dissenting:
A congressional focus as narrow as that indicated by the Hollings Amendment1 naturally arouses suspicions, about its legal propriety and counsels a reviewing court to examine it closely. Nonetheless, under our constitutional scheme, the Amendment is entitled to even-handed testing under the standard of review appropriate.2 My colleagues, purporting to subject the Amendment to a level of scrutiny characterized as something more than minimum rationality,3 strike the law down.4 I believe, however, that if that standard were properly applied, the Amendment would stand.
I
In evaluating the enactment at issue, we must assess the Government’s interest in the legislation and ascertain the extent to which the means chosen advance that interest.5 We cannot hold a federal statute unconstitutional merely because Congress could have done better; our role is to determine only whether Congress did well enough.
The Commission adopted the newspaper-broadcast cross-ownership rules6 in 1975.7 By limiting common ownership of broadcast facilities and daily newspapers in the same community, the Commission sought to promote diversity of program and service viewpoints, a policy grounded primarily in the First Amendment.8 Over time the Commission’s position on the rule has shifted, and there have been indications that the Commission may favor revision or outright repeal of the rule.9 In November, 1987, the Freedom of Expression Foundation petitioned the Commission for rulemaking to eliminate the newspaper-broadcast cross-ownership rule, and the Commission put the petition out for public comment.10
On December 22, 1987, Congress enacted a continuing resolution appropriating funds *817for operation of the Federal Government during fiscal year 1988.11 One portion of the resolution, referred to as the Hollings Amendment, spoke to the cross-ownership rule through a proviso
that none of the funds appropriated by this Act or any other Act may be used to repeal, to retroactively apply changes in, or to begin or continue a reexamination of the rules of the Federal Communications Commission with respect to the common ownership of a daily newspaper and a television station where the grade A contour of the television station encompasses the entire community in which the newspaper is published, or to extend the time period of current grants of temporary waivers to achieve compliance with such rules.12
The Hollings Amendment reflected the reaction of Congress to what it perceived as the threatened erosion, if not eradication, of the newspaper-broadcast cross-ownership rule.13 The case at bar involves only the last clause of the Amendment, which forbids the Commission from granting extensions of temporary waivers that were in effect when the continuing resolution was passed. Congress recognized the distinct possibility that through indefinite or successive extensions of a temporary waiver, the Commission could grant the equivalent of a permanent waiver without any showing that the heavy burden of justifying such a waiver had been met.14 The final clause of the Amendment affects a class of only one because News America Publishing, Inc. (News America), the appellant, was the only entity holding temporary waivers on the effective date of the legislation.15
II
In analyzing the congressional purpose in enacting the Hollings Amendment, the First Amendment considerations underpinning the cross-ownership rule cannot be ignored. In FCC v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting (NCCB),16 the Supreme Court upheld the rule against a facial attack, declaring that the First Amendment is served by achieving “ ‘the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources.’ ” 17 “[F]ar from seeking to limit the flow of information,” the Court explained, “the Commission has acted ... ‘to enhance the diversity of information heard by the public without on-going government *818surveillance of the content of speech’ 18 the cross-ownership rule thus was “designed to further, rather than contravene, ‘the system of freedom of expression.’ ” 19 Consequently, when Congress’s purpose in enacting the Hollings Amendment is assessed, it must be acknowledged that preservation of the cross-ownership rule will promote First Amendment values. And it goes without saying that this factor adds substantial weight to the governmental interest in this legislation.
