dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. This case should be remanded to the district court for a determination whether Cirimele felt free to leave at the time he was initially questioned and detained. If the officers did not possess founded suspicion at the moment the investigatory stop occurred, see Guam v. Ichiyasu, 838 F.2d 353, 355 (9th Cir.1988), the development of that suspicion during the detention cannot be used to support the initial stop. United States v. Espinosa, 827 F.2d 604, 608 (9th Cir.1987); United States v. Erwin, 803 F.2d 1505, 1510 n. 2 (9th Cir.1986); see also Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 n. 10, 88 S.Ct. 1788, 1791 n. 10, 20 L.Ed.2d 797 (1968) (search not justified by what it turns up).
A Fourth Amendment stop based on hunches alone will not withstand constitutional scrutiny. United States v. Kerr, 817 F.2d 1384, 1387 (9th Cir.1987). As a threshold matter, Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983) controls our analysis of the existence of a reasonable suspicion to support a brief investigatory stop. While it is true under Royer that the Fourth Amendment is not violated by merely approaching someone in a public place, Royer further holds that when evaluating a police stop, an individual “may not be detained even momentarily without reasonable, objective grounds for doing so.” Royer, 460 U.S. at 498, 103 S.Ct. at 1324.
Under this standard, even for an investigative stop, “[i]t is the State’s burden to demonstrate that the seizure it seeks to justify on the basis of a reasonable suspicion was sufficiently limited in scope and duration to satisfy the conditions of an investigative seizure.” Royer, 460 U.S. at 500, 103 S.Ct. at 1326. Moreover, the agents must show that the means used during the investigatory stop were the least intrusive means readily available. Ichiyashu, 838 F.2d at 356; Kraus v. County of Pierce, 793 F.2d 1105, 1108 (9th Cir.1986), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 1571, 94 L.Ed.2d 763 (1987). This, appellants have not done. Alternatively, the district court must determine whether Cirimele’s consent to answer questions or to allow the bag search “was in fact ‘voluntary’ or was the product of duress or coercion, express or implied.” Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2048, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). Whether Cirimele consented to the stop “is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of the circumstances.” Id.
I. THE INITIAL STOP
The majority parses the reasoning of Royer to reach the implicit conclusion that no degree of suspicion is necessary for an airport stop and questioning. Such a conclusion is inconsistent with the narrow exception to probable cause accorded Terry stops. “Although not all seizures require probable cause, ‘any curtailment of a person’s liberty by the police must be supported by at least a reasonable and articu-lable suspicion that the person is engaged in criminal activity.’ ” United States v. Sokolow, 831 F.2d 1413, 1417 (9th Cir.1987) (quoting Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 440, 100 S.Ct. 2752, 2754, 65 L.Ed.2d 890 (1980)). Because the very nature of airport stops renders them intimidating, the presumption raised by a police stop at an airport is that a reasonable person would not feel free to leave. United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583, 596-97 (5th Cir. Unit B, 1982) (en banc). The reasoning of the Eleventh Circuit is persuasive; we should “scrutinize the record with care to ensure that the totality of the circumstances *1509shows an utter absence of coercion and hence truly voluntary consent.” United States v. Elsoffer, 671 F.2d 1294, 1297 (11th Cir.1982); See also United States v. Espinosa-Guerra, 805 F.2d 1502, 1507 (11th Cir.1986).
A. Coerciveness of the Initial Stop.
The majority’s holding that a reasonable person would have felt free to leave under the circumstances confronting Cirimele is unsupported by the record. Whether an initial encounter with police rises to the level of a seizure is a highly factual question that is heavily dependent on the circumstances. United States v. Black, 675 F.2d 129, 134 (7th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1068, 103 S.Ct. 1520, 75 L.Ed.2d 945 (1983). The determination whether a reasonable person feels free to leave a police-citizen encounter is a question of fact. Erwin, 803 F.2d at 1508. This court reviews a finding that an encounter is consensual for clear error. United States v. Combs, 762 F.2d 1343, 1349 (9th Cir.1985).
The district court issued no findings as to the coerciveness of the initial stop. The court noted only that these “circumstances are probably about the worst that I have seen in all of the cases that I have seen.” Reporter’s Transcript, June 25, 1984 suppression hearing at 7. Therefore it assumed this encounter was a coercive, investigatory stop, and it proceeded to determine whether an articulable suspicion existed to support the stop. The facts of this case support the district judge’s reasoning that an investigatory stop occurred, necessitating an objectively reasonable or founded suspicion on the part of the agents that criminal activity was to occur in order to justify stopping and questioning Cirimele. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S.Ct. 690, 694, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981); Kerr, 817 F.2d at 1386.
