Gene Smith v. Lanson Newsome and Michael Bowers, Danny Smith v. Lansome Newsome and Attorney General for the State of Georgia

JOHNSON, Circuit Judge,

concurs in judgment:

Although I concur in the ultimate disposition of the issues presented in this case, I write separately to emphasize that the denial of relief should not be interpreted as narrowing the scope or availability of the writ of habeas corpus to relieve state prison inmates from confinement imposed in violation of the dictates of the Constitution.

Chief Justice Hughes once wrote for a unanimous Court, “[i]t must never be forgotten that the writ of habeas corpus is the precious safeguard of personal liberty and there is no higher duty than to maintain it unimpaired.” Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, 26, 59 S.Ct. 442, 446, 83 L.Ed. 455 (1939). This principle is as true today as it was in 1939. Recent decisions emphasize the propriety and necessity of federal collateral review of the constitutionality of state confinement or restrictions on the liberty of an individual. See Harris v. Reed, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 1038, 1044, 103 L.Ed.2d 308 (1989) (extending “plain statement” rule of Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983), to habeas cases); Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 131, 107 S.Ct. 1671, 1673, 95 L.Ed.2d 119 (1987) (reaffirming that “the failure to exhaust state remedies does not deprive an appellate court of jurisdiction to consider the merits of a habeas corpus application.”); Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 378, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 2585, 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986) (refusing to extend Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976), to Sixth Amendment habeas claims because “collateral review will frequently be the only *1469means through which an accused can effectuate the right to counsel”); Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 118, 106 S.Ct. 445, 454, 88 L.Ed.2d 405 (1985) (refusing to extend presumption of correctness under 28 U.S.C. A. § 2254(d) to state court conclusions on voluntariness of confessions because “independent federal review has traditionally played an important parallel role in protecting the rights at stake when the prosecution secures a conviction through the defendant’s own admissions”).

Federalism concerns make us mindful of important state interests presented in the habeas context, see Harris, 109 S.Ct. at 1049, and we recognize the need for finality. See Teague v. Lane, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989). However, our primary concern is with protecting the constitutional rights of the individual petitioner. See Miller, 474 U.S. at 117— 18, 106 S.Ct. at 453-54. I cannot join in language which suggests that federal review of petitions for habeas corpus brought by individuals incarcerated in state prisons is somehow inappropriate, troublesome, or less than “the precious safeguard of personal liberty.”