Furthermore, the congressional endeavor over time to maintain the integrity of the cross-ownership rules has been intense, as has been its concern about abuse of the waiver process. Hearings in July, 1985, before the House Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection and Finance explored, among other things, the Commission’s policy on waivers of those rules.20 The Subcommittee’s effort to ascertain the rigor with which the Commission would evaluate applications therefor drew a response by the Commission’s chairman that only a “compelling case” would justify a waiver.21 In November of 1985, however, the Subcommittee found it necessary to admonish the Commission’s chairman to live up to his earlier representations by tightening the standards for granting temporary waivers.22 The Subcommittee reemphasized its position: “As you are well aware, we firmly believe that the cross-ownership rules are vitally important in protecting competition and diversity in the marketplace of ideas and that waivers to those rules should be viewed as an extraordinary, not an ordinary, action.”23
*819Later that year, the subject was again addressed, this time in the Conference Report on the continuing resolution funding governmental operations for fiscal year 1986:
The conferees are concerned with Commission enforcement of the local cross-ownership rules particularly in light of the number of recent waiver requests to these rules the Commission has considered. The Commission’s purpose in granting any waiver to the cross-ownership rules should be to further the public interest; furtherance of the private interest of any applicant or licensee must be subservient to this purpose.
The conferees expect the Commission to review such requests with great scrutiny and not grant a waiver unless the applicant meets the burden of clearly demonstrating why such a waiver should be granted. Any temporary waiver granted should be limited in duration to the minimum amount of time necessary.24
Congress thus had a well documented interest in preserving the cross-ownership rules and in ensuring appropriately limited use of the waiver process. But when, at the close of 1987, Congress took up the continuing resolution for fiscal year 1988, that interest was threatened. Pending at the Commission was a petition for rulemak-ing seeking revision or repeal of the rule. There was evidence that the Commission no longer supported the rule.25 There was ground, too, for apprehension that the Commission would grant unjustifiably a waiver extension to News America, thereby circumventing the rule.26
Ill
Congress enacted the Hollings Amendment to forestall evisceration of the cross-*820ownership rule. To effect this purpose, one of the means chosen, among others, was to bar the Commission from extending the duration of extant temporary waivers. My colleagues do not characterize the congressional goal as inappropriate or insubstantial, as well they should not. Rather, they fault the Amendment because, they claim, the method used “bears only the most strained relationship” to the asserted purpose.27
I am unable to agree. If the aim is to preserve the cross-ownership rule, and waiver extensions endanger the rule, then a prohibition on extensions of waivers — albeit only current ones — does serve the purpose. Far from being “strained,” the relationship between means and end is decidedly strong. There cannot be any doubt that the fit between purpose and method in this case is more than close enough to satisfy a test of minimum rationality. The question then becomes whether the means-end relationship is sufficient to satisfy the slightly higher standard of review applicable here— something more than minimum rationality.
I agree with my colleagues that in ascertaining the standard of review to apply, “we need not go as far as the Supreme Court in FCC v. League of Women Voters." 28 My view, however, does not accord with my colleagues’ statement that this case “is far closer to the law invalidated in League of Women Voters than to the regulation sustained in NCCB.”29 League of Women Voters featured a challenge to Section 399 of the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967,30 which forbade any noncommercial educational station receiving a grant from the Corporation for Public Broadcasting to “engage in editorializing.”31 The Court emphasized, in determining the proper standard of review, that “Section 399 plainly operates to restrict the expression of editorial opinion on matters of public importance, and, as we have repeatedly explained, communication of this kind is entitled to the most exacting degree of First Amendment protection.”32 Because League of .Women Voters arose in the broadcast context, where “strict scrutiny” review is inappropriate,33 the Court required the legislation to be “narrowly tailored to serve a substantial governmental interest.”34 The case at bar is significantly distinct. Congress has blocked News America’s access to the Commission only for the purpose of requesting an extension of the waiver it presently enjoys. That is a far cry from the content-focused restriction involved in League of Women Voters, which outlawed a particular type of highly valued speech.35 The League of *821Women Voters standard of review is unsuitable here.
Despite a claim to the contrary,36 it appears to me that my colleagues have, in essence, used a standard equivalent to that applied in League of Women Voters. I think it inappropriate to focus solely on alternatives that Congress conceivably could have chosen rather than analyze the adequacy of what Congress actually did. Our task as judges is simply to look for something more than a rational relationship between the Government’s purpose and the means employed to achieve it. If the method is substantially related to the Government’s interest — a somewhat higher level of inquiry than mere rational relationship — the legislation should survive. A substantial relationship does exist in this case, and an examination of the majority’s objections to the Hollings Amendment makes that clear.
