with whom REAVLEY, JOHNSON, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, join dissenting:
The Magistrates Act authorizes district courts to delegate to magistrates “such additional duties as are not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.”1 The majority opinion holds that Congress did not mean what it so plainly said, despite legislative history confirming that Congress indeed said what it intended. Allowing a magistrate to conduct voir dire is not contrary to any law of the United States, and the majority does not state that it is. The opinion states only, without deciding, that such a delegation under the direct supervision of the district judge might violate the constitutional guarantee of a jury trial in criminal cases and, therefore, that the statute should be construed to prohibit such a delegation. I differ both with this statutory interpretation and with the implicit constitutional construction, and I therefore respectfully dissent.
I.
The factual situation giving rise to this appeal is a common occurrence. Trial of two defendants was scheduled to begin, and a venire had been summoned. Judge David Belew, Jr., to whom the case was assigned, was still engaged in the trial of another case. Instead of recessing the trial in progress or sending the venire home, he orally requested Magistrate Alex McGlinchey to conduct jury selection. The magistrate introduced himself to the ve-nire, explained the case, and conducted the first part of the voir dire. He then allowed counsel for each side to address the members of the venire and to ask them questions. He advised the two defendants, each of whom had different counsel, that they might each have ten peremptory challenges or, if they wished to exercise their challenges jointly, they might have twelve challenges. The defendants chose to exercise their challenges jointly. They made two challenges for cause. The government offered no objection to these challenges, and the magistrate allowed one and denied one. The parties then exercised their peremptory challenges, after which the magistrate excused the jury and instructed them to return two days later for trial.
The magistrate specifically instructed the defendants to notify the district judge of any matters he needed to consider in the two days between voir dire and the swearing of the jury. Nothing, however, was called to the district judge’s attention. When the jury thus selected reported for trial, none of the parties raised any question concerning either the eligibility or qualifications of any juror, the procedure the magistrate had followed, or the comments he had made to the venire. In the presence of the judge and of all parties, the clerk — not the judge — administered the oath to the jury, and the trial began. I use the latter words advisedly: Both in common vernacular and for the purpose we are now considering, that is when the trial began.
II.
Fed.R.Crim.P. 24 states, “The court may permit the defendant or his attorney and the attorney for the government to conduct the examination of prospective jurors or may itself conduct the examination.” Although the prevailing practice in many federal district courts is for the trial judge to preside over the selection of a jury, the Rules do not require it. Professor Orfield, *1441in his treatise Criminal Procedure Under the Federal Rules, states, “[N]either Rule 24(a) nor the principles of due process require the presence of the trial judge during the selection of a jury, and, as a general rule, the right to have the judge present during the selection of the jury may be waived.”2
A House Report on the 1976 amendments to § 636 of the Magistrates Act stated:
Under this subsection, the district courts would remain free to experiment in the assignment of other duties to magistrates which may not necessarily be included in the broad category of “pretrial matters”_
If the district judges are willing to experiment with the assignment to magistrates of other functions in aid of the business of the courts, there will be increased time available to judges for the careful and unhurried performance of their vital and traditional adjudicatory duties, and a consequent benefit to both efficiency and the quality of justice in the Federal courts.3
Senator Joseph Tydings, the Senate sponsor of the original Federal Magistrates Act, testified in the House hearings:
The Magistratefs] Act specifies ... three areas [explicitly] because they came up in our hearings and we thought they were areas in which the district courts might be able to benefit from the magistrate’s services. We did not limit the courts to the areas mentioned....
We hope and think that innovative, imaginative judges who want to clean up their caseload backlog mil utilize the U.S. magistrates in these areas and perhaps even come up with new areas to increase the efficiency of their courts.”4
As the Seventh Circuit stated in In re Establishment Inspection of Gilbert & Bennett Manufacturing Co.,5 “The only limitations on section 636(b)(3) are that the duties be consistent with the Constitution and federal laws and that they not be specifically excluded by section 636(b)(1).”
