dissenting:
My disagreement with the majority is a narrow one. I agree that the State’s claim that § 34-9-285 does not violate the equal protection clause is untenable: (1) on the ground that the statute was intended to alleviate a financial burden from those industries in which employees are likely to sustain more injuries, and (2) on the basis that occupational diseases have a gradual onset thus making it difficult to determine when an aggravating injury actually occurs. I also agree with the majority that Georgia workers who contract occupational diseases are denied equal protection of the law. The only issue of difference between us is whether there is any rational basis for concluding that § 34-9-285 encourages the employment of the handicapped.
Jn equal protection cases “the mere recitation of a benign compensatory purpose is not an automatic shield which protects against any inquiry into the actual purposes underlying a statutory scheme.” Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648, 95 S.Ct. 1225, 1233, 43 L.Ed.2d 514 (1975). A court need not “accept at face value assertions of legislative purpose ... when an examination of the legislative scheme and its history demonstrate that the asserted purpose could not have been a goal of the legislation.” 420 U.S. at 648 n. 16, 95 S.Ct. at 1233 n. 16. See also Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 463 n. 7, 101 S.Ct. 715, 723 n. 7, *82566 L.Ed.2d 659 (1981) (applying Weinberger ).
The majority makes the following statement and demonstrates a clairvoyance beyond my ken:
We believe that the Georgia legislature could reasonably find that the employment of persons afflicted with occupational diseases could be enhanced by reducing employers’ potential exposure to extraordinary compensation costs resulting from such preexisting diseases.
Maj.Op. at page 826. A review of the history of the Georgia Workers’ Compensation statute demonstrates that the Georgia legislature could not have contemplated such a purpose in enacting § 34-9-285.
I. The 1920 Act.1
In 1920 Georgia enacted its first statute which limited the financial liability of employers for injuries growing out of accidents during employment and provided benefits for all workers injured by accident arising from the employment whether or not the employer was responsible for the injury.
The Act limited compensation in cases where an injury aggravated an employee’s preexisting injury or disability:
If an employee who suffers an injury in his employment has a permanent disability or has sustained a permanent injury ... suffered elsewhere, he shall be entitled to compensation only for the degree of incapacity which would have resulted from the later accident if the earlier disability or injury had not existed.
1920 Ga.Laws 167, 186, § 34, Ga.Code § 114-408 (1933). Georgia courts interpreted § 114-408 “so as ‘to subject employers only to liability for ... injuries resulting to employees during the time of ... employment’ and not to compensate the employee as if the prior injury had never occurred.” Barry v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 133 Ga.App. 527, 211 S.E.2d 595, 599 (1974) (citations omitted). See e.g., Georgia Insurance Service v. Lord, 83 Ga.App. 28, 62 S.E.2d 402, 404-05 (1950) (employee who was blind in his right eye prior to losing the vision in his left eye as a result of a work-related injury could recover workers’ compensation benefits only for the blindness in his left eye).
The Georgia Workers’ Compensation Act provided compensation only for “injuries” occurring out of and in the course of employment. The term “injury” did not encompass occupational diseases: “ ‘injury’ and ‘personal injury’ ... shall not include a disease in any form except where it results naturally and unavoidably from [an] accident.” 1920 Ga.Laws § 2(d), Ga.Code § 114-102 (1933).
Despite the failure of the Act to compensate for occupational diseases, employees beset with such diseases were not left without a remedy for their disability. In 1936, the Georgia Supreme Court stated:
The remedy provided by [the Act] is exclusive within the field of its operation, but it does not exclude redress in cases to which it is not applicable. Consequently, if [the Act] does not apply to an “occupational disease” ... the employee may maintain an ordinary or common law action for damages against his employer, provided a cause of action exists in his favor relating to the liability of a master, independently of the [Act].
Covington v. Berkeley Granite Corp., 182 Ga. 235, 184 S.E. 871, 872 (1936). A year later, the court made it clear that a common law action for damages against an employer could be maintained by an employee who had been disabled by silicosis because occupational diseases were not compensable under the Act. See Berkeley Granite Corp. v. Covington, 183 Ga. 801, 190 S.E. 8, 12 (1937).
