dissenting:
A convicted lawyer-defendant in this bribery case has sold a bill of goods to my colleagues of the majority which I refuse to buy.
That the defendant Tonry paid a bribe of $25,000 to Larry Burgess to induce him to sign a contract which gave Tonry and his partners the right to establish and manage the tribe’s bingo establishment on its reservation was amply shown. That he and Burgess later traveled to Washington from New Orleans to facilitate the approval of the contract by the Bureau of Indian Affairs is also plain. That Burgess was acting in a fiduciary capacity for the Indian tribe is not in dispute.
I part company with the majority when they hold that the Louisiana Commercial Bribery Statute does not cover Burgess.
The bill of goods that I am talking about is the argument that Tonry makes that the district court erred when it refused to dismiss his indictment and denied his motion for judgment of acquittal because the commercial bribery statute applies only to the bribery of private employees, agents, or fiduciaries. He claims Burgess, the Chairman of the Chitimaeha Tribe, a “quasi-sovereign entity”, is not a private agent, employee, or fiduciary as required under the commercial bribery statute. According to Tonry, Louisiana law creates a dichotomy between Louisiana public employees and private employees, but a trichotomy, including employees of foreign or non-Louisiana public or sovereign entities, would be necessary to encompass the arrangement he had with Burgess.
Apart from Tonry’s distinction, the district court found, and I agree, that the essential elements of commercial bribery are here present. Burgess was bribed in New Orleans while acting in a classic position of trust and confidence to negotiate a commercial contract on behalf of the tribe. The payment to Burgess was made without the tribe’s knowledge or consent and was made for no other reason than to persuade, induce, influence, or entice Burgess to enter into a contract with Tonry’s corporation contrary to the rules of honesty and integrity. Burgess was unqualifiedly acting as a fiduciary of his tribe. The gist of Ton-ry’s argument, therefore, is that Chairman Burgess might have been bribed in fact but not in law.
In Louisiana, criminal statutes must be interpreted to be in harmony with, preserve, and effectuate the manifest intent of the legislature, and interpretation should be avoided which will defeat the purpose of a statute. State v. Broussard, 213 La. 338, 34 So.2d 883, 884 (1948); see also, State v. Seals, 255 La. 1005, 233 So.2d 914, 918 (1970). Furthermore, while ordinarily criminal laws should be strictly construed, this rule should not be applied with such unreasonable technicality as to defeat the *1286purpose of all rules of statutory construction, which is to ascertain the true meaning and intent of the statute. State v. Payton, 361 So.2d 866, 870 n. 10 (La.1978).
To interpret the Louisiana commercial bribery statute, we are bound to the statutory principles of interpretation which govern the Louisiana Criminal Code:
The articles of this Code cannot be extended so as to create crimes not provided herein; however, in order to promote justice and to effect the objects of the law, all of its provisions shall be given genuine construction according to the fair import of their words taken in their usual sense in connection with the context and with reference to the purpose of the provision.
La.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 14:3 (West 1986).
As Tonry concedes, the public and commercial bribery statutes in Louisiana must be construed together. Louisiana law requires that statutes be construed in conjunction with all laws on the same subject matter. State v. Brady, 310 So.2d 593, 595 (La.1975). There is no case law discussion of the scope of commercial bribery. I find instructive, however, the Reporter’s Comment to the commercial bribery statute, stating that it was promulgaged “in addition to the bribery of public officials [because it] is commonly agreed to be necessary in the modern criminal law.” (emphasis added). While the comments of the Reporter are not law, they have legislative sanction and they supply evidence of the legislature’s intent in drafting a law. See, e.g., State v. Daniels, 236 La. 998, 109 So.2d 896, 898 (1959); State v. Broadnax, 216 La. 1003, 45 So.2d 604, 610 (1950). Construing the commercial and public bribery laws together, and attempting to implement legislative intent, I find that “private” in the commercial bribery statute is the converse of the “public” activity described by Section 14:118. Any bribery committed in Louisiana that does not involve state government action and otherwise fulfills the criteria of 14:73 would be subsumed in the commercial bribery statute.
