concurring.
Judge Sloviter and Judge Garth have each written very logical opinions. Judge Sloviter persuasively demonstrates that the probation statute does not deprive a district court of the power to revoke probation prior to its formal onset, even though incarceration may have already begun.1 Judge Garth persuasively demonstrates why we need to be concerned about a conflict between executive and judicial power with respect to an incarcerated prisoner. I find no such conflict in this case, however, because in my view Camarata was under the custody of the court, not the Attorney General, and was not subject to the Attorney General’s action at the relevant times. In the absence of a conflict between the executive and judicial branches, I agree with Judge Sloviter that the district court had the power to revoke Camarata’s probation, hence I would affirm. I do not reach the issue of the effect of such a conflict, as both Judge Sloviter and Garth do, because it is unnecessary.
I.
My view of this case flows inexorably from the facts. Indeed my difficulty with both Judge Sloviter and Judge Garth’s opinions stems from their overemphasis of abstract legal principles and failure to focus upon the two salient facts of the case: first, from the time Camarata was released on bail until he returned to Allenwood, he was under the custody of the district court, not of the Bureau of Prisons; and, second, all of Camarata’s misconduct occurred during that time.2
While Camarata was serving both his state and federal sentences at Leesburg, he was obviously under the joint custody of the Attorneys General of New Jersey and the United States. However, that custody was interrupted when the district court released him on bail, and it was not resumed again until he was received in a federal institution. 18 U.S.C. § 3568. When Camarata was released on bail he was released to the custody of the district court, as the district court’s order clearly indicates. Between October 26, 1984 and June 1, 1985 Camarata was responsible to the district court, not the Bureau of Prisons. Cf. U.S. v. Roche, 611 F.2d 1180 (6th Cir.*9821980) (failure to report to designated institution as per condition of bail constituted affront to the power and dignity of the court that admitted him to bail, hence venue on bail jumping indictment lay there and not in district where failure to report occurred).
I am not unmoved by Judge Garth’s concern that if a judge were to revoke probation on account of an inmate’s conduct in prison which could also be the subject of prison discipline, the judiciary might interfere with the hegemony of the prison wardens.3 Perhaps, however, such a concern is exaggerated,4 and the logic of Judge Sloviter’s position may well outweigh Judge Garth’s concerns. Fortunately, I need not resolve that dispute. The potential conflict between the executive and judicial branches is in this case, as I have explained above, non-existent.
Moreover, the putative conflict is further reduced, if not completely eliminated, by the fact that when the district court acted, Camarata had been completely discharged from the custody of the Bureau of Prisons and was not subject to its authority, disciplinary or otherwise. As I have explained, it is clear from the record that Camarata’s misconduct occurred while he was enlarged on bail and in the custody of the court. I know of no authority reposing in the Bureau of Prisons to discipline Camarata, deprive him of good time, or otherwise adversely to affect him for misconduct that took place during that period. Suppositions about retrospective impact on prison morale are too ephemeral to undergird a decision about a conflict between the judicial and executive branches.
II.
Judge Garth has argued with great force that the district court’s action in this case directly conflicted with the actions of the executive and that it subjected Camarata to a double-barrelled attack: first, the executive reassigned him from a prison camp to a penitentiary, causing loss of good time and halfway house release, and then the district court gave him additional time. I believe, however, that the argument is incorrect.
While it is not entirely clear in the record, Camarata alleges, and the government does not deny, that after Camarata’s October 1985 New Jersey indictment the Bureau of Prisons redesignated the Federal Correctional Institution at Danbury as the place for his confinement. Apparently this caused the loss of “extra good time,” 18 U.S.C. § 4162, which is more likely to be earned in an institution such as Allenwood than one such as Danbury. That after the indictment the Bureau of Prisons (as surrogate for the Attorney General) changed the place for service of sentence is, however, of no legal significance. Congress has given the Bureau of Prisons broad discretion to transfer prisoners, 18 U.S.C. § 4082(b), apparently immune from judicial review. Therefore, I do not see how transfer can be deemed a form of punishment sufficient to implicate Judge Garth’s concerns. Moreover, “extra good time,” 18 U.S.C. § .4162, is not a matter of right, but only of the Bureau’s discretion.5
Neither the putative loss of good time nor the assignment to a different institution (even with loss of release to a less confining institution such as a halfway house) flows from the exercise of executive authority that could be deemed to conflict with judicial actions while Camarata was under the custody and control of the district court.
*983III.
In the absence of a meaningful conflict between executive and judicial power, I agree with Judge Sloviter that the district court had the power to revoke Camarata’s probation. I therefore concur in the judgment.
. I also agree with Judge Sloviter’s response to Judge Garth’s argument concerning the five-year limitation on probation and her observations about the opaqueness of the probation statute.
. Judge Sloviter and Judge Garth are correct that the formal charge against Camarata mentions misconduct after June 1, 1985.
However, I find the record to be clear that while Camarata’s co-conspirators may have continued the conspiracy after Camarata was incarcerated, Camarata himself had no more involvement. A review of the Bureau of Prisons’ detailed regulations on inmate discipline, Prohibited Acts and Disciplinary Severity Scale, 28 C.F.R. § 541.13 (1985) and the Bureau’s proposed (amended) regulation on inmate discipline, 52 Fed.Reg. 20,-678 (1987) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. § 541), makes clear that discipline is imposed only for acts violating institutional rules or threatening institutional security. Therefore, acts committed by Camarata’s erstwhile confederates (even if he had not formally withdrawn from the conspiracy) do not appear to violate the Bureau of Prisons regulations.
. It is arguable, for example, that judicial ability to retract probation and impose a longer sentence for prison infractions might present institutional morale problems, and cause friction between inmates and prison authorities because of the potential impact of disciplinary charges. On the other hand, it can also be argued forcefully that such a prospect will improve prison discipline and security for fear of the consequences.
. It is unlikely that probation officers would move to revoke probation or that district judges would act favorably on such motions except in the most extreme cases, where it was clear that putative probationer had demonstrated his total unsuitability for probation.
. Good time for good conduct, 18 U.S.C. § 4161, is not an issue here since it could not have been accumulated while Camarata was not in custody-