Even if I were to adopt the majority’s perspective of Royer, this court must first assess whether a coercive atmosphere existed which elevated the initial questioning into an investigatory stop requiring reasonable suspicion. The relevant test is whether, at the time of the initial stop and questioning, the agents exhibited “a show of official authority such that ‘a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.’ ” Royer, 460 U.S. at 502, 103 S.Ct. at 1326 (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1877, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980)). The majority engages in fact-finding by abstracting parts of the officers’ testimony to find that nothing prevented Cirimele from leaving the area. In relying on this testimony, instead of waiting for the facts to be found by the district court, the majority neglects other perspectives of the encounter. The question that the majority fails to pose or answer is whether Cirimele felt free to leave. The officers never testified that Cirimele was in fact free to leave or that they communicated this option to Ciri-mele.
We must assess other factors to determine the coerciveness of the initial questioning. While a show of physical force certainly demonstrates a show of authority, see United States v. Sokolow, 831 F.2d at 1416, the absence of such force does not automatically determine whether a reasonable person feels free to leave. See United States v. Beraun-Panez, 812 F.2d 578 (9th Cir.1987). “[T]he number and position of the officers have been recognized as important considerations for determining whether an atmosphere of restraint can be said to have existed.” United States v. Berry-man, 717 F.2d 651, 655 (1st Cir.1983); United States v. Nicholas, 448 F.2d 622 (8th Cir.1971); Horvitz v. State, 433 So.2d 545 (Fla.App.1983) (defendant surrounded by three officers).
The agents’ manner of approach and the tone and extent of their questioning are factors that indicate whether a subject is free to depart. United States v. Beraun-Panez, 812 F.2d at 580 (quoting United States v. Hall, 421 F.2d 540, 545 (2d Cir.1969) cert. denied, 397 U.S. 990, 90 S.Ct. 1123, 25 L.Ed.2d 398 (1970)). In this case, three Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents surrounded Cirimele upon initially approaching him. Given the physical layout of the airport, the agents’ actions create substantial similarities between this stop and the impermissible seizure in Royer. The agents positioned themselves around Cirimele, immediately *1510identified themselves as police officers investigating narcotics transactions, questioned Cirimele regarding narcotics possession, and neglected to inform Cirimele that he was not under arrest and was free to leave. See e.g., Espinosa, 827 F.2d at 608 (initial detention occurred when officers stopped, requested identification, and questioned suspect regarding narcotics transaction). In explaining the conclusion that Cirimele could have circumnavigated the officers, the majority neglects to mention other testimony or “facts” that support a finding of coerciveness. For instance, the questioning officer stood one to one and one half feet directly in front of Cirimele. One of the officers testified that they immediately identified themselves as police officers upon approach, showed their identification and stated that they were conducting an investigation, before asking any questions of Cirimele. One officer testified that he did not remember the exact sequence of events although he later stated that Farrant first requested Cirimele’s identification before asking him if he was carrying narcotics. Another officer testified that they informed Cirimele that they were conducting a narcotics investigation and asked whether he was carrying narcotics before receiving his identification. This detailed recital of the testimony shows only that the district judge should first have the opportunity to sort through the testimony and make factual findings before this court determines issues of coercion and consent without the benefit of factual findings.
The majority also fails to consider Ciri-mele’s language difficulties at this point. Cirimele’s language ability is germane to the question of whether he believed that he was free to leave at the time of the initial questioning. In United States v. Moreno, 742 F.2d 532 (9th Cir.1984) this court held that the degree of coercion is heightened when the suspect has “at best a very limited command of the English language.” Id. at 536. In addition, the Moreno court found that a reasonable person standard incorporated the special factors of Moreno’s alien status. “Moreno’s lack of familiarity with police procedures in this country, his alienage, and his limited ability to speak and understand the English language contributed significantly to the question of coercion present at the DEA office.” Id. at 536. See also Espinosa-Guerra, 805 F.2d at 1508 (“Most fundamental, however, is the fact that the agent and appellee were not able to communicate”).
The record shows that one of the first questions asked of Cirimele was whether he spoke and understood English. Agent Farrant testified that this question was prompted by Cirimele’s foreign appearance and thick accent. It was immediately obvious to the DEA agents that Cirimele had, at best, a limited command of English. The above factors combine to create a question as to the presence of psychological coerciveness, that would prevent a reasonable immigrant from believing that he was free to leave. See Beraun-Panez, 812 F.2d at 582 (approving of the refined objective test which considers illegal alien status or language difficulties when determining the coerciveness of an investigatory stop); United States v. Patino, 649 F.2d 724, 728 (9th Cir.1981) (noting language problem as a factor affecting the presence of coercion). See also United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 774 F.2d 1036, 1042 n. 8 (11th Cir.1985) (language barrier can be considered a factor indicating that an individual does not feel free to leave). Therefore, even if analyzing this case under the majority’s approach, I would remand to the district court to determine whether the circumstances surrounding the initial approach culminated in a coercive atmosphere such that Cirimele did not feel free to leave. Certainly, this court possesses inadequate facts to conclude that “Cirimele was not seized at the point of the initial encounter in airport concourse.”
