(dissenting in part and concurring in part):
The majority concludes that the Arizona Supreme Court, in affirming petitioner’s death sentence, adopted such a broad construction of Arizona Revised Statute § 13-703(F)(6) as to violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Because I believe the majority is doing little more than second-guessing the Arizona Supreme Court’s interpretation of facts that quite reasonably fit within the statutory definition of aggravating circumstances, I dissent.1
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Generally, a federal court in a habeas corpus proceeding must accord a presumption of correctness to a state court’s factual findings. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). This statutory presumption, however, does not apply to questions of law or to mixed questions of law and fact. Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591, 597, 102 S.Ct. 1303, 1306, 71 L.Ed.2d 480 (1982); Fendler v. Goldsmith, 728 F.2d 1181, 1191 n. 21 (9th Cir.1983). Rather, the federal court reviews such nonfactual questions de novo. Chaney v. Lewis, 801 F.2d 1191, 1194 (9th Cir.1986), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 1911, 95 L.Ed.2d 516 (1987); Fendler, 728 F.2d at 1191 n. 21 (federal courts are “obligated to conduct a complete and independent review of all purely legal or mixed fact and law questions raised by [a state prisoner’s] ha-beas corpus petition”).
Some federal courts in habeas proceedings have applied the presumption of correctness under § 2254(d) to state court findings of aggravating circumstances. See Woratzeck v. Ricketts, 820 F.2d 1450, 1459 (9th Cir.1987) (finding of “cruel, heinous, or depraved” aggravating circumstances by Arizona Supreme Court presumed correct under § 2254(d)); Magwood v. Smith, 791 F.2d 1438, 1449 (11th Cir.1986) (existence of aggravating or mitigating circumstance a question of fact subject to review under § 2254(d)). These courts, however, appear to have applied the presumption without considering whether the finding of an aggravating circumstance is a question of fact or a mixed question of fact and law.
A state court conclusion that the defendant killed in a “heinous, cruel, or depraved” manner appears to be a mixed question of fact and law. Chaney, 801 F.2d at 1194. The court must first determine that the defendant engaged in certain conduct (e.g., beat the victim after she was dead), and then, by reference to the decisions of the state supreme court, conclude that such conduct meaningfully distinguishes the defendant from the “usual or norm of first degree murders.” As a mixed question of fact and law, the state court finding is not entitled to a presumption of correctness.2
On the other hand, the state court’s conclusion that the defendant killed in a “heinous, cruel or depraved” manner should not be subject to de novo review. The *488United States Supreme Court has stated that its review of state court findings of aggravating circumstances is “limited to the question whether they are so unprincipled or arbitrary as to somehow violate the United States Constitution.” Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 947, 103 S.Ct. 3418, 3423, 77 L.Ed.2d 1134 (1983) (plurality). The Ninth Circuit has interpreted this language to support deferential habeas corpus review of aggravating circumstances. Adamson v. Ricketts, 758 F.2d 441, 450 (9th Cir.), withdrawn, 764 F.2d 1343 (9th Cir.1985), reh’g en banc, 789 F.2d 722 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, — U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 62, 93 L.Ed.2d 21 (1986).
Deferential review is justified by the presence of “procedural protections intended to ensure that the death penalty will be imposed in a consistent, rational manner.” Barclay, 463 U.S. at 960, 103 S.Ct. at 3430 (Stevens, concurring). Where the state’s sentencing procedures “focus discretion on ‘the particularized nature of the crime and the particularized character of the defendant,’ we lawfully may presume that [defendant’s] death sentence was not ‘wantonly and freakishly’ imposed, and thus that the sentence is not disproportionate within any recognized meaning under the Eighth Amendment.” McClesky v. Kemp, — U.S. -, -, 107 S.Ct. 1756, 1775, 95 L.Ed.2d 262 (1987) (emphasis added).3
The Arizona capital sentencing process contains the appropriate checks on arbitrariness. The procedural protections in-elude bifurcation of the penalty phase, statutorily-defined aggravating and mitigating circumstances which must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, written findings by the sentencing body, and automatic review by the state supreme court. See Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 96 S.Ct. 2960, 49 L.Ed.2d 913 (1976). On review, the Arizona Supreme compares “each death sentence with the sentences imposed on similarly situated defendants to ensure that the sentence of death in a particular case is not disproportionate.” Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 198, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2937, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976); State v. Richmond, 114 Ariz. 186, 196, 560 P.2d 41, 51, cert. denied, 433 U.S. 915, 97 S.Ct. 2988, 53 L.Ed.2d 1101 (1977). Moreover, the Arizona Supreme Court has demonstrated an ability to rationally apply the statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances. See State v. Gretzler, 135 Ariz. 42, 52-53, 659 P.2d 1, 11-12, cert. denied, 461 U.S. 971, 103 S.Ct. 2444, 77 L.Ed.2d 1327 (1983) and cases cited therein.
