dissenting.
An independent review of the entire record in this case leads me to the inexorable conclusion that plaintiff failed to prove the existence of “actual malice,” i.e., reckless disregard of the truth, by clear and convincing evidence. Therefore, I must respectfully dissent.
I.
The majority opinion sets forth a lengthy recitation of the factual background of this case. There are, however, two glaring omissions which I believe are critical to the proper resolution of the actual malice issue.1 First, the majority neglects to quote the exact language of the allegedly defamatory article. Second, the majority opinion does not adequately address the admissions made by the plaintiff during the course of an interview with the defendant, Journal-News. This interview was conducted prior to the publication of the article and the excerpts reveal that plaintiff essentially confirmed the substance of the factual allegations which subsequently appeared in the article.
When the article is read in light of the plaintiffs undisputed, pre-publication admissions to the Journal-News, it becomes abundantly clear that the plaintiff could not show that the Journal-News had printed the story in “reckless disregard of the truth” as is required by the actual malice standard. Moreover, I submit that the plaintiff could not have made the requisite showing of actual malice at trial under any standard of proof, let alone the rigorous “clear and convincing evidence” standard which applies in this case. Finally, I believe reversal is required even under the narrow scope of appellate review utilized by the majority.
A. The Article
The majority opinion provides only a generalized description of the allegedly libelous article stating that “Thompson’s *850charges branded Connaughton as a liar, an extortionist, an unethical opportunist who was waging [a] ‘deceitful’ and ‘dishonest’ and generally ‘dirty’ campaign_” At 834. I believe that the proper analysis of the issues before us requires a more detailed account of the exact language which appeared in the article. The article which precipitated this case was printed beneath a headline which read, “Bribery Case Witness Claims Jobs, Trip Offered.”2 The following excerpts are quoted from the article:
A woman called to testify before the Butler County Grand Jury in the Billy Joe New bribery case claims Dan Con-naughton, candidate for Hamilton Municipal Judge, offered her and her sister jobs and a trip to Florida “in appreciation” for their help.
Alice Thompson, 22, 1740 Shuler Ave., was scheduled to testify before the grand jury in relation to the charges against New, who resigned his court position Sept. 22.
Thompson said she believes Dan Con-naughton, a candidate for municipal judge, used “dirty tricks” in obtaining her cooperation with his personal investigation of New.
Connaughton, in an interview with the Journal-News Monday, confirmed meeting with Thompson.
But he denied any wrongdoing and said Thompson misinterpreted comments and discussion while attending meetings with him and persons involved in his campaign who were gathering information about New and Dolan.
Thompson said her reason for wanting to talk to the Journal-News were: 1. To let people know she did not “snitch” on New. 2. To reveal the “dirty tricks” Connaughton pulled to get her to make a statement.
She said two other things bothered her about Connaughton’s actions: (1) he did not protect her anonymity as promised and (2) he allowed other people to hear tapes of a session with Connaughton and other supporters about what happened with New during Thompson’s recent appearance in Hamilton Municipal Court.
Connaughton and some of his supporters and two neighbors were contacted by the Journal-News Monday to obtain their recollections of the meetings and conversation.
They claim there was never a direct offer to Alice Thompson and her sister Patsy Faye Stephens, 1757 Shuler Ave., Hamilton.
Connaughton did admit there was talk about the two sisters working in an ice cream shop the Connaughtons might open.
Thompson claims the tapes were turned off and on during a session she claims lasted until 5:30 a.m. When the tape was turned off, she said Connaugh-ton made promises about a job and a post-election trip to Florida for Thompson and Stephens which the Connaugh-ton family was going to take.
The Barnes claim the tapes ran continuously.
Dan Connaughton said there were times when the tapes were stopped.
Thompson said that either at that second meeting or a subsequent third meeting Connaughton offered:
. a job for Thompson in appreciation for her help with Connaughton’s investigation of Billy New and Judge Dolan.
. a municipal court job for Stephens.
. an invitation for Thompson and her sister to go on a post-election trip to Florida with Connaughton and his family-
. to set up Thompson’s parents, Zella and Brownie Breedlove, in the restaurant business at the location of Walt's Chambers, which Connaughton owns and leases.
Connaughton and his supporters claim no promises were made.
Connaughton said he suggested the two sisters may want to go South.
*851Connaughton said his wife had thought about opening a gourmet ice cream shop at the Walt’s Chambers location.
