(concurring in part; dissenting in part).
I disagree that our decision in United States v. Moreno Morales, 815 F.2d 725 (1st Cir.1987), constitutes stare decisis on the venue issue raised by appellant. I also disagree with my brethren’s conclusions as to appellant’s conviction under Count 26 of the indictment. However, I concur with the majority’s ruling on Count 27 thereof.
I
It is difficult to quarrel with the statements of general principle in the majority’s opinion as respects the doctrine of stare decisis. Ante at 687. In theory, stare decisis is a tenet mandated by the need for stability in the law and predictability in the outcome of social interchange. In a criminal law context, however, mechanical application of this principle can deprive a defendant of a more fundamental due process interest, the right to a day in court. In practice the doctrine of stare decisis is as often used as the tool of expediency to reach preconceived results, as for its legitimately intended purpose. Although in the present appeal and that of Moreno Morales there is the need to call upon the doctrine of stare decisis, it is in a manner different from that proposed by the majority-
If the doctrine of stare decisis were to be uniformly applied to this case, and in passing, had been applied to Moreno Morales, the majority would perforce have concluded that our ruling in Delaney v. United States, 199 F.2d 107 (1st Cir.1952), was controlling. Following that case it would necessarily have to reverse all of the convictions stemming from the Cerro Maravil-la incident. I will not recount the facts and circumstances of Delaney but will limit my statements to saying that the facts in Delaney, a case which “has been cited with approval not only by the Supreme Court, but also by most circuits, including our own,” 1 cannot be differentiated from those in the present appeal. I invite the reader to judge for himself. See Moreno Morales, supra. After such an exercise I am left with the distinct impression that stare deci-sis was somehow left at the starting gate. See Moreno Morales, 815 F.2d at 738.
There has been an even more direct and egregious violation of the doctrine of stare decisis by the majorities in this case and in Moreno Morales. These violations are particularly obnoxious because they concern the very issue raised by appellant in this appeal. In the civil version of the Cerro Maravilla incident this court ruled that “Puerto Rico is singularly unsuited to a change in venue ...” and, therefore, that such an option “would be unavailing.” In re San Juan Star Co., 662 F.2d 108, 117 (1st Cir.1981). See Moreno Morales at 772-73 (Torruella, J., dissenting). This being the law in this circuit at the time, and particularly considering the close relationship between the parties in the civil and criminal cases, it is beyond cavil that the criminal defendants in this case and Moreno Morales relied upon this pronouncement in not seeking a change of venue, i.e., relied on its stare decisis value. Yet in a unique and picturesque circumvention of this doctrine this Court’s panel majority in Moreno Morales stated that its “observation” regarding the inappropriateness of requesting a change in venue in Puerto Rico was not a “major pronouncement,” and that it therefore had no binding effect on the panel decision. Moreno Morales, 815 F.2d at 737. Cf. id. at 772 (Torruella, J., dissenting).
Notwithstanding the above, however, I suggest that even this double-standard application of stare decisis is irrelevant to the precise issue raised by appellant. That issue (whether the district court sua sponte should have, in view of the massive pretrial *694publicity, raised the possibility of a change in venue) was never litigated or decided in Moreno Morales, a point apparently recognized by the majority opinion, although somewhat begrudgingly. Ante at 687. If that be the case, appellant’s “one fresh argument,” id., is entitled to somewhat more in-depth consideration than that accorded to it by the majority. Ante at 687-88.
The majority chastises appellant because he fails to offer any authority for the “novel proposition” that the district court erred by not acting sua sponte in directing the parties to focus on a change of venue. With due respect, I suggest that if there has been any “novel proposition” in these cases, none is surpassed by the majority’s ruling in Moreno Morales, singularly unsupported by any authority, that a criminal defendant must choose between his right to an impartial trial and his right to be tried by his peers, and that by failing to seek a change of venue he waives his right to an impartial trial. Moreno Morales, 815 F.2d at 737-39. Cf. id. at 772-74 (Torruella, J., dissenting). If there be a “novel proposition” it is the tragic comedy of errors through which the appellant has been led by this court’s prior rulings to believe that no change of venue was appropriate for a case tried in Puerto Rico, In re San Juan Star, supra, only to be penalized thereafter for relying on such stare deci-sis. As a minimum requirement of due process, a criminal defendant who has relied on a pronouncement of this court, whether ex post facto we choose to label it as “minor” or not, should be given the opportunity to rectify his position before we pull the judicial rug out from under him.
Furthermore, the idea that these circumstances require affirmative judicial action to alert a bemused defendant against the unconscious waiver of a basic constitutional right is hardly “novel,” particularly in this circuit. The district court in Delaney specifically urged the defendant to file for a change of venue because of pretrial publicity. Delaney, 199 F.2d at 115. Yet, notwithstanding his failure to follow the court’s prompting, we reversed and ordered a new trial. If Delaney was granted a new trial by this court in those circumstances, can there be any valid reason for not granting a new trial here, where not only was a change in venue not suggested by the trial court but circuit precedent indicated that such a move was inappropriate? Other courts have also invited such motions under similar circumstances. See Dennis v. United States, 302 F.2d 5, 8 (10th Cir.1962), rev’d on other grounds, 384 U.S. 855, 86 S.Ct. 1840, 16 L.Ed.2d 973 (1966).
The unusual setting of this trial, involving what the district court characterized as “the media event of the years 1983-1984,” United States v. Pérez-Casillas, 593 F.Supp. 794, 798 (D.C.P.R.1984) (emphasis in the original), mandates that the trial court have taken this minimal action to prevent appellant from unwittingly losing fundamental rights. That the district court failed to so act is most probably due also to its reliance on our pronouncements in San Juan Star. This brings the ball back to our court. It is incumbent upon this court to face its errors squarely and to correct this manifest injustice, without avoiding responsibility by reliance on a hyper-technical subterfuge.
II
I agree with the majority’s restatement of the law of perjury to the effect that to sustain such a charge the interdicted statement “must be literally false.” Ante at 689; Moreno Morales, 815 F.2d at 744; United States v. Finucan, 708 F.2d 838, 847 (1st Cir.1983). I do not believe that this test is met by the proof presented in connection with Count 26 of the indictment.
The alleged perjury in appellant’s testimony centers around his answer that “Colón came out and gave the halt” (emphasis supplied) to a question as to “when was the halt given?” The majority concludes that “a reasonable inference may be drawn from the use of the article (“the”) that there was only one command given.” Ante at 689. To say that Colón gave the halt, however, is not to say that only one halt was given. Thus, the answer at worst *695was unresponsive. Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 359, 93 S.Ct. 595, 600, 34 L.Ed.2d 568 (1973).
It would be perfectly appropriate, for example, both in English and Spanish2 to say “three persons gave the halt ” or “A gave the halt five minutes before B gave the halt.” The halt could be given several times, or by several people. The testimony of Montanez that he gave “the halt,” and the testimony of Reverón that Colón gave “the halt” are simply not inconsistent, as the majority finds.
The majority’s reference to defendant’s motive for committing perjury, ante at 690, is equally relevant for an unresponsive or incomplete answer and thus lends no support to the majority’s conclusion. The jury had no basis to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the answer was literally false. Therefore, the defendant was entitled to acquittal on Count 26.
Ill
For the reasons stated above, I am of the view that all of appellant’s convictions should be reversed.
. Moreno Morales, 815 F.2d at 775 (Torruella, J., dissenting).
. The original testimony in this case was in Spanish. The peculiar usage of "el alto” and "the halt” is the same in both languages.