Where a state’s capital sentencing process is procedurally sound and responsibly managed, I believe the correct standard of review is “whether ‘any rational factfinder’ could have found the existence of aggravating circumstance[s].” Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 100 S.Ct. 1759, 64 L.Ed.2d 398 (1980) (plurality) (White, J. dissenting) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 313, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2786, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)).4
*489CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION
Despite the open-ended language contained in Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 13-703(F)(6), providing the penalty of death for those who commit murder in a “heinous, cruel, or depraved” manner, the Arizona death penalty statute passes constitutional muster by virtue of the narrowing constructions available through the Arizona Supreme Court. Chaney v. Lewis, 801 F.2d at 1195. The majority, however, holds that the Arizona Supreme Court’s application of the death penalty statute to petitioner violates the constitution.
A. Analysis Under the “Rational Fact-finder” Standard of Review
The Supreme Court of Arizona has set forth in considerable detail those factors which support a finding that a murder was committed in an “especially heinous, cruel, or depraved” manner. See Gretzler, 135 Ariz. at 51-53, 659 P.2d at 10-12. In particular, the Arizona Supreme Court has identified the defendant’s relishing of the killing and the infliction of gratuitous violence as two bases for finding a heinous or depraved attitude. Id. Given the parameters identified by the Arizona Supreme Court, I believe a “rational factfinder” could have found the existence of aggravating circumstance § 13-703(F)(6).
The Arizona Supreme Court found that Jeffers had relished the killing:
[W]hile Jeffers was beating the [dead] victim he called her “a bitch and a dirty snitch” and with each striking blow said, “This one is for so and so.” [naming several names]. This evidences the relish with which appellant committed the murder.... [W]e find that the remarks made by appellant, while at the same time beating his victim, establish that the offense was committed in an especially heinous and depraved manner.5
State v. Jeffers, 135 Ariz. 404, 430, 661 P.2d 1105, 1131, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 865, 104 S.Ct. 199, 78 L.Ed.2d 174 (1983). This is a rational finding based on petitioner’s words and actions.
The Supreme Court of Arizona additionally found that Jeffers had inflicted “gratuitous violence.” Id. The record shows that Jeffers “climbed on top of the dead victim and hit her in the face several times which eventually resulted in additional wounds and bleeding.” Id. Based on these facts, the Arizona Supreme Court could rationally find that the petitioner inflicted gratuitous violence: “In short, it was this additional violence, over and above that which was necessary to carry out the defendant’s criminal intent, that in effect distinguishes the [defendant’s murder] from the ‘usual or the norm’ of first degree murders.” State v. Ceja, 115 Ariz. 413, 417, 565 P.2d 1274, 1278 (1977). In light of the factual grounds for finding that the petitioner “relished” the act of killing and inflicted “gratuitous violence,” the Arizona Supreme Court could rationally conclude that Jeffers’ committed murder in an “especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner.”
B. Analysis Under the De Novo or “Independent” Standard of Review
The majority acknowledges that the Arizona Supreme Court has adopted standards which narrow the class of first degree murderers who may be put to death, but concludes that a finding of aggravating circumstances under § 13-703(F)(6) “seems to call for conduct or attitudes more shocking than those exhibited by Jeffers.” Ante at 484. In holding that Jeffers’ conduct is not sufficiently objectionable, this Court simply substitutes its judgment for the judgment of the Arizona Supreme Court. Nothing in the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments permits this result.
The majority’s reliance on Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 100 S.Ct. 1759, 64 L.Ed.2d 398 (1980) (plurality) is misplaced. There the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed a death sentence without articulating how *490the defendant’s actions differed from the norm of first degree murders. The United States Supreme Court reversed the death sentence, finding that it had been imposed in a “standardless and unchanneled” fashion. Id. at 429, 100 S.Ct. at 1765. As Justice Marshall wrote, it was not a question of whether the facts supported the jury’s finding:
“As in any case raising issues of vagueness, the question is whether the court below has adopted so ambiguous a construction of the relevant provision that the universe of cases it comprehends is impermissibly large, thus leaving undue discretion to the decisionmaker and creating intolerable dangers of arbitrariness and caprice.”
