Two Farmers Home Administration (FmHA) officials repossessed and sold Terry Arcoren’s cattle, in which FmHA held a security interest, without giving him prior notice or an opportunity to be heard. Arcoren brought a Bivens-style action against the two FmHA officials under the fifth amendment, alleging a due process violation. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971). The central issue in this case is whether it was clearly established in 1980 that the FmHA officials could not, consistent with the fifth amendment, use the self-help remedy permitted under South Dakota’s Uniform Commercial Code, S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 57A-9-503 (1980), in repossessing Areoren’s cattle when they believed he was in default on his FmHA loan. The district court1 held that Arcoren’s constitutional right to notice and a hearing before the cattle were repossessed and sold was not clearly established and therefore dismissed the action against the government officials on the basis of qualified immunity. A panel of this court reversed the district court’s dismissal, Arcoren v. Peters, 811 F.2d 392 (1987), and we granted a rehearing en banc. We now vacate the panel’s decision and affirm the judgment of the district court.
Arcoren received two FmHA loans, one in 1976 and one in 1978, totaling $18,800. He used part of the proceeds to purchase cattle, and he signed a security agreement giving FmHA a security interest in the livestock. In the winter months, Arcoren’s cattle were located on either the trust land belonging to his father and his uncle, John Arcoren, Sr., or on land belonging to Richard Hand, his neighbor. In March 1980, Hand and Arcoren’s uncle visited the office of Wenton Peters — a County Supervisor for FmHA who had previously been in contact with the plaintiff on other matters concerning his loan — and complained to Peters that they were providing all of the care for Arcoren’s cattle and had been doing so for some months. They told Peters that they would turn Arcoren’s cattle out onto the road if FmHA did not take some action. About a week later they visited Peters’ office again, and told him that they had placed the cattle in a corral for FmHA to repossess. That day, Peters contacted his supervisor, John Schooler, an FmHA District Director, and Schooler agreed that FmHA should repossess and sell Arcoren’s *673cattle.2 They did not make any attempt to verify with Arcoren the allegations made by Hand and John Arcoren, Sr. They repossessed Arcoren’s cattle on March 27, 1980, and the cattle were-sold on March 28. Arcoren first learned of the repossession and sale of the cattle on April 1, when he received from the Winner Livestock Auction Company a copy of a bill of sale for twenty head of cattle.
Arcoren then brought this Bivens action and the district court dismissed for failure to state a claim, concluding that the availability of the FmHA appeals process supplanted any constitutionally based remedy. On appeal, we held that the administrative appeals process does not defeat an action brought directly under the fifth amendment. Arcoren v. Farmers Home Admin., 770 F.2d 137 (8th Cir.1985). We reversed and remanded for further consideration of whether Arcoren could establish a Bivens action. Id. at 141. On remand, the district court concluded that the claims were barred by qualified immunity and dismissed the action. Arcoren v. Peters, 627 F.Supp. 1513 (D.S.D.1986). The only issue before us on this appeal is the propriety of the ruling on qualified immunity.
I.
Qualified immunity accommodates competing social interests by ensuring that “plainly incompetent” officials or officials who “knowingly violate the law” are held accountable, while officials who reasonably exercise their discretion may do so without fear of being sued. See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 1096, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 813-14, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2735-36, 73 L.Ed. 396 (1982). When performing a discretionary function, a government official is entitled to qualified immunity from suit if, at the time of his conduct, it was not “clearly established” that his actions would violate the plaintiffs constitutional or statutory rights. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818-19, 102 S.Ct. at 2738-39. As the district court aptly noted, determining what constitutes clearly established law is no simple task. See Arcoren, 627 F.Supp. at 1515-16.