B. Presence of a Reasonable and Ar-ticulable Suspicion.
In Reid v. Georgia, a case involving an investigatory airport stop based on general drug courier profile characteristics similar to those relied on here, the Supreme Court focused on the existence of a reasonable and articulable suspicion possessed by the agents to determine whether an investigatory stop occurred. Reid, 448 U.S. at 440-41, 100 S.Ct. at 2753-54. The crucial question in Reid, properly the focus of the *1511district court’s holding here, was whether the agents possessed knowledge of specific and articulable facts regarding criminal activity at the time of the initial questioning.
Under these facts, no valid, articulable suspicion could have been formed by the agents. The district court held that at the time of the stop the agents had observed only the following general characteristics: (1) Cirimele’s ‘quick exit from a car without exchanging goodbyes’ with the driver, (2) the fact that Cirimele carried a gym bag and no other luggage, (3) his ‘anxious appearance,’ and (4) his scheduled flight to Miami, ‘a city known to have a high level of drug activity.’ These general characteristics describe a large number of innocent travelers and are similar to those characteristics held to provide an insufficient basis for an investigatory stop in Reid, 448 U.S. at 441, 100 S.Ct. at 2754; Espinosa, 827 F.2d at 609; see also United States v. Erwin, 803 F.2d 1505, 1511 (9th Cir.1986). Even “facts that bear some reasonable correlation to a suspicion of ongoing criminal activity but also describe a very large category of presumably innocent travelers cannot support a reasonable suspicion by themselves.” Sokolow, 831 F.2d at 1419. Here the agents failed to augment the drug courier profile factors with particularized evidence regarding Cirimele’s ongoing criminal activities. Id. Thus, the government does not establish sufficient founded suspicion for an investigatory stop.
II. RETENTION OF THE TICKETS AND IDENTIFICATION.
After informing Cirimele that they were DEA agents investigating drug transactions, asking him repeatedly whether he was carrying drugs, examining Cirimele’s identification card and airline ticket and searching his gym bag, the agents asked Cirimele to accompany them to the office for further investigation. At this point, the majority directs the district court to determine whether Cirimele freely consented to accompany the officers to the DEA office. If the district court finds that Ciri-mele was “seized” within the meaning of the fourth amendment, the majority directs the district court to decide whether the seizure was “a valid investigatory stop.” However, by this time the seizure may have ripened into a detention such that probable cause was needed to continue the detention and search.1 See Royer, 460 U.S. at 502-03, 103 S.Ct. at 1326-27. If the agents retained Cirimele’s identification and airline ticket, then the degree of eoer-civeness present would be indistinguishable from the impermissible seizure in Royer, 460 U.S. at 503, n. 9, 103 S.Ct. at 1327 n. 9; United States v. Robinson, 690 F.2d 869, 875 (11th Cir.1982) (length of retention of suspect’s ticket and identification an important factor in determining consent to airport stop or search). Therefore, I would remand to the district court to determine whether the agents retained possession of Cirimele’s ticket and identification such that Cirimele would have felt unable to leave the agents’ presence in order to catch his flight. See United States v. Black, 675 F.2d 129, 140 (7th Cir.1982) (Swygert, J. dissenting) and cases cited therein.
Moreover, the majority further restricts the proper functions of the district court by finding that the officers possessed a definite, presumably legitimate, purpose for removing Cirimele to the DEA office. The district court did not reach the factual issues concerning the officers’ actual purpose or the legitimacy of any possible purposes. Thus, Royer’s suggestion that some movement of a suspect may be justifiable should not be used as a springboard to expand the ability of police to remove suspects into detention without probable cause or a warrant. Clearly one result of removing Cirimele from the public concourse was that Cirimele would be more intimidated and thus more likely to consent *1512to the search of his belongings or his person. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 563, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1882, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring) (noting that detaining and questioning a suspect in a public place is inherently less coercive than doing so in private).
Instead of instructing the district court on the possibility that the district court found consent to search the bag or consent to accompany the officers to the DEA office, I would remand this case for a factual finding regarding the coerciveness of and consent to the initial stop and questioning. If the circumstances surrounding the investigatory stop are found to be coercive, any evidence obtained as a result of that illegal stop might trigger suppression. See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 2261, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975). Because the constitutionality of all stages of this search cannot be determined without factual findings as to the coerciveness of the initial stop and the presence of founded suspicion, I do not offer guidelines to the district court regarding the subsequent aspects of the search.
. The majority seems to indicate that the district court should characterize the seizure as either an investigatory detention or as no seizure at all. However, the inquiry at this point properly involves whether this seizure was an investigatory detention or an arrest. Thus, the district court should first determine what the seizure was, taking into consideration the full range of options, and then the court should decide whether the seizure was supported by the requisite degree of suspicion or probable cause. Only then should the district court determine, if the detention in the DEA officer was lawful, whether Cirimele freely consented to the search of his wallet.