F.2d 1313 (8th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1063, 104 S.Ct. 744, 79 L.Ed.2d 202 (1984); United States v. Jackson, 696 F.2d 578 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1073, 103 S.Ct. 1531, 75 L.Ed.2d 952 (1983); United States v. Nelson, 529 F.2d 40 (8th Cir.) cert. denied, 426 U.S. 922, 96 S.Ct. 2631, 49 L.Ed.2d 377 (1976); United States v. Carter, 528 F.2d 844 (8th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 961, 96 S.Ct. 1745, 48 L.Ed.2d 206 (1976). In a recent case, we specifically noted the large number of appeals raising this issue that originated, like this one, from the Eastern District of Missouri. Norton, 780 F.2d at 23 n. 3.1
The number of appeals in which such challenges are made indicates that many federal prosecutors have been ignoring the Supreme Court’s prohibition against the purposeful exclusion of black jurors from the juries of black defendants solely on account of their race. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 85 S.Ct. 824, 13 L.Ed.2d 759 (1965); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 202 [303], 25 L.Ed. 664 (1880). Prosecutors seem to have been relying on the tough evidentiary standard of Swain to bar a defendant from successfully demonstrating error due to a prosecutor’s conduct of peremptory striking of all or almost all potential black jurors. Prosecutors seem also to have been relying on Swain’s evidentiary standard to insulate themselves from being forced by the district court to provide the reasons for their use of peremptory strikes to eliminate black jurors.
In an effort to end this circumvention of the law, we long ago encouraged trial judges to use their supervisory powers to require that prosecutors discharge their duties “in a fair, even, and constitutional manner, and thus ensure that no potential juror is denied the privilege of serving upon a jury solely because of his race.” Nelson, 529 F.2d at 43; Andrade, 788 F.2d at 524 (quoting Nelson, 529 F.2d at 43); Childress, 715 F.2d at 1321 (quoting Nelson ); Jackson, 696 F.2d at 592-93 (quoting Nelson). We noted with approval in two recent cases the district judges’ require*425ment that the prosecutor provide the reasons for the use of peremptory challenges to strike some, and in one case all, of the black prospective jurors in the sole case before him. Andrade, 788 F.2d at 524-25; Jackson, 696 F.2d at 593.
In essence, what we have done is encourage trial judges to take appropriate action to eliminate the unfair striking of black jurors by prosecutors exercising peremptory challenges. Trial judges, following suggestions of this court, have required that federal prosecutors explain the reasons for those peremptory challenges they exercise to strike a disproportionate number of black potential jurors in any one trial. Batson now demands such an explanation be given in these circumstances. As the majority notes, under Batson a defendant may establish a prima facie case of a constitutional violation through the prosecutor’s use of a disproportionate number of peremptory challenges to strike black jurors in a single case. Once the prima facie case is made, the burden shifts to the other side and demands prosecutors provide a “neutral” explanation for these challenges.
With this background of warnings to prosecutors and suggestions to district judges, it becomes wholly proper that we apply Batson retroactively to direct appeals of criminal convictions such as the one before us. The relief which would be afforded Wilson is merely the same as that afforded the petitioner in Batson. Like the petitioner in Batson whose conviction was reversed and remanded under the new evidentiary standard announced by the Bat-son Court, we would reverse and remand Wilson’s conviction, brought to us on direct appeal while Batson was pending in the Supreme Court. The majority, however, contends that the presence of reliance by law enforcement officers upon the old evidentiary standard of Swain, and the consequent impact upon the administration of justice resulting from the application of a new evidentiary standard, compel its decision to deny Batson retroactive effect. See Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 643, 104 S.Ct. 1338, 1341, 79 L.Ed.2d 579 (1984). I disagree.
First of all, so far as prosecutors have relied upon the evidentiary standard in Swain to shield themselves from being forced to relate their reasons for peremptorily striking black prospective jurors, their reliance is neither justified nor in good faith. This court’s suggestions that district courts take appropriate action as well as the compliance by some district judges with these suggestions, as reflected in the Andrade and Jackson opinions, indicate that prosecutors have had ample notice that an explanation should be furnished or available when prosecutors act to peremptorily strike a disproportionate number of potential jurors who are black. Prosecutors’ reliance on the Swain standard in the face of such warnings is not, as the majority argues, good faith, and thus the second criterion of Stumes, that of reliance by law enforcement officials, does not foreclose our giving Batson some retroactive effect. See Stumes, 464 U.S. at 643, 104 S.Ct. at 1341.2 “Unjustified ‘reliance’ is no bar to retroactivity.” Id. at 646,104 S.Ct. at 1343.