The qualified immunity defense fails when the official acts in a manner that disregards undisputed constitutional guarantees. See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 321-22, 95 S.Ct. 992, 1000-01, 43 L.Ed.2d 214 (1975). For this reason, we have held that public officials must “apply well-developed legal principles in carrying out their duties.” Lappe v. Loeffelholz, 815 F.2d 1173, 1177 (8th Cir.1987). An official is not expected to anticipate the law’s development or its possible application to a unique situation. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818, 102 S.Ct. at 2738; Wood, 420 U.S. at 319-20, 95 S.Ct. at 999-1000; Lappe, 815 F.2d at 1176. Such a requirement would “ ‘dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible [public officials], in the unflinching discharge of their duties.’ ” Harlow at 814, 102 S.Ct. at 2736 (quoting Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir.1949), cert, denied, 339 U.S. 949, 70 S.Ct. 803, 94 L.Ed. 1363 (1950)). Moreover, the official could not have “known” that his conduct would violate the law unless that conduct had been identified as unlawful. Id. Thus, an official does not forfeit his immunity because he “gambled and lost on the resolution of [an] open question.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511,105 S.Ct. 2806, 2820, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985).
II.
Whether Arcoren had a clearly established constitutional right to prior notice and a hearing turns in large part on whether Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 92 S.Ct. *6741983, 32 L.Ed.2d 556 (1972), is directly applicable to the facts before us. In Fuentes, the Court held the prejudgment replevin provisions of Florida and Pennsylvania statutes invalid under the fourteenth amendment because they permitted a deprivation of property without an opportunity for a pre-seizure hearing. The challenged statutes allowed any person who claimed that his goods were being wrongfully detained to obtain a writ of replevin from a court clerk simply by filing a complaint and a security bond. The issuance of the writ allowed the creditor to invoke state power to effect a prejudgment seizure. The writ directed the state officer to seize the property, and allowed him to use force when necessary.3 Concluding that due process requires “an opportunity for a hearing before the State authorizes its agents to seize property in the possession of a person upon the application of another,” id. at 80, 92 S.Ct. at 1994, the Court held the Florida and Pennsylvania replevin statutes unconstitutional. Id. at 96, 92 S.Ct. at 2002.
Immediately after Fuentes, the constitutionality of self-help repossession under U.C.C. § 9-503 — as used here by the FmHA — came into question. See, e.g., Brodsky, Constitutionality of Self-Help Repossession Under the Uniform Com- ( mercial Code: The Eighth and Ninth Circuits Speak, 19 S.D.L.Rev. 295 (1973). Since then, however, the courts have almost uniformly upheld statutes allowing a creditor to proceed by self-help.4 In Bichel Optical Laboratories, Inc. v. Marquette National Bank of Minneapolis, 487 F.2d 906 (8th Cir.1973), this court distinguished the state action involved in the Fuentes replevin procedure from the U.C.C.’s self-help remedy, which “involve[s] only private actions arising out of the express written agreements between the parties.” Id. at 907; see also Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1973), cert, denied, 419 U.S. 1006, 95 S.Ct. 325, 42 L.Ed.2d 282 (1974). Thus, if a private creditor had financed Arcoren’s loan, the creditor would have been entitled under S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 57A-9-503, to take possession of the property without notice or a hearing in the event of default, and Arcoren would have no claim that his constitutional rights were violated.5 Arcoren asserts, however, that because the FmHA is a governmental agency, it could not rely on the self-help provisions of the U.C.C. He argues that the FmHA had additional responsibilities under the fifth amendment and could not operate in the same manner as a commercial lender. We reject this argument. We do not believe that the cases clearly establish this proposition even as of today, much less as of 1980.
In 1980, when the repossession occurred, there was strong authority to support the FmHA officials’ position that when the FmHA acted as a lender, it acted in a commercial rather than a sovereign capacity. In United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 99 S.Ct. 1448, 59 L.Ed.2d 711 (1979), a case involving the relative priorities of private liens and government liens stemming from federal lending programs, the Court held that government security interests are controlled by the commercial law of each state. The Court, stated that the FmHA does not require the special priority of a sovereign power as it does, for example, in the case of a tax lien because the “[gjovernment * * is in substantially the same position as private lenders.” Id. at 737, 99 S.Ct. at 1463. It endorsed the court of appeals’ view that the FmHA acted as a “quasi-commercial lender,” id., and noted that:
[t]he agencies evaluate the risks associated with each loan, examine the interests of other creditors, choose the security *675believed necessary to assure repayment, and set the terms of every agreement. By carefully selecting loan recipients and tailoring each transaction with state law in mind, the agencies are fully capable of establishing terms that will secure repayment.
