dissenting.
As an appellate court, we generally do not consider nonjurisdictional issues raised for the first time on appeal. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120, 96 S.Ct. 2868, 2877, 49 L.Ed.2d 826 (1976); Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1016 (8th Cir.1988); United States ex rel. Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux Community v. Pan Am. Management Co., 789 F.2d 632, 635-36 (8th Cir.1986). This is not an absolute rule, however, and it is subject to our “prudence and discretion.” Struempler v. Bowen, 822 F.2d 40, 42 (8th Cir.1987). When the unraised issue is purely one of law, we may exercise our discretion to consider it on appeal, but then only in “exceptional cases * * * [in which] injustice might otherwise result.” Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 557, 61 S.Ct. 719, 721, 85 L.Ed. 1037 (1941); see Lattimore v. Oman Constr., 868 F.2d 437, 439 (11th Cir.1989) (per curiam); Hegg v. United States, 817 F.2d 1328, 1330 n. 2 (8th Cir.1987); Zunamon v. Brown, 418 F.2d 883, 888 (8th Cir.1969). In addition, we may resolve an issue that was neither raised nor ruled on in the district court when “the proper resolution is beyond any doubt.” Singleton, 428 U.S. at 121, 96 S.Ct. at 2877; see Sanders v. Clemco Indus., 823 F.2d 214, 217 (8th Cir.1987). Our discretion in addressing new issues must be carefully exercised, of course, lest the exceptions swallow up the general rule disfavoring review. Fairness to the district court is also a significant consideraton. See Struempler, 822 F.2d at 42. In my view, none of these principles justifies the court’s decision in this case. Thus, I dissent.
The government’s motion for summary judgment was premised on its contention that the release Cleland signed operated as a general release, fully extinguishing the United States’ liability. Similarly, Cle-land’s cross-motion for partial summary judgment sought relief based only on her legal argument that the release’s language did not relieve the United States of liability. These issue-formulating motions did not contain the slightest hint of a contention that the executrix “lacked authority under South Dakota [probate] law to release any party other than Largent and Feedlots.” Ante at 519.
At the hearing on the cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court expressed its view that the issues “[were] very clear,” Joint App. at 139, and would “be resolved by the application of the South Dakota Uniform Contribution Among Tort-Feasor[s] Act,” id. at 140. Cleland’s counsel agreed, id., and asserted his client’s position that the release was “not a general release,” id. at 152. The district court issued an oral ruling at the close of the hearing, which it later adopted in a written order dismissing the case against the United States. That ruling focused exclusively on the issues presented by the parties in their motions and arguments: whether the release Cleland signed was a general release and, if it was, the scope of that general release among the tort-feasors in this case. See id. at 160-67. The court recognizes, and I completely agree, that the district court correctly ruled against Cleland on this issue. See ante at 519.
At no time did Cleland suggest to the district court that its ruling was flawed or that the executrix’s authority to sign a general release was limited by an order of the state probate court. Cleland’s failure to do so is not the product of circumstances beyond her control. She was fully aware of the events leading up to her signing the release and of a potential claim against the United States. Cleland offers no excuse of *524any kind for not presenting the issue below, and the district court was not obligated to search the record for unraised issues of significance. See Lazzara v. Howard A. Esser, Inc., 802 F.2d 260, 268 (7th Cir.1986). Merely because Cleland chose to argue the issue on appeal does not permit us to excuse her failure to raise the argument in the district court.
We may be sensitive to the significant consequences Cleland must face as a result of signing the general release. Even so, sympathetic facts do not alone justify deviating from our general rule requiring reversible errors to be raised in the district court. See Gregory v. Honeywell, Inc., 835 F.2d 181, 182, 183-84 (8th Cir.1987) (seriously burned plaintiff barred from raising issue regarding tolling of statute of limitations when raised for first time on appeal). Because I believe the events surrounding Cleland’s failure to raise this issue do not constitute exceptional circumstances, our refusal to consider the issue will not result in “a plain miscarriage of justice,” Hormel, 312 U.S. at 558, 61 S.Ct. at 722.