II. The 1946 Act.
In 1946, the Georgia legislature amended the Act by adding to it a chapter on occupa*826tional diseases. 1946 Ga.Laws 103 et seq. The new chapter limited compensable occupational diseases to poisoning (by 22 chemicals or substances), x-rays or radioactive substances, asbestosis, and silicosis. Ga. Code § 114-803 (1946). As it does today in § 34-9-285, the chapter on occupational diseases apportioned compensation in cases where an occupational disease aggravated an employee’s preexisting noncompensable infirmity or condition or where an employee’s noncompensable infirmity or disease aggravated his preexisting occupational disease.2 Since in 1946 all other injuries that aggravated preexisting permanent injuries or disabilities were not fully compensated, supra at I. The 1920 Act, the apportionment of compensation in aggravation of occupational disease cases resulted in equal treatment for all Georgia employees.
From 1946 until 1978 there was no denial of equal protection of the laws to the workers in Georgia, i.e., no disparate treatment during those 32 years with respect to compensation to employees who had preexisting injuries, conditions, or diseases. Although enactment of the 1946 statute added to the scope of the Workers’ Compensation statute those employees who contracted occupational diseases while at work, there is nothing to support the pure conjecture by the majority, (and by the State of Georgia attorney who first raised the subject at oral argument) that the 1946 statute was passed for the purpose of encouraging the employment of handicapped workers who had an occupational disease or a condition that would be aggravated by certain types of working conditions. Instead, one objective of the 1946 statute was to eliminate the unlimited recovery an employee might receive in a common law action such as Covington v. Berkeley Granite Corp., supra. Another logical objective was to provide coverage for injured workers who might not recover in a common law action.
Nor does the statute encourage the employment of the handicapped as is refuted by Ms. Price’s case. Ms. Price had bron-chiectasis, which is “a chronic inflammatory or degenerative condition of one or more of the bronchi marked by dilation and loss of elasticity of the [bronchi] walls.” Webster’s Unabridged Third New International Dictionary 282 (1976). When Ms. Price was employed by Lithonia Lighting Company, there is no evidence that Lithonia Lighting asked Price about her health when it hired her or otherwise knew that she had bronchiectasis. Nor is there any evidence that Price suspected that her bronchiectasis would be aggravated by working at Lithonia Lighting. While employed at Lithonia Lighting, Price worked over a tank of acid and was exposed to paint fumes and gases given off by wood alcohol. The working conditions aggravated her respiratory problems, and she was forced to leave Lithonia Lighting in January of 1983. The majority states the following: We believe that the Georgia legislature could reasonably find that the employment of persons afflicted with occupational diseases could be enhanced by reducing employers’ potential exposure to extraordinary compensation costs resulting from such preexisting diseases. Ms. Price was not afflicted with a preexisting occupational disease when employed by Lithonia Lighting. Employment of the “handicapped” was not a decisional factor in her being employed.
III. The 1977-78 Acts.
In 1977 the Georgia legislature added a section to the Workers’ Compensation statute, Ga.Laws 1977, Vol. 1 at 608. “Chapter *827114-9. Subsequent Injury.” The preamble to the statute states in part: “An Act to amend Code Title 114, relating to workmen’s compensation, as amended, so as to encourage the employment of handicapped persons by protecting employers for excess liability for compensation for certain injuries; ...” This statute is now codified as § 34-9-350, et seq.
The statute creates a Subsequent Injury Trust Fund and authorizes assessments against insurers or self-insurers according to a formula based upon the total workers’ compensation claims paid by an insurer or self-insurer as those claims bear to the total workers’ compensation claims paid by all insurers and self-insurers in the state during the preceding calendar year. The purpose of the Fund is to make available money to reimburse insurers or self-insurers for a portion of the medical expenses and income benefit payments to employees who have sustained an injury which impaired and merged with a preexisting injury. In the first instance, the employer or insurer pays the employee the amount of compensation benefits owed and then is reimbursed by the fund according to a formula set forth in the statute.
IV. The 1978 Statute.
The 1977 statute as such did not encourage employment of handicapped workers because § 114-408 was not repealed until 1978. Section 114-408, supra at page 825, forbade payment of compensation for any portion of disability allocable to a preexisting disability or injury. In 1978, the Legislature repealed existing § 114-408 (along with §§ 114-409 and 114-410) and, to give life to the 1977 Act, substituted a new § 114-408 entitled “subsequent injury” which included the following:
(c) Total disability by subsequent injury.
(1) An employee who has a prior disability as described in Article 9 of this chapter and who sustains a subsequent injury which combines with the prior injury to produce total disability shall be entitled to income benefits as provided in Code Section 34-9-261. The loss of both hands, feet, arms, legs, or the loss of any two of them or the total loss of vision of both eyes shall be presumed to be total disability, subject to rebuttal.