IV
My colleagues hold the Amendment unconstitutional because they find it underin-clusive in two respects. First, they fault the enactment because it proscribes grants of waiver extensions to News America, the only holder of “current” waivers,37 but “not to any other party that might receive a temporary waiver and seek an extension during the fiscal year.”38 In other words, “[i]f News America sold its Boston station to the Boston Globe today, the new owner could seek a temporary waiver and extension,” whereas News America could not.39 Although that is literally true, as a practical matter it ignores reality. In the past, initial waivers bestowed by the Commission have ranged from eighteen months to three years,40 and no requests for initial waivers are now pending;41 consequently, any hypothetical extension request is a long way off. Not only do these “future” waivers present no immediate threat, but Congress is free to anticipate a permanent solution before they ever would.42 To be sure, Congress could have brought future waivers within the purview of the Amendment, but that is not to say that its failure to do so renders this enactment unconstitutional. Rather, Congress may deal with immediate threats as they arise.43
Second, my colleagues find the Amendment underinclusive because it “applies only to extensions of temporary waivers, not to the granting of temporary waivers themselves.”44 Put another way, theoretically an unextended temporary waiver could endure longer than a temporary waiver that has been extended. This argument strikes me as even more curious than the first. The suggestion is that Congress could either have forbidden all temporary waivers or limited the aggregate duration of waivers plus extensions.45 That reasoning, it seems to me, misses the point, for it is not the length of the waiver alone that subverts the cross-ownership rule. Rather, the larger problem is the potential conversion of something temporary into something perpetual without meeting the higher standards for permanent waivers.46
*822A ban on all temporary waivers likely would raise more problems than it would solve and, more importantly, it would not address the kind of circumvention of the rule with which Congress was concerned. Moreover, because the necessity of a waiver and the length appropriate will vary from case to case, a ceiling on the aggregate duration of waivers plus extensions may not have been a prudent alternative. Temporary waivers are intended to provide a reasonable opportunity for orderly divestiture of the newspaper or the broadcast property.47 Congress could logically conclude that one waiver of specified duration would be sufficient to achieve that goal,48 and that extensions of waivers could undermine that purpose, for example, by giving owners an incentive to postpone or avoid divestiture in order to become eligible for an extension when the original waiver expired.
Because of News America’s unique status as the only holder of a current waiver, it was the only entity affected by the Holl-ings Amendment. There is no content discrimination here.49 And, although it may be easy to hypothesize other means by which Congress could have sought to achieve its objectives, the existence of alternatives does not necessarily render the chosen method unconstitutional. When the standard of review to be applied is strict scrutiny, courts have a tendency, appropriate in such cases, to define the Government’s interest very precisely and narrowly. Because the countervailing interest is of such extreme importance, courts expect exactitude and compelling justification from the legislature, and give it little if any benefit of the doubt. But the test purportedly applied in this case is not even an “intermediate” standard of review; it simply is something more than minimum rationality. Courts must take care to ensure *823that they do not in effect engage in strict or intermediate scrutiny when the applicable standard of review demands less.50
V
In my view, Congress pursued a wholly legitimate purpose when it acted to protect the cross-ownership rule from circumvention or erosion. Because of the First Amendment foundation that underlies the rule, the congressional action at issue here was designed to promote constitutional values. By forbidding the Commission from extending current grants of temporary waivers, Congress selected a method that was more than adequately related to the purpose it sought to achieve. Because I believe this enactment withstands constitutional scrutiny, I respectfully dissent.
. Pub.L. No. 100-202, 101 Stat. 1329 (1987).