Id. at 736, 99 S.Ct. at 1462-63 (footnotes omitted).
This is not to say that when the government engages in a traditionally private function there is no federal government action and fifth amendment due process restrictions do not apply. The Supreme Court, however, has consistently recognized that the process that is “due” depends on the precise nature of the government function involved and the private interest that has been affected. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35, 96 S.Ct. 893, 902-03, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976); Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895, 81 S.Ct. 1743, 1748-49, 6 L.Ed.2d 1230 (1961). Unlike the situation in Fuentes, the FmHA was not operating pursuant to its authority as a sovereign power, but pursuant to a security agreement that permitted the FmHA to repossess and sell the cattle “with or without notice as permitted by law” if Arcoren was in default. D.R. at 18.
Similar circumstances have been examined in the context of non-judicial mortgage foreclosures by the Government National Mortgage Association (GNMA) and the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA). See Warren v. Government Nat’l Mortgage Assoc., 611 F.2d 1229 (8th Cir.), cert, denied, 449 U.S. 847, 101 S.Ct. 133, 66 L.Ed.2d 57 (1980); Roberts v. Cameron-Brown Co., 556 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1977); Northrip v. Federal Nat’l Mortgage Assoc., 527 F.2d 23 (6th Cir.1975). In these cases, the courts rejected similar fifth amendment due process claims. Although the holdings were based on the ground that there was no federal government action, there were strong indications that the courts relied heavily upon the fact that FNMA and GNMA foreclosures were initiated pursuant to a contractual agreement between the parties.
In Warren, the plaintiff asserted that GNMA’s failure to afford her notice and a hearing prior to the foreclosure sale violated her fifth amendment due process rights. This court recognized that GNMA “is not only wholly-owned by the federal government, but it also operates under federal government authority.” 611 F.2d at 1233. Despite this seemingly indisputable entanglement with the federal government, we concluded that “mortgage foreclosures through power of sale agreements * * * are not in and of themselves powers of a governmental nature.” Id. at 1234. The court also quoted approvingly from the district court:
A wholly-owned government agency can enforce a valid contractual provision for foreclosure without running afoul of the constraints of the Fifth Amendment, under all circumstances in which the foreclosure of the same contract by a private lender would be held not to violate the requirements of due process.
Id. (quoting Warren v. GNMA, Civil Action No. 19006-2, slip op. at 6 (W.D.Mo. Feb. 12, 1979)).
In Northrip, the Sixth Circuit also concluded that no federal government action exists when FNMA forecloses on a mortgage because foreclosure through a power of sale agreement is a contractual remedy, and FNMA is not exercising powers traditionally associated with sovereignty. 527 F.2d at 32. The court noted that the foreclosure is analogous to self-help repossession under U.C.C. section 9-503, which is an “age-old creditor remedy.” Id. at 33. The court stated that it was no more significant that FNMA foreclosed the mortgage than it would have been if a private creditor had done so. Id. Moreover, even though the court did not reach the issue of what process would be due if there were federal government action, it did note that there would be little reason to require a pre-foreclosure hearing because as a practical matter a mortgagee would have no reason to institute foreclosure proceedings unless the mortgagor had defaulted. Id.
The panel opinion looked to section 122 of the Agricultural Credit Act of 1978, 7 *676U.S.C. § 1981a (1982), as clearly establishing that Arcoren had a constitutional right to notice and a hearing. It viewed Allison v. Block, 723 F.2d 631 (8th Cir.1983), as, not an innovation, but a logical interpretation of the Act based on its language and legislative history. We believe that section 1981a and Allison do not apply to the circumstances of this case.
