concurring:
While I agree with the holding of the majority that Kelly did not lose his entitlement to annual parole review on his original sentence under Mont.Admin.Reg. (“MAR”) § 20.25.401(8) by virtue of his being sentenced to a second prison term for escape, I write separately to note that the majority miscalculates Kelly’s parole eligibility with respect to his second (escape) sentence.
While the majority reads the term “completed” in MAR § 20.25.304(3) to mean “complete one’s term of legal custody,” they do not remain true to their own definition. The majority has this to say about Kelly’s parole eligibility with respect to his second sentence:
The Board could condition the parole on his original sentence subject to Kelly serving the minimum sentence on the second (escape) sentence, and later parole him on the second sentence (which now would be converted to a concurrent *206sentence by reason of the parole on the original sentence) after the minimum time on that sentence has been served.
This passage implies that Kelly could be considered for parole on his second sentence before completing his term of legal custody on the original sentence — a proposition squarely at odds with the majority’s earlier interpretation of MAR § 20.25.304(3)’s completion requirement. In effect, the majority approach proves too generous to Montana prisoners because it reads out MAR § 20.25.304(3)’s completion requirement, thus permitting them to become parole-eligible on their second sentences prior to fully completing their original terms.
The majority relies on Herman v. Powell, 139 Mont. 583, 367 P.2d 553 (1961), as a guide to calculating the parole eligibility of prisoners serving consecutive sentences. Herman, however, represents a factually distinct situation from that of Kelly. Petitioner Herman, while serving the first month of a five year sentence, tried unsuccessfully to escape from Montana State Prison. He received a one year sentence for his efforts, this second sentence to be served consecutively to his original sentence. Herman was subsequently conditionally paroled on the original sentence; five months later, after serving the minimum portion on his escape sentence,1 he was paroled on this escape sentence and allowed to serve the remainder of his sentences outside prison. Thus, the Herman rule for calculating parole eligibility of prisoners serving consecutive sentences holds that prisoners become parole-eligible (1) with respect to their original sentences, after serving the statutory minimum on their original sentences, and (2) with respect to their second sentences, after serv-mg the statutory minimum on that second sentence in addition to the minimum time required on the original sentence. See Herman, 367 P.2d at 555; see also Taylor v. Risley, 210 Mont. 356, 684 P.2d 1118, 1119 (1984) (affirming Herman calculation rule).
The Herman rule, however, is factually limited to circumstances in which the prisoner receives an additional sentence prior to appearing before the Board for an initial parole hearing. Since Herman escaped before his initial parole hearing, his parole eligibility on his second sentence was thus governed by the precursor to subsection 2 of MAR § 20.25.304 which does not require that prisoners “complete” their original sentences before receiving consideration for parole on their second sentences.2 Kelly, in contrast, escaped from prison after receiving his parole hearing and his eligibility for parole on his second sentence thus falls under the spell of subsection 3 of MAR § 20.25.304. Thus, Herman provides no support for the majority’s method of parole calculation.
The appropriate method of calculating Kelly’s parole eligibility requires a sensitivity to the interplay between MAR § 20.25.304(3) and the related merger provision of Mont.Code Ann. (“MCA”) § 46-18-401. Kelly may begin accruing prison time on his second sentence which is applicable toward MCA § 46-23-201’s minimum time requirement for parole eligibility once he has either (1) served his full term on the original sentence, or (2) been granted parole with respect to the original sentence, whichever occurs sooner. See MCA § 46-18-401(5). The merger of sentences provision in MCA § 46-18-401(5) comes *207into play when (if ever) Kelly is actually granted parole on his original sentence.
Should Kelly be conditionally released on parole on his original sentence, pursuant to MCA § 46-18-401(5), his four year escape sentence will begin to run concurrently and expire along with his original sentence; Kelly’s conditional release triggers the “clock” on the second sentence so that he can then begin serving time on that sentence.3 Yet consistent with the requirements of MAR § 20.25.304(3), Kelly should receive no parole consideration on his second sentence until his original sentence has been completed to its full term and he has served the minimum time required — one-quarter of his 4 year escape sentence less any good time allowance — on his second sentence.
. Under then-existing Montana statutes governing parole eligibility, Herman became eligible for parole on his original sentence after serving one-quarter of his full term. See Herman, 367 P.2d at 555 (citing R.C.M. § 94-9832 (1947)). Like Herman, Kelly also received parole consideration prior to completing the full term on his original sentence. Under current Montana law, prisoners designated as "nondangerous” offenders, such as Kelly, may become parole eligible after serving a minimum one-quarter portion (less good time allowance) of their sentences. See MCA § 46-23-201(l)(a).
. MAR § 20.25.304(2) provides that
(i]f an inmate receives an additional sentence after he has been received at the institution but before his appearance before the board for consideration, his sentences will be combined automatically for parole and [sic] consideration purposes, unless the court orders otherwise.
. This simultaneous release on parole with respect to the original sentence and commencement of the prison term with respect to the second sentence represents the merger feature of MCA § 46-18-401(5).