dissenting, in which RONEY, Chief Judge, HILL and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges, join:
Most respectfully, I dissent from the conclusion reached in the majority opinion that there is merit in the Caldwell claim presented by the petitioner. Our court is issuing opinions in Harich v. Dugger and in this case which contain lengthy discussions of Caldwell claims and how they are to be evaluated. I join in the statement of Judge Tjoflat in his special concurrence in Harich that: “The relevant question under Caldwell is whether remarks made at trial lessened the jury's sense of responsibility toward its role of determining whether the death penalty is appropriate.” From our perspective as members of the Court of Appeals, this necessarily involves a case by case approach with detailed review of the entire record of any given case. The bottom line, however, is the subjective reaction of each individual judge to the language and text of the record. In this case, it is my opinion that no Caldwell violation occurred. Phrased in the words of the “relevant question,” this record convinces me that none of the remarks of the judge, prosecutor or defense counsel lessened, in any way, the jury’s sense of responsibility toward its role in deciding whether or not death was the appropriate penalty.
The majority finds that at trial, the prosecutor misled the jury as to its sentencing role by stating that (1) its sentence recommendation was advisory, and (2) the ultimate responsibility for imposition of the sentence rests with the judge. The majority also concluded that the trial judge did not correct the false impression left by the prosecutor. See ante section III. In my opinion, the record does not support these findings.
I agree with the majority’s analysis of the role of the trial judge in determining whether a Caldwell violation occurred. See ante at 1456 (citing McCorquodale v. Kemp, 829 F.2d 1035, 1037 (11th Cir.1987)). The trial judge should take steps to correct the impression made when a prosecutor’s inaccurate statements diminish a jury's sense of responsibility in a capital sentencing case. In such a case, a trial judge’s curative response could negate a potential Caldwell violation. However, in this case, there was no need for such a correction since no misimpression had been given.
In Florida, comments made by the prosecutor which emphasize the “advisory” role of the jury or indicate that the jury is making a “recommendation” to the judge, do not support a Caldwell claim. See Harich v. Wainwright, 844 F.2d at 1473-74 (11th Cir.1988) (en banc); Combs v. State, 525 So.2d 853, 13 Fla.L.Weekly 142 (Fla.1988). Under Florida's death penalty statute the jury’s role is advisory. After receiving the jury's recommendation, the trial judge must independently weigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and render sentence.1
It serves no purpose to dwell on the word ‘advisory’ [or ‘recommendation’] as does the majority, because that is the procedural structure established by the Florida statutes. The jury’s verdict as to the appropriate sentence is advisory. The question is whether the jury was somehow given an erroneous understanding of its responsibility.
Mann v. Dugger, 817 F.2d 1471, 1485 (11th Cir.1987) (Fay, J., dissenting) (panel opinion). Such comments are neither inaccurate nor misleading.
Moreover, in this case the prosecutor made the controversial comments during voir dire at the suggestion of defense counsel. The prosecutor was discussing death *1462penalty concerns with the prospective jurors when one member of the venire stated that he would be unable to find the defendant guilty if it could lead to a death sentence. Trial Transcript at 105. The attorneys then held a side-bar conference with the judge. At this conference the defense counsel suggested that someone should inform the jury of the bifurcated system used in Florida to determine guilt and sen-fencing.2 The prosecutor followed this suggestion and gave the jury an accurate summation of its role under the Florida system.3 Defense counsel supplemented the prosecutor’s explanation by stating that should the jury find the defendant guilty of first degree murder, the judge would give the jury’s sentencing recommendation great weight.4
*1463A thorough review of the trial transcript reveals that defense counsel and the prosecutor placed equal emphasis on the advisory role of the jury.5 In addition, both lawyers indicated to the jurors that if they found the defendant guilty of first degree murder, the judge would ultimately determine the appropriate penalty.6
Defense counsel’s numerous comments regarding the jury’s advisory role indicate that he agreed with the explanations given by the prosecutor and the trial judge. This strengthens my conviction that the prosecutor accurately stated the Florida law and did not mislead the jury. Therefore, I am unable to find that the prosecutor’s statements created a Caldwell violation.
Because I believe that the prosecutor did not mislead the jury, I do not find it necessary to determine whether the trial judge’s comments were sufficiently curative. I note, however, that the trial judge’s statements were not misleading. The judge explained to the jury its role in the Florida sentencing scheme.