Section 1981a permits the Secretary of Agriculture to defer the principal and interest on outstanding FmHA loans and to forego foreclosure if the borrower shows that, due to circumstances beyond his control, he is unable to make the required payments without unduly impairing his standard of living. In Allison, this court interpreted section 1981a as imposing a duty on the Secretary to give notice to borrowers of the availability of this relief and establish uniform procedures that allow borrowers to demonstrate their eligibility for deferral. The court based its decision entirely on statutory grounds, and “declined to meet the constitutional issues” raised by the Allisons. 723 F.2d at 633 n. 1. In conclusion, the court stated that “Congress * * * clearly expressed its intent to assist farmers blown astray by [the changing winds of time, nature, fate, and the economy] by granting those who could show that their inability to meet their financial obligations was temporary more time to repay their debts to the government.” Allison, 723 F.2d at 638.
Despite the fact that the decision in Allison was based on a specific statutory right to notice of the availability of section 1981a relief, the panel in Arcoren held that the Agricultural Credit Act clearly established a “constitutional right of protection for farmers’ property by facilitating whenever practicable the continued operation of existing agricultural enterprises.” 811 F.2d at 399. We do not read the Act so broadly. Moreover, FmHA officials could not be on notice in 1980 that section 1981a, which protects farmers with financial difficulties in bad times, would be extended by a court to encompass default in a case such as this where financial difficulty was not an issue. We do not believe that Allison —decided in 1983 — makes this extension, and it certainly does not indicate that Arcoren had a clearly established constitutional right in 1980.6
We need not determine whether Arcoren’s fifth amendment rights were actually violated. In deciding a question of qualified immunity, as we have discussed earlier, we look to whether established law informed the defendants that their conduct violated “basic, unquestioned constitutional rights.” See Wood, 420 U.S. at 322, 95 S.Ct. at 1001. Arcoren has not demonstrated, nor has our study caused us to conclude, that there is a constitutional right to prior notice and a hearing when the government acts in the capacity of a commercial lender pursuant to a security agreement. Actually, based on cases such as Warren and Northrip, supra, it would be easier for us to hold that in 1980 the law was clearly established that the FmHA officials could act as they did. We need not go that far, however; in a qualified immunity case we need only determine that there was a “legitimate question” as to what process was due Arcoren in these circumstances. See Mitchell, 105 S.Ct. at 2820 n. 12. Thus, we conclude that the defendants did not violate clearly established law in using the secured creditor’s self-help remedy under S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 57A-9-503.
III.
Arcoren further asserts that the defendants violated the clear provisions of the security agreement, FmHA regulations and South Dakota’s U.C.C. A Bivens action for damages, however, must be founded upon a violation of constitutional rights. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396, 91 S.Ct. at 2004-05; McIntosh v. Weinberger, 810 F.2d 1411,1432-33 (8th Cir.1987). A violation of a statute or a regulation does not rise to a constitutional level unless the statutory or *677regulatory provisions supply the basis for the claim of a constitutional right. Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 193-94 & n. 12, 104 S.Ct. 3012, 3019 n. 12, 82 L.Ed.2d 139 (1984); Culbreath v. Block, 799 F.2d 1248, 1250 (8th Cir.1986). State law, for example, creates the property and liberty interests that are protected by the fifth amendment, and thus may bear upon a plaintiff’s claim that he was deprived of such property or liberty without due process. See Davis, 468 U.S. at 193 n. 11, 104 S.Ct. at 3018 n. 11; McIntosh, 810 F.2d at 1432. Here, however, the question concerns not whether Arcoren has an established property interest, but what process is due him before repossession and sale of that property by the FmHA acting as a secured creditor. Arcoren does not argue that our analysis of what process is due turns on the South Dakota statutes or the FmHA regulations. Instead, he asserts that we need not reach the due process issue because the FmHA officials acted beyond their authority as established in the regulations, statute, and security agreement. Appellant’s Brief at 11. However, “[wjhere neither the constitutional right nor the constitutional cause of action is expressly created by the terms of a regulation or statute, officials do not forfeit qualified immunity solely by failing to comply with the provisions of that statute or regulation.” Culbreath, 799 F.2d at 1250 (citations omitted).
