concurring in part and dissenting in part;
I concur in Part B of the Majority Opinion and dissent from Part A of the opinion. In Part A the majority holds that the district court was correct in deciding that Fulton County’s award of the contract to IBM was proper.
IBM’s bid for the 3083EX machine was $1,233,480 and MLC’s bid for the used 3083E was $640,000, a difference of $593,-480. Available to an owner of a 3083E was *792a modification furnished by IBM for approximately $100,000. This modification made the speed of the improved 3083E approximately the same as the EX. The only difference in the machines at that point was that the EX used less electricity. Obviously, the EX furnished by IBM was a new machine and the 3083E was a used machine. The expenditure of the $100,000 reduced the price differential to approximately $493,480. The following is the district court’s findings of fact in their entirety; dictated upon completion of the plaintiff’s case, and transcribed by the court reporter:
THE COURT: All right. It seems to me that, as this case perhaps demonstrates, any time the low bidder is not selected that you get a situation that’s fraught with danger and comes very close or runs a chance of violating the Georgia law in regard to low bidder.
Now, apparently it’s also — in this state the requirements on counties are much more stringent than they are on the state, and may be much more stringent than they are on the city, although I am not sure why that should be, but apparently that may very well be the case.
But however that may be, in this case I find and conclude that the evidence presented by the plaintiff has failed to establish that in awarding the bid to IBM the county engaged in any improper conduct.
I frankly don’t understand the county's actions after the bid award in failing to tell the plaintiff the truth, and in many cases in making untrue statements. But I don’t find that that conduct is actionable in this case, particularly in regard to the awarding of the contract.
I also find and conclude that the plaintiff has not proven that the E machine is equal to the E-X machine, but to the contrary, the plaintiff’s credible evidence demonstrates and affirmatively estab-lishs [sic] that an E and an E-X are not equal in many respects and that it would require an expendature [sic] of more than $100,000 to make them equal.
I also conclude that if an E was modified or converted to make it substantially equal to an E-X, there is no evidence that the resulting modification would be certified or warranted by IBM. Therefore, I conclude the county was correct, that the plaintiff’s bid was not equivalent.
I also find and conclude that prior to an award of the contract to IBM, the used machine identified by the plaintiff by serial number in plaintiff’s bid was no longer available to the plaintiff to be leased to Fulton County. The plaintiff did not furnish Fulton County any other serial number, and the plaintiff took the position that the plaintiff had the right to provide equipment without furnishing prior information about the serial number. I conclude that this position and this action by the plaintiff constituted a violation of the bidding requirements.
For each of the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff has failed to show that the defendant violated any of the applicable bidding procedures, or that even if the procedures were violated that the plaintiff has any right to recover in in [sic] proceeding either by way of monitory [sic] damages or by equitable relief, and the reasons I have just indicated, as well as an attempt to balance the equities and a lack of an indispensable party would prohibit plaintiff from receiving any of the equitable relief they have preyed [sic] for.
Therefore, the defendants’ [sic] 41(b) motion is hereby granted.
Anything further, gentlemen?
(No response).
Record, Vol. 5 at 429-31 (emphasis added).
This case was decided by the district court at the close of the plaintiff’s evidence pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b). This rule permits the trial court to render judgment on the merits against the plaintiff if the facts presented by the plaintiff and the law governing the case establish that the plaintiff has no right to relief. The district court found in the fifth paragraph of his order that an expenditure of more than $100,000 would make the machines equal. Modifying this in the next paragraph, he concludes that even if the E were modified *793“to make it substantially equal to an EX,” there was no evidence that the modification would be certified or warranted by IBM. However, there was no showing that a certification would be worth $493,480. Then the court concluded that MLC failed to provide a new serial number for a replacement machine and this violated the bidding requirements. Based on these reasons the district court concluded the plaintiff could not recover.
The district court failed to explain the reasons why the two machines were not equivalent when the price differential was approximately $493,480. Nor did the district court explain how the non-availability of the machine identified by MLC in its bid affected the bidding process. Part B of the majority opinion explains certain irregularities in the bidding process. The bids were opened May 22, 1985. MLC’s bid was open for thirty days. Before the expiration of that time, the county informed MLC that it intended to award the bid to IBM because it wanted new equipment. The county did agree to consider any contentions that MLC might make that the machines were equivalent. From thence forward, MLC made efforts to demonstrate to the county that the modified 3083E would satisfy the county’s needs at a savings to the county. In July, MLC sold the equipment it had identified in its bid. Its bid provided it could substitute one 3083E for an identical one or an EX. On August 15, 1985, the county awarded the contract to IBM but continued to discuss with MLC the latter’s contentions about equivalency of the two machines. On November 1st, MLC learned that IBM had been awarded the contract and that delivery of the equipment would be made November 5th.
In Golf City, Inc. v. Wilson Sporting Goods, 555 F.2d 426 (5th Cir.1977) when discussing the district court’s need to provide an appellate court with a proper predicate for reviewing its opinion, our court stated that “the findings of the trial court must be sufficiently detailed to give us a clear understanding of the analytical process by which ultimate findings were reached and to assure us that the trial court took care in ascertaining the facts.” Id. at 433.
The issue in this case is whether the defendant Fulton County complied with the Georgia statute governing competitive bidding. That statute requires a county to award a contract to the lowest responsible bidder. While it is implicit that the district court concluded that IBM was the lowest responsible bidder, there is no explanation by the court how that can be when there is a difference in the bids of $493,480. It may be that the evidence of the defendant would have shown that the new EX was indeed worth the differential when compared to a modified but used E.
The district court did not adequately explain the basis for its judgment. I would reverse and remand for a completion of the trial so that the county could offer evidence as to the reasons it awarded the contract to IBM at which time a court could find the credible facts and make a reasoned judgment.