Appellant Robert Meyer is a Massachusetts lawyer charged with violating anti-boycott regulations issued under the Export Administration Act, 50 U.S.C.App. §§ 2401-2420 (1969) (as amended), by completing, and failing to inform the Commerce Department about, a Saudi Arabia trademark registration form that asked whether his client had a business relationship with Israel. Appellant refused to pay a $5,000 civil fine, and the government then brought this suit to collect the penalty. The district court upheld the assessment, and we affirm.
We begin by relating the particulars of Meyer’s alleged violation. In December 1977, in the course of assisting a client who sought to register a trademark in Saudi Arabia, Meyer received an Authorization of Agent form from a Saudi Arabian firm that processed applications for trademark registration in that country. The form included a section characterized in the cover letter as a “Creed Declaration.” In relevant part, it stated:
I/We also hereby solemnly declare that this company has no relations with Israel, which would contradict the following boycott principles:
1. Establishment of a branch of the factory in Israel.
2. Establishment of assembling factory in Israel or presence of an agent who assembles the products of the company in Israel.
3. The availability of general agents or central offices for the Middle East in Israel.
4. Granting the right to use the company’s name by Israeli companies.
5. Participation in Israeli factories or companies.
6. Rendering technical assistance to Israeli companies.
7. In case one of the promoters is an Israeli national.
In January 1978, Meyer mailed the completed form to the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Washington, D.C. The next month, in response to a request from the Embassy, Meyer attempted to obtain State Department notarization of the form through a Virginia associate. The State Department responded to the associate’s request by explaining that it could not authenticate documents “relating to the Arab boycott of Israel,” and it further stated that the law “prohibit[s] U.S. persons from providing certain boycott information.” The Virginia lawyer later wrote to Meyer that he authenticated the form through the U.S. Arab Chamber of Commerce, “[a]fter failing to obtain authentication by the State Department because of the Arab boycott.”
In April, Meyer wrote a letter to his client in which he described his efforts to obtain authentication of the form, explaining that one problem he encountered was “that the Department of State would not *217apply its Certificate because of the boycott provisions [and] that Saudi Arabia would not waive the boycott provisions.” In September 1978, Meyer sent a copy of the completed form to the Saudi Arabian firm that had sent it to him.
Meyer received a letter from the firm in November, explaining that the form he submitted was unacceptable because it was not authenticated by the State Department. The letter added, however, that the Creed Declaration was no longer required, and it suggested that the change was made because Saudi Arabia recognized “that the United States State Department will not legalize any document which contains the Boycott provisions.” A new form, without the declaration, was enclosed. Meyer sent the new form to his client, but he never received a reply from her. He therefore closed his file on this matter.
The statute under which Meyer was charged authorized the President to issue regulations prohibiting the furnishing of information about whether any person has a business relationship with a boycotted country when the information is given “with intent to comply with, further, or support” an unsanctioned foreign boycott. 50 U.S.C.App. § 2408-1a(a)(1)(D). This intent requirement was repeated, and elaborated on, in the regulations enacted under the statute. See 15 C.F.R. §§ 369.1(e), 369.2(d)(1), (5). The regulations also required certain persons receiving requests for such information to file a report with the Department of Commerce. 15 C.F.R. § 369.4.1
Meyer’s primary argument is that he lacked the requisite intent to violate the statute and regulations. He claims that his sole purpose in transmitting the form containing the Creed Declaration was to secure a trademark registration for his client, and that nothing he did “either furnished any information or in any way had anything to do with any boycott.” The purpose of the Declaration, he asserts, was “not to derive information or knowledge, but merely to exclude [those] unworthy” to obtain a trademark registration.
We disagree that Meyer’s actions fell outside of the regulatory prohibition. Although an individual does not violate section 369.2(d) if he takes a prohibited action inadvertently, see 15 C.F.R. § 369.1(e)(3), the regulations expressly state that an individual who does an act “[knowing] that such action was required or requested for boycott reasons” will be deemed to have acted “with intent to comply with an unsanctioned foreign boycott.” Id. at § 369.1(e)(6). The regulations spell out the significance of the intent requirement:
(4) Intent in this context means the reason or purpose for one’s behavior. It does not mean that one has to agree with the boycott in question or desire that it succeed or that it be furthered or supported. But it does mean that the reason why a particular prohibited action was taken must be established.
*218(5) Reason or purpose can be proved by circumstantial evidence. For example, if a person receives a request to supply certain boycott information, the furnishing of which is prohibited by this Part, and he knowingly supplies that information in response, he clearly intends to comply with that boycott request. It is irrelevant that he may disagree with or object to the boycott itself. Information will be deemed to be furnished with the requisite intent if the person furnishing the information knows that it was sought for boycott purposes.
15 C.F.R. § 369.1(e)(4), (5). Included in the regulations are “Examples of ‘Intent,’ ” one of which resembles the circumstances of this case:
(viii) A, a U.S. chemical manufacturer, receives a “boycott questionnaire” from boycotting country Y asking, among other things, whether A has any plants located in boycotted country X. A, which has never supported Y’s boycott of X, responds to Y’s questionnaire, indicating affirmatively that it does have plants in X and that it intends to continue to have plants in X.
A’s responding to Y’s questionnaire is deemed to be action with intent to comply with Y’s boycott, because A knows that the questionnaire is boycott-related. It is irrelevant that A does not also wish to support Y’s boycott.
In addition, an example in the section of the regulations discussing what it means to furnish information about business relationships is strikingly similar to this case, and illustrates that appellant’s completion of the Creed Declaration was prohibited.