446 U.S. at 420 n. 1, 100 S.Ct. at 1762 n. 1 (concurring opinion).
The Arizona Supreme Court, unlike its counterpart in Godfrey, “has gone to great lengths to precisely define and correctly apply Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 13-703(F)(6).” Adamson v. Ricketts, 758 F.2d at 451. In finding that Jeffers committed his crime in a heinous or depraved manner, the Arizona Supreme Court identified the specific conduct which, in its judgment, set this murder apart from other first degree murder: (1) He climbed on to his dead victim; (2) repeatedly struck her in the face so as to draw blood; (3) called her a “bitch and a dirty snitch,” and, (4) with each blow, said, “This one is for so and so.” See State v. Jeffers, 135 Ariz. 404, 430, 661 P.2d 1105, 1131, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 865, 104 S.Ct. 199, 78 L.Ed.2d 174 (1983). The Arizona Supreme Court further explained how petitioner’s conduct satisfied § 13-703(F)(6) under existing Arizona precedent. By repeatedly striking his victim in the face after she was dead, Jeffers inflicted “gratuitous violence,” and by the remarks he made while inflicting this additional violence, Jeffers showed he “relished” the killing. Id.
The majority attacks this finding not on the basis that it is “standardless and un-channeled” under Godfrey, but that it does not comport with other decisions of the Arizona Supreme Court. The majority’s conclusion that § 13-703(F)(6) requires “conduct or attitudes more shocking than those exhibited by Jeffers,” ante at 484, represents one possible reading of the Arizona death penalty statute and Arizona precedent, but the majority fails to show that this reading is constitutionally required. The Arizona Supreme Court may constitutionally impose the death sentence on petitioner provided the court consistently applies the death penalty statute to other defendants in Jeffers’ position. The fact that Jeffers’ conduct may lie close to the line separating ordinary first degree murders from “heinous, cruel, or depraved” killings — and could be interpreted to fall below the threshold for imposing the death penalty under current Arizona case law— does not give rise to a constitutional violation absent inconsistent determinations by the Arizona Supreme Court.6
In an effort to show that the Arizona Supreme Court’s decision in Jeffers was so unprincipled that it violated the constitution, the majority undertakes a selective review of other Arizona death penalty cases. The majority emphasizes those cases in which the defendant’s conduct seemingly was more objectionable than Jef-fers’ but the Arizona Supreme Court did not find the defendant killed in a “heinous, cruel, or depraved” manner.7 None of the *491cited cases, however, involved conduct similar to Jeffers’, and little can be distilled from broad comparisons.
In State v. R.D. Smith, 138 Ariz. 79, 673 P.2d 17 (1983), the Arizona Supreme Court found that the only evidence of a heinous or depraved mind was the uncorroborated testimony of a codefendant that Smith, the defendant, had requested the tape “We Are The Champions” be played at some stage during the kidnap-rape-murder. The court found this to be insufficient evidence of heinousness or depravity, particularly in light of the defendant’s suicide attempt, which was motivated in part by remorse. Id. at 86, 673 P.2d at 24. The finding in R.D. Smith is not inconsistent with the Arizona Supreme Court’s finding that Jeffers “relished” the killing. Unlike the defendant in R.D. Smith, Jeffers made statements that directly captured the gusto with which he killed, at the time he killed.8
In State v. Graham, 135 Ariz. 209, 660 P.2d 460 (1983), the court found insufficient evidence of a heinous or depraved attitude where the defendant, who was organically brain-damaged and highly impressionable, smiled while recounting that the victim “squealed like a rabbit” when shot. The court concluded that “[w]hatever statements Graham may have made about the killings are more likely attributable to his immaturity, nervousness and need to impress his peers than to a hardened attitude towards the death of another.” Id. at 212, 660 P.2d at 463. No such charitable interpretation can be given to the statements of Jeffers, made while repeatedly striking his dead victim in the face.
In State v. Brookover, 124 Ariz. 38, 601 P.2d 1322 (1979), the Arizona Supreme Court found that the defendant had not committed murder in an especially “heinous, cruel, or depraved” manner where he shot the victim in the back, told the groaning victim “Don’t worry ... it will be over soon” and shot the victim again. The court found that the defendant’s words and actions, all in furtherance of a deliberate plan to “rip-off” a drug dealer and, in the process, impress other narcotics traffickers, failed to adequately distinguish the crime from other first degree murders. Id. at 40-41, 601 P.2d at 1324-25. Again, nothing in Brookover shows the Arizona Supreme Court inconsistently applied the death penalty statute to petitioner. Jeffers did not commit “cold and deliberate homicide” as in Brookover; rather, his words and actions show that he “relished” taking the life of a “dirty snitch.”
The majority cites two additional cases to show the Arizona Supreme Court inconsistently found Jeffers to have inflicted gratuitous violence. Both cases are readily distinguishable.
In State v. Watson, 120 Ariz. 441, 586 P.2d 1253 (1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 924, 99 S.Ct. 1254, 59 L.Ed.2d 478 (1979), a robbery victim engaged the defendants in a shoot-out, and was shot four times in the back, the last time while face down on the floor. In finding that the killing was not committed in an especially “heinous, cruel, or depraved” manner, the Arizona Supreme Court looked to the victim’s role in bringing about his own death. Id. at 447-48, 586 P.2d at 1260. No such consideration is present here.
