Concurring.
I join in the court’s holding that Lewis is entitled to good time credit earned after the district court’s 1982 finding that he could not benefit from YCA treatment during service of the remainder of his original YCA sentence. I further join in the court’s holding that Lewis is entitled to no relief with respect to the period preceding that finding. I write separately to record my disagreement with the suggestion of the majority and of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in the Scott and Johnson cases that a failure on the part of the Bureau of Prisons to honor its statutory mandate regarding segregation and rehabilitation for youthful offenders may alone provide justification for materially altering the terms and conditions of a validly imposed sentence. I would deny relief to Lewis with respect to the period preceding the 1982 sentencing even if he had come to us with “clean hands” and had been able to show that the Bureau of Prisons, during that period, elected not to live up to its duty to provide segregation from adult inmates.
In Ralston v. Robinson, 454 U.S. 201, 102 S.Ct. 233, 70 L.Ed.2d 345 (1981), the respondent Robinson had originally been sentenced to a ten-year term of imprisonment under the YCA. Before completing the service of that sentence, he was convicted of assaulting a federal officer and was sentenced to an additional 66 months of incarceration to run consecutive to the YCA sentence. The second sentencing judge found that the respondent would derive no further benefit from treatment under the provisions of the YCA and declined to sentence under that Act. After this second sentence, the Bureau of Prisons classified Robinson as an adult offender pursuant to a written policy that limited the definition of a “YCA inmate” to any inmate sentenced under the YCA “who is not also sentenced to a concurrent or consecutive adult term, whether state or federal.” 454 U.S. at 205; 102 S.Ct. at 237; 70 L.Ed.2d 345.
Robinson filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus contending that he should be treated as a YCA inmate throughout the remainder of his YCA sentence. As a first line of defense, Robinson’s custodian, Ral-ston, asserted that the YCA gives the Bureau of Prisons authority to determine that a YCA offender will not benefit from further YCA treatment. The Supreme Court rejected this “extraordinarily broad interpretation” of the YCA, as well as “any interpretation that would grant the Bureau independent authority to deny an offender the treatment and segregation from adults that a sentencing court mandates.” 454 U.S. at 211; 102 S.Ct. at 240; 70 L.Ed.2d 345.
As a second line of defense, Ralston argued that the YCA implicitly authorizes a second sentencing court to make a determination that the defendant will receive no benefit from YCA treatment during the remainder of the original sentence and that once such a determination has been made, the Bureau no longer has a duty to provide the treatment and segregation required by the YCA. The Supreme Court concluded that while “Congress apparently did not consider this specific problem,” the “history and structure of the YCA ... demonstrate Congress’ intent that a court — but not prison officials — may require a youth offender to serve the remainder of a YCA sentence as an adult after the offender has received a consecutive adult term.” 454 U.S. at 214; 102 S.Ct. at 242; 70 L.Ed.2d. 345. Since the Court also concluded that the second sentencing judge had made a sufficiently clear finding that no benefit would be derived from YCA treatment during the remainder of the YCA sentence, it denied relief to Ralston.
In Ralston, the Supreme Court held only that one in Robinson’s position need not be afforded YCA rehabilitative treatment and segregation. The issue of whether such an inmate is entitled to good time credit was not before the Court. However, the approach utilized by the Court in Ralston leads me to the conclusion that an inmate in this position is entitled to good time credit following a judicial determination of “no further benefit.”
*725Since Congress did not think about the situation in which an inmate serving a YCA sentence is subsequently convicted of another crime, it had no specific intent with respect to whether good time credit should be granted following a “no benefit” determination by the second sentencing judge. Accordingly, as in Ralston, the courts must fill this interstice using the history, structure, and purpose of the YCA and the good time statute as guides for determining what alternative Congress would have chosen had it foreseen this situation.
As the Court stressed in Ralston, the YCA adopts a two-track statutory scheme; a judge sentencing a youthful offender can elect to sentence him or her either under the YCA or under the applicable adult statute. If the latter alternative is chosen, all of the rules governing adult sentences, including those found in the good time statute, apply. The Ralston Court further found that if Congress had thought of the situation involving a second conviction, it would have wanted the second judge to be authorized to revisit the decision between the two tracks in light of changed circumstances. By the same token, when the second judge elects the second track and the youthful offender thereafter is treated as an adult inmate, I believe Congress would want good time credit to be awarded. Further, I believe that the rationale for awarding good time credits counsels in favor of making such an award. If the incentive for good behavior provided to all other inmates in an institution is denied to a former YCA inmate solely because of his or her prior status, one creates a potential threat to the institutional security and order that the good time statute was designed to promote.
Accordingly, I would hold that Lewis is entitled to adult good time credit from the time of his 1982 sentencing on the second offense.1 My holding would be limited, however, to those situations in which a second sentencing judge exercises the statutory authority recognized in Ralston and makes a “no further benefit” determination. It follows that I would not award Lewis good time credit for any period before the 1982 sentencing even if he had not assaulted a prison guard and even if he were able to demonstrate that the Bureau of Prisons, during that period, elected not to live up to its duty to provide segregation from adult inmates. It would fly in the face of Ralston to hold that such a defalcation on the part of the Bureau would alone justify a district court, through an exercise of equitable discretion or otherwise, in transforming a sentence involving no good time credit into one that can be reduced by such credit.2
. Both parties acknowledge that the second sentencing judge made a finding that Lewis would received no benefit from serving the remainder of this YCA sentence as a YCA inmate. Lewis litigated that issue in a post-conviction relief proceeding and lost. Supp.App. 46-48.
. I agree with the majority that once Lewis seeks and is granted good time credit as an adult inmate, he will be an adult inmate for all purposes and will not be entitled to any benefit as a youthful offender under the YCA.