dissenting.
The majority has failed to take into account that the Administrative Law Judge’s (AU’s) finding that Crady was unable to perform his past relevant work shifted the burden to the Secretary to establish Cra-dy’s ability to work. Even more troubling, however, the majority phrases the main question presented in this case as whether the AU applied the age categories in the “grid” too mechanically. I believe the proper question is whether the AU applied the “grid” itself too mechanically. Because the AU applied the “grid” itself too mechanically, I dissent.
By showing “a medical basis for an impairment that prevents him from engaging in his particular occupation,” Hephner v. Mathews, 574 F.2d 359, 361 (6th Cir.1978), *623the claimant establishes a prima facie case of disability. In the instant case, the AU found that Crady was not capable of returning to his particular occupation.
Once the claimant makes out a prima facie case, it becomes the Secretary’s burden to establish the claimant’s ability to work. Allen v. Califano, 613 F.2d 139, 145 (6th Cir.1980). The Secretary must prove that, taking into consideration present job qualifications such as age, experience, education and physical capacity, and the existence of jobs to match those qualifications, a claimant retains the capacity to perform a different kind of job. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f)(1); Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 460, 103 S.Ct. 1952, 1953, 76 L.Ed.2d 66 (1983). The Secretary’s burden can, on occasion, be satisfied by relying on the medical-vocational guidelines, otherwise known as the “grid.” See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 2. If the characteristics of the claimant do not identically match the description in the grid, however, the grid is used only as a framework or a guide to the disability determination. Kirk v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 667 F.2d 524, 528 (6th Cir.1981).
The Secretary should not have been allowed to rely on a mechanical application of the “grid” to meet his burden in this borderline age case. My conclusion is supported by the Third Circuit’s approach in Kane v. Heckler, 776 F.2d 1130, 1134 (3d Cir.1985). In Kane, upon finding the existence of a borderline age situation contemplated by 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563(a) the Third Circuit remanded the case with the instructions that the AU consider which age category to apply, and that the AU use the grid primarily as a guide in making the disability determination.
Because I agree with the Third Circuit that the grid should be applied only as a guide in borderline age situations such as this in order to effectuate section 404.-1563(a), I would reverse the district court’s judgment and remand this case for further findings.