. See City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 96 S.Ct. 2513, 49 L.Ed.2d 511 (1976); Daniel v. Family Sec. Life Ins. Co., 336 U.S. 220, 225 n. 5, 69 S.Ct. 550, 553 n. 5, 93 L.Ed. 632, 637 n. 5 (1949); Fort Smith Light & Traction Co. v. Board of Improvement, 274 U.S. 387, 391, 47 S.Ct. 595, 597, 71 L.Ed. 1112, 115 (1927); see also Maine Cent. R.R. v. Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees, 813 F.2d 484 (1st Cir.1987) (legislative classification that encompasses only one specific entity is not necessarily irrational or unconstitutional). In Nixon v. Administrator, 433 U.S. 425, 97 S.Ct. 2777, 53 L.Ed.2d 867 (1977), the Supreme Court noted that an equal protection challenge likely would have failed although the legislation there addressed could affect only one person, who was specifically named. "[M]ere underinclusiveness,” the Court said, “is not fatal to the validity of a law under the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment ... even if the law disadvantages an individual or identifiable members of a group.” Id. at 471 n. 33, 97 S.Ct. at 2804 n. 33, 53 L.Ed.2d at 908 n. 33 (citations omitted).
. Majority Opinion (Maj.Op.) at 802, 814.
. Id. at 815.
. This is true whether the correct standard is existence of a rational basis, see, e.g., Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 508 n. 14, 96 S.Ct. 2755, 2763 n. 14, 49 L.Ed.2d 651, 662 n. 14 (1976), or the higher standard applied in FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 380, 104 S.Ct. 3106, 3118, 82 L.Ed.2d 278, 292 (1984).
. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(c) (1987).
. See Second Report & Order, 50 F.C.C.2d 1046 (1975).
. Id. at 1048-1049; see notes 16-19 infra and accompanying text.
. In fact, the Commission's brief in this court states:
This is not to say that, in the Commission’s view, continuing the ban on newspaper/television cross-ownership for another year is necessarily good public policy. Indeed, had Congress not provided otherwise, the Commission might have concluded that the present rule against newspaper/television cross-ownership should have been reviewed to determine whether it continued to serve the public interest.
Brief for Appellee at 16; see note 25 infra.
. Public Notice Rep. No. 1695 (Nov. 30, 1987).
. Pub.L. No. 100-202, 101 Stat. 1329 (1987).
. Making Further Continuing Appropriations for the Fiscal Year Ending September' 30, 1988, H.R.Rep. No. 498, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1987) (emphasis added).
. See 134 Cong.Rec. S63 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1988) (statement of Sen. Hollings) (proviso serves to ensure that the rule will not be evaded by successive grants of temporary waivers); Id. at S59 (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (proviso designed to preserve cross-ownership rule against attempts to obtain permanent exemption in guise of series of temporary waivers). In identifying the underlying purpose of the Amendment, the statements of Senator Holl-ings, sponsor of the Amendment, and Senator Kennedy, who provided primary impetus for it, must be given weight, particularly in the absence of a more complete legislative history. See, e.g., Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 63, 100 S.Ct. 915, 919, 63 L.Ed.2d 198, 207-208 (1980) ("[¡Inasmuch as Senator Long was the sponsor and floor manager of the bill, his statements are entitled to weight”); Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6, 13, 98 S.Ct. 909, 913, 55 L.Ed.2d 70, 77 (1978) ("[a]lthough [a Congressman’s] remarks are of course not dispositive of the issue of [the statute’s] reach, they are certainly entitled to weight, coming as they do from the provision’s sponsor”). Furthermore, these statements comport with the legislative purpose posited by the Commission. See Brief for Appellee at 30-31.
. See note 13 supra; see also Brief for Appellee at 30-31. According to the Commission, "it is clear that the burden of showing that a permanent waiver is warranted is extremely high— and considerably higher than that for a temporary waiver." Id. at 27; see Health & Medicine Policy Research Group v. FCC, 257 U.S.App.D.C. 123, 127-128, 807 F.2d 1038, 1042-1043 (1986).
. See Brief for Appellee at 13.