Nor does the consideration of the third criterion of Stumes, the impact of the new rule on the administration of justice, bar the retroactive application of Batson to direct criminal appeals in this circuit. Id. at 643, 104 S.Ct. at 1341. The impact of the rule upon the administration of justice in our court system should be minimal. Batson requires only that prosecutors explain their reasons for peremptorily striking black prospective jurors. For the last decade, prosecutors in this circuit have been aware that they could be called upon *426to give this explanation and they therefore should have been prepared to do so. Moreover, since the Court’s decision in Strauder v. West Virginia in 1880, no prosecutor has had the freedom to exercise such strikes solely because a prospective juror is black. All prosecutors must have good reason for peremptorily striking blacks from serving on the jury. In applying Batson retroactively to direct appeals, we only call upon prosecutors in the Eastern District of Missouri to provide an explanation for that conduct resembling a practice prohibited by the Supreme Court and by this circuit; an explanation which the prosecutor might have been called upon to give to the trial court.3
II.
In conclusion, I would apply Batson retroactively to George Wilson’s conviction. I would remand the present case to the trial judge so that he may require that the prosecutor provide a neutral explanation for the peremptory challenges used during the voir dire to strike black prospective jurors. If the prosecutor is unable to provide a neutral explanation for the strikes, thus leaving race as the reason, the district court should grant appellant a new trial by a jury that has not been skewed by the taint of racial prejudice in the jury selection process.
. The relevant cases cited by the Norton court are as follows: United States v. Thompson, 730 F.2d 82 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 2024, 105 S.Ct. 443, 83 L.Ed.2d 369 (1984); United States v. Childress, 715 F.2d 1313 (8th Cir.1983) (en banc), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1063, 104 S.Ct. 744, 79 L.Ed.2d 202 (1984); United States v. Capers, 685 F.2d 249 (8th Cir.1982); Hampton v. Wyrick, 606 F.2d 834 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1022, 100 S.Ct. 681, 62 L.Ed.2d 654 (1980); United States v. Neal, 527 F.2d 63 (8th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 845, 97 S.Ct. 125, 50 L.Ed.2d 116 (1976); United States v. Delay, 500 F.2d 1360 (8th Cir.1974); United States v. Pollard, 483 F.2d 929 (8th Cir.1973); cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1137, 94 S.Ct. 882, 38 L.Ed.2d 762 (1974). 780 F.2d at 23 n. 3.
In Norton, we warned prosecutors of the Eastern District of Missouri that we would be watchful of the practice of striking all or almost all potential black jurors from a jury without any apparent cause. 780 F.2d at 23.
. Thus I believe that the Supreme Court’s characterization of the rule of Batson as "an explicit and substantial break with prior precedent”, Allen v. Hardy, — U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 2878, 2880, 92 L.Ed.2d 199 (1986) (per curiam), has no relevance as to whether, under the second criterion of Stumes, Batson should be given retroactive effect in this circuit. Certainly the Batson rule is not a substantial break with prior precedent in our circuit. Moreover, while Allen v. Hardy held that Batson is not to be retroactively applied to collateral attacks on criminal convictions, 106 S.Ct. at 2881, Allen does not require that we refuse to apply the Batson rule to direct appeals of criminal convictions as in the present case.
. In rejecting the argument that its holding would create administrative difficulties, the Court in Batson stated, "In those states applying a version of the evidentiary standard we recognize today, courts have not experienced serious administrative burdens.” 106 S.Ct. at 1724. The Court cited People v. Hall, 35 Cal.3d 161, 197 Cal.Rptr. 71, 672 P.2d 854 (1983), in which the California Supreme Court noted the absence of evidence demonstrating that the imposition on state trial judges of a standard similar to that imposed in Batson had created administrative burdens. Batson, 106 S.Ct. at 1724.