Thompson claimed that Connaughton promised a post-election dinner at the Maisonette in downtown Cincinnati.
Connaughton said “it may have been discussed. I wouldn’t say it wasn’t discussed.”
Thompson claimed Connaughton had told her the tapes he made of her and her sister’s statement Sept. 16 or Sept. 17 were to be presented to Dolan.
Thompson said Connaughton hoped to get New and Dolan to resign and then to have himself appointed as municipal judge.
Plaintiff claimed that the following allegations were false and defamatory: (1) that he had threatened to confront Judge Dolan with the taped allegations of the informants in order to force his resignation; (2) that he had promised the informants that they would remain anonymous; (3) that he had promised the jobs, a trip to Florida, and an expensive dinner “in appreciation” for their cooperation; and (4) that he had used “dirty tricks” to obtain their cooperation.
B. The Connaughton Interview
Prior to the publication of the foregoing article, the Journal-News arranged an interview with plaintiff in order to confirm Ms. Thompson’s allegations. I find the transcript of the interview to be very revealing with respect to the issue of actual malice.
1. Allegation that Plaintiff had Intended to Confront Judge Dolan With the Tape Recorded Accusations
Q. Did you ever say — tell Alice that your purpose was to collect the evidence, present the information to Dolan, get New and Dolan to resign, and then for you to be appointed to that post?
A. That I would present what I had to them ...
Q. Yeah, you’d get what you ...
A, And then they would resign and I would be appointed?
Q. Yeah. Or that your intention was to try to — at least — at the very least confront them with the information — was that your intention at all? I mean, in interviewing these people, was to confront Dolan with this?
A. Well, I don’t know that I had a firm purpose prior to hearing what they had to say, what I was going to do with the information once I got it. I think it would be fair to say, sometime during those three or four hours that they were there, that I probably made a remark along the lines that I just can’t believe what I’m hearing, and, you know, I would think if they could hear what we’re hearing, they would probably resign. I mean, I thought the allegation was that serious. But to tell her that— to answer that — and if she’s saying that was my announced purpose of what I had them there for and what we were going to do with the information, my answer would be no.
MR. BLOUNT: You didn’t tell her you were going to take the tapes to him? and play them for them?
A. No. No. What I might have said is, boy, I’d sure like to let them hear these tapes and see what they’ve got to say for themselves, you know, in a fashion such as that.
MR. BLOUNT: In an expression of shock.
MR. CONNAUGHTON: Yeah, Yeah, as I almost fell off of the fireplace. Right.
[MR. BLOUNT] But to get back to the question on the deal about New and Do-lan’s resignation — was it ever your intention, either during this interview or subsequent to it, to use the tapes as an attempt to get New and Dolan to resign?
A. I can only answer this way. After hearing it all, I knew it would be an unrealistic approach, you know, to go down to their office and say do you gentlemen have about an hour, I’d like for you to listen to something, and then say*852ing, oh, well, okay, if you want to accept our resignations, you know, we quit. And you know, that was absolutely impractical and would not apply. I do not deny that during the course of saying a lot of things in total shock and wondering what in the world we were ever going to do with something that was dynamite, I probably said something like yeah, I’d like to go down there and let them hear this and see what they’ve got to say about it, you know.
Q. As far as the resignation though?
A. Well, I probably would have put an add-on and said, you know, Goddamn, after they hear this they ought to just resign and quit, or something, you know, in that kind of a setting and expression.
2. Alleged Promise of Anonymity for the Informants
Q. Did you ever promise Alice Thompson anonymity?
A. That question was discussed, and I was hoping [sic] to her, and I told her it would be my intention and hope that she could remain anonymous, yes. But did I promise her anonymity, the answer would be no. Did we discuss it, we sure did, and I expressed to her my desire as well as her desire that she could remain anonymous.
Q. Do you think that she felt that that was a promise? Did she ever refer to it later, as, you know, well I, you know, I ...
A. I imagine she feels betrayed.
Q. And why would that be?
A. Because she's not anonymous, and she probably felt that my representation, that maybe she could remain anonymous had been a breach of trust to her.
3. Alleged Job Offer
Q. Did you ever talk to Alice about getting a job for her in appreciation for her help with your investigation of New and Dolan?
A. No.
Q. Not a waitress job?
A. No.
Q. Did you promise a Municipal Court job for her sister Patsy Stephens?
A. No.
Q. Did you offer to have “the sisters go on a post election trip to Florida with you and your family to stay in a condominium”?
