James Lee Hartley appeals from a final judgment entered in the District Court for the Western District of Missouri affirming the orders of the Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Missouri. The Bankruptcy Court held that a $1,000,000 debt arising from a judgment against Hartley for the personal injury of Rickey D. Jones is nondischargeable in bankruptcy pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). 75 B.R. 165. For reversal, Hartley argues that the § 523(a)(6) exception to discharge does not apply to him because he did not intend to injure Jones. For the reasons discussed below, we reverse the decision of the district court.
On October 11, 1984, Jones was working in the basement of Shade Tree Auto Parts and Tire Service Store, Kansas City, Mis*395souri, of which Hartley was an owner. At Hartley’s direction, Jones was cleaning and painting tires with a gasoline mixture. Highly flammable fumes accumulated in the poorly ventilated basement. Hartley threw a firecracker into the basement, as a joke, intending only to startle Jones. Sparks from the firecracker caused an explosion and fire, and Jones was severely burned and permanently scarred.
Jones filed a personal injury suit against Hartley on January 25, 1985. On November 3,1986, Hartley filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition listing among his debts Jones’ claim against him for $1,000,000. Subsequently the bankruptcy court held that the debt is nondischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). That decision was affirmed by the district court. This appeal followed.
Exception to Discharge
Section 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code provides:
A discharge under section 727 ... of this title does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt ... for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the property of another entity-
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). Hartley argues that the $1,000,000 debt is dischargeable because he did not intend to injure Jones when he threw the firecracker into the basement. Jones argues that the debt is nondischargeable because Hartley became responsible for all foreseeable consequences of his deliberate act.
Jones’ argument is a proper analysis for tort liability. However, the tort standard of liability is not the same as the standard used to determine whether a debt is nondis-chargeable under § 523(a)(6). The Report of the House Judiciary Committee on the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, defines “willful” as it is used in the bankruptcy context:
Under this paragraph, “willful” means deliberate or intentional. To the extent that Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473 [24 S.Ct. 505, 48 L.Ed. 754] (1902), held that a looser standard is intended, and to the extent that other cases have relied on Tinker to apply a “reckless disregard” standard, they are overruled.
H.R.Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 365, reprinted in 1978 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 5787, 6320-21. As the statute was written by Congress, it is the injury to the creditor which must have been intentional — not the action of the debtor which caused the accident.
This interpretation is supported by cases from this court. Cassidy v. Minihan, 794 F.2d 340 (8th Cir.1986) (Cassidy), held that § 523(a)(6) is only intended to bar discharge of debts arising from intentionally inflicted injuries. In Cassidy, the debtor sought discharge of a debt arising from an automobile accident. At the time of the accident the debtor was driving under the influence of alcohol. His car crossed the center line causing the accident which resulted in injuries to the creditor. Cassidy affirmed the decision of the district court which held the debt dischargeable because the debtor’s conduct was at most reckless disregard for the risks involved and not intended to injure anyone. Id. at 342. See also In re Long, 774 F.2d 875, 882 (8th Cir.1985) (debtor who willfully breaches a security agreement is not precluded from discharge of the debt unless he or she acted intending to harm interests of the creditor).
In the instant case there is simply no proof that Hartley threw the firecracker into the basement intending to cause the explosion and fire that injured Jones. Therefore, § 523(a)(6) does not preclude Hartley from discharge of this debt.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the district court.