Every other circuit that has considered this question has held that § 636(b)(3) allows a judge to delegate to a magistrate, as an “additional duty” within the meaning of this section, the quasi-judicial duty of presiding over voir dire. In United States v. Rivera-Sola,6 the First Circuit held that, by failing to object to a magistrate’s conduct of voir dire, the defendant had waived his right to do so. But because this appeared to be a regular practice in the District Court of Puerto Rico, the court reviewed the procedure and, in a lengthy comment, approved.7 In United States v. DeFiore, 8 the Second Circuit reached the same result, relying on the defendant’s failure to object to the use of the magistrate. In United States v. Peacock 9 and United States v. Bezold,10 the Ninth Circuit considered cases in which the defendant had timely objected, and found that § 636(b)(3) does authorize the conduct of voir dire by a magistrate. That court relied on the legislative history of the Act and the listing of voir dire as an “additional duty” in the Legal Manual for United States Magistrates.11
*1442Circuit courts have also approved the delegation to magistrates of other duties not expressly enumerated in § 636. In Mathews v. Weber,12 the Supreme Court upheld, the referral to magistrates of all actions to review administrative determinations regarding entitlement to Social Security benefits. And this circuit, in United States v. Boswell,13 permitted a magistrate to preside over four hours of closing argument when the trial judge became ill. There is no reason to read the statute as forbidding a similar delegation of the conduct of voir dire to magistrates, provided, as the legislative history indicates, that the delegation does not offend the Constitution.
In United States v. Raddatz,14 moreover, the Supreme Court was unanimous in finding that § 636 grants to judges the authority to delegate the holding of suppression hearings in criminal cases to magistrates. The Court in Raddatz was divided only on the issue of the constitutionality of this delegation absent a de novo hearing by the trial judge.
III.
The real issue before us, then, is whether the delegation to a magistrate of the conduct of voir dire, subject to review by the district court, violates the Constitution. The majority first demolishes a straw man: It would (or might) be unconstitutional to delegate to a magistrate the trial of felony cases. That is not the issue. The sole question before us is the constitutionality of delegating to an officer appointed by the court with express statutory authority, who is working under the direct supervision of a district judge, the duty of conducting voir dire. The majority opinion holds that presiding over voir dire is so inherently a part of trial that it must be done by a district judge in person. I do not agree with this sanctification of the voir dire process. ’
Whether the magistrate in this case gave the venire what might be considered a preliminary charge is irrelevant to the constitutionality of delegating to such a court officer the power of presiding at the preliminary stage of jury selection. What is significant is that the magistrate acts as an aide to the district judge under the judge’s immediate supervision and control, and that all of the magistrate’s actions are subject to de novo review.
In Peacock and Bezold, the Ninth Circuit held that selection of jurors by a magistrate does not offend Article III of the Constitution. No other circuit has expressly ruled on the constitutionality of such a delegation, although the First Circuit did state in dicta in Rivera-Sola that it would permit magistrates to conduct voir dire even if the defendant objected. Rulings by the Second15 and Third16 Circuits, that the parties may by silence waive their right to object to voir dire by a magistrate, at least imply that voir dire by a magistrate does not violate the Constitution, for waiver of a constitutional right designed to protect the fairness of trial must be knowing, express, and intelligent.17
The constitutionality of this delegation does not depend on finding “a floating point that adjusts to the issue,” as the majority describes it. We nevertheless note the Supreme Court’s statement, in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court,18 that the point at which a trial begins does indeed vary as a function of the right at issue.19 Thus, although, for purposes of *1443double jeopardy, a trial begins when the first witness is sworn, it begins earlier for purposes of the public’s first amendment right to attend criminal trials. We must apply the same reasoning in the case before us: The fact that voir dire may be treated as part of a trial for some purposes is not controlling.
Voir dire is an important stage in a felony trial, as it is in any jury trial, but it is not for this reason so “inherently judicial” that no part of it may be delegated to a magistrate. Comparing voir dire to other parts of a felony trial, certainly an eviden-tiary hearing on a motion to suppress evidence is at least as important; for it may determine the result. Yet, in United States v. Raddatz, the Supreme Court approved a magistrate’s conduct of an eviden-tiary hearing on a motion to suppress evidence, as authorized by § 636(b)(1)(B) of the Magistrates Act.