A. No.
Q. Did you offer to set up Thompson’s parents, the Breedloves, in what is now Walt’s Chambers, which you own and lease?
A. Absolutely not.
Q. Why would she say this to us?
A. What was discussed in an offhanded way, the people who own that bar, who we’re not very pleased with, their lease expires next September. My wife has the idea that she wants to open an ice cream type shop like Graeters, or some such thing as that, and I heard her discussing with them that maybe, since Patty had run this Homette Restaurant or something of that nature, that maybe she would help out and participate in the operation of this — whatever you want to call it — deli shop or gourmet ice cream shop. Yes, and I was present when that took place.
Q. And when was that?
A. Well, I don’t think it was that night. As I recall, this was a later time that we had seen them.
Q. But that would only by for Patty (unclear)?
Q. I guess Alice was there, and the offer may have been extended to her in that fashion, that she could work there or something — I wouldn’t be surprised if that was said.
4.Alleged Promise of a Florida Trip
Q. What about this post-election trip to Florida? Is there any possibility that they were, in an off-hand way, well, you know, you guys want to go, you know, you can go along, or something like that?
MR. BLOUNT: Did you talk about anything like that?
A. Ummm-hmmm. After getting over the initial shock it became a little clearer to me of — kind of how scary this *853thing was with the information they gave to us, as far as, if their personal safety was at stake, and before this ripened into a police matter officially where they might get protection if that would be required, I do remember in an off-handed way it being discussed or some thing that they ought to ... they could go down to Hilton Head or Florida, or something like that, or maybe hide out or something like that, I don’t know. But I own no property and have nothing to offer them....
5. Alleged Promise of Expensive Dinner
Q. One last statement. At lunch Thompson said that you promised to take her and her sister out to a post election victory dinner at the Maisonette.
A. I promised to take them to the Maisonette? Hell, I haven’t been to the Maisonette for years.
MR. BLOUNT: Was it discussed? Was it brought up?
A. It may have been. It may have been. I won't deny that some loose discussion in a kidding way was ...
MR. BLOUNT: Did you compare Bob Evans with the Maisonette?
A. No, we didn’t make those comparisons, but if she said that was discussed, I wouldn't say that she was not telling the truth. If she says that I made a firm statement that we were going to definitely plan a party at the Maisonette, that’s not true.
II.
Plaintiff's responses set forth above confirmed the fact that the subject of jobs, vacations, and dinners, had been discussed with the informants. Likewise, plaintiff admitted that he had expressed his “hope” and his “intention” to protect Ms. Thompson’s anonymity. Plaintiff also admitted that he had discussed the possibility of playing the taped September 17 interview for Judge Dolan. Thus, I believe that the pre-publication interview of the plaintiff conducted by the Journal-News, confirmed the factual basis of Ms. Thompson’s allegations.
It would be difficult if not impossible for the Journal-News to conclusively determine whether Ms. Thompson was justified in construing the plaintiff's statements as “promises.” This is more a question of interpretation than one of fact. I believe that the allegations made by Ms. Thompson (and reported virtually verbatim by the Journal-News) “amounted to the adoption of one of a number of possible rational interpretations of a document [in this case a discussion] that bristled with ambiguities. The deliberate choice of such an interpretation, though arguably reflecting a misconception, was not enough to create a jury issue of ‘malice’ under New York Times. ” Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 290, 91 S.Ct. 633, 639, 28 L.Ed.2d 45 (1971).
It should also be noted that the Journal-News reported plaintiff’s contention that Ms. Thompson had misinterpreted his statements. Moreover, plaintiff’s position was set forth in the fifth sentence of the article, thereby alerting readers to the conflicting viewpoints. The article also revealed that plaintiff's supporters who had attended the September 17 meeting stated that plaintiff had not made any “direct offers” to the informants. Basically, the article presented two versions of a discussion which admittedly took place and allowed the readers to draw their own conclusions as to which version was more accurate.