(2) An employer who makes payment under this subsection shall be entitled to reimbursement as determined under Article 9 of this chapter.
1978 Ga.Laws 2220, § 6 (codified as Ga. Code § 34-9-241(c)).
The legislature did not repeal that part of the 1946 Occupational Disease Act (now § 34-9-285) which apportioned compensation benefits by limiting payment by employers to those employees having a preexisting disease for only that part of the disabling disease allocable to the claimant’s employment. The Georgia law as it now stands authorizes full compensation to employees whose disabling injury merges with a preexisting injury and results in total disability. The change in law is illustrated by reference to Georgia Insurance Service v. Lord, supra at page 825, in which case the court held that the employee who was blind in his right eye prior to losing his vision in his left eye as the result of a work-related injury could recover only partial disability compensation for blindness in his left eye. An employee under identical circumstances would now be compensated for total disability.
Employees with a preexisting condition or disease who become totally disabled by virtue of an occupational disease do not receive full compensation. Ms. Price’s receipt of only the minimum compensation of $25.00 per week instead of $135.00 per week is the result of the failure of the Legislature in 1978 to repeal § 114-805 (now § 34-9-285). The disparity in treatment of persons situated as Ms. Price, as compared with those such as an employee who loses sight in his only good eye, led to this lawsuit to declare unconstitutional the statutes as applied to those employees who become totally disabled by virtue of occupational diseases and yet receive only partial compensation. The majority in the second paragraph of Part II acknowledges the disparate treatment and that the statutory scheme is unconstitutional unless there is a *828“rational basis” for the difference in treatment.
The foregoing history and current status of the Georgia law establish beyond dispute that the majority’s “rational basis” for the disparate treatment of workers who contract occupational diseases is mere sophistry. The 1946 Act (§ 34-9-285) was not enacted to encourage employers to hire the handicapped. That Act limited the compensation to the extent the disease was attributable to the employment. The 1920 Act (§ 114-408) similarly limited compensation where an injury was superimposed on a prior condition. It is obvious from the legislative history that the Georgia Legislature did not enact legislation to encourage employment of the handicapped until 1977. This was 31 years after passage of the statute here under attack.
Under the rational basis test, “legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.” Id. 473 U.S. at 440, 105 S.Ct. at 3254 (citations omitted).3 That recognition is only the beginning of the inquiry, for the rational basis test has long been a source of confusion and debate. See, e.g., United States Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 176 n. 10, 101 S.Ct. 453, 460 n. 10, 66 L.Ed.2d 368 (1980) (“The most arrogant legal scholar would not claim that [our] eases applied a uniform or consistent test under equal protection principles.”); Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 243 n. 4, 101 S.Ct. 1074, 1087 n. 4, 67 L.Ed.2d 186 (1981) (Powell, J., dissenting) (“The Court has employed numerous formulations for the ‘rational basis’ test. Members of the Court continue to hold divergent views on the clarity with which a legislative purpose must appear, and about the degree of deference afforded the legislature in suiting means to ends.”) (citations omitted). The disagreement over the meaning of the rational basis test is understandable. However well its language may read, the test in the end depends for its application upon words such as “arbitrary,” “legitimate,” and “rational,” which are subject to many differences of opinion. Accord Illinois State Bd. v. Socialist Workers, 440 U.S. 173, 188-89, 99 S.Ct. 983, 992, 59 L.Ed.2d 230 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“[P]hrases [such as ‘compelling state interest’ and ‘least drastic means’] are really not very helpful for constitutional analysis. They are too convenient and result oriented.”). Nevertheless, certain general propositions about equal protection and rational basis bear repeating.
First, the rational basis test requires more than a mere connection between means and ends. “[T]he objectives of a legislative classification can be characterized on different levels of generality.... As one moves to higher levels of generality, the likelihood of finding rational grounds for distinction increases.” Brest & Levinson, Processes of Constitutional Decisionmaking 560-61 (1983). This is because any regulation can be validated through the use of sophistry or a non se-quitur:
It is always possible to define the legislative purpose of a statute in such a way that the statutory classification is rationally related to it.... The nature of the burdens or benefits created by a statute and the nature of the chosen class’s commonality will always suggest a statutory purpose — to so burden or benefit the common trait shared by members of the identified class. A statute’s classification will be rationally related to such a purpose because the reach of the purpose has been derived from the classifications themselves.