Likewise, State v. Poland, 144 Ariz. 388, 698 P.2d 183 (1985), aff'd 476 U.S. 147, 106 S.Ct. 1749, 90 L.Ed.2d 123 (1986), fails to be instructive. There the court’s inability to ascertain the exact circumstances of the victims’ deaths precluded any finding that the murders were heinous or depraved. Id. at 405, 698 P.2d at 200. Nothing in Poland suggests that Jeffers’ words and actions, established firmly on the record, fail to show depravity or heinousness.
CONCLUSION
The foregoing case-by-case analysis should be unnecessary. As a federal habe-*492as corpus court, we offer a limited forum for petitioner’s collateral attack on his state court conviction and sentence. Our duty is to ensure that the petitioner is not being held in violation of the constitution. Our role does not extend to re-writing the law of Arizona to comport with our own interpretation of Arizona precedent. Where state courts are responsibly and consistently interpreting state death penalty statutes which have been held to be constitutional, our review should be limited to whether “any rational factfinder” could have found the existence of aggravating circumstances.
. I concur with the majority opinion to the extent it affirms petitioner’s conviction.
. Even if the state court finding of aggravating circumstances is “essentially factual" so that it would be reviewed under the "clearly erroneous" standard if on direct appeal, see United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1199-1202 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 824, 105 S.Ct. 101, 83 L.Ed.2d 46 (1984), it is not an "issue of fact” subject to the presumption of correctness under § 2254(d). The presumption only applies to "basic, primary or historical facts: ‘facts (in the sense of recital of external events and the credibility of their narrators).’" Fendler, 728 F.2d at 1191 n. 21 (quoting Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 309 n. 6, 83 S.Ct. 745, 755 n. 6, 9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963)).
. The Eleventh Circuit until recently held that these procedural protections not only raised a presumption that the sentence was imposed consistent with the Constitution, but foreclosed federal review:
[w]here in a capital punishment case the state courts have acted through a properly drawn statute with appropriate standards to guide discretion, federal courts will not undertake a case-by-case comparison of the facts in a given case with the decisions of the state supreme court. This rule stands even though were we to retry the aggravating and mitigating circumstances in these cases, ‘we may at times reach results different from those reached in the Florida state courts.’
Ford v. Strickland, 696 F.2d 804, 819 (11th Cir.) (en banc) cert. denied, 464 U.S. 865, 104 S.Ct. 201, 78 L.Ed.2d 176 (1983) (quoting Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582, 604-05 (5th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 976, 99 S.Ct. 1548, 59 L.Ed.2d 796 (1979)) (citations omitted).
The Eleventh Circuit has since abandoned its position of total deference to state court findings of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. In Magwood, 791 F.2d at 1449, the court held that a federal habeas corpus court is not precluded from reviewing state fact-findings that determine the existence of a particular aggravating or mitigating circumstance. The court additionally held that such findings are issues of fact, and are presumed to be correct under § 2254(d). Id.
. The majority does not identify the standard of review it applies in this habeas corpus proceeding, but it appears to be the "complete and independent" standard of review provided for in Fendler, 728 F.2d at 1191 n. 21.
. The Arizona Supreme Court’s findings of historical facts, such as what Jeffers said and did at the time of the killing, are presumed to be correct under 18 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The majority questions the strength of Van der Veer’s testimony, see ante at 488 n. 4, but in no way shows that the state court findings are not "fairly supported by the record.” 18 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
. The majority in effect challenges the constitutionality of any capital sentencing system which recognizes an aggravating circumstance as open-ended as A.R.S. 13-703(F)(6). Inevitably, courts must draw difficult lines between ordinary first degree murder and those murders which are committed in an "especially heinous, cruel, or depraved” manner. But the constitution is satisfied where state courts draw lines based on "rational criteria that narrow the deci-sionmaker’s judgment as to whether the circumstances of a particular defendant’s case meet the threshold [below which the death penalty cannot be imposed].” McClesky v. Kemp, — U.S. at -, 107 S.Ct. at 1774 (emphasis added).
. These cases are relevant benchmarks to the extent that similar or worse conduct did not result in a finding of aggravating circumstances. They help to answer a threshold question: What is the minimum level of objectionable conduct required for a finding of aggravating circumstances under A.R.S. § 13 — 703(F)(6)? The decision in Jeffers is not undermined by those cases in which the Arizona Supreme Court found aggravating circumstances based on conduct more *491objectionable than Jeffers’. Such cases say very little about whether Jeffers’ conduct meets the threshold below which the death penalty cannot be imposed.
. It is not clear that the defendant in R.D. Smith requested the tape be played while killing the victim, as opposed to raping her. Under Arizona case law, the defendant must "relish the murder” for § 13-703(F)(6) to be satisfied. See Gretzler, 135 Ariz. 52, 659 P.2d at 10.