The trial judge essentially repeated the explanations given by the lawyers. He told the jury that its determination of the appropriate penalty would serve as a recommendation.7 The judge also stated that although the final determination of the appropriate penalty rested with the court, the jury had a duty to recommend the appropriate penalty in this case.8 One of the trial *1464judge’s last comments before the jury retired reinforced the importance of the jury’s task:
The fact that the determination of whether or not a majority of you recommend a sentence of death or sentence of life imprisonment in this case can be reached by a single ballot should not influence you to act hastily or without due regard to the gravity of these proceedings. Before you ballot, you should carefully weigh, sift and consider the evidence, and all of it, realizing that a human life is at stake, and bring to bear your best judgment upon the sole issue which is submitted to you at this time, of whether a majority of your number recommend that the Defendant be sentenced to death or to life imprisonment.
Trial Transcript at 1348-1349 (emphasis added). Such a closing instruction had to impress upon the jury the importance of their role in the sentencing process.
One other aspect of cases of this sort troubles me. Jurors are a cross section of our communities. They are our average citizens with differing degrees of education, sophistication, experiences and views of government. My experience with juries convinces me that they approach such service with great dedication and awareness. In cases involving a question of whether or not the death penalty should be imposed, great concern and seriousness of purpose literally permeates the courtroom. Jurors, like judges, lose sleep and are totally preoccupied with doing what is right and correct under the law. We, as judges, should be slow to assume that such men and women have somehow been derailed or led astray.
Finding nothing in this record, when considering such in its entirety, that would mislead or tend to diminish the responsibility of the jury, I would deny relief.
. See Fla.Stat. § 921.141 (1985). The Supreme Court held that the division of authority between the jury and the trial judge under the Florida death penalty statute is constitutional. See Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 104 S.Ct. 3154, 82 L.Ed.2d 340 (1984); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 96 S.Ct. 2960, 49 L.Ed.2d 913 (1976). In Spaziano, the Court made reference to the fact that the jury’s recommendation is entitled to some deference by the trial court. 468 U.S. at 465-66, 104 S.Ct. at 3164-65.
. During the side-bar conference, defense counsel stated:
I think, first of all, I would just like to have the right to try to rehabilitate this gentleman who made these for cause statements earlier and perhaps the — we should have a right to try to rehabilitate him in this respect. I think he is of the opinion, not understanding the bifurcated system, that, in fact, if he rendered a guilty verdict, that that in and of itself would take care of the penalty.
I think he should be told by somebody that, in fact, it's two different phases; that he can, in fact, return a guilty verdict if that's the appropriate verdict; and he will have the opportunity to voice his opinion. That may satisfy it.
Trial Transcript at 106.
. During this portion of the voir dire the prosecutor stated:
Not only for your benefit, ... but for the benefit of the rest of the prospective members of the jury, let me jump ahead a little bit and see if I can do some clarification. The law in the State of Florida provides that in a trial for a capital offense, such as murder in the first degree, we actually have two stages or two phases of the proceedings.
The first phase relates to the guilt or the innocence of the Defendant. At that point, the State puts on its case in chief against the Defendant in an attempt to convince the jury that he is guilty of murdering Elisa Nelson, beyond and to the exclusion of every reasonable doubt. The jury, in Florida, has the opportunity to go back and to deliberate that issue. Obviously, if the jury finds him to be innocent, they come back and say so, and he walks out of the courtroom and that’s the end of that.
... If, on the other hand, this jury ultimately at the conclusion of the State's case, convicts, walks back into the courtroom and says that he is guilty of murder in the first degree, there then begins a separate portion of the proceeding in front of the same jury panel with additional testimony and evidence being presented, at which time you again — these matters that were not brought to your attention in the prior portion of the trial. The jury then has the opportunity to go back and deliberate whether or not you will come back and make a recommendation of mercy to the Court.
The recommendation that you make to Judge Federico in this portion of the trial is simply a recommendation, and he is not bound by it. He may impose whatever sentence the law permits. He will have been here and will have listened to all of the testimony himself.
Trial Transcript at 106-108.
.During voir dire the following occurred:
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Only guilty of murder one requires a death penalty. And there are only two alternatives the Court has: One is death in the electric chair; the other is life with a minimum mandatory twenty-five years before the person becomes eligible for parole. I think a lot of people get the idea that if somebody gets a life sentence, they get out in seven years.