The Court in Raddatz first held that the language of the Act does not require the district court to rehear the testimony on which the magistrate based his findings. “[T]he statute calls for a de novo determination, not a de novo hearing.”20 Turning to the constitutional issues, the Court next found that the Act does not violate the Due Process Clause because it requires the district court to make a de novo determination of any disputed portion of the magistrate’s proposed findings and recommendations. The Court stated, “Of course, the resolution of a suppression motion can and often does determine the outcome of the case; this may be true of various pretrial motions.” 21 However, “the interests at stake in a suppression hearing are of a lesser magnitude than those in the criminal trial itself.”22
Turning then to the question whether this delegation violates Article III, the Court stated:
In passing the 1976 amendments to the Federal Magistrates Act, Congress was alert to Art. Ill values concerning the vesting of decisionmaking power in magistrates. Accordingly, Congress made clear that the district court has plenary discretion whether to authorize a magistrate to hold an evidentiary hearing and that the magistrate acts subsidiary to and only in aid of the district court. Thereafter, the entire process takes place under the district court’s total control and jurisdiction.23
The Court concluded:
Thus, although the statute permits the district court to give to the magistrate’s proposed findings of fact and recommendations “such weight as [their] merit commands and the sound discretion of the judge warrants,” Mathews v. Weber, supra, 423 U.S., at 275, 96 S.Ct., at 556, that delegation does not violate Art. Ill so long as the ultimate decision is made by the district court.24
The majority seeks to distinguish Rad-datz on the basis that suppression hearings are not so inherent a part of trial as voir dire. Certainly suppression hearings are even more likely to be outcome determinative. The defendant has the same right to a public proceeding25 and to the assistance of counsel.26 And the government is even permitted to lodge an interlocutory appeal if the hearing results in suppression.27 Other parts of a criminal trial, moreover, are performed outside the judge’s presence. Fed.R.Crim,P. 15, for example, permits a deposition to be taken before another official and later to be offered in evi*1444dence at trial. Other “inherent” parts of trial are performed in the judge’s presence but are not so inherently judicial that they must be performed by the judge. Fed.R. Crim.P. 31(a) requires that the verdict be returned “to the judge in open court.” Yet it is common practice for the verdict to be returned to a clerk, reviewed by the court, and then read aloud by the clerk. And in this case, as is customary, the clerk administered the oath to the jury and the witnesses.
The conduct of voir dire is not considered so inherently judicial as to be non-delegable in civil cases. In Puryear v. Ede’s Ltd.,28 this court held that, after consent by the parties, a magistrate may conduct the entire trial of a civil jury case and enter final judgment. The panel found that the Magistrates Act is “saved from any constitutional infirmity by its requirement that all parties consent to such [delegation] and by the power of the district court to vacate the reference to the magistrate on its own motion.” The court noted, “Each circuit facing this question has reached a similar conclusion.” 29 In Archie v. Christian,30 moreover, this court sitting en banc held that a civil trial conducted by a magistrate, even in the absence of consent by both parties, should not be set aside. If the delegation of voir dire to a magistrate does not violate the “right of trial by jury” guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment, I do not see why it violates the Sixth Amendment right to “trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed,” or the Article III guarantee that “[t]he trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment; shall be by Jury.”
Even the delegation to magistrates of tasks considered to be “inherently judicial ” in felony trials has been approved by other circuits. In United States v. Saunders, 31 a Ninth Circuit case, the jury began deliberating on a Friday afternoon at about 4:30. The trial judge, for reasons that do not appear in the opinion, left a magistrate in charge of the proceedings. Shortly before 6:00 p.m., the magistrate sent for the jury. He learned that a verdict was not imminent and asked the jury to reconvene on Monday morning as the trial judge had instructed him to do. Three of the jurors informed the magistrate that they could not be present on Monday. None of the jurors objected to staying later on Friday or to returning Saturday morning. Although the magistrate was unable to reach the trial judge, he instructed the jury to continue deliberations that evening. Half an hour later, the jury returned a guilty verdict. On appeal, the court rejected Saunders’ argument, based on a constitutional separation-of-powers thesis, that the magistrate exceeded his authority in directing the jury to continue deliberations.
