dissenting.
This circuit decided this case on July 30, 1970 under the style of Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir.1970). It denied rehearing en banc on August 11, *10901970 and the Supreme Court affirmed the decision by an equally divided court during its October term of the same year.1 Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 402 U.S. 689, 91 S.Ct. 2186, 29 L.Ed.2d 267 (1971). The law of the case in Dewey is, accordingly, existing precedent in this circuit.
The Dewey court, like the instant court, was confronted with a religious discrimination charge arising as a result of Dewey’s refusal to work on his Sabbath, coupled with his refusal to arrange for an authorized replacement because he perceived his effort to induce another to work in his stead as a sin. The Dewey court, in considering the plaintiff’s refusal to work on his Sabbath, and his refusal to seek a replacement because it constituted a sin concluded in clear and concise language that the employer had satisfied its duty of “reasonable accommodation to the religious needs of its employees when it permitted Dewey, by the replacement system, to observe Sunday as his Sabbath.” Dewey, 429 F.2d at 331.
The majority disposition summarily overrules the precedent of Dewey for the following reasons:
1. Congress amended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 et. seq. (Title VII or Act) in 1972, and added subsection 701(j), 42 U.S.C. 2000e(j), which provides that employers must attempt to reasonably accommodate the religious needs of their employees, absent undue hardship; and
2. Prior to the enactment of subsection 701(j), Title VII, as enacted in 1964, imposed no requirement upon an employer to accommodate the religious needs of its employees. See at 1086-1087.
Because it is the tradition of this circuit that reported panel opinions are binding upon subsequent panels and all issues decided therein become the law of the circuit and may not be overruled by another panel, because the resolution of the majority directly conflicts with the prior existing Sixth Circuit precedent enunciated in Dewey, because the majority rationalizes its definition of religious belief within a purely subjective environment, and because the majority erroneously imposes upon the employer the entire burden of reasonably accommodating every religious preference of its employees in a manner prescribed by or acceptable to the employee, I must respectfully dissent.
The continuing viability of Dewey as legal precedent within this circuit is memorialized in its explicit reasoning and uncomplicated conclusions. A review of Dewey discloses that the charged religious discrimination occurred on September 11 of 1966, at which time, Title VII imposed no duty upon an employer to reasonably accommodate the religious needs of its employees absent undue hardship. At the time of the events reported in Dewey, § 703(a)(1) of the Act, in broad and general terms, made it unlawful for employers to discriminate against employees on the basis of religion. Implementation of the congressional mandate had been delegated to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) through its rulemaking authority.
The EEOC guidelines in effect at the time of Dewey’s charged discrimination provided in pertinent parts as follows:
Section 1605.1 Observance of Sabbath and religious holidays. — (a)(1) Several complaints filed with the Commission have raised the question whether it is discrimination on account of religion to discharge or to refuse to hire a person whose religious observances require that he take time off during the employer’s regular work week. These complaints arise in a variety of contexts, but typically involve employees who regularly observe Saturdays as the Sabbath or who observe certain special holidays during the year.
******
(2) The Commission believes that the duty not to discriminate on religious grounds includes an obligation on the *1091part of the employer to accommodate the reasonable religious needs of employees and, in some cases, prospective employees where such accommodation can be made without serious inconvenience to the conduct of the business.
(3)(b)(3) The employer may prescribe the normal workweek and foreseeable overtime requirements, and absent an intent on the part of the employer to discriminate on religious grounds, a job applicant or employee who accepted the job knowing or having reason to believe that such requirements would conflict with his religious obligations is not entitled to demand any alterations in such requirements to accommodate his religious needs.
29 C.F.R. § 1605.1(a)(1), (2), (3)(b)(3) (effective June 15, 1966).
Effective July 10, 1967, the EEOC guidelines were amended by eliminating subsection (3)(b)(3) in its entirety and by revising subsection (2) to read:
(b) The Commission believes that the duty not to discriminate on religious grounds, required by section 703(a)(1) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, includes an obligation on the part of the employer to make reasonable accommodations to the religious needs of employees and prospective employees where such accommodations can be made without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business. Such undue hardship, for example, may exist where the employee’s needed work cannot be performed by another employee of substantially similar qualifications during the period of absence of the Sabbath observer.