That isn't the case in a first degree murder. It does carry a maximum of life, a minimum mandatory of twenty-five years before a person becomes eligible. That is the alternative the judge has, one of those two.
[JUROR]: Is that the judge's discretion, or is that by law?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: By law, the judge only has two choices if you return a verdict of murder in the first degree. Like [the prosecutor] said, you go back and render an advisory opinion as to what you people believe is the appropriate sentence, whether you believe that the appropriate sentence is death or whether you believe the appropriate sentence is life with a minimum mandatory twenty-five years.
Now, he just doesn't disregard that and do whatever he wants to. He is, by law, required to give your recommendation great weight, but he is also permitted to overrule your recommendation if he desires to do so and he feels under the law he should. But he can still only do one of those two things. The law does not give him any other discretion.
He has to, ultimately, if Mr. Mann is convicted of murder in the first degree, say, I sentence you to death, life, or the minimum mandatory of twenty-five years. That’s the only two options he has. Okay? Does that clear that up? Does everybody understand that?
*1463(THEREUPON, the prospective jurors indicated affirmatively.)
Trial Transcript at 163-64 (emphasis added).
. The prosecutor used the words "advisory” or "recommendation” (or derivatives thereof) during two phases of the trial. These included comments made during voir dire, see Trial Transcript at 108, 109, 110, 211, 283, 285, and during the closing argument of the sentencing phase. See Trial Transcript at 1319, 1326, 1327.
By comparison, the defense counsel used these terms just as often. These included comments made during voir dire, see Trial Transcript at 163-64 (for text of this comment see supra note 4), 171, 173, 272, 273, 274, and during closing argument of the sentencing phase. See Trial Transcript at 1331, 1338, 1341, 1342.
. As the majority notes, the prosecutor made three references to the judge as the final decision maker. These include comments twice made during voir dire, see Trial Transcript at 110-111, 285, and once during the closing argument of the sentencing phase. See Trial Transcript at 1330.
The defense counsel, however, also indicated that the judge had the burden of choosing between a death and a life sentence. See Trial Transcript at 164-165>(for text of this comment, see supra note 4). During his final argument of the sentencing phase, defense counsel again spoke of the judge’s responsibility as sentencer:
To begin at the very beginning, the issue here is whether this man lives, by my computation, to the age of eighty-five in prison before he can be eligible for parole or whether he dies. This judge can sentence this man, in addition to the twenty-five years minimum mandatory, he can sentence him in addition to that ninety-nine years on the kidnapping and retain jurisdiction over him for thirty-three of those years to prevent his release or his consideration for release, as I understand it, to approximately the year 2039. So, the issue that you are here to determine is not whether he lives among us. The issue is whether he lives.
Trial Transcript at 1331.
. The trial judge made several references to the advisory nature of the jury’s sentence. These comments occurred during post verdict instructions, see Trial Transcript at 1236, during the initial instructions of the sentencing phase, see Trial Transcript at 1252-1253, and during the final instructions of the sentencing phase. See Trial Transcript at 1344-1351.
. During the initial instructions of the sentencing phase the trial judge stated:
Members of the jury, you have found the Defendant guilty of murder in the first degree. The punishment for this crime is either death or life imprisonment. The final decision as to what punishment shall be imposed rests solely with the judge of this court. However, the law requires that you, the jury, render to the Court an advisory sentence as to what punishment should be imposed upon the Defendant.
Trial Transcript at 1252.
During the final instructions to the jury in the sentencing phase, the judge stated:
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, it is now your duty to advise the Court as to what punishment should be imposed on the Defendant for his crime of murder in the first degree. As you have been told, the final decision as to what punishment shall be imposed is the responsibility of the judge. However, it is your duty to follow the law which will now be given to you by the Court and render to the Court an advisory opinion based upon your determination as to whether sufficient aggravating circumstances exist to justify the imposition of the death penalty, whether sufficient mitigating circumstances exist to outweigh any aggravating circumstances found to exist. Your verdict should be based upon the evi*1464dence which you have heard while trying the guilt or innocence of the Defendant, and evidence which has been presented to you in this proceeding.
Trial Transcript at 1344-44 (There are two consecutive pages in the trial transcript numbered as 1344.).