Even if we were to assume, however, that the procedures outlined in the statutes, regulations, and security agreement bore upon the question of what process was due, there is no provision that clearly establishes the right to notice and a hearing before FmHA officials could determine that Arcoren was in default. S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 57A-9-503 states in part:
Unless otherwise agreed, a secured party has on default the right to take possession of the collateral. In taking possession, a secured party may proceed without judicial process if this can be done without breach of the peace * * *.
Also, under S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 57A-9-504, a secured party after default may sell the secured property without notice to the debtor if certain conditions exist.7 The regulations and security agreement define default as including improper care or abandonment of the security.8 Arcoren apparently interprets the phrases “on default” and “after default” in the statute as requiring FmHA to provide prior notice and a hearing in order to establish default. Nothing in the statutes, however, requires FmHA officials to establish default based on notice and a hearing. In Arcoren’s affidavit and in the stipulated facts, Arcoren admits that during the winter his cattle were located on either the trust land belonging to his father and his uncle or on Richard Hand’s land. D.R. at 53, 55. He also admits that his uncle and Richard Hand visited Peters’ office and told him that they, not Arcoren, had been caring for the cattle and that they would turn the cattle out onto the road if FmHA did not take action. There is nothing in the statutes, regulations, or security agreement that clearly establishes that FmHA officials could not exercise their discretion to determine that Arcoren was in default under the security agreement based on this information. Thus, the provisions cited by Arcoren do not bear upon the constitutional analysis concerning what process was due.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
. The Honorable Donald J. Porter, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the District of South Dakota.
. Under FmHA regulations, a borrower is in default when he has "not cared properly” for the security. 7 C.F.R. § 1962.4(g)(3) (1980). Also, under the terms of the security agreement, Arcoren was in default if he failed to "observe or perform any covenants or agreements [in the security agreement],” one of which was to "care for and maintain the collateral in a good and husbandlike manner * * * [and] not abandon the collateral * * Designated Record at 17-18. The agreement provides that, upon default, the secured party "at its option, with or without notice as permitted by law, may * * * enter upon the premises and take possession of [the collateral and] exercise any sale or other rights accorded by law.” D.R. at 18.
. The Florida replevin statute provided that if the goods were inside some enclosure and were not delivered upon demand, the officer "shall cause such house, building or enclosure to be broken open * * Fla.Stat.Ann. § 78.10 (Supp.1972-73).
. See Burke, More Decisions on the Constitutionality of Self-Help Repossessions, 27 Pers.Fin.L.Q. Rep. 115, 116 (1973) (collecting cases).
. We recognize that if the secured creditor is wrong in his determination of default, the debt- or may have a tort claim, but that is not the issue before us.
. At oral argument, Arcoren’s counsel stated that Arcoren was current in his payments and that section 1981a did not apply.
. One exception to the notice requirement is when the collateral was "of a type customarily sold on a recognized market.” S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 57A-9-504(3). The district court held that none of the cases Arcoren cited clearly established as of March, 1980 that cattle were not sold on a recognized market. The district court has since been proved correct in its determination. In First National Bank of Minneapolis v. Kehn Ranch, Inc., 394 N.W.2d 709 (S.D.1986), the South Dakota Supreme Court declined to follow the cases cited by Arcoren and held that commercial cattle raised for sale at public livestock markets are " ‘collateral of a type customarily sold on a recognized market’ for purposes of S.D. Codified Laws Ann. 57A-9-504(3).’’ Id. at 715 (footnote omitted).
. See supra n. 2.