Appellant, Keith Buchannon, convicted of possession of eleven ounces of cocaine (street value $11,000 to $22,000) with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1),1 contends that the drugs found on his person and in a bag referred to as his child’s diaper bag were unlawfully seized and inadmissible as evidence. We affirm.
The circumstances of the case are somewhat unusual. Enforcement officers were conducting surveillance of the residence of one Darnell Parker in St. Louis while colleagues were obtaining a search warrant for the premises. There was ample probable cause for issuance of the warrant, but nothing implicating Buchannon until he was seen entering the house, carrying a baby in his arms and a bag referred to as a diaper bag draped over his shoulder. Soon thereafter he left the house carrying the baby and the bag and drove off in his car. Leaving with him were Parker, Mrs. Parker, and another adult male. They drove off in another car, which the Buchannon vehicle followed. This information was radioed to the officer in charge, who was then en route with the search warrant. He directed that the two cars be stopped and the occupants advised of the search warrant.
Officer Tony Coleman, of the St. Louis County Police, who was aiding the federal agents in the pursuit of the two cars, noticed appellant leaning away from the steering wheel and making movements toward the passenger side of Buchannon’s car. Coleman flashed his red light and appellant stopped his car and got out. Coleman directed him to pull into a less busy parking lot, where appellant again got out of his car and approached the officer. Coleman advised him of the search warrant and said he would “pat down” the appellant, a large man, as a usual safety precaution. During this process Coleman felt a hard object (it turned out to be a compact disc) and when he put his hand in appellant’s overcoat pocket he also found two plastic baggies of cocaine. Buchannon was then placed under arrest.
Later at the First Precinct station the arresting officer advised drug agent Voll-mar of the plastic bags and Yollmar took them from appellant’s coat and placed him in a holding cell.
At the station Mrs. Parker, identifying herself as the baby’s godmother, was caring for appellant’s baby. When the baby cried, Mrs. Parker asked for the diaper bag in order to change the baby’s diaper. Voll-mar first made a security check of the bag and found nine plastic bags of cocaine packaged like those from Buchannon’s pocket.
As well summarized in Appellants Brief (p. 13) his argument is
that the seizure of the Defendant made by a patrol officer who did not know him, who had no warrant for his arrest, who had never seen the man before, who did not observe him commit any violations or crimes and stopped him or seized him at the sole request of a DEA agent while in traffic amounted to an arrest without probable cause. Further, Defendant argues that the detention was followed immediately by a pat down when there were no exigent circumstances warranting this violation of the law.
Similarly with respect to the nine ounces of cocaine from the diaper bag he contends that failure to obtain a search warrant was a gross violation of his rights and “that the crying of a baby and the need for a diaper was not an exigent circumstance warranting a violation of Defen*1067dant’s constitutional rights to be secure in his effects.” 2
But the arresting officer’s conduct is not to be judged in isolation. Its propriety is to be determined in view of the totality of circumstances known to the law enforcement officers as a group at the time. U.S. v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 231, 105 S.Ct. 675, 681, 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985); U.S. v. Reed, 733 F.2d 492, 502 (8th Cir.1984).3 Officer Coleman was simply an additional ministerial agent assisting in Vollmar’s investigation. There was probable cause to detain appellant as a purchaser from Parker, a known seller. His visit to the house, carrying a bag and departing a short time later, conformed to the patterns of the drug trade.
Moreover, the simultaneous departure from the house of the two vehicles as a caravan would justify a stop to maintain the status quo and ensure that the seller’s supply of drugs was not being moved to a new location. U.S. v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 235, 105 S.Ct. 675, 683, 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985); U.S. v. Eisenberg, 807 F.2d 1446, 1451 (8th Cir.1986).
Officer Coleman was justified in “patting down” Buchannon by the well-settled rule announced in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1881, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). Officer Coleman was alone and appellant was a larger man, wearing a long winter coat which might have concealed a weapon. A routine “frisk” was a prudent precaution. Coleman did not arrest appellant until after discovery of the cocaine (if this was not a “plain view” case it may be called a “plain feel” case). There is no requirement that Miranda rights warnings be read before making an arrest. Miranda requires the ceremony only before custodial interrogation. It does not prohibit arrest without admonition. Even if “he who runs may read,” an officer apprehending a fleeing felon may wisely save his breath for the chase and defer the Miranda ritual until ready to begin questioning the suspect at the station house.
Similarly, the security search of the “diaper bag” was reasonable and justified without a warrant. It would be insensitive to disregard the baby’s cries until going through the procedures for getting a search warrant. The circumstances were sufficiently “exigent” to satisfy the Terry standard. Moreover, it may convincingly4 be argued, as the appellee’s brief does (p. 14), that the search was justifiable as an inventory search [Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 107 S.Ct. 738, 741, 93 L.Ed.2d 739 (1987); Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 644-45, 103 S.Ct. 2605, 2608-09, 77 L.Ed.2d 65 (1983)] or as incident to arrest outside a motor vehicle [N.Y. v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 457, 460, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 2862, 2864, 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981); U.S. v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 2173, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982)].
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court is
AFFIRMED.
. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) reads, in pertinent part: it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or or intentionally—
(1) to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance.
.Appellants’ brief, pp. 13-14. Appellant also argues that it was error to deny appellant’s belated motion to strike a question on cross-examination “Isn’t it a fact that you paid $11,-000.00 for the cocaine carried in a maroon briefcase?” to which appellant answered in the negative. The Court gave a cautionary instruction that lawyer’s questions are not evidence. That was a sufficient curative precaution, even if the question was improper. Apparently when the search warrants were executed, $11,000.00 was discovered on the premises; and eleven ounces of cocaine had been found in appellant’s possession. The prosecutor was not just "fishing.” In any event, in view of appellant’s clear guilt, any error was harmless. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23-24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 827-28, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967).
. A recent Third Circuit case, Capone v. Marinelli, 868 F.2d 102, 104-105 (3rd Cir.1989), supports the conclusion that a police officer may act upon the basis of good faith reliance upon information received from other officers by means of modern technology. That case is a fortiori, since the charges against Capone were ultimately dropped, rather than resulting in conviction, as in the case at bar. Yet the Court held nonetheless that the arresting officers were protected by immunity.
. More tenuous and questionable is the appel-lee’s further argument of "consent” by Mrs. Parker as the basis of search. She did identify herself as the baby’s godmother, and did babysit at least once a week. See U.S. v. Baswell, 792 F.2d 755, 758-59 (8th Cir., 1986).