The majority opinion discounts the statements made by the plaintiff during the course of his pre-publication interview with the Journal-News. At one point the majority states, “Connaughton’s answers to these questions are a matter of record and, when read in context, do not support the Journal-News ’ conclusions that he admitted to any of the Thompson charges which he had unequivocally denied during the early stages of the interview.” At 836. It is precisely because Connaughton’s statements “are a matter of record” that this court is obliged to consider them in determining whether the judgment against the Journal-News is contrary to the first amendment. See, e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285, 84 S.Ct. 710, 728, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964) (an appellate *854court “must make an independent examination of the whole record, so as to [insure] that the judgment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression.”) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
Elsewhere in its opinion, the majority states:
Moreover, the jury obviously refused to credit the Journal’s construction of Connaughton’s interview of October 31. It accepted Connaughton’s express denials of each Thompson charge and considered the significant language interpreted by the Journal to constitute his admissions of those charges, when read in context, as nothing more than conjecture elicited by structured questions calculated to evoke speculation. Thus, upon reviewing the record in its entirety, this court concludes that the jury’s determinations of the operational facts bearing upon the falsity of the article in issue were not clearly erroneous.
At 841.3
I cannot join in the cavalier manner in which the majority dismisses these undisputed factual statements made by the plaintiff. Admittedly, plaintiff initially denied the general allegations made by Ms. Thompson; however, he then promptly contradicted himself by admitting that each of these matters had been discussed. I have quoted extensively from the transcript of plaintiff’s interview in order to show that his statements were not taken out of context, nor can they be construed as mere “speculation.” Rather, they provided ample basis for the Journal-News to conclude that Ms. Thompson’s allegations were substantially true. Plaintiff did not deny the fact that such discussions had taken place; he merely suggested that Ms. Thompson had “misinterpreted” his comments. This is the way in which it was reported in the November article. Given these undisputed facts, I cannot agree with the majority’s conclusion that the Journal-News printed Ms. Thompson’s allegations with a “high degree of awareness of ... probable falsity.” See St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731, 88 S.Ct. 1323, 1325, 20 L.Ed.2d 262 (1968) (citations omitted).
III.
A substantial portion of the majority opinion is devoted to the analysis of the proper standard of appellate review of a finding of “actual malice.” Specifically, the majority has attempted to resolve the conflict which it perceives is created by the Supreme Court’s opinion in Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 104 S.Ct. 1949, 80 L.Ed.2d 502 (1984), wherein the Court squarely held:
We hold that the clearly-erroneous standard of Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure does not prescribe the standard of review to be applied in reviewing a determination of actual malice in a case governed by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. Appellate judges in such a case must exercise independent judgment and determine whether the record establishes actual malice with convincing clarity.
Id. at 514, 104 S.Ct. at 1967. The majority found that a broad reading of the Court's holding in Bose would conflict with the mandate of Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a) which dictates that “findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous.... ” The majority also expressed the opinion that if an appellate court engaged in de novo review of factual findings, it would “impinge” on a plaintiff’s constitutional right to a jury trial as guaranteed by the seventh amendment. Therefore, the majority has attempted to reconcile this conflict by stating:
Logic and reason dictate that the Bose directed de novo review did not apply to preliminary, operative, or subsidiary fac*855tual determinations anchored in credibility determinations but rather was limited to a review of the ultimate conclusion of clear and convincing proof of actual malice.
At 842.
Admittedly, the majority opinion in Bose is somewhat confusing; nevertheless, I do not believe that a fair reading of that opinion can support the extremely narrow construction which it is given by the majority.4 Therefore, since Bose cannot be distinguished on its facts, I believe this court is bound by the Supreme Court’s pronouncements in that case regardless of whether we agree or disagree with the Supreme Court’s method of analysis.
Moreover, I do not believe that this case requires us to determine whether or not the de novo review standard announced in Bose extends to determinations of credibility made by a jury. It is undisputed that the plaintiff made the statements from which quoted in Part I of my dissent. Given these statements, I would find, as a matter of law, that plaintiff failed to prove actual malice by clear and convincing evidence. Therefore, I would refrain from attempting to resolve the admittedly difficult issues posed by the Bose opinion since it is not necessary to the resolution of the instant case. The Sixth Circuit has not yet had occasion to rule on these issues and I would prefer to wait for a case in which they are squarely presented.
Even if I were to agree that this court should adopt the circumscribed reading of Bose proposed by the majority in the instant case, I still could not concur in its judgment. The majority sets forth eleven “subsidiary or operative facts” which the jury could have found from the evidence presented at trial. At 843. The majority infers these conclusions from the jury’s finding of actual malice” in the general verdict. Under the majority’s interpretation of the proper standard of appellate review, we are bound to accept these inferred conclusions as true unless they are “clearly erroneous.”