Evidence of the legislature’s intent to implement a comprehensive set of bribery laws is found also in the “usual sense” of the word “private” in the commercial bribery statute. Webster’s defines “private” as “not invested with or engaged in public office.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1805 (1976). Similarly, “private” is defined as “not holding public office or employment.” The Random House Dictionary of the English Language 1145 (1966). Black’s Law Dictionary defines “private” as “[a]ffecting or belonging to private individuals, as distinct from the public generally,” and defines “private agent” as “[a]n agent acting for an individual in his private affairs; as distinguished from a public agent.” Black Law Dictionary 59 and 1076 (5th ed. 1979). The implication is that “private” includes all that is not considered public.
As admitted by the majority, the Louisiana Supreme Court has similarly interpreted “private.” Galloway v. Wyatt Metal & Boiler Works, 189 La. 837, 181 So. 187, 189 (1938) (“Highways are public ways as con-tradistinguished from private ways.”) Strohmeyer v. Consumers’ Electric Co., 111 La. 506, 35 So. 723, 724 (1904) (“Such a business may be called ‘private’ as contra-distinguished from a municipal or public duty or function_”); State ex rel. Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Board of Levee Commissioners, 109 La. 403, 33 So. 385, 399 (1902) (“[a]ll public corporations are municipal corporations, as contradistin-guished from private corporations.”) In short, the “usual sense” of the word “private” is that which is not public. The terms “public” and “private” are mutually exclusive, and together they exhaust the universe. Therefore, the legislative intent of the commercial bribery statute, as derived from the usual sense of the word “private,” was to prohibit all forms of bribery not covered under the public bribery statute.
The majority classifies Burgess as a public official. He is not a public official under any law of Louisiana, but is an official of a tribe within an Indian reservation which has been created under federal law. He was not bribed on the reservation, in which *1287case we might say that no law of Louisiana had been violated in Louisiana because the laws of Louisiana do not control actions taking place within an Indian reservation. Burgess, however, was bribed in New Orleans. Once he stepped out of the Indian reservation over which he was the chairman, he became like any other private citizen in Louisiana, whether a resident or just in the state to conduct business.
I am convinced that the intent of the Louisiana legislature was to make criminal all forms of bribery in Louisiana. One statute covers the bribing of Louisiana public officials and the commercial bribery statute was intended to cover everyone who was not a Louisiana public official. I, therefore, would conclude that Tonry’s proffered interpretation of the commercial bribery statute does not properly account for its relation to Louisiana’s public bribery statute, creates a distinction among types of commercial bribery not clearly contemplated by the Louisiana legislature, and conflicts with the legislature’s goal to protect Louisiana citizens from commercial bribery.
Applying Tonry’s logic to the commercial bribery statute demonstrates its inconsistency with the legislative intent. Not only would the bribery of Burgess be unprose-cutable, but also any commercial bribery scheme which involved a principal or employer that is arguably not a private commercial entity. Bribery of an agent of the federal government or of neighboring states’ governments or agencies could not be prosecuted under Louisiana law even though the crime occurred there. Bribery of officials of such entities as Pemex, Aramco and other governmentally-owned companies might be defended on the basis that they are quasi-sovereign agencies. More to the point, eliminating such activity from the scope of the Louisiana commercial bribery law does not do justice to the legislature's intent to protect its citizens from a morally and economically offensive practice. In this case, for instance, Tonry represented partners who invested in his bingo management venture while oblivious to his activities, and who lost a substantial portion of their capital because of the bribery scheme. The Indian tribe, whose members reside in Louisiana, has been delayed in its entrepreneurial venture. Louisiana businessmen who might have competed legitimately with Tonry for the tribe’s business were thwarted. It would lead to an absurd result to conclude, despite the obvious harm inflicted upon Louisiana and its citizens by Tonry’s bribery, that the legislature intended to exempt this conduct from its commercial bribery statute. Louisiana law requires that a statute should not be interpreted so as to effect absurd consequences. State v. Booth, 347 So.2d 241, 248 (La.1977).
I am convinced from reading the two bribery statutes passed by the Louisiana legislature that the intent was, as I have said before, to condemn all bribery and nothing has fallen through the cracks that is exempt from prosecution as the majority now holds.
Since all other points of error included in the appeal by Tonry are without merit, I would affirm his conviction.