Note, Legislative Purpose, Rationality, and Equal Protection, 82 Yale L.J. 123, 128 (1972). Cf. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 995 (1978) (without requiring a legitimate public purpose, “it would seem useless to demand and discover even the most perfect congruence between means *829and ends, for each law would supply its own indisputable fit: if the means chosen burdens one group and benefits another, then the means perfectly fit the end of burdening just those whom the law disadvantages and benefitting just those whom it assists”); Fritz, 449 U.S. at 180, 101 S.Ct. at 462 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“if the analysis of legislative purpose requires only a reading of the statutory language in a disputed provision, and if any ‘conceivable basis’ for a discriminatory classification will repeal a constitutional attack on the statute, judicial review will constitute a mere tautological recognition of the fact that Congress did what it intended to do”). For example, a statute requiring the installation of exhaust emission devices on blue cars has a tautological objective — reducing emissions on blue cars — but it cannot seriously be argued that such a statute passes constitutional muster: “such self validation is obviously inconsistent with any criterion for rationality.” Brest & Levinson, Processes of Constitutional Decisionmaking 560 (1983). See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 882 n. 10, 105 S.Ct. 1676, 1684 n. 10, 84 L.Ed.2d 751 (1985) (rejecting state’s contention that “any discrimination subject to the rational relation level of scrutiny could be justified simply on the ground that it favored one group at the expense of another”).
Second, it is axiomatic that “[n]o bright line divides the merely foolish from the arbitrary law.” Schweiker, 450 U.S. at 243, 101 S.Ct. at 1087 (Powell, J., dissenting). As a result, each equal protection case turns on its particular factual scenario. Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Burley Tobacco Growers Co-op, 276 U.S. 71, 91, 48 S.Ct. 291, 295, 72 L.Ed. 473 (1928). See also Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District, 410 U.S. 719, 725, 93 S.Ct. 1224, 1228, 35 L.Ed.2d 659 (1973) (“In determining whether or not a state law violates the Equal Protection clause, we must consider the facts and circumstances behind the law, the interests which the State claims to be protecting, and the interests of those who are disadvantaged by the classification.”) (citation omitted).
Third, the equal protection clause is not static. Because the clause is not “shackled to the political theory of a particular era, ... [njotions of what constitutes equal protection ... do change.” Harper v. Virginia State Board, 383 U.S. 663, 669, 86 S.Ct. 1079, 1083, 16 L.Ed.2d 169 (1966). See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 494-95, 74 S.Ct. 686, 691-92, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954) (holding that the “separate but equal” doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 16 S.Ct. 1138, 41 L.Ed. 256 (1896) was unsupported by modern authority).
Fourth, the rational basis test is “not a toothless one.” Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 510, 96 S.Ct. 2755, 2764, 49 L.Ed.2d 651 (1976). In recent cases, the Supreme Court has carefully analyzed the legitimacy of asserted state purposes, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 105 S.Ct. 1676, 84 L.Ed.2d 751 (1985) and Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 102 S.Ct. 2309, 72 L.Ed.2d 672 (1982), in assessing the rationality of a statute. If no legitimate state purpose is served, there is then no rational basis for creating the unequal classifications in the challenged statute. The Court has also closely scrutinized the means/ends nexus of legislative classifications, e.g., Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985) and Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612, 105 S.Ct. 2862, 86 L.Ed.2d 487 (1985), in striking down state classifications. In addition, the Court has reviewed legislative records and other relevant evidence bearing on the rationality of a particular classification. See, e.g., Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. at 447-50, 105 S.Ct. at 3258-60; Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 670-74, 101 S.Ct. 2070, 2084-86, 68 L.Ed.2d 514 (1981); Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 464-70, 101 S.Ct. 715, 724-27, 66 L.Ed.2d 659 (1981).4
*830In Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 92 S.Ct. 1400, 31 L.Ed.2d 768 (1972), a Louisiana workers’ compensation statute denying death benefits to dependent, unacknowledged, and illegitimate children of deceased employees was challenged on equal protection grounds. The Supreme Court, applying the rational basis test,5 held that the statute violated the equal protection clause. The defendant insurance company had argued, among other things, that the statute was constitutional because it lessened the possible problems of locating illegitimate children and determining uncertain claims of parenthood. The Court reviewed that argument in light of the overall purpose of the Louisiana workers’ compensation scheme and stated that while it “fully respect[ed] Louisiana’s choice on [that] matter, ... the inferior classification ... [bore] no significant relationship to those recognized purposes of recovery [i.e., providing compensation to disabled employees and their families] which workmen’s compensation statutes commendably serve.” Id. at 174-75, 92 S.Ct. at 1406.