29 C.F.R. § 1605.1(b) (1967).2
It is apparent that the substance of subsection (b) of 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 as amended in 1967 was identical to subsection (2) of 29 C.F.R. 1602.2 of the original 1966 guideline. The thrust of both the 1966 and 1967 guidelines was and continues to be the obligation of the employer to accommodate the religious needs of its employees where such accommodations could or can be accomplished without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.
In June of 1969 the Dewey trial court, having ignored the 1966 EEOC guidelines in effect on September 11, 1966, the date of Dewey’s discharge, entered judgment in his favor after retroactively applying the 1967 amendment.
Upon appellate review, a panel of this circuit reversed the trial court and entered judgment for the employer. Its decision noted that the 1966 EEOC Regulation § 1605.1(a)(3) and (b)(3) had limited any obligation imposed upon the employer to accommodate the reasonable religious needs of its employees. Dewey, 429 F.2d at 329-30. The panel initially observed that, in its opinion, “it would have been more appropriate for the District Court to have applied the EEOC Regulation § 1605.1 which was in force at the time of Dewey’s discharge, and which became effective June 15, 1966,” id. at 329, and since the employer had provided a fair, uniform and equitable method of distributing the heavy workload among the employees without discriminating against any of them, it had not intentionally engaged in any unlawful employment practice in violation of Title VII of the Act or the EEOC guidelines. The panel thereupon proceeded to consider Dewey’s right to invoke the accommodation requirements of both the 1966 and 1967 EEOC guidelines.
The panel observed that the 1967 EEOC guideline omitted § 1605.1(b)(3), in its entirety, which had provided:
(3) The employer may prescribe the normal workweek and foreseeable overtime requirements, and absent an intent *1092on the part of the employer to discriminate on religious grounds, a job applicant or employee who accepted the job knowing or having reason to believe that such requirements would conflict with his religious obligations is not entitled to demand any alterations in such requirements to accommodate his religious needs.
29 C.F.R. § 1605.1(b)(3) (emphasis added).
The panel reasoned that it was undisputed by the parties that Dewey had entered the employ of Reynolds before he acquired his religious beliefs and before his employer had entered into its collective bargaining agreement which required all employees to work overtime. Accordingly, the Dewey panel, in the first instance, decreed that, pursuant to the 1966 EEOC guideline in force at the time of Dewey’s discharge, his employer was under no obligation to accommodate his religious convictions because Dewey knew or had reason to believe that the work assignments approved by the collective bargaining agreement would conflict with his subsequently acquired religious needs.
The panel went on to decide, in the alternative, that in the event that Dewey’s after acquired religious convictions were entitled to be reasonably accommodated under subsection (a)(2) of § 1605.1 of the 1966 EEOC guidelines:
his employer did endeavor to make accommodation to the religious beliefs of its employees by interpreting the agreement so as to permit any employee assigned to overtime to be relieved from the assignment simply by arranging for another qualified employee to replace him. We hold that this was a reasonable accommodation.
Dewey, 429 F.2d at 335.
Subsequent to having considered and disposed of the controversy pursuant to the 1966 EEOC guidelines, the Dewey panel proceeded to consider the issues presented by applying § 1605.1(b) of the 1967 EEOC amendment to its guidelines that had been the anchor of the trial court’s resolution. The panel opinion, in a direct unequivocal passage, stated:
But even if the 1967 regulations are applied, we think that Reynolds complied with Section 1605.1(b) thereof by making a reasonable accommodation to the religious needs of its employees when it permitted Dewey, by the replacement system, to observe Sunday as his Sabbath. He stubbornly refused to exercise this privilege. The finding of the District Court that Reynolds did not make reasonable accommodations to the religious needs of Dewey is not supported by substantial evidence and is clearly erroneous.
Dewey, 429 F.2d at 331 (footnote omitted).
To summarize the Dewey disposition, the panel concluded that:
1. The trial court should have applied the 1966 EEOC guidelines that were in effect when Dewey was discharged;
2. There was no duty imposed upon the employer by the 1966 EEOC guidelines to reasonably accommodate Dewey’s religious convictions because he knew or had reason to believe that the requirements of the existing collective bargaining agreement would conflict with his subsequently acquired religious beliefs;
3. Even if Dewey’s after acquired religious beliefs were entitled to be reasonably accommodated by subsection (a)(2) of Section 1605.1 of the 1966 EEOC guidelines, his employer’s replacement program constituted a reasonable accommodation of his religious beliefs since the replacement program satisfied the mandate of the regulation;
4. Even if Dewey’s charges were considered pursuant to Section 1605.1(b) of the 1967 amendment, his religious needs had been reasonably accommodated, as noted above.