. 436 U.S. 775, 98 S.Ct. 2096, 56 L.Ed.2d 697 (1978).
. Id. at 799, 98 S.Ct. at 2114, 56 L.Ed.2d at 716 (quoting Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20, 65 S.Ct. 1416, 1424-1425, 89 L.Ed. 2013, 2030 (1945)).
. NCCB, supra note 16, 436 U.S. at 801-802, 98 S.Ct. at 2115, 56 L.Ed.2d at 718 (quoting National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 181 U.S.App.D.C. 1, 17, 555 F.2d 938, 954 (1977)).
. NCCB, supra note 16, 436 U.S. at 802, 98 S.Ct. at 2115-2116, 56 L.Ed.2d at 719 (quoting T. Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression 663 (1970)). One of the premises of the decision in NCCB was that broadcast regulation is justified at least in part by spectrum scarcity. 436 U.S. at 799, 98 S.Ct. at 2114, 56 L.Ed.2d at 716-717. Although this rationale has been criticized because of changes in television technology, the Supreme Court has refused to abandon it absent guidance from Congress or the Commission. FCC v. League of Women Voters, supra note 5, 468 U.S. at 376-377 n. 11, 104 S.Ct. at 3115 n. 11, 82 L.Ed.2d at 289 n. 11.
. Media Mergers and Takeovers: the FCC and the Public Interest, Hearings Before the Sub-comm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection and Finance of the House Comm, on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985), reprinted in part in 134 Cong.Rec. S65 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1988).
. MR. FOWLER. I think generally we ought not to grant waivers unless a compelling case is shown which demonstrates that a waiver would either not disserve the purpose of the rule and would serve other important public policy goals or that it would serve the purpose of that rule by having granted a waiver. I am generally, though, however, against a policy of liberally granting waivers for two reasons: one, I think it is very poor administrative law; and two, once you do that, I think it is difficult to justify not having to grant other waivers in similar circumstances.
******
MR. WIRTH. It seems to me that there is an important consideration here in terms of again the standards and criteria that you are using on this front. And it is my concern— and you and I have talked about this in the past — that we underline, underscore, and emphasize to people the importance of concentration and cross-ownership, which is the thrust of what I am getting at. And I would hope that you all, in looking at this, make very clear to the applicants our mutual concern about this and the fact that this is not something that is going to go away. It is not going to disappear as some think it may, and that this is an important concern, and to be as strong and clear about that as possible.
MR. FOWLER. We totally agree, Mr. Chairman.
Id.
. Letter from House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection and Finance of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, to Mark S. Fowler (Nov. 13, 1985), reprinted in 134 Cong.Rec. S65 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1988).
. Id. The Subcommittee's letter further stated:
While temporary waivers may be justified in cases where clear public policy justifications exist, we are very disturbed by the Commission’s apparent attitude that temporary waivers are justified solely upon mere allegations that possible financial hardship or distress sales would result if property cannot be disposed of in what has been termed an "orderly” fashion. Clearly, this attitude is nothing more than an open invitation for parties to seek temporary waivers with an expectation that they be routinely, if not automatically, granted.
*819******
By your own words [in previous subcommittee testimony], an applicant who seeks a temporary waiver must carry the burden of presenting a compelling case which demonstrates all of the facts that would justify such a waiver, "[a]nd if they do not make that case, they will not be granted any kind of a waiver.”
It is one thing for a regulatory agency created by Congress to disagree with the Congress over the direction of policy, as you have done on a number of previous occasions. It is quite another for you to come before the Congressional committee responsible for overseeing your agency and make commitments as to how you will exercise your responsibility under the Communications Act and then not give [sic] up to those commitments either in letter or spirit.
Id.
. H.R.Rep. No. 453, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 433 (1985), reprinted in 134 Cong.Rec. S57 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1988).