These eleven conclusions can be summarized in five general categories: (1) the Journal-News had a motive to publish sensational falsehoods about the plaintiff because it supported his opponent in the upcoming election and because it hoped that such stories would boost its circulation; (2) Ms. Thompson was an unreliable source given her emotional instability; (3) Other witnesses present at the meetings between Thompson and Connaughton discredited her accusations; (4) The Journal-News “intentionally” avoided interviewing a key witness; and (5) the Journal-News printed Ms. Thompson’s allegations with the knowledge that plaintiff would be harmed “personally, professionally, and politically.” The majority found that these possible conclusions were not clearly erroneous and therefore must be taken as true. Purporting to apply a de novo review of the “ultimate fact,” i.e., actual malice, the majority concluded that given the existence of these “subsidiary facts” the plaintiff had demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that the Journal-News had published Ms. Thompson’s allegations despite serious doubt as to their truth. At 844.
Even if these speculative “subsidiary” factual findings were the only evidence before this court, I would be hesitant to agree that they constitute “clear and convincing evidence” of a reckless disregard of the truth.
First, with respect to the “finding” that the editorial staff sought to defeat plaintiff’s campaign by discrediting him, this alone does not support a finding of actual malice. See, e.g., Old Dominion Branch *856No. 496 v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 281-82, 94 S.Ct. 2770, 2779-80, 41 L.Ed.2d 745 (“[I]ll will toward the plaintiff, or bad motives, are not elements of the New York Times standard.”) (citations omitted). Admittedly, the existence of a subjective dislike may be relevant to the issue of motive; however, the plaintiff must show more than an “intent to inflict harm”; he must show an “intent to inflict harm through falsehood.” Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356, 357, 85 S.Ct. 992, 993, 13 L.Ed.2d 892 (1965). The phrase “actual malice” is a legal term of art which is defined as the publication of a statement “with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.” New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80, 84 S.Ct. at 726. It seems to me that the majority may have equated the term “actual malice” with “animosity” or “antipathy” rather than its technical legal definition. Nor is the “fact” that the Jounral-News sought to increase its circulation conclusive evidence of “actual malice.” Once again, this only relates to motive and is not particularly probative, since I presume that all newspapers seek to increase their market share by publishing newsworthy stories.
Second, despite Ms. Thompson’s history of personal problems, her allegations were not inherently unbelieveable and were entirely plausible in light of the preceding events which were known to the editors and reporters of the Journal-News. Nor is the fact that her allegations were “contradicted” by several other witnesses necessarily determinative. These witnesses were avowed supporters of the plaintiff and the fact that none of them claimed to have heard plaintiff make any offers does not disprove Thompson’s allegations since she claimed that at least some of the “promises” were made privately off the record.
Third, the majority relies heavily on the “subsidiary” fact that the Journal-News “intentionally” failed to interview a key witness, Patsy Stephens, Ms. Thompson’s co-informant who could have confirmed or discredited Thompson’s allegations. It is well established, however, that the failure to investigate does not in itself establish actual malice. St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 733, 88 S.Ct. at 1326. In Schultz v. Newsweek, 668 F.2d 911 (6th Cir.1982), this court stated that “unless there is a showing of actual doubt concerning the truth of the statements, mere evidence of incomplete investigation is insufficient to show actual malice.” 668 F.2d at 918. Furthermore, as noted by the majority, the Journal-News assigned “eight or nine” reporters to investigate Thompson’s allegations. Even if the reporters were unable to substantiate her story, this is hardly indicative of a complete departure from the fundamental standards of investigative reporting.
Finally, and most importantly, the majority neglects to mention the one undisputed “subsidiary fact” which has the most relevance to the “ultimate fact” of actual malice, i.e., plaintiff’s own statements. The fundamental issue in this case is whether the Journal-News knew or should have known that Ms. Thompson was lying when she said that the plaintiff had offered her a job, a trip, and an expensive dinner “in appreciation” for her cooperation and that he had promised to protect her anonymity and that he had threatened to confront Judge Dolan with Thompson’s accusations. The factual basis of each one of these allegations was at least partially substantiated by the plaintiff himself. The record shows that the Journal-News did not decide to publish Ms. Thompson’s allegations until after plaintiff had confirmed that the discussions had taken place. I emphasize that plaintiff has never denied making these statements which appear in the transcript of his pre-publication interview. Even if the eleven subsidiary factual conclusions inferred by the majority are given the most damaging interpretation, they still cannot support a finding of reckless disregard of the truth in light of the plaintiff’s own uncontroverted admissions.