The Dewey panel’s precedential declarations that the employer had satisfied its duty to reasonably accommodate the religious needs of Dewey by the standards of either the original or amended versions of EEOC guidelines where it had authorized a voluntary replacement program as an alternate procedure for working on Sabbath, even under circumstances where the em*1093ployee refused to exercise the privilege because he believed that to do so would be a sin, constituted the law of the case. The panel’s observations pioneered the definition of the terms “reasonable accommodation” and “undue hardship,” which terms had not been defined in either the 1966 or 1967 EEOC guidelines or by Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act or its 1972 congressional amendment. Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324, 331 (6th Cir.1970), aff'd by an equally divided court, 402 U.S. 689, 91 S.Ct. 2186, 29 L.Ed.2d 267 (1971).
It is apparent from the Dewey decision that the panel’s primary concern with the 1967 amendment of 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 was the elimination of subsection (3)(b)(3) which significantly limited the employer’s duty to reasonably accommodate the religious convictions of employees and the trial judge’s retroactive application of the amendment. It is equally apparent that the panel was not concerned with, but rather accepted, the administrative mandate addressing the employer’s duty to reasonably accommodate the religious needs of employees which had been incorporated into both the 1966 and 1967 versions of the regulation since the panel considered and decided the case by parallel, but independent, applications of both the 1966 and 1967 models of the rule. The substance of the decision and its precedential impact has withstood the passage of time and the critical scrutiny of legal commentators and remains intact, having received the affirmative endorsement of the Supreme Court in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 97 S.Ct. 2264, 53 L.Ed.2d 113 (1977).
It is true that the Dewey decision attracted widespread legal notoriety subsequent to its publication. The attention was, however, prompted by the panel’s casual observations as to an issue that it did not decide. In a post hearing addendum to its decision, issued subsequent to a vote of the entire court denying en banc reconsideration, the panel, after reaffirming its original reasoning, suggested that a construction of Title VII approving the adoption of regulations which compelled an employer to accede to or reasonably accommodate the religious beliefs of all of his employees could be offensive to the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The comment had no bearing or impact whatsoever upon the panel’s enunciated law of the case. The comment did, however, stimulate debate among legal commentators and the judiciary of other circuits, and was interpreted by Congress as implicating an abuse of administrative rulemaking authority that enlarged the scope of Title VII beyond the congressional intent of the 1964 Act. To allay any doubt as to the scope of authority delegated to the EEOC to formulate guidelines imposing a duty upon employers to reasonably accommodate the religious convictions of its employees, Congress promulgated the 1972 § 701(j) amendment to the Act, which essentially incorporated the very language of the “reasonable accommodation” provisions that appeared in both the 1966 and 1967 EEOC Regulations. Although the 1972 congressional amendment of the Act may be construed as an enlargement of Title VII, the substance of the change merely imputed legislative recognition of EEOC administrative mandates that had been effectively implemented by courts from as early as June 15, 1966, the legislative enlargement by the § 701(j) amendment did not warrant overruling the casé law enunciated by the Dewey panel for reasons recognized by the Supreme Court in Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 97 S.Ct. 2264, 53 L.Ed.2d 113 (1977), and reviewing legal scholars.
The singular purpose of the § 701(j) amendment to the Act was to justify the EEOC formulation of the reasonable accommodation requirement that had been an integral element of both the 1966 and 1967 guidelines.3 Riley v. Bendix Corp. 464 F.2d 1113, 1116-17 (5th Cir.1972).
*1094In 1977, the Supreme Court, upon revisiting Dewey, interpreted the § 701(j) amendment of the Act as congressional imprimatur of the EEOC’s rulemaking authority to impose upon the employer a duty of reasonable accommodation. The Court’s review comports favorably with the analysis of this dissent. After reflecting upon the evolution of both the 1966 and 1967 EEOC guidelines, the Court observed:
The EEOC did not suggest what sort of accommodations are “reasonable” or when hardship to an employer becomes “undue.”