(xvii) U.S. company A, a manufacturer of certain patented products, desires to register its patents in boycotting country Y. A receives a power of attorney form required to register its patents. The form contains a question regarding A’s business relationships with or in boycotted country X. A has no business relationships with X and knows or has reason to know that the information is sought for boycott reasons.
A may not answer the question, because A would be furnishing information about its business relationships with or in a boycotted country.
15 C.F.R. § 369.2(d).
There is no doubt that Meyer knew that the Creed Declaration was boycott-related. The document expressly asked for a declaration that the company had no relationship with Israel that would “contradict ... boycott principles.” If he somehow failed to notice the language on the form when he received it, his Virginia associate’s letter explaining the State Department’s refusal to authenticate the form certainly brought the boycott issue directly to his attention. Indeed, when appellant wrote to his client in April 1978, he referred to the “boycott provisions” in the document.
In light of Meyer’s obvious awareness of the Creed Declaration, appellant can not contend that he inadvertently violated the regulations when he arranged for completion of the form and transmitted it, thus fulfilling Saudi Arabia’s boycott requirements. Instead, appellant emphasizes the district court’s finding “that at no time did he consciously intend to violate the laws of the United States or any applicable regulations established by the commerce department.” We find no fault with this conclusion, but — as the district court recognized — it does not help appellant. The maxim that ignorance of the law is no excuse is fully applicable here. Appellant sent the application form to Saudi Arabian officials with full awareness that it contained a signed declaration that his client did no business with Israel. In so doing, he intentionally complied with Saudi Arabia’s boycott of Israel. That he had no intent to break the law does not erase the fact that he did so.2
*219We touch briefly on appellant’s other arguments. He suggests that the revised regulations that went into effect in 1978 should not apply to him because he received the trademark application form and began processing it before that time. Most of Meyer’s efforts to authenticate and submit the document occurred in 1978, however, and he therefore violated the new regulations.
As to the reporting requirement, the Administrative Law Judge found a violation in Meyer’s failure to report the original receipt of the form in December 1977. At that time, the reporting regulation applied to exporters and related service organizations. According to the regulation, “related service organization^]” include, but are not limited to, banks, insurers, freight forwarders, and shipping companies. 15 C.F.R. § 369.4. The AU concluded that the language is broad enough to include a lawyer assisting a client in registering a trademark, and we agree. Appellant’s client sought trademark protection in Saudi Arabia in preparation for selling products there, and appellant’s function was, in essence, to facilitate the export of his client’s goods by arranging for the registration of the company’s trademark. This was sufficient to bring him within the regulation.
Appellant also claims that he received inadequate notice of the regulations. He particularly criticizes the State Department for failing to warn him, through his Virginia associate, that he would be subject to sanctions if he pursued his attempt to file the application for a trademark registration. The government properly published these regulations in the Federal Register in January 1978, however, and appellant has suggested no reason why the government had any obligation to provide particularized notice to him. In fact, the State Department’s response when it declined to authenticate the application form arguably put appellant on notice that he should look into the law “prohibit[ing] U.S. persons from providing certain boycott information.” 3
Finally, we find no merit in appellant’s argument that applications for trademark registration are not covered by the statute and regulations at issue here.
AFFIRMED.
. The statute and regulations involved in this case underwent changes during the period in which appellant was attempting to complete and verify the trademark application form. Until June 22, 1977, the relevant provision of the Export Administration Act provided only that it was United States policy "to encourage and request” certain domestic businesses to refuse to take any action that would further or support a boycott imposed on a country friendly to the United States. 50 U.S.C.App. § 2402(5)(B). The statute was then amended to direct the President to issue regulations prohibiting any United States person from taking such actions. 50 U.S.C.App. § 2403-1a(a)(1)(D).
In compliance with the amended act, new regulations went into effect on January 18, 1978 expressly prohibiting any United States person from "furnish[ing] or knowingly agree[ing] to furnish information concerning his or any other person's past, present or proposed business relationships ... with or in a boycotted country" when those actions were taken with the intent described in the text above. 15 C.F.R. § 369.2(d)(1), (5).
The reporting requirement was changed on August 1, 1978, extending coverage to any United States person. Before that date, only exporters and "related service organization[s]" were required to report requests for boycott-related information.
Our references and citations are to the statute and regulations as they existed in January 1978 including, with regard to the reporting requirement, the regulation in effect before August 1, 1978.
. Appellant does not appear to contend that the interpretation of intent contained in the regulations is inconsistent with either the statutory language or Congress’ intent in enacting the legislation. To the extent his brief could be viewed as making such an argument, we reject it. See Briggs & Stratton Corp. v. Baldrige, 539 F.Supp. 1307, 1312-14 (E.D.Wis.1982), aff’d, 728 F.2d 915 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826, 105 S.Ct. 105, 83 L.Ed.2d 50 (1984).
*219We note, in response to the dissent, our view that subsection (3) simply states the limitation that the statute and regulations do not apply to inadvertent actions in compliance with a boycott. We believe that subsection (5) and the "Examples of ‘Intent’ ” demonstrate that the intent requirement is met so long as the actor complies with a request for information with knowledge that the request is boycott-related. We therefore disagree that the principle of Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 105 S.Ct. 2084, 85 L.Ed.2d 434 (1985) is applicable here.
. We recognize that appellant’s associate in Virginia did not send the State Department’s letter to him, but the associate did alert appellant to a boycott-related problem. At least the decision not to pursue the issue further — if not also the neglect of his associate — is attributable to appellant.