. See note 9 supra and accompanying text. Senator Hollings’ statements on the floor of Congress indicate apprehension regarding the Commission’s position on the rule. It “has been open season over there," he said, “in getting rid of nearly any kind of rule and regulation." 134 Cong.Rec. S56 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1988). Regarding the deregulatory tendencies of the Commission, the Senator stated that "we have, time and again, set forth admonitions and the FCC has in turn done exactly the opposite." Id. "I am trying to catch a runaway Federal Communications Commission. They have been the ones who have been edging to not just another waiver but permanent repeal.” Id. at S57.
.News America’s petition for an extension of its waiver rested primarily on pendency of the petition for new rulemaking on cross-ownership. See Petition of News America Publishing, Incorporated, for Extension of Waiver, Joint Appendix A 1. News America requested an extension until the expiration of six months following the Commission’s action on that petition. Id. The debate over repeal of the Hollings Amendment reveals that Congress may have believed that the Commission was inclined to treat News America more favorably than other applicants. Senator Hollings noted a statement made by the outgoing chairman of the Commission at his retirement party: "The greatest gift I gave to anybody as Chairman of the FCC was an 18-month waiver to Rupert Murdoch.” 134 Cong.Rec. S58 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1988). Senator Hollings commented, “and everybody clapped and said ‘Whoopee.’ That is the way we are doing business — cash and carry downtown at the Federal Communications Commission.” Id. Senator Kennedy stated that "Mr. Murdoch is one of the most powerful publishers in the world, and he has been using those powers to ignore the will of Congress, subvert the FCC, and evade the cross-ownershaip rule.” Id. at S59. Senator Kennedy declared that "we have also learned the hard way to be skeptical about whether the FCC is willing to stand up to him and apply the same rules to him that it applies to everyone else,” id. at S60, and that ”[t]he agency had been captured lock, stock, and barrel by Rupert Murdoch, and it was long past time for Congress to step in," id. at S61.
. Maj.Op. at 814.
. Id. at 814; see FCC v. League of Women Voters, supra note 5, 468 U.S. at 380, 104 S.Ct. at 3118, 82 L.Ed.2d at 292.
. Maj.Op. at 812-813.
. 47 U.S.C. §§ 390-399 (1982 & Supp.III 1985).
. Id. § 399.
. 468 U.S. at 375-376, 104 S.Ct. at 3115, 82 L.Ed.2d at 289 (emphasis added).
. Id. at 376, 104 S.Ct. at 3115, 82 L.Ed.2d at 289.
. Id. at 380, 104 S.Ct. at 3118, 82 L.Ed.2d at 292.
. Similarly, I believe we are at some distance from the scenario in Community-Service Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 192 U.S.App.D.C. 448, 593 F.2d 1102 (en banc 1978). The provision there in controversy required all noncommercial educational stations receiving federal funding to make audio recordings of all broadcasts "in which any issue of public importance is discussed," and to provide a copy upon request to any member of the Commission or the public. See Pub.L. No. 93-84, § 2, 87 Stat. 219 (1973). We deemed this command an obstacle to free expression. First, it was not on its face content neutral, 192 U.S.App.D.C. at 457, 593 F.2d at 1111; indeed, the fact that it regulated only programming concerning issues of public importance indicated "a government purpose intentionally and impermissibly to restrict free speech on the basis of its content," id. at 458, 593 F.2d at 1112. Additionally, we found that the legislative history supported the conclusion “that the purpose of the recording requirement was related to suppression of free expression on issues of public importance.” Id. As Judge Bazelon noted in his concurring opinion, the statute "not only ‘touches upon’ fundamental First Amendment freedoms, but does so by classifications formulated explicitly in terms of the content of speech.” Id. at 470, 593 F.2d at 1124. Therefore, while heightened scrutiny may have been appropriate in Community-Service, the restriction presented in the case before us is unaccompanied by any similar need for that stan*821dard of review. There is no content discrimination here. There is only an attempt by Congress to force compliance with a structural rule it considers of great importance. Accordingly, there is no basis for equating this case with Community-Service.
. Maj.Op. at 813-814.
. See id. at 805.
. Id. at 814 (emphasis added).