This question — the extent of the required accommodation — remained unsettled when this Court, in Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 402 U.S. 689, 91 S.Ct. 2186, 29 L.Ed.2d 267 (1971), affirmed by an equally divided Court the Sixth Circuit’s decision in 429 F.2d 324 (1970). The discharge of an employee who for religious reasons had refused to work on Sundays was there held by the Court of Appeals not to be an unlawful employment practice because the manner in which the employer allocated Sunday work assignments was discriminatory in neither its purpose nor effect; and consistent with the 1967 EEOC guidelines, the employer had made a reasonable accommodation of the employee’s beliefs by giving him the opportunity to secure a replacement for his Sunday work.
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 73, 97 S.Ct. 2264, 2271, 53 L.Ed.2d 113 (1977) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
Moreover, in footnote 8 of the Hardison opinion, the Court explained that:
The conduct alleged to be an unlawful employment practice [in Dewey ] occurred prior to the promulgation of the 1967 guidelines, and the Court of Appeals expressed the view that those guidelines should not be given retroactive effect. Also, an earlier ruling by an arbitrator was held to have conclusively resolved the religious discrimination question in favor of the employer. Finally, the employer in Dewey was not excused from a duty to accommodate; the Court of Appeals simply held that the employer had satisfied any obligation that it might have had under the statute.
Hardison, 432 U.S. at 73 n. 8, 97 S.Ct. at 2271 n. 8 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
In sum, any suggestion that the EEOC lacked authority to impose upon employers the duty to reasonably accommodate the religious needs of its employees was put to rest by the 1972 § 701(j) amendment to the Act. However, neither Congress nor the EEOC have suggested that “reasonable accommodation” requires an employer to do more than was done in Dewey, apparently having preferred to leave that issue open for resolution by the courts. Hardison, 432 U.S. at 74 n. 9, 97 S.Ct. at 2272 n. 9. Thus, the employer’s sole obligation to make reasonable accommodations for the religious observations of its employees, short of incurring undue hardship, is presently clear, but the reach of that obligation has never been spelled out by either Congress or the EEOC. This Circuit’s decision in Dewey was a first effort to fill the void by declaring that an employer had discharged its duty to reasonably accommodate the religious needs of Dewey by the standards of the 1967 EEOC guidelines where it had authorized a voluntary replacement program as an alternate procedure for working on his Sabbath, even under circumstances wliere the employee refused to exercise the privilege because he sincerely believed that to do so would be a sin. That pronouncement, which identified but one course of action by which an employer could satisfy its duty to accommodate, has remained unquestioned and intact to this date and has been adopted by a *1095consensus of the circuits that have addressed the issue. The instant case falls within the four corners of the Dewey decision.
Danny R. Smith (Smith), the plaintiff herein, was employed by Pyro Mining Company (Pyro), the defendant, as a mechanic responsible for repairing equipment in an underground coal mine from June 19, 1981 to August 23, 1982. Smith’s presence on his crew was necessary to ensure the safety, efficiency and effectiveness of his unit. All mechanics such as Smith, who performed electrical work, were required to be certified electricians. Pyro was not permitted, by federal regulations, to operate a mine unit without a mechanic. Consequently, when a mechanic was absent from his job assignment, another qualified employee with contemporaneous duties was required to be substituted for the absent employee thereby compromising the production and safety of the mining unit’s operation. Pyro maintained a uniformly enforced policy of terminating any employee having three unexcused absences in a six month period.
Smith, at all times material to this action, was a member of and a Sunday school teacher at the Independent Baptist Church of Cedar Hill, Kentucky. Although his church had no tenets against gainful Sunday employment, Smith asserted that he perceived his religious obligations as prohibiting him from working on his Sabbath, i.e., Sunday between the hours of 12:00 a.m. Saturday to 12:00 a.m. midnight Sunday.
On June 11, 1982, Pyro initiated an eight (8) day work week for production personnel employed in the mine where Smith was assigned. Under this schedule, employees were assigned to work for four (4) consecutive ten (10) hour days out of eight (8)— four (4) days on then four (4) days off. Of the eight-day work week, employees were scheduled to work some, but not all, Sundays during the year. Prior to instituting the eight-day work week, Pyro operated a three-shift daily schedule. Most mechanics worked either a five-day work week [Monday through Friday], or a six-day work week [Monday through Saturday], A few mechanics worked seven days a week. Smith occasionally worked the 11:00 p.m. Sunday night shift.
