dissenting.
I dissent. I do not necessarily disagree with the legal conclusions set forth in the majority’s opinion. Rather, my problem with the district court’s judgment stems from the fact that the court granted the defendants’ motions for summary judgment without allowing Greensboro the opportunity to conduct discovery, a fact the majority simply ignores.
A.
At the outset, the case’s procedural history is worth mentioning. Greensboro filed its complaint on October 5, 1984 and shortly thereafter began its discovery efforts. On December 27, however, the district court granted the defendants’ motion to stay discovery. The court’s order stayed indefinitely all discovery pending the defendants’ answers and any dispositive motions. The order indicated that if Greensboro needed discovery to respond to a motion for summary judgment it could file an affidavit under Rule 56(f) along with a discovery plan outlining the discovery required.1
By February 1985 the defendants had all filed motions to dismiss or for summary judgment. On February 26 Greensboro amended its complaint and filed a motion to lift the stay of discovery. After the defendants renewed their motions to dismiss or for summary judgment Greensboro filed an affidavit pursuant to Rule 56(f). In the affidavit Thomas Gutherie, Greensboro’s president, stated that Greensboro could not present the facts necessary to oppose the defendants’ motions for summary judgment until given the opportunity to conduct discovery.2 Along with the affidavit Greensboro filed a proposed discovery plan outlining the discovery required to respond to the defendants’ motions.
At a September 9 status conference the district court heard oral argument on all pending motions. At that time Greensboro reiterated its need for discovery and renewed its motions to lift the stay of discovery or to permit discovery under its proposed plan. Almost one year later on August 29, 1986, the court entered its order granting the defendants’ motions for summary judgment. The court’s order made no mention of Greensboro’s motion to lift the stay of discovery or of its Rule 56(f) affidavit.
B.
Rule 56(f) allows a court to deny a motion for summary judgment or order a continuance when a party sets forth by affidavit sufficient reasons for its inability to present facts in opposition to the motion. The rule was designed to give parties a reasonable opportunity to prepare a case, and it is frequently invoked when there has not been a sufficient opportunity to conduct discovery. See 10A C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2741 (1983). Summary judgment is rarely appropriate before the party opposed to the motion has had at least some opportunity to gather material facts through discovery. See, e.g., WSB-TV v. Lee, 842 F.2d 1266, 1269 (11th Cir.1988); Murrell v. Bennett, 615 F.2d 306, 310-11 (5th Cir.1980); Service, Hosp., Nursing Home and Pub. Employees Union v. Commercial Property Servs., 755 F.2d 499, 507 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 850, 106 S.Ct. 147, 88 L.Ed.2d 122 (1985). This is especially true in antitrust cases, where the material facts are likely to be in the exclusive control of the defendants. Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 746, 96 S.Ct. 1848, 1853, 48 L.Ed. *15462d 338 (1976); George C. Frey Ready-Mixed, Concrete, Inc. v. Pine Hill Concrete Mix Corp., 554 F.2d 551, 555 (2d Cir.1977).
To be sure, it is not always improper to grant summary judgment prior to discovery. For instance, if the nonmoving party cannot demonstrate in a Rule 56(f) affidavit that discovery might uncover evidence that would create a dispute as to a material fact, summary judgment is appropriate. See Hancock Indus. v. Schaeffer, 811 F.2d 225, 229-30 (3d Cir.1987); see also Wallace v. Brownell Pontiac-GMC Co., Inc., 703 F.2d 525, 528 (11th Cir.1983) (discovery would have been useless as plaintiff’s own version of the facts were insufficient to support the action). Here, however, Greensboro’s Rule 56(f) affidavit together with its proposed discovery plan was more than sufficient to warrant at least a continuance.
In affirming the district court’s grant of summary judgment the majority accepts the court’s conclusion that the all-requirements contracts between Oglethorpe and the EMCs were required by the REA. Greensboro, however, consistently has disputed this fact and specifically sought discovery on the issue in its Rule 56(f) affidavit and accompanying discovery plan. The court should have allowed Greensboro to conduct limited discovery into the matter so that Greensboro could respond to the defendants’ affidavits. In addition, Greensboro should have been allowed limited discovery into the relationship among the defendants and the various agreements between them. Given the one-sided presentation the district court was faced with in ruling on the motions for summary judgment, I do not have confidence in its conclusion that Greensboro suffered no injury from the defendants’ alleged antitrust violations.
C.
I do not suggest that the result in this case would have been different had the district court allowed Greensboro to conduct discovery. It may be that the discovery requested would not have created a dispute as to a material fact. As the Third Circuit once stated, however, in reversing a grant of summary judgment in a somewhat analogous case:
This case illustrates the danger of founding a judgment in favor of one party upon his own version of facts within his sole knowledge as set forth in affidavits prepared ex parte. Cross-examination of the party and a reasonable examination of his records by the other party frequently bring forth further facts which place a very different light upon the picture.
Toebelman v. Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co., 130 F.2d 1016, 1022 (3d Cir.1942). Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
. Rule 56(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just.
. The affidavit set forth the specific areas in which Greensboro needed discovery in order to respond to the motions for summary judgment.