As did the Court in Weber, we think it is proper to evaluate § 34-9-285’s rationality in light of the overall goal of the Georgia Workers’ Compensation Act. The Georgia courts have consistently held that the Act is “ ‘a humanitarian measure’ providing relief to the injured employee and protecting employers from excessive damage awards.” Koger Properties, Inc. v. Adams-Cates Co., 247 Ga. 68, 274 S.E.2d 329 (1981) (citation omitted). Even if § 34-9-285 by its operation suggested the purpose of encouraging employment of the handicapped as contended by the majority, § 34-9-285 is inconsistent with the overriding purpose of the Act.
The maximum compensation limits placed on injured employees under the Act already serve the purpose of “protecting employers from excessive damage awards.” Even if a disabled employee can recover the maximum benefits under the Act, such benefits are bound to be less than his previous salary. See Ga.Code Ann. § 34-9-261(a) (1987) (in cases of total disability, the employee shall be paid a “weekly benefit equal to two-thirds of [his] average weekly wage but no more than $155.00 per week”). Consequently, § 34-9-285 provides a windfall for employers engaged in those industries where those few employees with preexisting conditions are disabled because of occupational diseases. By apportioning income compensation only in cases where preexisting conditions have been aggravated by occupational diseases, § 34-9-285 denies workers like Ms. Price the full measure of workers’ compensation benefits while at the same time benefiting those industries most likely to injure employees. This inequity is a far cry from the underlying theory of workers’ compensation — that “the cost of the product should bear the blood of the workman.” Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts 530 (5th ed. 1971).
Like all other insurers, workers’ compensation insurers rate employers according to risk factors: “Theoretically, employers are charged a premium based on the relative safety of their workplaces as measured by reported employee injuries and illnesses.... Employers will therefore engage in preventive safety efforts only as long as such efforts are less costly than the payments they must make to the workers’ compensation fund.” Schroeder & Shapiro, Responses to Occupational Disease: The Role of Markets, Regulation, and Infor*831mation, 72 Geo.L.J. 1231,1245 (1984). The apportionment of occupational disease claims, coupled with the structure of the insurance system and the difficulty of proving such claims, provide disincentives for employers to eliminate or control such diseases, id. at 1245-47, thus leading to a vicious circle of more disabled workers. It seems difficult to square this result with any notion of rationality or with the theory behind workers’ compensation. As Professor Larson has noted, the general rule is that when a preexisting condition is aggravated by a work-related occurrence, the entire disability is compensable. IB Larson, The Law of Workmen’s Compensation § 59.22(a) (1987). See also Griggs v. Lumbermen’s Mutual Casualty Co., 61 Ga.App. 448, 6 S.E.2d 180 (1939) (“It is not necessary, in order for an employee to recover compensation as an injured workman, that he must have been in perfect health or free from disease at the time he received the injury. Every workman brings with him to his employment certain infirmities; his employer takes him as he finds him and assumes the risk of a diseased condition aggravated by injury.”), aff'd 190 Ga. 277, 9 S.E.2d 84 (1940).
Given the high risk of injury or disability faced by employees in industries with occupational diseases, and the inability of those employees to pursue tort actions against their employers, § 34-9-285 is not rationally related to the overall legitimate purpose of the Act: providing sustenance to disabled employees.
Assuming arguendo that the purpose of § 34-9-285 was to encourage the employment of handicapped persons, § 34-9-285 violates the equal protection clause because it is not rationally related to that purpose. It is ludicrous to suggest that discrimination only against employees disabled by aggravating occupational diseases rationally furthers the encouragement of handicapped persons.
In Williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S. 14, 105 S.Ct. 2465, 86 L.Ed.2d 11 (1985), car buyers who bought and registered their cars outside of Vermont before becoming Vermont residents filed suit challenging, on equal protection grounds, Vermont’s requirement that they pay a full use tax in order to register their cars in the state. Under the Vermont statutory scheme, the state collected a use tax when a car was registered with it but not if the car was purchased in Vermont and the buyer had paid a sales tax. The tax was reduced by the amount of any sales or use tax paid to another state if the state would afford a credit for taxes paid to Vermont in similar circumstances. The credit, however, was available only if the person registering the car was a Vermont resident at the time he paid the taxes. Id. at 15, 105 S.Ct. at 2468. Vermont argued, in part, that the statute was constitutional because it was consistent with the state’s policy that those persons using the roads should pay for them. The Supreme Court disagreed: “This ‘basic policy’ arguably supports imposition of the use tax on [out-of-state car buyers], and the denial of a credit to them; but it provides no rational reason to spare Vermont residents an equal burden.” Id. at 25-26, 105 S.Ct. at 2473. The reasoning of Williams is applicable here. If encouraging the employment of handicapped employees is the goal of § 34-9-285, there is no rational justification for attempting to accomplish that goal with an uneven hand by burdening only those employees whose preexisting conditions are aggravated by occupational disease. Cf. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 637-38, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 1333, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969) (“A state purpose to encourage employment provides no rational basis for imposing a one-year waiting period restriction [for welfare eligibility] on new residents only.”); Aladdin’s Castle, Inc. v. City of Mesquite, 630 F.2d 1029, 1039-40 (5th Cir.1980) (Vance, J.) (assuming legitimacy of goal of preventing truancy, ordinance making it unlawful for coin-operated amusement centers to allow persons under the age of 17 to play or operate a coin-operated amusement machine violated equal protection because it singled out coin-operated amusement centers for its policy of preventing truancy), rev’d in part on other grounds, 455 U.S. *832283, 102 S.Ct. 1070, 71 L.Ed.2d 152 (1982), on remand, 713 F.2d 137 (5th Cir.1983).6
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.
. Explanation of citation to Georgia Statutes. While there have been seven official codifications of Georgia laws only two are applicable here, the 1933 Code and the 1981 Code. Citation will be to the statutes and both codes unless a statute has been repealed, in which instances the 1981 Code will not be cited. Parenthetically, the Act involved here was originally titled "Workmen’s Compensation Act” but is now titled 'Workers’ Compensation.” These may be used here interchangeably.
. Where an occupational disease is aggravated by any other disease or infirmity not itself compensable or where disability or death from any other cause not itself compensable is aggravated, prolonged, accelerated, or in any other wise contributed to by an occupational disease, the compensation payable shall be reduced and limited only to such proportion of the compensation that would be payable if the occupational disease were the sole cause of the disability or death as such occupational disease, as the causative factor, bears to all the causes of such disability or death. Compensation shall be adjusted by reducing the number of weekly payments or the amounts of such payments as, in the circumstances of the particular case, may be determined by the board.
Ga.Code § 114-805 and § 34-9-285.
. Thus, the test "contains two substantive limitations on legislative choice: legislative enactments must implicate legitimate goals, and the means chosen by the legislature must bear a rational relationship to those goals.” Lyng v. International Union, — U.S. -, -, 108 S.Ct. 1184, 1194, 99 L.Ed.2d 380 (1988) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
. Whatever the reach of the rational basis test, it seems safe to say that the test, as applied today, is not always as deferential as it was in cases like Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, *83075 S.Ct. 461, 99 L.Ed.2d 563 (1955). See Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. at 458, 105 S.Ct. at 3264 (Marshall, J., concurring) (“however labeled, the rational basis test invoked today is most assuredly not the rational basis test of Williamson ... and [its] progeny").
. Although the Supreme Court in Weber was somewhat unclear as to the standard of review it used, see 406 U.S. at 172-73, 92 S.Ct. at 1405, it relied on Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71, 88 S.Ct. 1509, 1511, 20 L.Ed.2d 436 (1968), a case which employed the rational basis test. The Weber Court was, of course, motivated by a concern over the condemnation of illegitimate children simply because of their status, but it did not hold that classifications involving illegitimate children were subject to heightened scrutiny. Even if Weber involved a more searching scrutiny, however, its approach is consistent with the rational basis test applied by the Court in recent cases such as Cleburne Living Center.
. Moreover, because § 34-9-285 apportions income benefits for employees whose preexisting condition is aggravated by an occupational disease, such handicapped persons (for lack of a better term) would probably be reluctant to work in industries where occupational diseases were prevalent. Handicapped persons might forego employment because of the knowledge that they would only be partially compensated if completely disabled by an occupational disease. Thus, the incentive to employers, if § 34-9-285 can be called that, would therefore not make a real difference in the hiring of handicapped persons.