Prior to implementing the eight-day work week, Pyro advertised, through a video presentation, its policy of authorizing employees who objected to working on a Sabbath to trade or swap scheduled shifts with another qualified employee who was not also scheduled to work the same shift. Smith acknowledged that it was his responsibility to find a replacement if he did not desire to work on any Sunday.
In addition to the voluntary replacement program implemented by Pyro, it had an “open-door policy” whereby any employee who professed a work-related grievance or other problem could, in sequence, present the matter, first to his supervisor then up through channels to and including the president of the company for consideration and resolution. Smith had been furnished with a handbook explaining Pyro’s open-door policy before it implemented its eight-day work week. Thus, it was common knowledge that when scheduled job shift assignments conflicted with religious observances, employees were initially required to arrange for a replacement by another qualified employee. In the event that the employee was unsuccessful in arranging for his replacement, the employee was required to exhaust his remedies afforded by Pyro’s open-door policy.
Smith was scheduled to work on both Sunday, July 11, 1982 and Sunday, August 15, 1982. He did not attempt to arrange a shift trade for either day. Rather, Smith telephoned Pyro on both scheduled Sundays and reported that he would be absent from work because he was attending church. Smith was assessed unexcused absences for both days.
Smith was scheduled to work on Sunday, August 15, 1982. In an effort to resolve Smith’s conflict, David Dunbar (Dunbar), Smith’s immediate supervisor, attempted to have his son, who was also employed by Pyro as a mechanic, replace Smith on his assigned August 22, 1982 work schedule. Dunbar’s son was not available as a replacement for Smith on Sunday, August 22, 1982. Between August 15, 1982 and Au*1096gust 22, 1982, Smith made inquiry of only two of twenty qualified employees who worked shifts other than his to replace him so that he could observe his Sabbath. Both attempts were unsuccessful. Thereafter, Smith refused to request any employee to exchange shifts with him because he had concluded that it was improper for him to seek a replacement.
On August 22,1982, Smith again notified Pyro that he would not report for work because he was attending church services. Smith was assessed a third unexcused absence for missing work on August 22, 1982 and, was accordingly, terminated on September 11, 1982 for having three unexcused absences in a six-month period.
As in Dewey, Pyro maintained neutral employment policies and practices that were uniformly applied. Under its rotating work week, every underground miner was scheduled to work essentially an equal number of Saturdays and some Sundays. No employee was required to bear more than his or her fair share of weekend work and no employee was required to work every Sunday or other Sabbath. The uniform and equitable allocation of off days resulting from Pyro’s rotating shift assignments “represented a significant accommodation to the needs, both religious and secular, of all of [Pyro’s] employees.” Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 78, 97 S.Ct. 2264, 2274, 53 L.Ed.2d 113 (1977). Accordingly, Pyro’s eight-day work week satisfied the non-discriminatory mandate of Title VII.
As in Dewey, Pyro authorized a replacement program that permitted Smith the opportunity to accommodate his religious convictions if he elected to do so. As in Dewey, Smith refused to exercise the privileges of reasonable accommodation authorized by Pyro claiming that to do so would be inducing a third party to sin. Moreover, Smith refused to pursue and exhaust the remedies provided by Pyro’s open door policy which had been inaugurated to resolve differences such as that posed by Smith’s religious beliefs. Accordingly, pursuant to the pronouncements of Dewey, the employer, Pyro, satisfied its reasonable duty to accommodate Smith’s religious beliefs and was therefore justified in discharging him.
Accordingly, I would respect the longstanding tradition of this court and follow this court’s prior decision in Dewey.
As in Dewey, the Fifth and Tenth Circuits have recognized that the implementation of a flexible scheduling system which permits employees to arrange replacements with other qualified co-workers satisfies the employer’s duty of reasonable accommodation. Brener v. Diagnostic Center Hosp., 671 F.2d 141 (5th Cir.1982); United States v. City of Albuquerque, 545 F.2d 110 (10th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 909, 97 S.Ct. 2974, 53 L.Ed.2d 1092 (1977). The majority seeks to avoid the pronouncements of those legal precedents by factually distinguishing those decisions from the instant litigation.