The court observed that “inherently judicial” tasks must be performed by Article III judges,32 but concluded:
We find it unnecessary to decide whether the magistrate here performed an inherently judicial function. Despite the requirement that such functions be performed by Article III judges, the Supreme Court has recently upheld the constitutionality of certain judicial actions by magistrates. Under the “para-judge” rationale, the Magistrates Act comports with Article III because it subjects magistrates’ rulings to de novo determination by a federal district judge. See United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 681-684, 100 S.Ct. 2406, 2415-16, 65 L.Ed.2d 424 (1980) (magistrate conducted suppression hearing); Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 266-72, 96 S.Ct. 549[, 46 L.Ed.2d 483] (1976) (social security case referred to magistrate for preliminary findings and recommendation). Thus, the Supreme Court has allowed magistrates to perform “inherently judicial” tasks when *1445under the supervision of an Article III judge.33
A later Ninth Circuit decision relied on Saunders in rejecting a similar argument. In Hinman v. McCarthy,34 the State of California had appealed from a district court order granting a writ of habeas corpus. The State argued that 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), which authorizes federal magistrates to conduct evidentiary hearings in habeas proceedings, violates Article III. The court upheld the delegation, stating:
Although magistrate[-conducted] evi-dentiary hearings and subsequent recommended disposition of habeas corpus petitions might be considered “inherently judicial” tasks, under Raddatz delegation of those responsibilities cannot be considered unconstitutional as the district judge retains the power to make the final decision. The district judge could, at the request of the habeas corpus petitioner, or on his own motion, conduct his own evidentiary hearing if he deemed it necessary.35
In comparison, even if supervising voir dire is considered an “inherently judicial” task, Raddatz requires us to sanction it provided the district judge retains the power to make an effective de novo review.
Section 636(b)(3) authorizes judges to “assign” magistrates “additional duties” not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States. District courts impliedly have the power, in assigning these additional duties, to retain the role of making de novo determinations. Section 636(b)(1), which explicitly allows magistrates to conduct evidentiary hearings and mandates de novo review of actions to which the parties object, in no way detracts from the judge’s inherent and implicit reservation of the power to make a de novo determination when delegating other duties to a magistrate.
In this case, although the trial judge had the power to review in advance the proposed voir dire questions or the magistrate’s explanation of the case, he did not choose to do so. The parties, however, did not object to any of the questions or to any actions of the magistrate, despite the magistrate’s instruction to the defendants to raise any matters with the judge that he needed to consider before trial began. The availability of de novo review satisfies constitutional requirements, but it need not be exercised in the absence of a request.36 The judge’s failure to screen the questions or the magistrate’s explanation of the case before the magistrate conducted voir dire, therefore, does not constitute a constitutional violation.
Several appellate decisions involving the delegation to magistrates of duties other than voir dire confirm our reading of § 636(b)(3). Even though the trial judge may not be required to exercise de novo review when the parties have entered no objection, the judge is nevertheless allowed to conduct de novo review at his discretion. In Delgado v. Bowen, 37 the district court had referred a motion for summary judgment to a magistrate, and, although the parties did not object to the magistrate’s findings, the district judge reviewed the entire record de novo and chose not to follow the magistrate’s recommendation. The Seventh Circuit held that the district judge did not act improperly, and emphasized the legislative history of the Federal Magistrates Act, which clearly permits de novo determinations by the district judge at all times.38 In Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,39 the Supreme Court noted that, when judges refer pre-trial motions to a magis*1446trate, the judge remains “free to rehear the evidence or to call for additional evidence.” Indeed, in United States v. Lewis,40 this circuit said, “It is for the district court to decide how much [from a suppression hearing] it wishes to rehear.” Thus, the district court’s authority to make a de novo review of voir dire proceedings is not limited to matters about which the parties object. The judge might elect to do so sua sponte, but in this ease he did not. The Constitution does not require us to mandate de novo review in every case.