IV.
As a final note, I find it necessary to briefly address plaintiff’s contention that he was defamed by the portion of the article which contained Thompson’s allegation that plaintiff had used “dirty tricks” to *857obtain her cooperation as an informant. I discuss this issue separately because I find that the references to “dirty tricks” are constitutionally protected expressions of opinion.
It is well established that “there is no such thing as a false idea. However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries, but on the competition of other ideas.” Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 3007, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (footnote omitted). It is a question of law as to whether an allegedly defamatory statement constitutes an expression of opinion or a statement of fact. Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 978 (D.C.Cir.1984) (en banc), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127, 105 S.Ct. 2662, 86 L.Ed.2d 278 (1985).
The phrase “dirty tricks” appears twice in the article:
Thompson said she believes Dan Con-naughton, a candidate for municipal judge, used “dirty tricks” in obtaining her cooperation with his personal investigation of New.
Thompson said her reasons for wanting to talk to the Journal-News were:
. 1. To let people know that she did not snitch on New.
. 2. To reveal the “dirty tricks” Con-naughton pulled to get her to make a statement.
She said two other things bothered her about Connaughton’s actions: (1) he did not protect her anonymity as promised and (2) he allowed other people to hear tapes of a session with Connaughton and other supporters about what happened with New during Thompson’s recent appearance in Hamilton Municipal Court.
I believe that the phrase “dirty tricks” is a conclusory phrase which does not lend itself to precise definition. The accuracy of this statement cannot be verified by any objective criteria. The language of the article which states “Thompson said she believes” clearly indicates that it was Thompson’s personal subjective opinion that she had been the victim of “dirty tricks.” Moreover, the article also set forth Thompson’s allegations which provided the basis for her belief, i.e., that plaintiff had promised her anonymity and that he had broken that promise. The article also presented the plaintiff’s position that Ms. Thompson had misinterpreted his comments. Thus, the readers were able to decide for themselves as to whether or not the plaintiff’s actions constituted “dirty tricks.”
In sum, I find that Ms. Thompson’s characterization of the plaintiff’s actions as “dirty tricks” is an expression of opinion which is protected speech under the first amendment. Therefore, the Journal-News should not be held liable for the publication of that opinion.5
For the foregoing reasons, I dissent.
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. There is one further omission which is not directly relevant to the disposition of this appeal but, nevertheless, bears mentioning. In all fairness to Judge Dolan, it should be noted that he was cleared by a grand jury of any wrongdoing in connection with the indictment and conviction of his court administrator.
. A copy of the entire article appears in an appendix attached to this dissent.
. Because I believe that plaintiff has utterly failed to prove actual malice by clear and convincing evidence, I find it unnecessary to analyze whether he proved the requisite elements of falsity and defamation by a preponderance of the evidence. I find it ironic, however, that in order to find the allegations contained in the article were false, the jury would not only have to discredit Ms. Thompson's testimony, but also discredit some of the statements made by the plaintiff himself when he admitted that the subjects had been discussed.
. The Supreme Court’s decision in Bose has generated a great deal of controversy in academic circles and has spawned several law review articles, most of which are critical of the Court’s reasoning. See, e.g., Bezanson, Fault, Falsity and Reputation in Public Defamation Law: An Essay on Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 8 Hamline L.Rev. (1985); Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 Colum.L.Rev. 229 (1985); Note, The Failure of Libel Law and Independent Appellate Review: Making Sense of Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 71 Cornell L.Rev. 477 (1986); Comment, The Expanding Scope of Appellate Review in Libel Cases— The Supreme Court Abandons the Clearly Erroneous Standard of Review for Findings of Actual Malice, 36 Mercer L.Rev. 711 (1985).
. The majority cites several Second Circuit cases and a Ninth Circuit case for the general proposition that "opinions based on false fact are actionable ... against a defendant who had knowledge of the falsity or probable falsity of the underlying facts.” Maj. op. at 847 (citations omitted). Based on my conclusions in Part I of my dissent, I believe that the inverse of this rule is applicable in the instant case; i.e., if the underlying facts are substantially correct, then the newspaper cannot constitutionally be held liable for expressing an opinion with regard to those facts. See Orr v. Argus-Press Co., 586 F.2d 1108, 1115 (6th Cir.1978).