Consistent with Brener and Albuquerque, the majority has acknowledged that the implementation of a neutral shift trade policy constitutes a reasonable accommodation of employee religious convictions. See at 1088. Nonetheless, the majority reasons that, in the instant case, Pyro’s policy was not a reasonable accommodation because Smith had a sincere religious belief which prevented him from seeking another person to work in his stead.
Thus, the primary issue, more properly framed, confronted by this court is not one of sincerity, but rather a definition of a religious belief. Unfortunately, neither the Supreme Court nor the EEOC guidelines have afforded direction in defining the phrase as it is employed within the context of Title VII congressional or agency pronouncements addressing the term.
The purely subjective test adopted by the majority to fill the congressional hiatus, investing carte blanche discretion in the employee to bring virtually any personal belief within the protection of 42 U.S.C. 2000e(j) by merely characterizing it as a religious belief, is fraught with wide ranging hazardous economic and commercial consequences.
I would suggest that a more appropriate standard against which the term religious belief should be judged is the objective test applied by the Supreme Court in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 32 *1097L.Ed.2d 15 (1972), to identify a particular practice or belief as one to be afforded constitutional protection under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. In Yoder, the Supreme Court observed that, in order to qualify “a ‘religious’ belief or practice entitled to constitutional protection,” an alleged belief must not be “merely a matter of personal preference, but one of deep religious conviction, shared by an organized group, and intimately related to daily living.” 406 U.S. at 215-16, 92 S.Ct. at 1533. Mere personal preferences or interpretations do not constitute “religious” beliefs because the “very concept of ordered liberty precludes allowing every person to make his own standards on matters of conduct in which society as a whole has important interests.” Id. It would appear that Yoder’s definition of religious beliefs is equally applicable in the Title VII context. McCrory v. Rapides Regional Medical Center, 635 F.Supp. 975, 979 (W.D.La.), aff'd mem., 801 F.2d 396 (5th Cir.1986); McGinnis v. United States Postal Serv., 512 F.Supp. 517, 520 n. 2 (N.D.Cal.1980); Brown v. Pena, 441 F.Supp. 1382, 1384-85 (S.D.Fla.1977), aff'd mem., 589 F.2d 1113 (5th Cir.1979); see also 118 Cong.Rec. 705-06 (1972) (“I think in the Civil Rights Act we thus intended to protect the same rights in private employment as the Constitution protects in Federal, State or local governments.”) (statement of Sen. Randolph) (emphasis added).
If construed as more than a pretextual post hoc justification for his failure to implement company policy, Smith’s alleged belief that he could not seek another to work in his stead must be considered a mere personal preference not entitled to the statutory protection set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). Having conceded that the tenets of his religion did not forbid him from working on his Sabbath and that he had not attempted to arrange for a replacement prior to his unexcused absences on July 11 and August 15, 1982, Smith testified that, only after he had twice been rejected by individuals who also preferred not to work on Sunday, August 22, 1982, “it came to me that if I was asking somebody else to work for me, I would be asking them to sin for me; and it wasn’t right if I asked somebody to do something that I couldn’t do; and I just didn’t ask nobody else after that.” He further attested that his personal" religious perceptions would not have been offended if the company arranged for his replacement; however, he was unable to reconcile this apparent conflict with his assertion that it was improper for him to seek a replacement because he would be asking his replacement, whomever it would be, to sin because, according to Smith’s perceptions, it was a sin for anyone to work on his, Smith’s, Sabbath.
In light of the foregoing concessions, Smith’s testimony belies the conclusion that his refusal to participate in the company’s authorized replacement program was predicated upon a belief “of deep religious conviction, shared by an organized group, and intimately related to daily living.” Yoder, 406 U.S. at 216, 92 S.Ct. at 1533. The fact that Smith’s miraculous revelation did not appear until he had been twice rejected in seeking a replacement reflected that his convenient revelation may not have been totally the product of a deeply held religious conviction. Moreover, the record is devoid of any evidence that Smith’s refusal to implement company policy was predicated upon a belief which was shared by other members of his religious sect.
Accordingly Smith’s belief that he could not ask other employees to work in his stead does not appear to come within the definition of a “religious” belief protected by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). Although Pyro had a duty to accommodate Smith’s Sabbatarian practices, it was under no obligation to satisfy Smith's purely subjective personal preference for a company arranged shift trade. In light of the foregoing, I find the majority’s effort to distinguish Brener and Albuquerque unpersuasive and would apply the reasoning and conclusions of those cases to the instant case.