Both Raddatz and circuit court decisions following it have emphasized the distinction between de novo review and a de novo hearing. Although the district court is not required to hold a hearing to review all magistrate-conducted suppression hearings, or to do so when the parties contest the magistrate’s credibility determinations, the district court nevertheless retains the discretion to hold a new hearing.41 Similarly, when a magistrate conducts voir dire, the trial judge retains the discretion to review the questions asked, and to question the jurors again on his own.42 This circuit may choose to institute rules that require the district judge to be available while a magistrate conducts voir dire so that the judge can review contested rulings in court at the time the dispute arises and observe the prospective juror's demeanor;43 but the absence of these rules in the statute is not an unconstitutional restriction of the trial judge’s power of review. Moreover, the absence of any credibility issue in this case renders the judge's failure to observe juror responses in person immaterial.
Review of magistrate-conducted voir dire thus appears no less adequate than review of magistrate-conducted suppression hearings. As the Ninth Circuit assumed in United States v. Peacock and as the district court and the parties apparently did in this case, the district judge could review the conduct of voir dire at his discretion and would do so at the request of the parties. How the district judge should proceed — e.g., whether he should screen questions in advance — addresses a procedural matter and not the per se unconstitutionality of the delegation itself.
Depending on the procedure followed, adequate superintendence of the magistrate’s conduct of voir dire by the district judge might be difficult in some cases. No problems arose here. None has arisen in any of the other cases in which the magistrate has been permitted to conduct voir dire. The hypothetical slippery slopes posed by the majority should not be the basis for depriving district judges of the power Congress has expressly given them.
In practice, even before passage of the Magistrates’ Act, the Constitution has not been deemed to require the court to conduct voir dire. In Haith v. United States,44 the district court's approval of the delegation of voir dire to magistrates relied partly on the testimony of lawyers that they recalled only one criminal case in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in more than ten years in which the jury was selected in the presence of a judge. In addition, the court found that there was never any “absolute common law requirement” that the judge be present during voir dire.45 And in Stirone v. United States,46 voir dire was supervised by a deputy clerk.
Centuries ago, under the common law of England, challenges for cause were exercised relatively infrequently,47 probably be*1447cause of the more homogeneous nature of jury venires at that time,48 but they were nevertheless deemed an important part of the defendant’s right to a trial by jury.49 Yet court decisions indicate that it was not remarkable for challenges for cause to be tried to and decided by panels of other jurors rather than by the judge,50 and that such challenges may have been tried outside the presence of the judge.51 The majority’s citation of a passage in Blackstone’s Commentaries, which is expressly limited to challenges by the king and does not mention the practice of trying the defendant’s challenges for cause before other jurors, is not to the contrary.52
Not only does the delegation of voir dire to a magistrate uphold the integrity of the trial process; it is also consistent with the Article III principle of separation of powers. The Supreme Court has often stated that the tenure and salary guarantees of Article III principally serve a separation-of-powers function; their dominant purpose is “to ensure the independence of the Judiciary from the control of the Executive and Legislative Branches of government.”53 Clearly, the availability of adequate de novo review by the trial judge preserves the independence of the judiciary.54
The Supreme Court’s decision in Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor55 confirms this separation-of-powers analysis. That opinion emphasizes the importance of an independent judiciary as distinguished from administrative agencies. Article III “safeguards the role of the Judicial Branch in our tripartite system by barring congressional attempts ‘to transfer jurisdiction [to non-Article III tribunals] for the purpose of emasculating’ constitutional courts, and thereby preventing ‘the encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of the other.’ ”56
This structural principle on which the Court relied does not relate to the performance of duties within the judicial branch. A fortiori, there is no reason to condemn a delegation of power within the judicial branch by an Article III judge to an officer who is appointed by the court and whose actions are not only under the judge’s instructions but are subject to plenary review.
In Donovan v. Sarasota Concrete Co., 57 the Eleventh Circuit considered another *1448type of delegation to a magistrate, that of the power to make a probable-cause determination for the issuance of an administrative warrant. The court stated:
Under the Magistrates Act, a district court retains general supervisory power to review any action taken by a federal magistrate. This is because the magistrates themselves are not Article III judges. Magistrates are allowed to perform “inherently judicial” acts only because they act under the supervision of an Article III judge. Decisions by a magistrate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) are not final orders and may not be appealed until rendered final by a district court.
The principal consideration prompting the requirement of formal judicial review, and indeed the concept underlying the establishment of an Article III judiciary, is the desire to insulate judicial acts from executive and legislative coercion. Therefore, the proper method to ensure that a magistrate’s determination remains untainted by such coercion is review by an Article III court58
IV.