Apart from the lack of injustice, the court’s decision to take up this previously unraised issue is made even more troublesome here because the issue implicates undecided questions of South Dakota law. See ante at 521. I cannot imagine we will reverse the district court’s ruling by delivering a blind-side blow on this aspect of the case solely on the strength of our own predictive pronouncements about unraised questions of South Dakota law. Indeed, applying the general rule against considering new issues on appeal “is particularly appropriate * * * [when] the issue * * * is not clearly resolved under existing [state] law.” Zunamon, 418 F.2d at 888. In those circumstances, the district court is in the best position to interpret state law and should be given the first opportunity to consider the question. See id.
I can only speculate, but the court apparently passes off these concerns by assuming its ruling involves a pure question of state law for which the pertinent factual record is fully developed. See Hegg, 817 F.2d at 1330 n. 2; Wright v. Newman, 735 F.2d 1073, 1076 (8th Cir.1984). The record, however, contains critical factual deficiencies that undercut either of those assumptions.
Cleland undeniably sought court authority to settle claims with Largent and Feedlots. Joint App. at 66-68. Her adult children consented to the settlement. See id. at 107-10; see also S.D.Codified Laws § 21-5-6 (1984 Rev.) (“If all the statutory beneficiaries are of full age and competent and consent in writing to the proposed settlement, the [settlement] may be made at any time, before or after suit, without the consent of [the] court.”). The probate court then approved settlement of those claims in extremely broad language. See Joint App. at 69 (“[T]he settlement made by the [e]xecutrix * * * with * * * Lar-gent * * * and * * * Feedlots * * * for any and all claims, both known and unknown[,] arising out of the death of [Cle-land’s former husband], [is] approved, confirmed[,] and allowed.”). Cleland signed the general release, which necessarily accomplished the probate court’s settlement directive, a few days later.
The record fails to demonstrate, however, whether the probate court reviewed the general release document before approving the settlement. Indeed, Cleland’s chronological recitation of the historical, undisputed facts in this case sheds no light on whether the release was or was not presented to the probate court when the settlement was approved. Nor did counsel at oral argument (apart from Cleland’s counsel’s recollection at the podium, which is not evidence) provide definitive answers that would permit us to bypass the requirement of a developed factual record on this pivotal question.
This undetermined fact is significant because if the court actually saw the release Cleland later signed, the court knew the release was a general release and approved it in that form. If the court did not see the general release, the broad language in its order approving the settlement suggests the court was aware of the interests of the settling parties in extinguishing the com*525mon liability of all joint tort-feasors as a prerequisite to seeking contribution. See S.D.Codified Laws § 15-8-14 (1984 Rev.). For these reasons, the state law rule the court seeks to decree today is hardly “clear,” ante at 520, and the factual record necessary for its complete determination is in any event deficient, see St. Louis Developmental Disabilities Treatment Center Parents’ Ass’n v. Mallory, 767 F.2d 518, 521 (8th Cir.1985). Thus, the issue made dispositive by the court is neither purely one of law, see Hegg, 817 F.2d at 1330 n. 2, nor “beyond any doubt,” Singleton, 428 U.S. at 121, 96 S.Ct. at 2877; see Sanders, 823 F.2d at 217.
The uncertainty of the proper result under South Dakota law based on the record in this case further underscores the need to refrain from considering an unraised issue on which we are not favored by the local district court’s ruling. See Zunamon, 418 F.2d at 888. To nevertheless reverse is not only decidedly unfair to the district court and at odds with our appellate role in this dispute, but it also takes the United States by complete surprise and decides a case on an issue “upon which [the United States has] had no opportunity to introduce evidence,” Hormel, 312 U.S. at 556, 61 S.Ct. at 721.
In sum, our task is evenhandedly to resolve issues that have been aired in the district court and not to take up the sword of advocacy to generate a particular result for any given litigant. I believe the applicable rules of appellate review compel us to affirm the district court on the state law issue that is before us to decide. I thus dissent.