I am also concerned by the far reaching implications of the majority’s disposition. The majority suggests that, by labeling any purely subjective personal preference as a “religious” belief or practice, an employee may effectively shift the entire burden of accommodation onto the employer.
*1098However, it is well established that an employee is not invested with an absolute right to demand an accommodation on his own terms. Title VII “does not require employers to accommodate the religious practices of an employee in exactly the way the employee would like to be accommodated. Nor does Title VII require employers to accommodate an employee’s religious practices in a way that spares the employee any cost whatsoever.” Pinsker v. Joint School District No. 28J, 735 F.2d 388, 390-91 (10th Cir.1984) (citing Brener, 671 F.2d at 145-46); Chrysler Corp. v. Mann, 561 F.2d 1282, 1285 (8th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1039, 98 S.Ct. 778, 54 L.Ed.2d 788 (1978). Moreover, an employer is not required to bear more than a de minimis cost in order to accommodate his employees’ religious beliefs. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84, 97 S.Ct. 2264, 2277, 53 L.Ed.2d 113 (1977).
In Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, — U.S.-,-, 107 S.Ct. 367, 372, 93 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986), the Supreme Court clearly stated that an employer is not required to select an employee-preferred procedure to accommodate his employee’s religious needs, but rather may satisfy its statutory duty of accommodation by implementing any one of many reasonable alternatives available to the employee:
We find no basis in either the statute or its legislative history for requiring an employer to choose any particular reasonable accommodation. By its very terms the statute directs that any reasonable accommodation by the employer is sufficient to meet its accommodation obligation. The employer violates the statute unless it “demonstrates that [it] is unable to reasonably accommodate ... an employee’s ... religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.” Thus, where the employer has already reasonably accommodated the employee’s religious needs, the statutory inquiry is at an end. The employer need not further show that each of the employee’s alternative accommodations would result in undue hardship.
Thus, if the employer presents the employee with any accommodation that is reasonable, the employee must attempt to implement that accommodation, regardless of whether he would prefer some other course of action.
Finally, even the most cursory analysis of relevant Supreme Court precedent discloses that the majority’s attempt to join the issue of undue hardship in the instant controversy is misconceived. As the Supreme Court declared in Ansonia, “the extent of undue hardship on the employer’s business is at issue only where the employer claims that it is unable to offer any reasonable accommodation without such hardship.” Ansonia, — U.S. at-, 107 S.Ct. at 372. In the present case, Pyro has demonstrated that it had satisfied its duty of reasonable accommodation by implementing a neutral policy of permitting employees to arrange their own shift trades. Thus, Pyro was not required to prove that the alternative accommodations suggested by Smith would have resulted in undue hardship. Ansonia, — U.S. at-, 107 S.Ct. at 372.
For the reasons stated above, I would reverse the judgment of the district court and remand this matter for entry of judgment in favor of Pyro.
. Although the judgment entered by an equally divided Supreme Court in Dewey is not "entitled to precedential weight" in other circuits, it is, nevertheless, significant precedent within this circuit.
. There is some confusion in the citations to the EEOC guidelines and their respective effective dates. In Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 97 S.Ct. 2264, 53 L.Ed.2d 113 (1977), and in the majority opinion, the original EEOC enactment addressing the duty of the employer to accommodate the religious convictions of its employees which became effective on June 15, 1966 has been cited as 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (1967); the amended version of that regulation has been cited as 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (1968) although its effective date was July 10, 1967. For purposes of the dissent each regulation has been cited by referring to its actual effective date.
. Remarks of Senator Randolph who sponsored the amendment as memorialized in the Congressional Record clearly reflect the congressional intent:
I think in the Civil Rights Act we thus intended to protect the same rights in private employment as the Constitution protects in Federal, State or local governments. Unfortunately, the courts have, in a sense, come down on both sides of the issue. The Supreme Court of the United States, in a case involving *1094the observance of the Sabbath and job discrimination, divided evenly on this question.
This amendment is intended, in good purpose, to resolve by legislation — and in a way I think was originally intended by the Civil Rights Act — that which the courts apparently have not resolved [the authority of the EEOC to promulgate the rules imposing upon the employer the duty to reasonably accommodate].
118 Cong.Rec. 705-06 (1972).