The Magistrates Act expressly authorizes district courts to delegate to magistrates any duty not inconsistent with the Constitution or laws of the United States. These express words are buttressed by a clear declaration of Congressional intent that the office of magistrate be used in an innovative and imaginative way.59
Every other circuit that has considered the issues before us has interpreted the Act to permit the delegation of voir dire to a magistrate, and the only circuits that have have considered the constitutionality of such a delegation have upheld it. We should not deprive district judges of the power to use the assistance given them by Congress to make their judicial function more efficient by posing a constitutional spectre in order to reach a statutory interpretation that denies the statutory words their plain meaning.
I therefore respectfully dissent.
. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3) (1982).
. 3 L. Orfield, Criminal Procedure Under the Federal Rules § 24.65, at 180 (1966).
. H.R.Rep. No. 1609, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 12, reprinted in 1976 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 6162, 6172 (emphasis added).
. Hearings on the Federal Magistrates Act before Subcommittee No. 4 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 81 (1968) (emphasis added).
. 589 F.2d 1335, 1340-41 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 884, 100 S.Ct. 174, 62 L.Ed.2d 113 (1979).
.713 F.2d 866 (1st Cir.1983).
. Id. at 872-73.
. 720 F.2d 757, 764-65 (2d Cir.1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1241, 104 S.Ct. 3511, 82 L.Ed.2d 820 (1984).
. 761 F.2d 1313, 1317-19 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 847, 106 S.Ct. 139, 88 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985).
. 760 F.2d 999, 1001-03 (9th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1063, 106 S.Ct. 811, 88 L.Ed.2d 786 (1986).
. Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Legal Manual for United States Magistrates § 3.10(3).
. 423 U.S. 261, 266-72, 96 S.Ct. 549, 552-55, 46 L.Ed.2d 483 (1976).
. 565 F.2d 1338, 1341-42 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 819, 99 S.Ct. 81, 58 L.Ed.2d 110 (1978).
. 447 U.S. 667, 100 S.Ct. 2406, 65 L.Ed.2d 424 (1980).
. United States v. DeFiore, 720 F.2d 757, 764-65 (2d Cir.1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1241, 104 S.Ct. 3511, 82 L.Ed.2d 820 (1984).
. Haith v. United States, 342 F.2d 158, 159 (3d Cir.1965), aff’g per curiam 231 F.Supp. 495 (E.D. Pa.1964); Stirone v. United States, 341 F.2d 253, 255-56 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 902, 85 S.Ct. 1446, 14 L.Ed.2d 284 (1965).
. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 235-40, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2052-55, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973).
. 464 U.S. 501, 104 S.Ct. 819, 78 L.Ed.2d 629 (1984).
. Id. at 509 n. 8, 516, 104 S.Ct. at 823 n. 8, 827.
. Id. at 674, 100 S.Ct. at 2411.
. Id. at 677-78, 100 S.Ct. at 2413.
. Id. at 679, 100 S.Ct. at 2414.
. Id. at 681, 100 S.Ct. at 2415 (footnote omitted).
. Id. at 683, 100 S.Ct. at 2416.
. See Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 45-47, 104 S.Ct. 2210, 2214-16, 81 L.Ed.2d 31 (1984); Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 397, 406, 99 S.Ct. 2898, 2914, 2919, 61 L.Ed.2d 608 (1979); Rovinsky v. McKaskle, 722 F.2d 197, 201 (5th Cir.1984).
. See, e.g., Davis v. Estelle, 529 F.2d 437 (5th Cir.1976).
. See United States v. Kington, 801 F.2d 733, 735 (5th Cir.1986), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 1888, 95 L.Ed.2d 495 (1987).
. 731 F.2d 1153 (5th Cir.1984).
. Id. at 1154.
. 808 F.2d 1132 (5th Cir.1987) (en banc).
. 641 F.2d 659 (9th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 918, 101 S.Ct. 3055, 69 L.Ed.2d 422 (1981).
.Id. at 663, citing Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 549, 82 S.Ct. 1459, 1472, 8 L.Ed.2d 671 (1962); In re Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 458, 49 S.Ct. 411, 416, 73 L.Ed. 789 (1929).
