dissenting in part and concurring in part.
I join the Venue portion of the majority’s opinion and their affirmance of Goldberg’s convictions under Counts One through Four. I dissent from the Jurisdiction portion of the opinion. I believe that under the only reasonable reading of the indictment and the relevant statutory language, the convictions under Counts Five and Six must be reversed.
Count Six charges the transportation “from the Royal Bank of Canada, Montreal, Canada, to the Royal Bank of Canada, Nassau, Bahamas, knowing the same to have been taken by fraud” in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314 and 2. App. at 165. The majority affirms the conviction under Count Six on the basis of cases that extend the jurisdiction of the United States to include offenses, wholly committed outside this country, if the acts committed were intended to have an effect in this country. However, the issue before us is not whether the United States can extend its jurisdiction to the transportation between two foreign countries of funds that were stolen in the United States, but whether the United States has done so in 18 U.S.C. § 2314. Since the definition of foreign commerce for purposes of Title 18 refers only to “commerce with a foreign country,” 18 U.S.C. § 10 (emphasis added), it is patently not as all-encompassing as it could be. At this time, however, it is the only definition Congress has chosen to enact, and it simply does not cover commerce between foreign countries.
United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 43 S.Ct. 39, 67 L.Ed. 149 (1922), upon which the majority rely, addresses the question whether a federal criminal statute may be applied extraterritorially where Congress has “not specifically defined” the locus of the crime. In that situation, a court seeking to ascertain Congress’ intent must look to “the description and nature of the crime and upon the territorial limitations upon the power and jurisdiction of a government to punish crime under the law of nations.” Id. at 97-98, 435 S.Ct. at 41. See also United States v. Wright-Barker, 784 F.2d 161, 167 (3d Cir.1986). Unlike the Bowman situation, Congress has defined “foreign commerce” as applied to section 2314, and therefore Bowman provides little assistance here.
The relevant legislative history clearly precludes the application of section 2314 to the transportation of stolen money between two foreign countries. Section 10 first appeared in the 1948 recodification of Title 18 of the United States Code, Pub.L. No. 80-*468772, § 10, 62 Stat. 683, 686 (1948), and the Revisor’s Notes to that section state that it “consolidates into one section identical definitions contained in sections 408, 408b, 414(a) and 419a(b) of title 18, U.S.C., 1940 ed.” These provisions, one of which was a provision of the National Stolen Property Act containing the predecessor to section 2314, all defined “interstate or foreign commerce” to include:
transportation from one State, Territory, or the District of Columbia, to another State, Territory, or the District of Columbia, or to a foreign country, or from a foreign country to any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia.
The Revisor’s Notes refer to “slight improvements in style” in the recodified version. However, there is no indication that Congress intended to broaden the definition of “foreign commerce” to include transactions that do not begin or end in the United States.
United States v. Braverman, 376 F.2d 249 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 885, 88 S.Ct. 155, 19 L.Ed.2d 182 (1967), upon which the majority also rely, is in no way inconsistent with the definition of “foreign commerce” as only including transactions that begin or end in the United States. In that case, the court stated that “Braver-man knew, when he cashed the money orders and gave Miranda two for the same purpose, that he was putting them in foreign commerce [in Brazil] because, of necessity, they had to be ultimately paid in Brooklyn, New York.” 376 F.2d at 251. Here, the transaction charged in Count Six between foreign countries did not begin or end in the United States. While the Canada bank may have had some recourse against the Wilmington Trust Company, the possibility of such recourse cannot alter the nature of the transaction that is charged in Count Six, particularly since Goldberg was charged in Count Four with a violation of sections 2314 and 2 for the transportation between the Wilmington bank and the Canada bank.
Nor do I believe that Goldberg’s conviction under Count Six can be upheld by application of 18 U.S.C. § 2(b). That provision states that a person who “willfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed by him or another would be an offense” is punishable as a principal. However, if the transportation charged would not be an offense because it is not in “foreign commerce” as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 10, then the fact that the transportation is willfully caused by a person acting inside the United States cannot change the nature of the transportation.
For similar reasons, I believe that the majority also err in upholding Goldberg’s conviction under Count Five, which charges a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343, prohibiting wire transmissions “in ... foreign commerce” for the purpose of executing a fraudulent scheme.1 The majority circumvent the “foreign commerce” issue presented by the Montreal to Nassau wire by reading Count Five of the indictment as charging that Goldberg made telephone calls from Graterford Prison to Montreal in furtherance of the scheme to defraud. The majority are plainly in error.
Count Five charges that Goldberg, for the purposes of executing the fraudulent scheme, “caused to be transferred by means of wire communication in foreign commerce certain signal[s] and sounds, that is, defendant caused the Royal Bank of Canada, Montreal, Canada, to wire transfer funds in an amount in excess of $190,000.00 to an account in the name of RONALD J. GOLDBERG at the Royal Bank of Canada, Nassau, Bahamas.” App. at 164. The offense charged is clearly based on the wire communication between Montreal and Nassau. The telephone calls relied on by the majority are not referred to anywhere in the indictment. For that reason, the incorporation “by reference” language of Count Five, referred to by the majority at note 7 of their opinion, cannot possibly supply the nonexistent allegation.
*469Finally, the Graterford-Montreal calls cannot be considered to be properly charged by the allegation in the indictment that Goldberg “caused” the wire transfer of funds from Montreal to Nassau. The evidence at trial showing that Goldberg in fact caused the wire transmission in part by means of various telephone calls from Graterford to Montreal and the district court's reliance on those calls cannot alter the undeniable fact that the indictment does not charge that the offense was the telephone communication. The means of the communication is the essence of the offense under 18 U.S.C. § 1343, and fraud effected by the wire communication from Montreal to Nassau, not fraud effected by telephone communication from Graterford to Montreal, was what was charged. To permit the conviction of Goldberg on Count Five on the basis of telephone calls that were never charged or alluded to in the indictment is contrary to our cases holding the purpose of an indictment is, inter alia, to apprise the defendant of the charge. See United States v. Crocker, 568 F.2d 1049, 1059-60 (3d Cir.1977); United States v. Goldstein, 502 F.2d 526, 529 (3d Cir. 1974) (in banc).
For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the convictions of Goldberg under Counts Five and Six.
. In 1956, the Wire Fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1343, was amended to include transmissions "in ... foreign commerce.” Pub.L. No. 84-688, 70 Stat. 523 (1956). Significantly, the examples in the legislative history of "foreign commerce” to which the amended provision was to apply all included transmissions between a foreign country and the United States. See S.Rep. No. 1873, 84th Cong.2d Sess. 2-3 (1956); H.R.Rep. No. 2385, 84th Cong. 2d Sess. 1-2 (1956).