. Id.
. Brief for Appellee at 34 n. 19.
. Id. at 32 n. 16.
. See Maj.Op. at 814; Brief for Appellee at 34-35.
. E.g., Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 813, 96 S.Ct. 2488, 2499, 49 L.Ed.2d 220, 233 (1976); Katzenbach v. Morgan. 384 U.S. 641, 657, 86 S.Ct. 1717, 1727, 16 L.Ed.2d 828, 839 (1966); Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 488-489, 75 S.Ct. 461, 465, 99 L.Ed. 563, 573 (1955).
. Maj.Op. at 814.
. Id.
. See note 14 supra. Furthermore, any single waiver of fixed duration, by its nature, will not extend indefinitely. Surely it would be difficult *822for the Commission in good faith to grant a “temporary” waiver of any duration that could be considered permanent.
. See, e.g., Health & Medicine Policy Research Group v. FCC, supra note 14, 257 U.S.App.D.C. at 127-128, 807 F.2d at 1042-1043; Second Report & Order, supra note 7, at 1047, 1085.
. At the time the rules were adopted, the Commission stated, "we do not contemplate permanent waiverfs], for problems in disposing of these interests would not be expected to endure indefinitely.” Second Report <& Order, supra note 7, at 1084 n. 46.
. As my colleagues acknowledge, their lengthy recitation of the debate on the suggested repeal of the Hollings Amendment serves merely to discern the intended meaning of the statutory language. Maj.Op. at 810 & n. 12. That discussion gives no basis for imputing an improper motive to Congress; in fact, it does quite the opposite. There is no evidence during the debate that Congress was endeavoring to censor Murdoch because of his views, as distinguished from his tactical approach to an extension. Rather, Congress was merely trying to ensure compliance with a rule it prized highly, a perfectly legitimate motive and concern. The sole question for decision is whether the means Congress used to address that concern falls within constitutional parameters.
Furthermore, I take issue with the majority’s characterization of the Supreme Court’s reexamination of Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 56 S.Ct. 444, 80 L.Ed. 660 (1936), as set forth in Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Commissioner, 460 U.S. 575, 579-580, 103 S.Ct. 1365, 1368-1369, 75 L.Ed.2d 295, 301 (1983). See Maj.Op. at 809 (“[tjhe Supreme Court has recently hinted at a readiness to infer censorial intent from legislative history and to invalidate laws so motivated”). First, the few equivocal statements pulled from the legisaltive debates to support this proposition are sorely inadequate to support an inference of improper purpose in this case, to the extent that such is an appropriate judicial inquiry. A fair reading of the Congressional Record fully supports the interpretation that this Amendment’s objective was to preserve a rule that Congress valued highly, not to censor speech. This is quite unlike Grosjean, where a United States Senator and the Governor of Louisiana had distributed a circular to all members of the state legislature, describing the ‘"lying newspapers’ as conducting ‘a vicious campaign’ and the tax as 'a tax on lying, 2e a lie.’ ” Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Commissioner, 460 U.S. at 579-580, 103 S.Ct. at 1369, 75 L.Ed.2d at 301. There is no comparable evidence of illicit purpose in this case. In addition, the Court has stressed the hazards of basing a finding of unconstitutionality on legislative motive that is assertedly unseemly. See, e.g., United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382-385, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 1682-1684, 20 L.Ed.2d 672, 683-685 (1968). Accordingly, I would be extremely hesitant, on the basis of the Court's single statement in Minneapolis Star, to read this doctrine into constitutional law, particularly in light of the majority’s acknowledgement that its discussion of the matter is dicta and irrelevant to the decision in this case. See Maj.Op. at 809-810 & n. 12.
. There are indications that my colleagues have done just this. For example, they recognize the rule that "Congress ordinarily need not address a perceived problem all at once." Maj.Op. at 815. Nonetheless, they give that rule short shrift on the basis of four cases, all of which use a standard of review higher than that conceded to be applicable in this case. Id.