. Id. (emphasis added).
. 676 F.2d 343 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1048, 103 S.Ct. 468, 74 L.Ed.2d 617 (1982).
. Id. at 346-47.
. Delgado v. Bowen, 782 F.2d 79, 81-82 (7th Cir.1986); United States v. Peacock, 761 F.2d 1313, 1318 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 847, 106 S.Ct. 139, 88 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).
. 782 F.2d 79 (7th Cir.1986).
. Id. at 82.
. 458 U.S. 50, 79, 102 S.Ct. 2858, 2875, 73 L.Ed.2d 598 (1982).
. 621 F.2d 1382, 1387 (5th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 935, 101 S.Ct. 1400, 67 L.Ed.2d 370 (1981).
. See Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 675-81, 100 S.Ct. at 2412-15; United States v. Hardin, 710 F.2d 1231, 1235 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 918, 104 S.Ct. 286, 78 L.Ed.2d 263 (1983).
. See Peacock, 761 F.2d at 1318.
. Cf. Levit, Nelson, Ball and Chernick, Expediting Voir Dire: an Empirical Study, 44 S.Cal.L. Rev. 916, 930-36 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Levit].
. 231 F.Supp. 495, 497 (E.D.Pa.1964), aff'd per curiam, 342 F.2d 158 (3d Cir.1965).
. Id. at 498. See also Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 577-79, 4 S.Ct. 202, 203-05, 28 L.Ed. 262 (1884).
. 341 F.2d 253 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 902, 85 S.Ct. 1446, 14 L.Ed.2d 284 (1965).
. Levit, supra, at 922.
. See id.; Moore, Voir Dire Examination of Jurors: II. The Federal Practice, 17 Geo. L.J. 13, 36 (1928).
. See 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *352-53; The Trial of Peter Cook (1696), 4 Hargrave’s State Trials 738, 748.
. See Anonymous, 1 Salkeld 152 (1795); 9 W. Holdsworth, A History of English Law 183 (3d ed. 1944); J. Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law 123-24 (1898); Moore, Voir Dire Examination of Jurors: I. The English Practice, 16 Geo. L.J. 438, 442-43 (1928); see also Mima Queen v. Hepburn, 7 Cranch 290, 296-97 (1813); J. Goebel and T. Naughton, Law Enforcement in Colonial New York 618-19 (1944).
. See Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. at 577-79, 4 S.Ct. at 203-05; Anonymous, 1 Salkeld 152.
. That passage reads:
This privilege of peremptory challenges, though granted to the prisoner, is denied to the king by the statute 33 Edw. I. st. 4, which enacts that the king shall challenge no jurors without assigning a cause certain, to be tried and approved by the court. However, it is held that the king need not assign his cause of challenge till all the panel is gone through, and unless there cannot be a full jury without the person so challenged; and then, and not sooner, the king’s counsel must show the cause, otherwise the juror shall be sworn.
W. Blackstone, supra, at *353.
. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 59, 102 S.Ct. 2858, 2865, 73 L.Ed.2d 598 (1982); accord Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, — U.S. -, -, 106 S.Ct. 3245, 3256, 3257, 92 L.Ed.2d 675 (1986); United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 217-19, 101 S.Ct. 471, 482-83, 66 L.Ed.2d 392 (1980); O’Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 530-34, 53 S.Ct. 740, 743-44, 77 L.Ed. 1356 (1933).
. Cf. Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 681-83, 100 S.Ct. at 2415-16; Hinman v. McCarthy, 676 F.2d 343, 346 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1048, 103 S.Ct. 468, 74 L.Ed.2d 617 (1982); United States v. Saunders, 641 F.2d 659, 663 (9th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 918, 101 S.Ct. 3055, 69 L.Ed.2d 422 (1981).
. — U.S. —, 106 S.Ct. 3245, 92 L.Ed.2d 675 (1986).
. Id. at-, 106 S.Ct. at 3257 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
. 693 F.2d 1061 (11th Cir.1982).
. Id. at 1066-67 (citations omitted).
. See Hearings on the Federal Magistrates Act before Subcommittee No. 4 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 81 (1968).